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II 
The Influence of Corporate Governance on Managers’ 
Opportunistic Behaviours prior to Leveraged Buyouts in the 
UK 
Abstract 
This research investigates the influence of corporate governance mechanisms 
on managers’ opportunistic behaviours prior to leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the 
UK. The UK is, after the US, the second largest LBO market in the world, where 
the total deal value of LBOs rose from £458.62 million in 1997 (the initial year 
of the sample period) to £817.12 million in 2011 (the end year of the sample 
period). This 15-year period covers a significant wave of LBO activity in the UK. 
This research extends previous studies of corporate governance and 
managerial opportunism by considering management leveraged buyouts 
(MBOs) and third-party LBOs separately, because managers’ incentives in 
each setting are different. Managers’ direct involvement in MBO transactions 
may lead to conflicts of interests between managers, who have an incentive to 
try to minimise the purchase price, and shareholders, who seek to maximise 
their selling price. In contrast, third-party LBOs are inherently more uncertain 
for managers’ long-term job security, which may serve to intensify managers’ 
incentives to engage in opportunistic activities to prevent takeovers.  
 
This research comprises three empirical studies, which are structured to 
compare third-party LBOs with MBOs in relation to: the influence of managerial 
interests on takeover resistance and bid premiums (empirical study 1); the 
relationship between accounting conservatism and corporate governance 
(empirical study 2); and the influence of board structures and board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums (empirical study 3).   
III 
 
The first empirical study finds that managerial share options are negatively 
related to the likelihood of takeover resistance in third-party LBOs, possibly 
because managers can accrue high returns from exercising options 
immediately after the buyout. However, as expected, managerial share options 
and the likelihood of bid resistance are positively related in MBOs. The research 
also finds that high levels of managerial share options reduce the size of 
takeover premiums in both MBOs and third-party LBOs. The research suggests 
that while managerial ownership is positively associated with takeover 
resistance and bid premiums in third-party LBOs, these variables are not 
significantly related in MBOs.   
 
The second empirical study finds that, during the year prior to the 
announcement of MBOs (year Y−1), managers engage in more conservative 
accounting, i.e. the asymmetric reporting of good and bad news, where bad 
news is disclosed faster than good news, possibly to reduce the perception of 
the firm’s value and thus depress their purchasing price. In order to identify the 
differences between accounting conservatism prior to MBOs and third-party 
LBOs, this study examines three years’ data preceding LBOs event. The 
research finds that managers engage in more conservative accounting in year 
Y−1 prior to MBOs than prior to third-party LBOs, but less conservative 
accounting in year Y−2. The research also finds a mean-reversion of 
managerial behaviours toward accounting conservatism precedes both types 
of LBOs. In particular, managerial behaviours shifted from less to more 
conservative prior to MBOs from year Y−2 to Y−1, but from more to less 
conservative preceding third-party LBOs from year Y−2 to Y−1 and year Y−3 to 
Y−1. In addition, this research suggests that the ownership characteristics and 
board characteristics have a greater impact on accounting conservatism in 
third-party LBO than in MBO firms.  
 
IV 
The investigation of the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs in the first empirical study suggested 
that board structures are not significantly related to takeover premiums in either 
case. However, the overall impact of the board on takeover premiums is not 
only determined by board structures but also by its effectiveness, which 
encapsulates directors’ qualifications, experiences, engagement, integrity and 
their ability to work together. Conflating board structures with its effectiveness 
can be misleading. Therefore, the third empirical study extends previous 
research on the effects of the board by investigating the impact of board 
structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBOs 
and MBOs. In particular, during the analysis, this study takes into account the 
potential for moderating or mediating relationships between board structures 
and board effectiveness. Moreover, this research extends previous studies by 
employing the degree of accounting conservatism as a new measure of board 
effectiveness. The findings suggest that board size has a moderating effect on 
the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs 
such that the relationship is more positive when board size is smaller. Moreover, 
the research finds that board effectiveness moderates the relationship between 
CEO duality and takeover premiums in MBOs such that the relationship is more 
negative when there is a higher level of board effectiveness. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1  Research Background and Motivation 
This thesis investigates the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours preceding leveraged buyout (LBO) 
transactions in the UK. A LBO is the acquisition of a company in which a publicly 
quoted company is purchased by private equity using a significant amount of 
debt (Fox and Marcus, 1992; Weir et al., 2005a). The UK is, after the US, the 
second largest leveraged buyout market of the world (Geddes, 2011; Nash, 
2011). Buyout activities tend to display ‘wave’ patterns as the number and deal 
values of LBOs tend to increase and decrease over periods of time following 
broad economic trends. The wave under observation, 1997–2011, is 
characterised by an increasing presence of private equity and debt financiers 
and the rapid growth in target size and total transaction value (Renneboog et 
al., 2007; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Amess and Wright, 2012; Weir et al., 
2013). When comparing this with the wave in the 1980s, during the years under 
study from 1997 to 2011 there were approximately 40 per cent of buyout deals 
belonging to third-party leveraged buyouts, which is much higher than in the 
1980s (12 per cent) (Thomson One Database). Moreover, the total deal value 
of leveraged buyouts rose from £458.62 million in 1997 to £817.12 million in 
2011 with a peak of £21.54 billion in 2006. As increasingly larger corporations 
were being targeted, the mean deal value rose from 57.33 million in 1997 to 
90.79 million in 2011 (see Table 3.7 in the Appendix). 
 
In a LBO, the acquiring group could be led by outside investors or by the target’s 
existing management team (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). 
Accordingly, leveraged deals are subdivided into third-party leveraged buyouts 
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(third-party LBOs) and management leveraged buyouts (MBO). Third-party 
LBOs are deals where the bidding group consists solely of institutional investors 
and private equity firms (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2013; Renneboog et al., 
2007). As third-party LBOs make managers’ long-term job security inherently 
more uncertain, they are arguably more likely to engage in opportunistic 
activities to try to avoid a takeover, e.g. by pushing up the share price and offer 
price (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006; Amess and Wright, 2012). By 
contrast, in an MBO, the target’s incumbent management is directly involved in 
the transaction, and seeks to purchase the firm possibly with the help of private 
equity funds (Weir and Wright, 2006; Fox and Marcus, 1992). Management’s 
direct involvement in MBO transactions may generate a conflict of interest 
between the firm’s managers, who have incentives to try to reduce the purchase 
price, and their shareholders, who seek to sell their shareholdings at a high 
price (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). Therefore, 
LBOs may create incentives for managers to alter their behaviours 
opportunistically. Buyouts thus become an ideal setting to examine the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on managerial behaviours. 
 
There is a call for future research to extend the study of buyouts in the UK 
market. For example, Campbell et al. (2015) argue that earning manipulation 
and LBOs are a worldwide concern that should be investigated. Future research 
into managers’ opportunistic behaviours “could expand the investigation of 
delisted firms outside of US incorporated firms, the US financial market, and 
US GAAP regulatory influence” (Campbell et al., 2015: 62). It would be 
interesting to investigate the incentives of earnings manipulation “imposed by 
different global regulatory groups, corporate structures, and 
investor/stockholder expectations” (Campbell et al., 2015: 62). Kawanishi et al. 
(2014: 11) argue that “companies not in MBOs must also be included in the 
sample using such techniques as a paired sample” to provide full understanding 
of shareholder wealth protection in buyout firms. Hafzalla (2009) suggests that 
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managerial incentives and their disclosure behaviours could be different in 
specific settings; future studies could provide more evidence on managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours in comparing MBOs with third-party LBOs. Therefore, 
this research explores the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours in UK third-party LBOs and MBOs. 
 
LBOs are an important tool to restructure corporations in global finance, and 
have been the subject of much academic interest (Weir et al., 2005a; 
Renneboog et al., 2007). Previous studies of LBOs have generally been based 
on the US market covering the 1980s (see Table 1.1). For example, Van de 
Gucht and Moore (1998) examine the reversal probabilities of LBOs that took 
place in the US during the period 1980–1992. They find that there is a high 
reversal probability of LBOs over the first seven or eight years following a typical 
LBO. Moreover, Halpern et al. (1999) focus on MBOs and third-party LBOs 
between 1981 and 1986 in the US market and find pre-firm performance is 
negatively related to takeover premiums but moderated by the levels of 
managerial ownership. They also suggest that buyout firms tend to have 
different levels of managerial ownership, performance and debt compared to 
non-buyout firms.  
 
In the UK, the buyout market developed from the late 1990s onwards. The UK 
buyout market has some specific characteristics that differ from the US market. 
For example, in the UK, LBOs have relatively fewer hostile takeovers, tend to 
involve less debt finance, focus more on target growth opportunities and are 
more commonly financed by privately placed mezzanine bonds rather than junk 
bonds (Renneboog et al., 2007; Toms and Wright, 2005). Hence, it is 
questionable to what extent the US findings can be generalised to a different 
governance and financial reporting regime in the UK (Renneboog et al., 2007).  
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Table 1.1 Previous studies of leveraged buyouts: post 1990s 
Authors Country 
Nature of 
transactions 
Findings 
Long and 
Ravenscraft 
(1993) 
US MBOs, LBOs LBOs lead to reductions of R&D expenditures 
Van de Gucht 
and Moore 
(1998) 
US LBOs 
The reversal probabilities of LBOs are found to 
increase over the first seven or eight years 
following a typical LBO 
Andrade and 
Kaplan (1998) 
US LBOs 
Financial distress has positive effects on firm 
value 
Halpern et al. 
(1999) 
US 
MBOs, third-
party LBOs, 
LBOs 
MBO firms display higher managerial 
ownership, poorer performance, greater use of 
debt and higher expenditures on taxes than 
companies that remain publicly quoted; third-
party LBO firms display lower managerial 
ownership, less use of debt and poorer 
performance than firms remain publicly quoted; 
the poorer the prior performance of the LBOs, 
the higher the takeover premiums but these are 
moderated by the levels of managerial 
ownership 
Desbrières and 
Schatt (2002) 
France MBOs 
French buyouts differ to the US and UK buyouts 
in two ways: a higher concentrated 
shareholding in the acquired firms before the 
buyouts and a lower debt level; MBO firms 
provide better returns on equity than their 
industry counterparts before buyout 
Begley et al. 
(2003) 
US MBOs 
Prior to MBOs, boards with more independent 
directors and higher compensated CEO tend to 
discourage earnings manipulation; managers 
are more likely to revise their bidding price 
upwards when the manipulation is most severe, 
and blockholders tend to put pressure on 
managers to make these revisions; downward 
earnings manipulation does not prevent 
managers from retaining control of the firm, but 
they tend to pay a higher premium 
Weir et al. 
(2005a) 
UK LBOs 
Buyout firms are more likely to have higher 
CEO ownership and institutional ownership, 
and CEO duality 
Weir et al. 
(2005b) 
UK 
MBOs, third-
party LBOs 
Buyout firms tend to have a perceived 
undervaluation prior to buyout; they have non-
optimal governance structures and higher 
board and institutional ownership 
Weir and 
Wright (2006) 
UK 
MBOs, MBIs1, 
LBOs 
MBOs have fewer non-executive directors, a 
greater incidence of duality and higher board 
shareholdings than traditional acquisitions of 
listed firms 
Renneboog et 
al. (2007) 
UK 
MBOs, MBIs, 
third-party 
LBOs 
Shareholder wealth gains in LBOs mainly 
associated with pre-buyout undervaluation of 
targets, incentive realignment and increased 
interest tax shields 
                                                             
1 MBIs: management leveraged buy-in (MBI) is a going private transaction where the equity may be 
largely held by new incoming managers and private equity financiers (Weir and Wright, 2006). 
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Nikoskelainen 
and Wright 
(2007) 
UK LBOs 
Increases in value and return characteristics of 
LBOs are positively related to corporate 
governance mechanisms, especially 
management’s equity share 
Kaplan and 
Strömberg 
(2009) 
US LBOs Private equity activity creates economic value 
Hafzalla (2009) US 
MBOs, third-
party LBOs 
Managers involved in MBOs selectively release 
negative disclosures before transactions; 
disclosure in MBO firms becomes significantly 
more pessimistic than in third-party LBO firms 
and performance-matched control sample 
De Maeseneire 
and Brinkhuis 
(2012) 
European LBOs 
Reputable private equity sponsors are more 
capable of obtaining high leverage for their 
target firms 
Weir et al. 
(2013) 
UK LBOs 
LBO firms have a significant improvement in 
financial health in the post-deal years relative to 
the year before buyout 
Mao and 
Renneboog 
(2015) 
UK 
MBOs, third-
party LBOs 
Managers in MBOs tend to engage in negative 
earnings management via both accrual and real 
earnings management 
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Furthermore, researchers have previously applied their studies in LBO and 
MBO settings (see Table 1.1). For instance, Weir et al. (2005a) analyse the 
corporate governance factors that affect LBO transactions and suggest that 
buyout firms are more likely to have higher CEO ownership, institutional 
ownership and CEO duality. Cotter and Peck (2001) and Nikoskelainen and 
Wright (2007) investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm performance in the LBO setting. They find that corporate governance 
mechanisms can facilitate shareholder wealth gains in LBO firms.  
 
Moreover, Desbrières and Schatt (2002) examine MBO firm performance and 
suggest that such firms could provide better returns on equity than their industry 
peers before MBOs. Renneboog et al. (2007) investigate the determinants of 
MBOs and third-party LBOs and find that pre-buyout undervaluation of target 
firms, realignment of incentives and increased interest tax shields are 
significantly related to shareholder wealth gains.  
 
Halpern et al. (1999), Weir et al. (2005b) and Weir and Wright (2006) study the 
corporate governance characteristics of MBO and third-party LBO firms. They 
suggest that MBO firms have fewer non-executive directors, a greater incidence 
of duality and higher board and institutional shareholdings than listed firms that 
involved in traditional acquisitions.  
 
Furthermore, Begley et al. (2003) examine managerial incentives and the 
effects of corporate governance on earnings management prior to MBOs. They 
find that a high proportion of independent directors and more highly 
compensated CEOs tend to discourage earnings manipulation prior to MBOs. 
Besides, managers may revise their bidding price upwards when manipulation 
is severe, and blockholders are likely to push managers to make these revisions. 
Hafzalla (2009) also examines managerial disclosure behaviours prior to MBOs. 
He finds that managers involved in MBOs tend to selectively release negative 
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information prior to a buyout. 
 
However, little attention has been given to managerial incentives and 
behaviours and shareholder wealth protection in MBOs in comparison with that 
in third-party LBOs. Typically, market undervaluation is one of the most 
significant characteristics for both third-party LBOs and MBOs. Management’s 
direct involvement in buyout transactions differentiates third-party LBOs from 
MBOs (Fox and Marcus, 1992; Weir et al., 2013; Weir and Wright, 2006). 
Compared with third-party LBOs, managers in MBOs are on both sides of the 
transaction. On the one hand, the target firm’s management is acting on behalf 
of shareholders to determine whether the buyout is in the interests of 
shareholders and to seek as high a purchase price as possible. On the other 
hand, managers are buyers who act in their own interests to reduce the 
purchase price (Lowenstein, 1985).  
 
In third-party LBOs, managers may gain financially from increases in the value 
of their shares, but may lose compensation, control and power if they are 
displaced after buyout (Bange and Mazzeo, 2004; Cotter and Zenner, 1994). 
Weir et al. (2005b) and Weir and Wright (2006) suggest that third-party LBO 
targets are likely to experience high undervaluation, which may intensify the 
incentives of outside buyers to make changes to firms’ management team after 
buyouts. Moreover, although the outside buyers may continue to hire the targets’ 
managers as they are more familiar with firms’ operation, the outside investors 
may re-sale the firms in the next few years (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b; 
Renneboog et al., 2007). Hence, prior to third-party LBOs, managers may have 
strong incentives to protect their long-term job security that may motivate them 
to engage in opportunistic activities, such as manipulating earnings upwards to 
avoid the firm being taken over, even though this is not always in the best 
interests of shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006; Amess 
and Wright, 2012). In the actual event of a takeover, while shareholders might 
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paradoxically benefit from an artificial overstatement of the firm, such earnings 
overstatements during the buyout period will eventually be reversed. This may 
result in a significant drop or an even worse loss in the future that is harmful to 
the long-term interests of shareholders (Hafzalla, 2009; He et al., 2010). As the 
prediction of third-party LBOs is more difficult than MBOs, shareholders are 
likely to be more prudent to avoid overpaying incompetent managers. Therefore, 
MBOs and third-party LBOs provide distinct settings to examine managers’ 
behaviours and shareholder wealth protection. 
 
Moreover, accounting conservatism usually indicates that managers have 
adopted prudent attitudes towards recognising economic gains than losses, so 
that compare with good news, bad news tends to be recognised timeliness 
(Basu, 1997). Accounting standards board (ASB) and financial accountant 
standards board (FASB) advocate conservatism and state that conservative 
accounting reporting is a prudent reaction to uncertainties and risks of business 
activities (FASB, 2010; ASB, 2000). Previous studies (e.g. Ball, 2001; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005; Watts, 2003a) suggest that under conservative accounting 
disclosure, managers are less likely to exert efforts to overstate earnings for the 
sake of their private benefits. As the overstatement will reverse eventually, 
conservative accounting is supposed to address the issues of limited horizons 
that protects the long-term interests of shareholders (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Watts, 2003a). However, due to the asymmetric 
recognition of economic gains and losses, conservative accounting indeed 
affect firm’s current value (Beekes et al., 2004; Begley et al., 2003). Within the 
rules, managers can choose the degree of accounting conservatism in practice. 
Their incentives are likely to be the main factors in affecting their behaviours 
towards accounting conservatism. Therefore, it is expected that managers may 
engage in different levels of accounting conservatism depending on whether 
they can participate in the buyout transactions. LBOs then provide unique 
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opportunities to examine managerial incentives and the mechanisms that 
managers might use to exploit the interests of shareholders. 
 
In addition, corporate governance mechanisms may play an important role in 
mitigating opportunistic behaviours by management; few prior studies have 
explored this issue in the leveraged buyout setting. Specifically, as discussed 
above, different types of leveraged buyout may provide different incentives for 
managers. Their behaviours in third-party LBOs tend to differ from those in 
MBOs. The effects of corporate governance mechanisms on opportunistic 
behaviours by management thus may be different in third-party LBOs as 
opposed to MBOs. 
 
Overall, this research makes contributions to mergers and acquisitions (M&A), 
accounting and corporate governance literature by extending the study of 
corporate governance and managerial opportunistic behaviours in leveraged 
buyout settings. Buyouts have provided unique opportunities for the 
investigation as managers tend to have different incentives prior to third-party 
LBOs and MBOs. Managers may have long-term job security issues in facing 
with third-party LBOs, which provide them with incentives to engage in self-
interest activities to prevent firms being taken over. However, in MBOs, 
managers are also buyers who may have incentives to minimise their purchase 
price. The findings of this thesis may have implications for institutional investors 
and boards of directors in understanding the incentives of management and 
their behaviours preceding third-party LBOs and MBOs. Additionally, the 
findings may have implications for the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms. They may provide more empirical evidence on how to enhance 
the monitoring and control mechanisms over opportunistic behaviours by 
management. 
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1.2  Aims and Objectives 
This thesis investigates the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
opportunistic behaviours by managers prior to LBOs in the UK. Depending on 
whether the incumbent management team participates in leveraged buyouts or 
not, managerial incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviours are different. 
This thesis subdivides leveraged buyouts into third-party LBOs and MBOs for 
the purpose of this investigation.  
 
In particular, in third-party LBOs, a firm’s undervaluation may attract outside 
buyers to take over the firm. In this case, the target firm’s managers may have 
long-term job security issues, as the external buyers are likely to take over 
control and make changes to the firm’s existing management team to improve 
its efficiency of governance after third-party LBOs (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 
2005b). Although outside investors may continue to retain the target firm’s 
management because they are more familiar with its operations, the transaction 
is likely to threaten managers’ long-term job security (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et 
al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006; Renneboog et al., 2007). Therefore, such 
managers are likely to engage in opportunistic activities to try to reduce the 
firm’s undervaluation to prevent a takeover. However, artificially inflated share 
prices are not in the interest of shareholders, due to the inevitable adjustment 
in the long run. As the prediction of third-party LBOs is difficult, shareholders 
are more prudent in earnings manipulation, so as to avoid overpaying the 
incompetent managers. Managers and shareholders thus have a conflict of 
interest prior to third-party LBOs.   
 
By contrast, management in MBOs “is on both sides of the table, acting on 
behalf of the shareholders to determine whether a sale is in their interest and 
to seek the best possible price, all the while acting in their own proprietary 
interest as purchasers” (Lowenstein, 1985: 732). There exists a conflict of 
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interest between the target firm’s managers and shareholders, since managers 
can benefit from the MBOs at the expense of the shareholders (Hafzalla, 2009). 
The managers’ personal interests may motivate them to engage in more 
opportunistic behaviours, such as to depress the pre-MBO accounting earnings 
to the detriment of shareholder interests (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b; 
Weir and Wright, 2006).  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to prevent inappropriate sub-
optimal behaviours of managers and ensure that firms are managed efficiently 
in the interests of shareholders (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lara et al., 2009). 
Good corporate governance is supposed to mitigate agency conflicts by 
effectively motivating managers and better controlling and monitoring their 
behaviours. Weak corporate governance may enable greater managerial 
discretion and may therefore lead to more opportunistic behaviours (Lara et al., 
2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, this thesis provides a new insight into 
the effects of corporate governance by examining the influence of corporate 
governance on managerial opportunistic behaviours prior to third-party LBOs 
and MBOs in the UK. 
 
1.3  Theoretical Framework 
Agency relationships are defined as relationships between principal(s) and 
agent(s) “under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976: 308). In many listed companies, where ownership diversification and the 
recruitment of professional managers has led to a separation of ownership and 
control, shareholders are seen as principals, which hire (directly or indirectly) 
managers as agents work on behalf of or for their interests (McGuire, 1988; 
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Eisenhardt, 1989; Solomon, 2013). However, the managers (agents) do not 
bear the full wealth effects of their decisions because managers are likely to 
control the firms’ operation but generally do not hold a significant equity share 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Schroeder et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the agency problems may arise from the separation of ownership 
and control (McGuire, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Solomon, 2013; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
Agency problems are caused by the conflict of interests and information 
asymmetry. In the assumption, shareholders are assumed to seek for 
maximising the firm performance to protect their long-term wealth (Roche, 2009; 
Solomon, 2013). However, managers may be motivated to maximise their 
private interests and utilities rather than the goal of shareholder wealth 
protection. For example, managers may have strong incentives to obtain high 
salaries and bonuses, and protect their control power and job security within 
the firms (Berle and Means, 1932; Gul, 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Solomon, 2013). Hence, managers may not always act in the interests of 
shareholders. Instead, they are likely to have incentives to act inappropriately 
when their interests are not aligned with those of the shareholders (Schillhofer, 
2003; Gul, 2007; Saam, 2007; Schroeder et al., 2010; Solomon, 2013). 
 
Moreover, different risk preferences of managers and shareholders may be 
another reason for the aberrant activities of agents (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Typically, managers and shareholders tend to hold different views 
towards the corporate risk, in order to defend their own interests. Under the 
prerequisite of separate ownership and control, it is not the money which 
belongs to managers as well as the risks. Therefore, principals are assumed to 
be risk-neutral, while agents are assumed to be risk averter (Saam, 2007; 
Solomon, 2013; Roche, 2009; Tricker, 2009; Gul, 2007). This risk divergence 
tends to motivate managers and shareholders to engage in different actions 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989; Solomon, 2013). 
 
The second assumption of agency theory concerns that the monitoring and 
verification of agents can be expensive and difficult due to the information 
asymmetries (Solomon, 2013). Information asymmetries are likely to be raised 
because the agents’ competences, intentions, knowledge and actions cannot 
be fully observed by the principals (Saam, 2007; Kim and Suh, 1992). Due to 
this inefficient monitoring, the information gap may put the principals in a 
disadvantageous position where shareholders will never be certain about the 
contribution of managers in the business (Gul, 2007; Mallin et al., 2005). Since 
then, shareholders may need to pay a high price to obtain the same information 
or it may even be impossible for them to acquire (Schillhofer, 2003; Keil, 2005). 
Agency costs are then raised from shareholders’ attempts to monitoring the 
management (Solomon, 2013; Tricker, 2009). 
 
Agency costs usually refer to the misalignment of the interests between 
shareholders and managers when the ownership and control separate (Jensen, 
1986a). It can be incurred by the principals applying for control and monitoring 
to align their interests with agents when facing with information asymmetry or 
different risk preferences (Weir et al., 2002; Weir et al., 2005b; Solomon, 2013) . 
In general, the agency costs are subdivided into the ex-ante and ex-post cost. 
Ex-ante cost refers to the cost incurred in developing the contract, whereas ex-
post cost refers to the cost of enforcing and monitoring the contract (McGuire, 
1988). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the ex-post costs are the sum 
of the (1) principal monitoring costs that arise from the expenditures of incentive 
schemes, monitoring procedures, and supervision; (2) agent bonding 
expenditures which are used to guarantee that the agents will not take certain 
actions which would harm the principals or to compensate principals if such 
actions happen; and (3) residual loss is incurred by the costs of full enforcement 
of contracts exceeding the benefits (McGuire, 1988; Solomon, 2013; Fama and 
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Jensen, 1983).  
 
Although agency costs are unavoidable expenses in resolving agency 
problems, it is necessary to be reduced to protect the wealth of shareholders 
(Solomon, 2013; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory suggests a set of 
corporate governance mechanisms to minimise the agency costs and align the 
interests between principals and agents so as to protect shareholders wealth 
(Keasey, 2005; Solomon, 2013; Davis et al., 1997). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that the proper incentives can restrict the aberrant activities of the 
agents, limit the divergences between the two parties and shrink the agency 
costs. In particular, incentive schemes are the mechanisms that enable 
principals to motivate the particular actions of the agents in both a positive way, 
which indicates the rewards of promotion in return for compliance, and a 
negative way of dismissal and demotion in the opposite (Grant, 2005). The early 
studies (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Weir et al., 2005a; Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008) confirm the positive correlation between monetary 
incentive and performance outcomes. Conversely, several studies (e.g. 
Sprinkle, 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Coles et al., 2012; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) suggest that incentives contrasts may not improve but degrade 
the performance of agents. This is because incentives can divert managers’ 
attention away from performing a task instead of focusing on how to obtain 
more wealth from incentive schemes. Moreover, a good corporate governance 
structure is expected to lead to better control and monitoring over management 
that is helpful in reducing the occurrence of the agency problems and agency 
costs (Cornett et al., 2008; Lara et al., 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
In facing with buyout transactions, managers may engage in self-interest 
activities to affect shareholders’ perceptions of firm value. In MBOs, there is a 
clear conflict of interests between managers, who seek to minimise their 
purchase price, and shareholders, who seek to maximise their selling price 
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(Hafzalla, 2009; Lowenstein, 1985). By contrast, in third-party LBOs, managers 
may have long-term job security issues that may motivate them to manipulate 
earnings upward to try to prevent a takeover, however, this is not always in the 
interests of shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; Amess and Wright, 2012; Weir 
and Wright, 2006). Accounting conservatism refers to the asymmetry 
recognition of economic gains and losses, where economic losses are 
disclosed faster than economic gains, either in order to follow a prudent and 
cautious approach to corporate reporting and reduce the need for future 
negative restatements of accounts, or in order to deliberately depress the firm 
value due to opportunistic consideration by managers (Basu, 1997; Beekes et 
al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Before buyouts, managers tend to 
engage in different levels of accounting conservatism in order to protect their 
wealth. Corporate governance mechanisms are supposed to mitigate the 
agency conflicts by effective monitoring and control over management, and 
better align the interests between managers and shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Lara et al., 2009). 
 
The agency theory has addressed the control role of directors, referring to the 
monitoring and governance functions in which directors serve shareholders by 
ratifying the decisions of management and monitoring managers’ behaviours in 
decision implementation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Edgerton, 2012). However, another distinct role 
that directors play is that of providing various resources of knowledge, skills, 
expertise and experience (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pugliese et al., 2009; 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Johnson et al., 1996; Hillman et al., 2000; Boyd, 
1990; Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Daily and Dalton, 1994b). These resources are 
supposed to be helpful in managing external dependencies (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), reducing environmental uncertainty for the firm (Pfeffer, 1972), 
decreasing the transactions costs (Williamson, 1984) and ultimately facilitating 
the survival of the firm (Singh et al., 1986; Hillman et al., 2009).  
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Resource dependence theory proposes that boards are important mechanisms 
to provide advice and counsel to the organisation, access to channels of 
information in linking the firm to environmental contingencies, access to 
facilitate external relations and resources, legitimacy and aiding in the 
formulation of firms’ strategy and decision making (Dalton et al., 1998; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
Zahra and Pearce (1989: 292) further support that the board of directors has 
service role in “enhancing company reputation, establishing contracts with the 
external environment and giving advice and counsel to executives”. Moreover, 
the board has strategy role “in the strategic arena through advice and counsel 
to the CEO, by initiating their own analyses, or by suggesting alternatives” 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989: 298). Johnson et al. (1996: 411) indicate that 
directors have service role in “advising the CEO and top managers on 
administrative and other managerial issues as well as more actively initiating 
and formulating strategy” and resource dependence role in “facilitating the 
acquisition of resources critical to the firm’s success”. 
 
In particular, board’s expertise, experience, knowledge, reputation and skills are 
supposed to be positively associated with the provision of advice and counsel. 
The board of directors is often composed of lawyers, financial representatives, 
marketing specialists and public affairs who tend to bring with them expertise, 
experience, knowledge and skills to facilitate advice and counsel to the firms 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Gales and Kesner, 1994; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001). For example, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Luoma and Goodstein 
(1999) find that firms in regulated industries tend to have more outsiders, 
particularly those with relevant experience. Kor and Misangyi (2008) examine 
the managers’ and directors’ industry experience and suggest that the board 
can supplement top management with vital advice and counsel. 
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Moreover, board’s expertise, experience, knowledge and skills are supposed to 
provide channels of information and communication between the firm and the 
external organisation. These characteristics of the board provide the firm with 
timely and valuable information that may reduce firm’s transaction costs in 
dealing with uncertainties, thereby enhance firm performance (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). It is also found that executive directors’ external ties can facilitate 
firm’s access to strategic information and subsequently improve firm 
performance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 
1997; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). 
 
In addition, board’s knowledge, expertise and experience are helpful for firms 
to acquire external resources, such as financial capital influence and influence 
from customers, suppliers and other communities (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
For example, start-up firms often put venture capitalists on the boards not only 
for access to capital but also for their expertise and reputation (Fried et al., 1998; 
Davila et al., 2003; Strömsten and Waluszewski, 2012). 
 
Also, board’s knowledge, expertise and experience are supposed to be linked 
to the provision of firm legitimacy (Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick and 
D'Aveni, 1992). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Daily and Dalton (2001) and Dunn 
(2012) suggest that the prestige of directors can enhance the firm performance, 
as the prestigious or legitimate persons may represent that the board are able 
to provide confirmation for the value and worth of the firm to the public. 
Therefore, resource dependence theory is an alternative theoretical base of this 
research in examining the effects of corporate governance mechanism on 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours. 
 
Early studies using resource dependence theory to examine the effects of 
board focus on its structures as indicators of the board’s ability and suggest that 
boards are able to provide critical resources to the firm (Hillman et al., 2009). 
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Pfeffer (1972), Pfeffer (1973) and Sanders and Carpenter (1998) suggest that 
board structure is related to the firms’ environmental needs and the level of 
internationalisation are an indicator of a successful resource dependence 
strategy. Fried et al. (1998) further indicate that board structures are contingent 
not only on the firm’s external environment but also on its current strategy and 
prior financial performance. 
 
There is one additional theory used in corporate governance research 
stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998). The stewardship theory suggests that managers are 
steward whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their shareholders 
rather than the entirely self-interested (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Davis et al., 
1997). Under the theory, managers are supposed to have a range of non-
financial motives, which includes “the need for achievement and recognition, 
the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority and 
the work ethic” (Muth and Donaldson, 1998: 6). Stewardship theory holds that 
managers are essentially a good steward of the corporate assets, and be loyalty 
to the firm (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Managers 
may comply their duties and identifications with the organisation when to 
confronting with personally unrewarding courses (Etzioni, 1975). Therefore, 
stewardship theory suggests that performance variations arise from whether 
the firm structure has located executive facilitates effective control actions 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Corporate structures 
are expected to facilitate this goal by the extent to which that they have provided 
clear, consistent role expectations, authorities and empower to management 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
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1.4  Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the motivations 
and outlines the objectives of the study, specifies the research questions, 
overviews the methodology and highlights the key findings and contributions of 
the thesis. The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: 
 
In particular, three empirical studies are designed to test the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ opportunistic behaviours in 
third-party LBO and MBO transactions. Chapter 2 (empirical study 1) examines 
the impact of managerial interests on takeover resistance and bid premiums in 
the settings of third-party LBOs and MBOs. Specifically, it examines managerial 
interests, including managerial ownership and share options. 
 
Chapter 3 (empirical study 2) investigates the accounting conservatism 
preceding leveraged buyouts in the UK. It first examines the differences 
between degrees of conservatism prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs. Then, 
the study investigates how accounting conservatism may change over the 
period preceding third-party LBOs and MBOs. Moreover, it examines the 
influences of corporate governance mechanisms; in particular, the effects of 
board characteristics and ownership characteristics on accounting 
conservatism prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs. 
 
Chapter 4 (empirical study 3) investigates the moderating and mediating effects 
of board structures in the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs. Moreover, it examines 
the moderating and mediating effects of board effectiveness in the relationship 
between board structures and takeover premiums prior to third-party LBOs and 
MBOs.  
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Chapter 5 presents a summary of the thesis and draws conclusions from and 
implications of the findings. This chapter also discusses potential limitations and 
makes suggestions for future research. 
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1.5  Research Overview 
In order to achieve the aims of the study, the following research questions are 
examined: 
 
Chapter of the Thesis Research Questions 
  
Chapter 2: Empirical Study 1 
(1). What is the relationship between managerial 
ownership, share options and takeover resistance in 
UK third-party LBO and MBO transactions? 
 
(2). What is the relationship between managerial 
ownership, share options and takeover premiums in 
UK third-party LBO and MBO transactions? 
 
(3). Is there a difference between the effects of 
managerial ownership and share options in UK third-
party LBO and MBO transactions? 
  
Chapter 3: Empirical Study 2 
(4). What is the difference between the degree of 
accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs 
and MBOs in the UK? 
 
(5). How does the degree of accounting 
conservatism change over the period preceding 
third-party LBOs and MBOs in the UK? 
 
(6). What are the influences of corporate governance 
mechanisms, including board characteristics and 
ownership characteristics, on firms' financial 
reporting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs and 
MBOs in the UK? 
  
Chapter 4: Empirical Study 3 
(7). Are there any mediating or moderating effects of 
board structures and board effectiveness which 
affect takeover premiums in UK third-party LBOs and 
MBOs? 
 
This thesis first explores the influence of managerial ownership and share 
options on takeover resistance and bid premiums in UK third-party LBO and 
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MBO transactions to provide a new insight into managerial behaviours and their 
incentive schemes. As options can only provide managers with the right to 
purchase the firm’s shares at an agreed upon price or within a certain time 
requirement, options and ownership are likely to provide different incentives for 
managers (Bender, 2003; Song and Walkling, 1993; Langley, 1997; Vallascas 
and Hagendorff, 2013). In particular, share options are different from ownership, 
as options can align the interests of management with shareholders when the 
share price increases, while there is no real reduction of managerial wealth 
when the share price declines (Tufano, 1996; Sanders, 2001; Veenman et al., 
2011; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). Hence, this study provides a better 
understanding of the influence of managerial incentives on their reaction to 
shareholder wealth protection by comparing the effects of managerial 
ownership with share options. Furthermore, as third-party LBOs and MBOs can 
provide different incentives for managers, the investigation and comparison of 
these two types of buyouts can provide a better understanding of the effects of 
managerial ownership and share options on shareholder wealth protection. 
 
In the second research, the study investigates the existence of accounting 
conservatism and its relationship with corporate governance mechanisms 
preceding third-party LBOs and MBOs in the UK. As buyouts provide managers 
with incentives to behave opportunistically, this study investigates the changes 
of accounting conservatism over the period preceding third-party LBOs and 
MBOs. Moreover, this research extends the literature of accounting 
conservatism by investigating the influence of corporate governance on it prior 
to third-party LBOs and MBOs. As the degree of accounting conservatism is 
based on managerial discretion over business operational decisions, managers’ 
incentives and board monitoring and control are important factors, affecting 
behaviour towards conservatism. Accordingly, this research focuses on the 
effects of board characteristics and ownership characteristics on accounting 
conservatism prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs. 
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In the third study, this research aims to investigate the potential relationship 
between board structure, board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-
party LBOs and MBOs in the UK. The inconclusive relationship between board 
structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs in the first 
empirical study might indicate that the research fails to model the impact of the 
board on performance outcomes correctly. The overall impact of the board is 
determined by its structures and its effectiveness (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2001; Roberts et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2009; Kirkpatrick et al., 2015). 
Conflating board structures with board effectiveness can be misleading. 
Therefore, this study builds a new model to improve the understanding of the 
link between board structures, board effectiveness and takeover premiums. By 
taking into account the potential interrelationship between board structures and 
board effectiveness, this research investigates the moderating and mediating 
effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in 
third-party LBOs and MBOs. In addition, it aims to provide a new proxy for board 
effectiveness: the degree of accounting conservatism. Board effectiveness 
occurs when the directors have fulfilled their responsibility of protecting 
shareholder wealth (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Accounting conservatism is 
expected to proxy the effectiveness of the board, as cautious accounting 
reporting protects the shareholders’ interests in the long run (Watts, 2003a; 
Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). 
 
1.6  Methodology 
This thesis investigates UK leveraged buyout transactions on the London Stock 
Exchange between 1997 and 2011. This time period covers a significant wave 
of LBO activities in the UK. The sample of firms examined in this thesis is 
consisted with third-party LBO and MBO transactions in the UK. It excludes 
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non-UK firms and financial services companies, since they are likely to be 
subject to a different set of financial structures, regulatory disclosure 
requirements and corporate governance systems. 
 
Under the study, the valuation of executive share options is measured via the 
Black and Scholes (1973) model. Accounting conservatism is measured initially 
using the Basu (1997) model. The Khan and Watts (2009) C-score model and 
the Ball and Shivakumar (2005) accruals-based model are also used to provide 
alternative measures for accounting conservatism. 
 
The first two empirical studies adopt ordinary least square (OLS) and logistic 
regression models to investigate corporate governance and opportunistic 
behaviours by managers in third-party LBOs and MBOs. The research studies 
start by considering whether MBO firms differ from third-party LBO firms using 
univariate tests. 
 
In the third empirical study, multiple regression analysis and structural equation 
modelling are adopted to test the moderating and mediating effects of board 
structures and board effectiveness. This is different to a lot of previous literature 
(e.g. Han et al., 2009; Zemzem and Ftouhi, 2013; Schepers and Wetzels, 2007), 
which usually focus on either of the approach. 
 
Also, this thesis has concerns over the potential endogeneity of the models. 
According to the accounting and corporate literature (Larcker and Rusticus, 
2010), lagged values are used as instrumental variables to test for endogeneity. 
The Hausman test is used to check for endogeneity where the null hypothesis 
is rejected (p<0.05) and endogeneity presents (Hadri and Mikhail, 2014; Adkins 
and Hill, 2011; Diamond and Tolley, 2013). Similar to prior studies (e.g. Hadri 
and Mikhail, 2014; Baum, 2006; Adkins and Hill, 2011), the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression is then used to address endogeneity. However, if 
Chapter 1 
25 
the instrumental variables are weak, 2SLS can produce a biased estimation 
over OLS. Furthermore, this thesis runs a set of additional analyses to test the 
robustness of the results. In particular, the studies use alternative 
measurements and different analysis approaches for robustness tests. 
 
1.7  Results  
The first empirical study (Chapter 2) examines the influence of managerial 
interests, specifically ownership and share options, on takeover resistance (i.e. 
the initial mood of target’s board to takeover attempt, friendly or hostile) and bid 
premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs. As anticipated, given the different 
managerial incentives in third-party LBO and MBO contexts, the findings 
suggest that the effects of managerial incentive schemes on takeover 
resistance and bid premiums are different in these transactions. Moreover, 
ownership and share options tend to provide different incentives to managers 
that are likely to affect their actions of shareholder wealth protection in different 
ways.  
 
The research indicates that managerial ownership is positively related to 
takeover resistance in third-party LBOs, but surprisingly they are not 
significantly correlated in MBOs. This may suggest that in third-party LBOs, 
higher levels of ownership can provide managers with power in their decision-
making that helps them protect their own interests. Nevertheless, managers’ 
involvement in the MBOs can provide more direct and strong incentives for 
managers other than their shareholdings. 
 
Moreover, it is found that managerial share options are negatively related to the 
likelihood of takeover resistance in third-party LBOs. This may be because 
managers of target firms can accrue additional benefits from exercising their 
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options immediately after a third-party LBO (Moeller, 2005). Higher values of 
share options may reduce the likelihood of takeover resistance from target firms’ 
management in third-party LBOs. However, the research finds that there is a 
positive relationship between managerial share options and takeover 
resistance in MBOs. Although managers’ share options are also exercisable 
after an MBO takeover, they are likely to serve to increase managers’ ownership 
in the firm, rather than being a cash pay-off. Moreover, if the board of directors 
is aware of managers’ economic incentives from share options and shares, non-
executive directors may be more wary of MBO proposals and tend to resist 
takeover offers.  
 
In addition, the research finds that managerial ownership is positively related to 
takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. This may be because managers may 
try to use their influence on the board to increase takeover premiums to 
maximise their wealth gains after the takeover. 
 
The findings also suggest a negative relationship between the value of 
outstanding share options owned by managers and takeover premiums in both 
third-party LBOs and MBOs. In third-party LBOs, higher values of share options 
may reduce the incentives of managers to drive up takeover premiums. This is 
because higher premiums may increase the risk of failure of the takeover, which 
would prevent managers from exercising their options after the takeover. 
However, in MBOs, share options do not provide cash incentives to managers. 
Managers may try to exercise these options after a takeover to increase their 
shares in the firm. In MBOs, managers have strong incentives to reduce their 
possible purchase price. Hence, higher managerial share options may be 
associated with lower takeover premiums in MBOs. 
 
The second empirical study (Chapter 3) investigates the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBO 
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and MBO transactions. In general, the findings suggest that the accounting 
conservatism is different prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs. Moreover, the 
corporate governance mechanisms are likely to have a greater impact on 
accounting conservatism in third-party LBO than in MBO firms. 
 
Particularly, this research finds that managers tend to engage in more 
conservative accounting one year before MBOs, possibly to reduce the 
perception of the firm’s value and thus depress the purchase price of the buyout. 
In order to identify the differences in managerial behaviour regarding 
accounting conservatism before third-party LBOs and MBOs, this research 
investigates data for the three years preceding a buyout event. By comparing 
the implementation of conservatism one year prior to MBOs and third-party 
LBOs, the research finds that managers are likely to engage in more 
conservative accounting in MBOs than in third-party LBOs. This difference may 
be because managers have different incentives in MBOs, as they seek to 
depress the purchase price, and third-party LBOs, as they seek to protect their 
long-term job security by preventing the takeover. Moreover, by comparing 
managerial behaviours regarding accounting conservatism three years before 
a buyout, the research discovers a mean-reversion in that managerial 
behaviours shift from more to less conservative preceding third-party LBOs, but 
from less to more conservative prior to MBOs.   
 
In addition, the research finds that corporate governance mechanisms have 
different effects on accounting conservatism one year prior to third-party LBOs 
and MBOs. In particular, as the prediction of third-party LBOs is difficult, more 
conservative accounting is expected to protect the long-term interests of 
shareholders before takeovers. The research finds that before third-party LBOs, 
a higher proportion of non-executive directors and institutional shareholding 
can lead to more conservative accounting. However, CEO duality, higher non-
executive shareholding and a high level of audit committee independence can 
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result in less conservative accounting prior to third-party LBOs. Moreover, there 
is a U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism preceding third-party LBOs.  
 
However, prior to MBOs, more conservative accounting cannot protect the 
shareholders’ interests, as it may depress the share price of the target firm. The 
research finds that high levels of audit committee independence can lead to 
less conservative accounting preceding MBOs. Moreover, high institutional 
shareholding is associated with more conservative accounting prior to MBOs. 
Other governance mechanisms, such as CEO duality, the proportion of non-
executives on the board, managerial ownership and non-executive ownership 
are not significantly correlated to accounting conservatism in MBOs. 
 
The third empirical study (Chapter 4) investigates the impact of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs, 
by taking into account their potential moderating or mediating effects. The 
findings suggest that board size moderates the relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs. The relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums is more positive when board size is 
smaller. Moreover, the research finds that board effectiveness has moderating 
effects on the relationship between CEO duality and takeover premiums in 
MBOs. The relationship between CEO duality and takeover premiums is more 
negative when there is a higher level of board effectiveness.  
 
1.8  Contributions 
Overall, this study is purposed to make contributions to the mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), accounting and corporate governance literature in several 
ways. First, this study extends the previous literature by examining the influence 
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of corporate governance on managers’ opportunistic behaviours in the 
leveraged buyout market. Leveraged buyouts are a distinct and increasingly 
important type of acquisition. As discussed before, managers of target firms 
may have a clear conflict of interests with shareholders prior to third-party LBOs 
and MBOs. Third-party LBOs are inherently more uncertain for managers’ long-
term job security, which may intensify their incentives to behave 
opportunistically to prevent a takeover threaten (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and 
Wright, 2006; Renneboog et al., 2007). In contrast, managers’ direct 
involvement in MBOs may generate conflicts of interests between managers, 
who seek to reduce their purchase price, and shareholders, who seek to sell 
for a highest possible price (Hafzalla, 2009; Lowenstein, 1985). Analysing the 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms in these settings may provide 
further evidence on how to effectively motivate managers and better monitor 
and control their opportunistic behaviours. 
 
In particular, this study provides new evidence on the effects of managerial 
incentive schemes in third-party LBO and MBO settings. Although previous 
studies have examined the relationship between managerial incentive schemes 
and shareholder wealth protection in general in M&A firms (e.g. Cotter and 
Zenner, 1994; Walkling and Long, 1984; St-Pierre et al., 1996; Moeller, 2005), 
there is little attention paid to leveraged buyout firms. Analysing the effects of 
managerial incentive schemes in third-party LBOs and MBOs tends to provide 
a better understanding of this relationship. This is because managers have 
played different roles in third-party LBOs and MBOs and are likely to engage in 
different behaviours in the two types of buyouts. The effects of managerial 
incentive schemes are likely to vary within these settings. It is important to 
analyse whether and to what extent are the incentive schemes can motivate 
managers to protect the interests of shareholders in the settings of third-party 
LBO and MBO. 
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Moreover, this study provides a better understanding of the effects of 
managerial incentive schemes by distinguishing managerial ownership from 
share options. In contrast to ownership, which ties managerial wealth in direct 
proportion to shareholder returns, managers who are paid with share options 
do not suffer real and immediate reductions when the share price declines 
(Bender, 2003; Song and Walkling, 1993; Langley, 1997; Veenman et al., 2011; 
Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). Although ownership and share options are 
able to affect managerial incentives, ownership can also affect managers’ 
control power on the boards. Comparing the effects of ownership and share 
options in the analysis may provide additional evidence of how and which 
incentive schemes can be more effective in protecting the interests of 
shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, this research extends the previous literature by examining 
accounting conservatism in third-party LBO and MBO settings. Previous 
studies (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Beekes et 
al., 2004) have examined firms’ accounting conservatism, while little attention 
has been paid to accounting conservatism prior to buyouts. MBOs generate a 
clear incentive for managers to depress the purchase price. However, there is 
little evidence about how managers can exploit the interests of shareholders. 
This study provides direct evidence that managers can decrease the firm’s 
value through more conservative accounting disclosure prior to an MBO. 
Additionally, comparing third-party LBOs with MBOs may provide an additional 
insight in observing the changes in managerial behaviours concerning 
accounting conservatism and the changes to the buyout transaction itself. This 
is because managerial incentives around most events (such as the studies of 
listed firms in e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; 
Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008) are to increase the firm’s value, while MBOs 
provide specific incentives for managers to decrease it, which affects managers’ 
behaviours regarding disclosure of accounting information. 
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Likewise, this study extends previous research concerning accounting 
conservatism by investigating the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms, including board characteristics and ownership characteristics, on 
accounting conservatism prior to MBOs and third-party LBOs. MBOs and third-
party LBOs are different types of buyouts, which have some distinct features. 
Managers are likely to have different incentives in third-party LBOs and MBOs. 
Analysing the impacts of corporate governance in different settings provide new 
evidence on how and to what extent are the corporate governance mechanisms 
affect the degree of accounting conservatism.   
 
Second, this research extends the previous literature on boards of directors by 
differentiating board structures from board effectiveness to better understand 
the effects of the board. In the literature on boards, previous studies (e.g. Baliga 
et al., 1996; Bliss, 2011; Brickley et al., 1997; Elsayed, 2007; Krivogorsky, 2006; 
Lefort and Urzúa, 2008; Coles et al., 2008) have primarily focused on the 
impacts of board structures on performance outcomes, but fail to find 
conclusive results. However, the overall impact of the board is determined not 
only by its structures but also by its effectiveness. This study provides a better 
understanding of the effects of boards by taking into account the 
interrelationship between board structures and board effectiveness and their 
effects on takeover premiums in buyout transactions. 
 
Third, this research also extends the previous studies on boards by providing a 
new measure of board effectiveness as accounting conservatism, rather than 
board structures and financial expertise. Although in previous studies board 
structures are usually mixed and conflated with board effectiveness (e.g. 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Peasnell et al., 2005; Levrau and Van den 
Berghe, 2007; Lee, 2008; Gonzalez and André, 2014), they are essentially 
different. Conflating board structures with board effectiveness may give 
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misleading results. In particular, board structures are defined as the makeup of 
the board, referring to board size, the proportion of non-executives on the board 
and CEO duality. Board effectiveness tends to indicate the ability of the board, 
which encapsulates the directors’ expertise, experience, engagement, integrity 
and social skills (Cornforth, 2001; Payne et al., 2009; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Kirkpatrick et al., 2015). However, these factors are difficult to measure 
empirically. Prior studies either ignore these issues or draw on fairly poor 
proxies for board effectiveness such as board structures (Kang et al., 2007; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Bedard et al., 2004), directors’ ages, tenure, gender 
and academic qualifications (Anderson et al., 2004; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; 
Peasnell et al., 2005). Although some survey-based research (e.g. Wan and 
Ong, 2005; Pahuja, 2011; van der Walt and Ingley, 2000) proxies board 
effectiveness by collecting data on directors’ effort norms, the cohesion in the 
board, and how they use their skills and knowledge, survey based research 
tends to have a limited number of observations and is likely to rely on the 
integrity and self-awareness of the interviewees.  
 
Consequently, this research extends the previous literature by providing a new 
measure of board effectiveness: the degree of accounting conservatism. 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) suggest that board effectiveness occurs when the 
directors have fulfilled their duties. Accounting conservatism is proposed to be 
a measure of board effectiveness, as a cautious approach to financial reporting 
protects the long-term interests of shareholders (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008; Watts, 2003a; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). Moreover, the degree of 
accounting conservatism can reflect the directors’ knowledge, expertise and 
experience (Fadzil and Ismail, 2014). The analysis of accounting conservatism 
prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs also indicates that boards are able to adjust 
their approach to accounting conservatism for the interests of shareholders. 
Therefore, accounting conservatism does not merely reflect a general approach 
to accounting, but a reasonable measure of board effectiveness. 
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Fourth, this study adds the previous literature on corporate governance and 
M&A by examining the influence of corporate governance on managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours in the UK buyout market. Buyout market has 
developed in the UK from the 1990s upwards. UK buyouts have some specific 
characteristics that different from the US market. For example, they have less 
hostile takeover, lower debt level, focus more on target growth opportunity and 
more commonly financed by privately placed mezzanine rather than junk bonds 
(Renneboog et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2006; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). 
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Chapter 2:  Managerial Interests, Takeover Resistance and 
Bid Premium: Evidence from UK Leveraged Buyouts 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This study investigates the impacts of managerial ownership and share options 
on reactions of shareholder wealth protection in the setting of MBO and third-
party LBOs. Specifically, it examines three research questions: (1) What is the 
relationship between managerial ownership, share options and takeover 
resistance in MBOs and third-party LBOs? (2) What is the relationship between 
managerial ownership, share options and takeover premiums in MBOs and 
third-party LBOs? (3) What are the differences between the effects of 
managerial ownership and share options in MBOs and third-party LBOs?  
 
The board of directors, including the general management or CEO, are critical 
in business operations and decision-making. During the takeover process, the 
primary responsibilities of the board of directors are to control and monitoring 
management, provide governance to the firms, approve firm’s strategic plans 
and with additional considerations that arise in connection with a sale because 
the sale transaction provides an opportunity for shareholders to achieve 
premiums for their investment. Thus, the board has responsible for assessing 
whether this is an opportune time to sell the firm. Moreover, the board of 
directors is obligated to secure the best price reasonably available for 
shareholders and act through the process to maximise the shareholder wealth 
(Phillips and Levitin, 2010; Ertimur et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 1993). On the 
other hand, the managers are responsible for executing the approved business 
strategy and decisions (Phillips and Levitin, 2010; Ertimur et al., 2010; Van Ees 
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et al., 2009).  
 
In general, during the takeover process, the decision on whether to sell or not 
sell the firm is a decision for the board. When the firm receives a takeover offer, 
the bidders will negotiate with the target board (Bange and Mazzeo, 2004). The 
board is then supposed to assess whether the shareholder wealth would be 
maximised by selling the firm at this time or it can be better served by remaining 
the firm independently (Phillips and Levitin, 2010; Ertimur et al., 2010; Van Ees 
et al., 2009). However, managers are the agents who are able to influence the 
other board of directors in decision making, particularly when managers hold 
higher levels of shareholdings. It is recognised that managers are responsible 
for firms’ daily operation, while the other board of directors are usually non-
executives who may lack the time, expertise and information to challenge the 
efficiency and the decisions of management (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; 
Shuto and Takada, 2010; Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). 
Therefore, during the process of takeover negotiation, managers are likely to 
have a strong influence on the other board members to make a decision.  
 
However, managers tend to have a conflict of interests with shareholders in 
facing with a takeover either because of their job security concerns or their 
direct involvement in the transactions (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b). 
According to agency theory, incentives are key mechanisms in mitigating 
agency conflicts and guiding the behaviours of management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Walkling and Long, 1984). The literature on general M&A finds 
evidence that the levels of managerial ownership affect managers’ attitude to 
takeover (e.g. Walkling and Long, 1984; Cotter and Zenner, 1994; St-Pierre et 
al., 1996) and the size of takeover premiums (Song and Walkling, 1993; Belot, 
2009; e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Moeller, 2005). However, there is another 
type of takeover that has been overlooked in previous studies, the leveraged 
buyouts.  
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A LBO occurs when the equity of a publicly quoted company is purchased by 
private investors and therefore no longer quoted on the share market (Weir et 
al., 2005a; Fox and Marcus, 1992; Hunt, 2009). As managers’ wealth, job 
security and power of control tend to undergo great changes after a firm is 
privatised, the context of LBOs presents a unique opportunity to investigate the 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. This research is motivated by 
the fact that the effects of managerial incentives are under-researched, as 
previous studies did not distinguish between MBOs and third-party LBOs, 
where the managers have played different roles in these settings (Cotter et al., 
1997; Weir et al., 2005b). This study, therefore, extends the previous literature 
on managerial incentives into MBO and third-party LBO settings, as these 
settings provide clear and direct evidence of the impacts of managerial 
incentives on shareholder wealth maximisation that is contrary to the analysis 
of traditional acquisitions of listed firms.  
 
The sample of this study is split into MBOs and third-party LBOs. This distinction 
is potentially important, because management has played different roles in 
these contexts and the effects of incentives may vary with managers’ 
involvement. An MBO is the purchase of all the outstanding equity of the firm 
by incumbent management, where the current management is likely to remain 
in post after the buyout (Wright et al., 1991; Weir et al., 2005a; Weir et al., 
2005b). Management’s direct involvement in the transaction generates a 
conflict of interest between the firm’s managers, who are willing to pay the 
lowest possible purchase price, and the shareholders, who are likely to sell the 
shareholdings for the highest possible price (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir and Wright, 
2006; Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2005b). Evidence is found (e.g. Weir 
et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006) that, the larger extent of pre-transaction 
undervaluation may increase management’s potential wealth gains from MBOs. 
Hence, prior to MBOs, managers are likely to use their influence, control and 
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voting power to pursue their self-interested actions, such as to reduce 
resistance from other directors and ensure the success of the buyouts. In 
addition to purchase price effects, opportunistically selecting which 
shareholders can be driven by the size of the premiums, the level of 
management shareholding decides the amount of equity purchase, the difficulty 
of finance and the bid premiums paid (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 1985; Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
In contrast, the purchasers of third-party LBOs usually consist of outside buyers 
(typically institutional investors and other private equity houses) (Weir and 
Wright, 2006; Weir et al., 2005b). The direct involvement of outsiders results in 
great uncertainty concerning managers’ control power and their long-term job 
security that may intensify their incentives to behave opportunistically. Although, 
in most cases, the outside investors would like to continue to hire the target 
firms’ management as they are more familiar with the firms’ operation, their 
discretion is likely to be highly constrained. For example, the debt finance of 
buyout may reduce managers’ control power of free cash flows (FCFs). The 
outside investors also tend to be more active in monitoring and participating in 
firms’ operations to maximise their benefits after buyouts (Weir et al., 2005b; 
Weir et al., 2005a; Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007). Moreover, 
managers may become potential subjects for dismissal, as the buyout firms are 
likely to be relisted in the next few years, so managers may not able to keep 
their jobs for a long period. Besides, the outsiders might make changes to firms’ 
existing management team after a third-party LBO to improve the efficiency of 
firm’s governance and performance (Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2005b; 
Weir and Wright, 2006).  
 
Hence, there is a conflict of interests, in that managers have incentives to 
behave in their own interests in order to protect their discretion, long-term job 
security, and control power, but shareholders may be motivated to sell the 
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shareholdings to obtain benefits from the premiums (Cao, 2011; Weir et al., 
2005a; Weir and Wright, 2006; Wright et al., 1991; Weir et al., 2005b). That is 
to say, managers’ interests are not always best served by accepting the offers. 
However, as managers may also gain financially from increases in the value of 
their shares at the announcement of a buyout, managerial ownership and share 
options are the instruments which may affect their decision-making and 
behaviours of shareholder wealth protection. As a result, managers’ decision to 
resist or support a tender offer may depend on the tradeoff between their gains 
resulting from shareholdings and their potential losses of discretion, job position, 
compensation and control power (Hafzalla, 2009; Cotter and Zenner, 1994). 
 
Moreover, this study has distinguished managerial ownership from share 
options in analysing their effects on takeover resistance and bid premiums in 
third-party LBOs and MBOs. Ownership and share options are supposed to 
provide divergent incentives for managers that are likely to affect their 
behaviours in different ways. First, ownership can align the interests between 
managers and shareholders by offering a certain amount of shares to managers 
and allowing them to become the co-owners of the firm (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Ali-Ahmed, 2009; Baek et al., 2009; Mallin et al., 2005; 
Bender, 2003). The increased ownership can not only provide managers with 
incentives to increase the firm value and protect the interests of shareholders, 
but also can enhance their control and power in decision making. High 
ownership then has entrenchment effects that may allow managers to be less 
disciplined and be able to engage in self-interested actions (Buchholtz and 
Ribbens, 1994; Song and Walkling, 1993; Belot, 2009; Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008).  
 
Second, differing from ownership that ties managerial wealth in direct 
proportion to shareholder returns, share options provide managers with the 
right to purchase the firm’s shares, which only aligns the interests of 
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management with shareholders when the firm’s share price increases 
(Veenman et al., 2011; Sanders, 2001; Tufano, 1996; Bender, 2003; Vallascas 
and Hagendorff, 2013). The decline in the share price will result in no reduction 
in real wealth when managers hold options (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Burns and Kedia, 2006). Moreover, share options are available for exercise 
immediately after the takeover, which might be able to take additional interests 
to managers (Moeller, 2005). Therefore, share options and ownership are 
expected to have different effects on shareholder wealth protection. 
 
Consequently, it is expected that during third-party LBO deals, share options 
tend to provide managers with great incentives to look for the chance to 
exercise these options, which may reduce the likelihood of takeover resistance 
from managers and may also reduce the probability that managers will work to 
maximise takeover premiums. However, managerial ownership is likely to 
provide strong incentives for management to maximise takeover premiums to 
increase their gains in wealth.  
 
In contrast, although options are also exercisable immediately after MBO 
transactions, managers are more likely to exercise their share options to 
increase their ownership in the firm rather than in a cash-pay off. Moreover, if 
the boards are aware of managers’ incentives from share options, which is to 
immediately exercise their options after the takeover offer, they might be more 
cautious about the MBO offers and tend to resist the takeovers. In addition, as 
managers are likely to pay the lowest possible purchase price, share options 
are likely to have similar effects to ownership and are expected to have negative 
effects on the size of takeover premiums in MBO transactions (Veenman et al., 
2011; Tufano, 1996; Moeller, 2005). 
 
This study is purposed to contribute to the corporate governance and M&A 
literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the corporate governance 
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literature by providing additional evidence on the effects of managerial 
ownership and share options in MBO and third-party LBO settings. Much of the 
prior literature documents mixed evidence on the effects of managerial 
incentives on shareholder wealth protection under traditional acquisitions of 
listed firms (e.g. Song and Walkling, 1993; Belot, 2009; Moeller, 2005; Walkling 
and Long, 1984; Cotter and Zenner, 1994; St-Pierre et al., 1996). This study 
has differentiated MBOs from third-party LBOs, as managers may play different 
roles in each setting. The effects of managerial ownership and options are likely 
to vary with managers’ involvement in the transactions, because managers are 
the future owners of the firm in MBOs, while they have long-term job security 
issues in third-party LBOs. The results of the study suggest that managerial 
options are significantly negative related to takeover resistance in third-party 
LBO offers, but have a significant positive impact on takeover resistance in 
MBOs. 
 
Second, this study contributes to the empirical evidence on managerial 
incentives by investigating how far the effects of incentives – in the form of 
managerial ownership and options – drive the decision to go private, as well as 
guiding managers’ behaviour regarding bid premium maximisation. It adds to 
the literature by distinguishing managerial ownership from share options. 
Differing from share ownership, which ties managerial wealth in direct 
proportion to shareholder returns, managers who are paid with share options 
do not suffer real and immediate losses when the firm’s share price declines; 
this also allows them to take more risks in making decisions (Veenman et al., 
2011; Sanders, 2001; Tufano, 1996; Bender, 2003). Moreover, since the options 
are available for exercise immediately after the buyout, managers are able to 
obtain additional benefits, which may affect their reactions to an offer (Moeller, 
2005). The study provides evidence that managerial ownership is significantly 
positively related to takeover resistance and bid premiums in third-party LBO 
settings. However, share options have negative relationship with takeover 
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resistance and bid premiums in third-party LBO. 
 
Finally, this study extends the previous literature by examining the effects of 
managerial interests on the likelihood of takeover resistance and the size of bid 
premiums based on the UK market. Previous studies about managerial wealth 
and tender offers are the result of samples from the US data during the 1980s. 
However, the LBO market developed in the UK from the late 1990s onwards, 
and to date there has been virtually no systematic research on sources of 
managerial wealth effects in UK LBO transactions (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2006). UK LBO transactions have 
some specific characteristics that differ from US deals. For example, there are 
fewer hostile takeovers and lower debt levels; they focus more on target growth 
opportunities; and they are more commonly financed by privately placed 
mezzanine bonds rather than junk bonds (Renneboog et al., 2007; Toms and 
Wright, 2005). This study complements the corporate governance literature by 
providing additional evidence of the relationship between the managerial 
ownership structure and shareholder wealth protection in the UK market. 
 
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the link between executive incentives and 
takeover resistance and bid premiums. Section 2.3 presents the development 
of the hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the research design and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 reports the main findings and additional tests 
and Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
 
Chapter 2 
42 
2.2  Literature Review 
2.2.1 Managerial interests and the severity of agency problems 
The separation of ownership and control has generated conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). As managers can effectively control the firm’s operation but 
generally do not hold a significant equity share (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
managers are able to pursue self-interested actions without shareholders being 
able to detect this at an early stage. Managerial incentive schemes have long 
been recognised as a governance mechanism that can be used to align the 
interests of shareholders and management, and mitigate the agency problems 
between these contracting parties (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Mande et al., 
2012; Weir et al., 2005a). 
 
As the key incentive mechanisms, share-based remuneration includes common 
shares and options, is purposed to restrict the aberrant activities of 
management by offering them a certain amount of shares and allowing them to 
become the co-owners of the firm (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Ali-Ahmed, 
2009; Baek et al., 2009; Mallin et al., 2005; Bender, 2003). Increased 
managerial ownership encourages diligence and reduces the incentives of 
managers to consume excess perquisites because managers have to bear a 
higher fraction of the cost for their poor decisions (Song and Walkling, 1993; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
However, the influence of target managerial ownership on their reactions of 
acquisition activity is unclear. It is recognised that the risk of takeover disciplines 
management through the external market of corporate control, as the target’s 
managers may have a threat of long-term job security and control power loss 
after acquisitions. The increased managerial ownership may then be supposed 
to provide addition control power for managers either to stop such acquisition 
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or at least force bidders to pay for a higher takeover premium. Specifically, 
managers can use this power to resist the offer when the gains from the 
acquisition are inadequate to offset the lost benefits of incumbency. Therefore, 
higher managerial ownership can also generate entrenchment effects and 
make managers less likely to be disciplined, engaging in actions that serve their 
own interests but conflict with shareholder wealth maximisation (Buchholtz and 
Ribbens, 1994; Song and Walkling, 1993; Belot, 2009; Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). 
 
However, differently to share ownership that ties executive wealth changes in 
direct proportion to shareholder returns, an executive share option only 
provides managers the right to purchase firm share at a pre-determined 
exercise price under a particular performance achievement and/or a time 
restriction (Langley, 1997; Bender, 2003; Song and Walkling, 1993). The 
agency theory suggests that share-based compensation (i.e. share ownership 
and options) benefits managerial wealth along with shareholders when share 
prices rise, which may align the interests of management with shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, such a view places little emphasis 
on downside risk, where share ownership and option pay have different risk 
characteristics, in terms of their degrees of effects on incentives. It is 
recognised that, when the firm’s share price declines, executives who own 
shares will suffer real and immediate reductions in their current wealth, but 
those paid with options will experience no reduction in real wealth. In the event 
that the options’ positive payoff is that the share price remains above the option 
price. Whenever the share price is at or below the option price, the payoff for 
options becomes zero or negative, and no executives would exercise their 
options (Veenman et al., 2011; Sanders, 2001; Tufano, 1996).  
 
Moreover, research in behavioural decision theory also suggests that decision 
makers are more likely to exhibit strong preferences for risk aversion when they 
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have something to lose. Alternatively, if they have nothing to lose but something 
to gain, managers may prefer to take more risks in terms of opportunistic 
benefits. Therefore, the risk-reward characteristics of share ownership and 
option pay may provide different incentives for managers in decision-making. 
The downside risk associated with share ownership may lead executives to be 
more risk averse or, alternatively, associated with share option pay that results 
in risk-seeking behaviours (Sanders, 2001; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Sitkin and Weingart, 1995; Burns and Kedia, 2006). 
 
It is recognised that managers are instigators of the MBOs whose intention is 
to successfully take over the target, which differs from the management in third-
party LBOs, who are more likely to deter the acquisition to protect their long-
term job security. This study, therefore, examines the influence of managerial 
ownership and share option on takeover resistance and bid premiums by 
differentiating MBOs from third-party LBOs. Specifically, in MBOs, managers 
are likely to use their influence, control and voting power to pursue their self-
interested actions, such as to reduce resistance from other board members, 
minimise their possible purchase price and ensure the success of the buyouts 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; St-Pierre et al., 1996; Jiraporn et al., 2004; 
Hafzalla, 2009). In MBOs, managerial shareholdings and options tend to decide 
the amount of their equity purchase and the potential bid premiums. Besides, 
the distribution of ownership in MBOs has become the mechanism that 
represents the power for managers to convince the board and shareholders to 
accept the offer.  
 
By contrast, there are conflicts of interests in third-party LBOs, in that managers 
have incentives to try to push up the share price and prevent takeovers in order 
to protect their long-term job security, while shareholders are motivated to sell 
their shares to obtain benefits from premiums (Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et 
al., 2007). High ownership may allow managers to be less disciplined and 
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pursue their self-interests. The benefits from share options are used to offset 
the loss of job security and control power, and align the interests of 
management with shareholders (Cao, 2011; Weir et al., 2005a; Weir and Wright, 
2006; Wright et al., 1991). 
 
2.2.2 Prior literature 
Early studies have examined the relation between managerial ownership and 
takeover resistance under the general M&A of listed firms, which present mixed 
results. For example, the US studies by Walkling and Long (1984) and Cotter 
and Zenner (1994) relate the probability of takeover resistance to the 
managerial wealth changes between their capital gains of ownership, golden 
parachutes, and their potential losses in compensation, perquisites and control, 
and then find a negative relation. Further, Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) find 
support that a higher ownership enables managers to share more benefits from 
premium when takeover occurs, thus decreasing their resistance to the offer. In 
contrast, by studying a sample in Canada, St-Pierre et al. (1996) have provided 
evidence of managerial entrenchment, since a substantial proportion of 
ownership has distributed greater voting rights for managers, which finally 
increase managers’ resistance to offers.  
 
Moreover, in relation to shareholder wealth protection, evidence comes from 
the general M&A, which shows that managerial ownership of targets has 
produced two opposite effects in aligning with premium maximisation. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Song and Walkling (1993) and Bauguess et al. (2009) 
suggest that the distribution of ownership can either align the interests of 
shareholders with managers by connecting the share price change with the 
gains of personal wealth for management, or entrench the behaviour of 
management by transferring their focus to other self-interested activities such 
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as seeking long-term job security or control power within the firm. A number of 
US studies (e.g. Stulz, 1988; Song and Walkling, 1993), find that increased 
inside ownership gives the target management a greater bargaining power, 
which has increased managers’ ability to extract higher takeover premiums 
from bidders. Stulz (1988) points out another reason that increased managerial 
ownership improves the firm performance, as well as increasing the difficulty of 
a takeover; the lower market anticipation of a potential takeover gains will result 
in higher target returns if a takeover is announced. Other studies include Morck 
et al. (1988b) and Fama and Jensen (1983), which also note a positive relation 
between managerial ownership and bid premium. They suggest that a greater 
shared ownership allows target management to be entrenched or engaged in 
activities harmful to shareholders’ interests, which is negative related to an ex-
ante firm performance, and a larger premium will be paid to overcome these 
inefficiencies.  
 
In contrast, the US study by Moeller (2005) suggests that the power from high 
levels of ownership may be used to bargain for personal compensation and 
side payments instead of bid premiums for existing shareholders. Grossman 
and Hart (1988), and Harris and Raviv (1988) further find evidence within a US 
sample that managers may use their position of privilege and control to 
expropriate benefits from takeover premiums, which results in a negative 
impact of inside ownership on takeover premiums. In related literature, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Hartzell et al. (2004) 
and Bauguess et al. (2009) report the evidence from US studies that if the 
incentive alignment has motivated managers to optimise the ex-ante firm value, 
there should have no possible efficiency gains that the bidder management 
could pass along to target shareholders in terms of takeover premium. 
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2.3  Development of Hypotheses 
2.3.1 The role of takeover resistance and bid premiums in MBOs 
As discussed before, the conflicts of interest between management and 
shareholders that arise in MBOs are caused by managers’ direct benefits from 
the transaction. The characteristics of undervaluation and a large free cash flow 
of target companies are the prerequisites to realise these profits (Weir et al., 
2005b). The undervaluation of MBOs reflects the perceived undervaluation 
where managers may have some private information that led them to value the 
firm differently from the market. If the market does not value this information, 
they may not accurately value the companies in terms of their share price. 
Undervaluation may therefore reflect the deterioration of company’s share price 
relative to firms remaining public that motivate the movement of this perceived 
incumbent management to take over the company. This is because the larger 
the extent of pre-transaction undervaluation, the higher will be the wealth gains 
of management in an MBO (Weir and Wright, 2006; Weir et al., 2005b; 
Renneboog et al., 2007).  
 
Additionally, the substantially high level of free cash flows in MBOs is able to 
ensure the firms’ ability of the future debt payment and the reliability of 
management’s wealth gains, as managers are the sole residual claimants once 
the debt is fully paid off (Fox and Marcus, 1992). Therefore, managers and 
shareholders are likely to have a conflict of interests before MBO where 
managers tend to purchase the firms with the lowest possible price, while 
shareholders tend to sell their shareholdings with the highest possible price 
(Hafzalla, 2009). Once such a conflict occurs, ownership and options become 
the instruments and the approaches to help management to accomplish their 
purpose of an MBO.  
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According to agency theory, increased ownership has generated an 
entrenchment effect that helps managers to realise their personal profits. As 
stated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), 
the distribution of managerial ownership increases the influence of 
management on the board of directors. The higher vote ownership holding has 
also provided managers with greater influence over the composition of the 
board of directors and thus reduces the likelihood of opposition from outside 
directors (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; St-Pierre et al., 1996). Consequently, 
it is expected that before MBOs, higher managerial ownership can provide 
managers with greater influence and voting power on pursuing their self-
interested actions, which might be helpful in reducing the likelihood of takeover 
resistance from the board. For consistency, it is hypothesised that:  
 
H2.1: Managerial ownership is negatively related to the likelihood of takeover 
resistance in MBOs. 
 
Furthermore, in MBOs, managers are also the buyers who are always willing to 
acquire the firm at the lowest possible price (Weir and Wright, 2006; Weir et al., 
2005b). Higher ownership has provided managers with strong power and 
influence on board that enable them to pursue their own interests (DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 1985; St-Pierre et al., 1996). Moreover, prior to MBOs, higher 
managerial ownership also implies that there is a lower proportion of 
shareholding needs to purchase. Hence, it is expected that higher 
shareholdings are more likely to motivate the management to offer a lower 
takeover premium to reduce their costs of takeover. Accordingly, the next 
hypothesis states that: 
 
H2.2: Managerial ownership is negatively related to the takeover premiums in 
MBOs. 
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Share ownership and share options are fundamentally different in terms of the 
degree of their effects in incentives. As discussed before, ownership aligns 
executive wealth changes more directly and immediately with shareholder 
interests. However, options fail to align the interests of management with 
shareholders when the firm’s share price declines, as the low share price does 
not reduce real management wealth (Sanders, 2001). Moreover, during 
acquisitions, share options are available to be exercised immediately after 
buyout. Acquirers will use cash or the shares of the new company to exchange 
these options (Moeller, 2005; Bauguess et al., 2009). 
 
In MBOs, although the share options are exercisable after takeovers, managers 
are less likely to exercise their options in a cash-pay off rather than to increase 
their ownership in the firms. In the event that if the boards aware of the incentive 
from options, they might be more cautious about the MBO offers and may tend 
to resist the offers. Hence, it is to be expected that the board is more likely to 
reject the MBO when there is a higher managerial share option (Veenman et 
al., 2011; Sanders, 2001; Tufano, 1996). According to the above arguments, 
the next hypothesis states that: 
 
H2.3: Executive share option is positively related to the likelihood of takeover 
resistance in MBOs. 
 
In MBOs, managers are the instigators of the takeover, and are always willing 
to acquire the firm at the lowest possible price, as they are the sponsors for all 
takeover costs (Weir and Wright, 2006; Weir et al., 2005b). As discussed above, 
in MBOs, share options do not have cash incentive, instead to increase 
managers’ ownership in the firms after a takeover. Hence, managers are less 
likely to offer high premiums when they held higher share options, because a 
higher takeover premium can increase managers’ takeover costs. 
Consequently, it is expected that management with higher share options are 
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more likely to offer a lower takeover premium. Therefore, the next hypothesis 
states that: 
 
H2.4: Executive share option is negatively related to takeover premiums in 
MBOs. 
 
2.3.2 The role of takeover resistance and bid premiums in third-party 
LBOs 
In third-party LBOs, the acquisitions are initiated and executed solely by a third 
party, without including incumbent management. As discussed before, 
management exclusion creates a conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders, where managers are likely to avoid buyouts to maintain their 
long-term job security, position and control power, but shareholders are seeking 
to sell their shareholdings and get benefits from the takeover premiums 
(Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007). The characteristics of undervaluation 
and large free cash flow holdings are the main reasons explaining these 
conflicts in third-party LBOs.  
 
The direct involvement of outsiders has caused great uncertainties for 
managers’ long-term job security, discretion and control power within firms, 
which may intensify their incentives to engage in opportunistic activities to 
prevent a third-party LBO. Although, in most cases, outside investors may 
continue to hire the targets’ managers in firms after buyouts because they are 
more familiar with those firms’ operations, managers’ discretion will be firmly 
constrained (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir et al., 2005a). Once bought-out firms are 
planned to relist in the next few years, managers in third-party LBOs are likely 
to be threatened by the risk of being fired (Hafzalla, 2009).  
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Moreover, differently to MBOs, the undervaluation of third-party LBO targets 
may reflect a higher objective undervaluation but lower perceived 
undervaluation (Weir and Wright, 2006; Weir et al., 2005b). According to 
previous literature Weir et al. (2005b) and Renneboog et al. (2007), objective 
undervaluation may result from poor decisions of prior management and low 
growth opportunities of firms. A buyout is an avenue for turning a failing 
company around. Hence, this objective undervaluation may grant the wish of 
outside buyers to make changes to a firm’s existing management team after a 
buyout and ultimately intensify the incentives for management to protect their 
own interests, especially their long-term job security. However, for shareholders, 
this objective undervaluation reflects a lower share price which motivates their 
willingness to sell their shareholdings and obtain benefits from the premium 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Cotter and Zenner, 1994; Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et 
al., 2005b).  
 
In addition, the increased free cash flow holdings may enhance the control 
power of incumbent management prior to buyout, since free cash flows are 
available, subject to self-interested managerial discretion, for either 
reinvestment or dividend distribution. However, the debt payment of the buyouts 
may reduce the control power of management to use free cash flows where 
these are fully used to pay off the debt. It is known that the penalty for defaulting 
on the debt payment is apparently greater than the corresponding penalty for 
reducing dividend payments (Renneboog et al., 2007; Fox and Marcus, 1992). 
Therefore, in third-party LBOs, managers are more likely to impede acquisitions 
to protect their own interests, while ownership and options are the main 
incentive schemes that work to align the interests of management with 
shareholders.  
 
According to the agency theory, managerial ownership aligns the interests of 
shareholders with management via the offer of shares. But the increased 
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shareholding has also provided a greater power to management by entrenching 
their self-interested actions (Song and Walkling, 1993; Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). In third-party LBOs, the distribution of ownership may 
provide managers with power to resist the bid to protect their long-term job 
security and power using free cash flows. Agrawal and Walkling (1994) suggest 
that an objective undervaluation increases the risks of managers being 
dismissed and strengthens their motivation to protect their long-term job 
security, remuneration and control power of using free cash flows. This is 
because if managers of target firms lose their jobs subsequent to the bid, it is 
generally difficult for them to find another senior executive position in public 
firms (Agrawal and Walkling, 1994). Moreover, Weir et al. (2005b) and Weir and 
Wright (2006) suggest that the lower perceived undervaluation in third-party 
LBOs may indicate that management does not have private information that 
leads them to believe that the market is wrong but shows that outside buyers 
value the firms differently. Consequently, managers may not agree to abandon 
funding expansion from the current equity market, as there is no signal to show 
that going private will make more profits and opportunities for the company 
(Weir and Wright, 2006; Weir et al., 2005b).  
 
Higher ownership has provided managers with greater power and influence on 
the board, which may enable them to protect their own interests rather than 
those of shareholders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). Therefore, it is 
expected that higher executive ownership provides managers with greater 
voting power and influence on the board to reject third-party LBO offers in order 
to protect their own interests concerning job security and control power within 
the firm. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2.5: Managerial ownership is positively related to the likelihood of takeover 
resistance in third-party LBOs. 
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In addition to takeover premiums, ownership aligns the interests of managers 
and shareholders, as any growth of premiums will directly increase the financial 
gains of management. Based on the discussion above, it is expected that, in 
third-party LBOs, managers with higher levels of ownership are more likely to 
use their power and influence to demand higher premiums either to stop the 
bidders to take over the firm or at least to get a higher premium on their shares. 
Moreover, higher premiums can increase the difficulty of buyouts and protect 
their interests when the bid successes. Hence, it is expected that managers 
with higher levels of ownership are likely to require a higher takeover premium. 
For consistency, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2.6: Managerial ownership is positively related to takeover premiums in third-
party LBOs. 
 
Additionally, a third-party LBO provides opportunities for management to 
exercise options immediately after the transaction, which results in managers 
who can realise additional personal profits without conditions or restrictions. 
According to agency theory, it is recognised that holding options allows 
management to take more risks in decision-making (Weir et al., 2005b; 
Renneboog et al., 2007; Sanders, 2001). Consequently, it is expected that the 
holding of share options may motivate management to pursue higher returns 
from the exercise of options and thus lead to a lower likelihood of resistance to 
a takeover. Accordingly, this study tests the hypothesis that: 
 
H2.7: Executive share option is negatively related to the likelihood of takeover 
resistance in third-party LBOs. 
 
Moreover, it is recognised that, in third-party LBOs, options align the interests 
of management with shareholders, as they can maximise the gains in wealth 
from increased takeover premiums (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the 
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prerequisite for managers to acquire these premiums is to ensure the 
accomplishment of the buyouts, because the share options are available to 
exercise immediately after the takeovers (Moeller, 2005). Higher managerial 
share options may reduce managers’ incentives to drive up the takeover 
premiums, since higher premiums may be associated with a high risk of 
takeover failure. Consistent with this argument, it is expected that the high level 
of options will motivate the target firm’s managers to accept the offer with a 
lower level of premium. Accordingly, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 
H2.8: Executive share options are negatively related to takeover premiums in 
third-party LBOs. 
 
Table 2.1 The summary table of the hypotheses 
Panel A: MBOs Third-party-LBOs 
Hypotheses 
H2.2: Managerial ownership is 
negatively related to the likelihood 
of takeover resistance 
H2.5: Managerial ownership is 
positively related to the likelihood of 
takeover resistance 
H2.2: Managerial ownership is 
negatively related to takeover 
premiums 
H2.6: Managerial ownership is 
positively related to takeover 
premiums 
H2.3: Executive share option is 
positively related to the likelihood of 
takeover resistance 
H2.7: Executive share option is 
negatively related to the likelihood 
of takeover resistance 
H2.4: Executive share option is 
negatively related to takeover 
premiums 
H2.8: Executive share option is 
negatively related to takeover 
premiums 
 
Panel B: MBOs Third-party-LBOs 
 RESIST  PREM RESIST PREM 
 
Expected 
Signs 
Actual 
Signs 
Expected 
Signs 
Actual 
Signs 
Expected 
Signs 
Actual 
Signs 
Expected 
Signs 
Actual 
Signs 
Ownership - + - + + +* + +*** 
Share options + +** - -* - -** - -*** 
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2.4  Research Design and Sample Selection 
2.4.1 Measurement 
2.4.1.1 Dependent variables 
Resistance to a takeover attempt represents an opportunistic behaviour on the 
part of managers who are willing to refuse the offer to retain control of the target 
firm (Baron, 1983; Turk, 1992; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994). Following prior 
research, takeover resistance (resist) represents the initial mood of the target’s 
board to buyout attempts, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 
if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. As Cotter and Zenner (1994) 
and Maheswaran and Pinder (2005) demonstrate, the hostility of a bid is 
regarded as initial evidence in justifying rejection by the target firm’s 
management. This study addresses this concern and proposes that the deal’s 
attitude of describing takeover attempts as hostile, unsolicited or even not 
applicable represents resistance by the board.  
 
The takeover premiums from the announcement (prem) reflects the premiums 
that the shareholders may receive from tendering their shares (Buchholtz and 
Ribbens, 1994). It is the percentage increase in the share price of the target 
firm for the time frame of four weeks before the announcement of the offer to 
the final offer price. Following its definition in Thomson One Banker: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =
(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 4 )
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 4 
                              (2.1) 
 
Where the offer price is the final offer price to the targets, share price 4 is the 
share price four weeks before the announcement of the takeover. 
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2.4.1.2 Independent variables 
The executive managers are the key agents of the shareholders in charge of 
the firms’ operational strategies and policies. This study uses two proxies of top 
executive ownership and executive share options to measure managerial 
interests in relation to takeover resistance and bid premium. Executive 
ownership (exeown) is defined as the number of shares held by the executive 
managers divided by the total number of outstanding shares. Executive share 
options (exeso) are defined as the logarithm of the valuation of executive share 
options. In line with the previous literature, this study uses the valuation as the 
measure of option holdings by calculating with the Black-Scholes’ (1973) 
valuation model: 
 
𝑐 = 𝑠 ∙ 𝑛(𝑑1) − 𝑥𝑒
−𝑟𝑡 ∙ 𝑛(𝑑2) 
 
     𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑠
𝑥
)+(𝑟+
𝛿2
2
)𝑡
𝛿√𝑡
;                   𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝛿√𝑡                   (2.2) 
 
Where 𝑐 is the market value of the call option; 𝑠 is the share price at the 
annual report date selected; 𝑥 is the exercise price; 𝑟 is the risk-free interest 
rate; 𝑡 is the time to expiration; 𝛿 is the volatility; and 𝑛(𝑑𝑖) is the cumulative 
normal density function evaluated at 𝑑𝑖. 
 
2.4.1.3 Control variables 
In the empirical analyses, this study controls for several factors, which are 
potentially related to the dependent and independent variables.  
 
This study controls for undervaluation of the price earnings ratio. As discussed 
before, a firm’s perceived undervaluation is one of the most significant reasons 
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for companies to go private, as the current market valuation of the company, 
measured by the price earnings, does not reflect management’s perception of 
its true value (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). It is for the reason 
that the market had not accurately valued the company in terms of share price; 
firms with a low price earnings ratio are thought to be temporarily unevaluated 
because investors become excessively pessimistic when faced with some bad 
earnings reports or other bad news. Once future earnings turn out to be better 
than the forecasts, the price is seen to be undervalued. Similarly, firms with high 
price earnings ratios are thought to be overvalued, before the price is adjusted 
by a predictably fall (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). Consistent with this argument, 
this study measures a firm’s perceived undervaluation (pe) following Alford 
(1992) and Francis et al. (2005) who constructed industry-adjusted price 
earnings ratios as the difference between the target firm’s price earnings ratio 
and the median industry price earnings ratio. This study draws similar 
inferences, using the ratio of the firm’s price earnings ratio to the two-digit 
industry classification benchmark (ICB) codes of the median industry price 
earnings ratios. Therefore, firms with low (high) pe ratios are likely to be 
undervalued (overvalued). 
 
This study controls for free cash flow (fcf). Generally, free cash flow can be used 
to achieve managerial objectives rather than maximise shareholder wealth. 
However, after buyout it will be used to pay off the debt, which may reduce the 
control power of management (Weir et al., 2005a; Weir and Wright, 2006; Fox 
and Marcus, 1992). Moreover, the large amount of free cash flow is an attractive 
factor for acquirers to take the firm private, as it provides sufficient financial 
support to ensure the firm’s ability to pay future debt (Renneboog et al., 2007; 
Toms and Wright, 2005). This study measures fcf scales as the funds from 
operations after subtracting capital expenditure and cash dividends following 
by the firm’s total assets. 
 
Chapter 2 
58 
This study controls for firm performance, measured by return on assets (roa). 
The target firm’s prior performance will influence management’s reaction 
toward a buyout, as past corporate performance is fundamental for buyout 
valuation (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Previous literature (Morck et al., 
1988a; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994) suggests that those managers who have 
been performing poorly are more likely to resist takeover attempts, because 
they do not want to reveal their incompetence.  
 
Additionally, the ex-ante firm performance will affect the bid premium for the 
reason that a better firm performance will result in fewer available takeover 
gains and target returns for acquirers, and thus reduce the offered premium 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hartzell et al., 2004). This study uses return on 
asset (roa) as a measure for firm performance, which is calculated by dividing 
the net income, by the total assets. 
 
Firm size will affect the difficulty of a buyout because of the magnitude of the 
credit required to finance the transaction. Large firms likely hold large financial 
resources that cause them to be more successful in resisting takeover attempts 
(Morck et al., 1988a; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Cotter et al., 1997).  
 
Furthermore, firm size is likely to affect the bid premium for three reasons. First, 
the larger a firm, the more difficult it will be for acquirers, because of the financial 
stress and risks that the higher magnitudes of the credit are required to finance 
the transaction. Second, the expected synergies from the acquisition for a 
larger firm are more likely to be uncertain, and therefore a lower premium is 
usually paid. Third, large firms tend to be subject to lower managerial ownership 
and are more likely to accept a lower premium. Therefore, this study controls 
for firm size (size) by including the natural logarithm of a firm’s market value 
(Shrivastava, 1986; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Cotter et al., 1997; Bauguess et 
al., 2009; Morck et al., 1988a; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994). 
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This study controls for the amount of ownership held by the board directors 
other than the CEO’s beneficial interest (other-own). The board of directors is 
supposed to supervise the actions of management, particularly in directing the 
CEO, safeguarding shareholders’ interests and vetoing poor business 
decisions (Ertimur et al., 2010; Nguyen, 2012; Weisbach, 1988). Under agency 
theory, a larger degree of ownership by directors will lead to a greater incentive 
for them to be involved and pursue common interests with shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Carline et al., 2011; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994). 
According to Kosnik (1990) and Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994), the extent to 
which a board member may actively defend shareholder interests depends on 
the extent to which board members have similar interests to the shareholders 
on the outcome of the decision. Therefore, directors with large equity holdings 
are more likely to acquiesce to the offer and urge for a higher bid premium than 
those directors whose personal interests are unaffected by the decision 
(Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994).  
 
Under agency theory, debt is used as a governance structure that works to bind 
the management to act in the shareholders' interests. The issuing of debt has 
established a covenant between creditors and debtors. Under this relationship, 
debtors are required to more carefully observe the firm’s stipulated interest 
payments, the liquidity of the business and the redeployability of the assets, as 
there is a stricter penalty for failure to repay debt payments (Williamson, 1988; 
Renneboog et al., 2007; Fox and Marcus, 1992; Jensen, 1986a; Jensen, 
1986b). Moreover, a leveraged buyout is usually financed with a high 
percentage of debt, typically 85%–90% of the purchase price. The firm’s prior 
debt finance has significant effects in buyout debt financing and the likelihood 
of the final success of the takeover. This is because if the company has higher 
leveraged debt before a buyout, managers are likely to have more difficulty in 
issuing new debt. Consequently, this difficulty may further reduce the premium 
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that they offer and increase the likelihood of resistance to the takeover (Jensen, 
1986a; Jensen, 1986b; Hafzalla, 2009). Therefore, this study includes the ratio 
of debt to total assets (level) as a control variable in investigating the 
managerial reactions of concerning takeover resistance and maximisation of 
the bid premium (Williamson, 1988; Fox and Marcus, 1992). 
 
Takeover premium reflects the premiums that target shareholders will receive 
for tendering their shares. Managers who seek to maximise shareholder wealth 
are more likely to accept an offer with a high premium (Buchholtz and Ribbens, 
1994). Consistent with this argument, Walkling and Long (1984), Jennings and 
Mazzeo (1993) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) find that lower premiums are 
usually associated with a greater rate of takeover rejection. Therefore, this 
study controls for the takeover premium (prem) in investigating the effects of 
managerial wealth on takeover resistance.  
 
Moreover, it is expected that new CEOs have usually had little time to develop 
and increase their power to be able to influence the board. They are more 
vulnerable to dismissal and are less likely to have an effect upon takeover 
resistance than CEOs who have been appointed for a long period (Buchholtz 
and Ribbens, 1994). This study controls for the change in CEO (ceoch) as 
defined by Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994), which is equal to 1 if the new CEO 
has been appointed in the financial year prior to the takeover announcement 
and otherwise it is equal to 0. 
 
This study uses the proportion of non-executive directors (ned) on the board as 
an explanatory variable. Non-executive directors are viewed as a governance 
mechanism, which supervises and controls the behaviour of management. The 
outside directors, who have no tie to the firm or its management, can more 
successfully fulfil their function to monitor and control the activities of its 
managers to represent the best interests of shareholders (Buchholtz and 
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Ribbens, 1994; Cotter et al., 1997). According to Jiraporn et al. (2004), in buyout 
transactions, outside directors have played a critical role in protecting 
shareholders’ interests.  
 
This study includes the dummy variable of multiple bidders (multi), which has a 
code of 1 if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target and a 
value of 0 otherwise. The greater the number of competing buyers, the greater 
the bargaining strength for sellers to require a higher premium, since the sellers 
can play one bidder against another (Flanagan and O'Shaughnessy, 2003). The 
argument that multiple bidders are positively correlated with tender offer 
premiums is also supported by Bugeja (2005), Moeller (2005), Bauguess et al. 
(2009) and Bugeja (2011). 
 
The only purpose of institutional investors is to extract the maximum profit from 
their investments. As block holders, institutional investors usually hold a large 
number of shares, which gives them a greater power to pursue a higher 
premium during buyout. For acquirers, in order to complete the buyout, they 
need to purchase the shares currently in the hands of institutional investors 
(Cao, 2011; Weir et al., 2005a; Weir and Wright, 2006; Wright et al., 1991). 
Consequently, a higher takeover premium is an attractive condition for 
institutional investors. Following the approach of Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994), 
Sridharan and Reinganum (1995), Bauguess et al. (2009) and Carline et al. 
(2011), this study controls for institutional shareholders (insti) as the sum of the 
common shareholding for all institutions that hold more than 3% of the 
company’s issued shares.  
 
Audit independence is the mechanism that monitors managers’ behaviours in 
specific accounting techniques (Lowenstein, 1985; Weir et al., 2005a; Fox and 
Marcus, 1992). Since the degree of reliance on and confidence in financial 
information will affect the true value of the firm, audit independence is 
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associated with the size of bid premium. Following the measures used by 
Defond et al. (2002) and Bugeja (2011), this study controls for audit 
independence (lnnas) as the natural logarithm of the non-audit fees paid to the 
incumbent auditor. 
 
2.4.2 Empirical models 
This study estimates the following empirical models containing the two proxies 
of managerial interests, including executive ownership and share options, and 
the control variables of the characteristics of the organisations, using logistics 
regression and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression respectively. 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑓𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
− 𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽8𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚 + 𝛽9𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑐ℎ + 𝜀                     (2.3) 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑓𝑐𝑓 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
− 𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 𝛽8𝑛𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽9𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠
+ 𝜀                                                       (2.4) 
 
Where pe is the price earnings ratio that is calculated by adjusting the target 
price earnings ratio by subtracting the industry median price earnings ratio, 
along with using the 2-digit ICB code; fcf is the free cash flow scaled by the total 
amount of assets; roa is the firm’s return on assets; size is the natural logarithm 
of the market value; level is the total debt divided by the total assets; other-own 
is the amount of common shares held by the target board directors other than 
the CEO; prem is the takeover premium of the offer price to the target firm’s 
closing share price four weeks prior to the original announcement date; ceoch 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the new CEO has been appointed 
in the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise takes a 
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value of 0; ned is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; multi 
is the dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is more than one 
simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise takes a value of 0; insti is the 
total amount of common shares held by institutional investors divided by the 
total amount of common outstanding shares; lnnas is the natural logarithm of 
non-audit fees.  
 
2.4.3 Sample and data 
The sample consists of all the complete and withdrawal leveraged buyout 
tender offers that took place on the London Share Exchange from 1997 to 2011 
for which full data were available. LBOs are defined as public-to-private 
transactions, where listed companies are taken over by financial institutions, by 
the executive directors or another individual blockholder (Weir et al., 2005a). 
This study is entirely based on UK data. The initial sample includes 113 MBO 
tender offers and 88 third-party LBO tender offers. The sample excludes non-
UK corporations (8 MBOs and 3 third-party LBOs) and financial services 
companies because they are subject to a different set of financial structures, 
regulatory disclosure requirements and corporate governance systems. Panels 
A and B in Table 2.7 in the Appendix report the number of observations having 
sufficient data to be included in the tests of takeover resistance and bid 
premiums respectively. The final sample consists of 92 MBO and 65 third-party 
LBO tender offers in the investigation of takeover resistance, and 84 MBO and 
62 third-party LBO tender offers in the investigation of takeover premiums. 
During the period under study, the number of buyout tender offers reached a 
peak in 1999 and 2006.  
 
Information on buyout transactions is taken from four sources. Deal information 
and the firms’ annual reports are collected from the Thomson One Banker 
Chapter 2 
64 
database, Thomson Research and the Nexis UK-Lexis database. DataStream 
represents the accounting and financial information. To be included, the 
financial and governance data at the last year-end before the announcement of 
a LBO is required. All the corporate governance information is hand collected 
from the companies’ annual reports. Moreover, this study winsorises the top 
and bottom 1% of the testing variables through the 3 times of stand deviation, 
to mitigate the effects of extreme observations. 
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Table 2.2 Name of variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variables:  
resist A dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is 
classified as friendly and 1 otherwise 
prem The takeover premiums of offer price to target closing 
share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement 
date 
Independent 
variables:  
exeown The percentage of executive shareholding 
ceoown The percentage of CEO shareholding 
exeownv The year-end share price times the number of executive 
shares held and is in millions of pounds 
ceoownv The year-end share price times the number of CEO 
shares held and is in millions of pounds 
exeso The logarithm of the valuation of executive share options 
with Black-Scholes’ (1973) model 
Control variable:  
pe The price earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target 
PE ratio by subtracting the industry median PE, along with 
using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (ICB-
code) sorting 
fcf Free cash flow, which is defined as the funds from 
operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend 
deflated by total assets 
roa Return on assets 
size The natural logarithm of market value 
other-own The common shares held by the target board directors 
other than the CEO 
level Total debt divided by total assets 
ceoch A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the new CEO 
has been appointed at the financial year prior to the 
takeover announcement and otherwise 0 
ned The percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
insti The total common shares held by institutional investors 
divided by total common outstanding shares, where the 
shareholding is in excess of 3% 
lnnas The natural logarithm of the non-audit fees 
multi A dummy variable that code as 1 if there is more than one 
simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise 0 
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2.5  Results 
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.3 presents an overview of descriptive statistics for the key variables in 
the models. As reported in Panel A of Table 2.3, about 3.26% of the MBOs and 
9.23% of third-party LBOs have an initial hostile target management reaction, 
which is much lower than the US hostile takeover rate reported by Cotter and 
Zenner (1994), who found that 50% of the firms sampled in 1988-1991 received 
target management resistance. In the sample, 6.52% of MBO offers and 9.23% 
of third-party LBO offers have changed their CEO within one year of the tender 
offer being announced, and 11.9% of MBO deals and 38.71% of third-party LBO 
deals have more than one bidder.  
 
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables 
 MBO Third-party LBO 
resist Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 89 96.74 96.74 59 90.77 90.77 
1 3 3.26 100 6 9.23 100 
Total 92 100  65 100  
ceoch Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 86 93.48 93.48 59 90.77 90.77 
1 6 6.52 100 6 9.23 100 
Total 92 100  65 100  
multi Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 74 88.1 88.1 38 61.29 61.29 
1 10 11.9 100 24 38.71 100 
Total 84 100  62 100  
 
Table 2.3, Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for determinants of takeover 
resistance. The mean ownership by the top executive (exeown) is 14.141% in 
MBOs and 6.274% in third-party LBOs, while the mean ownership by the CEO 
(ceoown) is 8.152% and 3.356% in MBOs and third-party LBOs respectively. 
exeown and ceoown exhibit a considerable degree of skewness in that the 
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median values are only 6.433% and 0.715% in MBOs, and 1.084% and 0.266% 
in third-party LBOs. The 75th percentile value for MBOs/third-party LBOs, 
20.275%/10.841% of top executive ownership and 9.714%/3.295% of CEO 
ownership, indicates that management involved in MBO deals holds a larger 
percentage of shareholdings. The mean (median) executive share option 
(exeso) is 10.724 (11.86) and 11.452 (12.561) in MBOs and third-party LBOs 
respectively. The mean (median) CEO ownership value (ceoownv) and 
executive ownership value (exeownv) exhibit £0.342 million (£0.038 million) 
and £0.618 million (£0.137 million) in MBO deals, compared with the values of 
£0.182 million (£0.043 million) and £1.128 million (£0.096 million) in third-party 
LBOs.  
 
The distribution of price earnings ratio (pe) appears to be generally skewed and 
presents mean values often considerably higher than median values. The 
median values of pe −4.784 in MBOs and −5.629 in third-party LBOs imply that 
at least more than 50% of buyout firms tend to exhibit perceived undervaluation 
one year prior to the announcement of the takeover. The free cash flow over 
total assets (fcf) shows that MBOs have a significantly greater proportion of 
firms exhibiting this characteristic than do firms in third-party LBOs. MBOs also 
have higher roa ratios. The firm size (size) extends from a value of 14.431 
(15.601) to 21.975 (23.019) in MBOs (third-party LBOs). Average leverage 
ratios (level) were 0.171 in MBOs and 0.257 in third-party LBOs, which indicate 
that MBO targets hold less debt than third-party LBO targets. The mean 
(median) other insider ownership is 11.867% (3.618%) and 6.436% (0.943%) 
in MBOs and third-party LBOs, respectively.  
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Determinants of Takeover Resistance  
 MBO  Third-party LBO 
 Mean Median S.D. Min 0.250 0.750 Max N  Mean Median S.D. Min 0.250 0.750 Max N 
prem (%) 45.587 43.210 35.995 -60.000 25.675 58.475 208.200 92  45.389 37.250 50.473 -99.380 22.230 63.680 228.570 65 
exeown (%) 14.141 6.433 18.147 0.000 0.652 20.275 73.190 92  6.274 1.084 12.062 0.000 0.172 10.841 72.835 65 
exeownv (million £) 0.618 0.137 1.610 0.000 0.046 0.486 13.031 92  1.128 0.096 6.708 0.000 0.019 0.324 54.136 65 
ceoown (%) 8.152 0.715 14.410 0.000 0.069 9.714 68.050 92  3.356 0.266 8.606 0.000 0.064 3.295 64.764 65 
ceoownv  (million £) 0.342 0.038 1.390 0.000 0.005 0.181 12.965 92  0.182 0.043 0.573 0.000 0.009 0.094 4.500 65 
exeso 10.724 11.860 3.905 0.000 10.590 12.984 15.571 90  11.452 12.561 4.328 0.000 10.685 14.235 15.819 65 
pe 6.709 -4.784 55.975 -24.724 -10.499 2.233 378.267 92  -1.231 -5.629 29.795 -42.347 -10.299 0.998 210.952 65 
fcf (%) 0.892 2.238 9.034 -41.535 -3.456 5.933 22.001 92  -0.252 0.821 8.651 -37.540 -2.119 4.589 20.130 65 
roa 0.061 0.068 0.128 -0.514 0.028 0.114 0.540 92  0.051 0.067 0.107 -0.521 0.038 0.092 0.315 65 
size 17.357 17.307 1.219 14.431 16.765 18.000 21.975 92  18.767 18.579 1.773 15.601 17.332 19.859 23.019 65 
other-own (%) 11.867 3.618 17.430 0.010 0.443 16.986 72.951 92  6.436 0.943 10.108 0.007 0.171 9.831 41.584 65 
level 0.171 0.147 0.148 0.000 0.051 0.238 0.740 92  0.257 0.250 0.186 0.000 0.110 0.373 0.833 65 
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Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Determinants of Bid Premiums  
 MBO Third-party LBO 
 Mean Median S.D. Min 0.250  0.750  Max N Mean Median S.D. Min 0.250  0.750  Max N 
prem (%) 45.889  43.210  36.243  -60.000  26.570  58.110  208.200  84 46.440  38.545  51.354  -99.380  22.230  64.960  228.570  62 
exeown (%) 13.554  6.249  17.650  0.000  0.652  19.076  73.190  84 6.554  1.258  12.285  0.000  0.172  10.992  72.835  62 
exeownv (million £) 0.645  0.151  1.679  0.000  0.046  0.472  13.031  84 1.177  0.096  6.867  0.000  0.016  0.464  54.136  62 
ceoown (%) 7.644  0.700  13.409  0.000  0.069  8.291  56.227  84 3.514  0.318  8.784  0.000  0.064  3.773  64.764  62 
ceoownv  (million £) 0.354  0.038  1.451  0.000  0.005  0.181  12.965  84 0.190  0.049  0.585  0.000  0.009  0.100  4.500  62 
exeso 10.748  11.845  3.863  0.000  10.590  12.984  15.571  82 11.345  12.547  4.367  0.000  10.685  14.225  15.819  62 
pe 2.713  -5.109  41.672  -24.724  -10.882  1.366  287.435  84 -1.119  -6.242  30.500  -42.347  -10.366  0.998  210.952  62 
fcf (%) 0.829  2.238  9.316  -41.535  -3.456  5.933  22.001  84 -0.300  0.841  8.791  -37.540  -2.119  4.589  20.130  62 
roa 0.059  0.068  0.127  -0.514  0.028  0.113  0.540  84 0.051  0.068  0.107  -0.521  0.038  0.092  0.315  62 
size 17.357  17.307  1.235  14.431  16.765  18.000  21.975  84 18.708  18.526  1.791  15.601  17.214  19.682  23.019  62 
other-own (%) 12.127  3.821  17.823  0.010  0.520  17.194  72.951  84 6.710  0.838  10.273  0.007  0.171  10.920  41.584  62 
level 0.168  0.140  0.152  0.000  0.050  0.233  0.740  84 0.261  0.253  0.186  0.000  0.123  0.373  0.833  62 
ned (%) 45.476  42.900  13.823  14.300  38.750  50.000  75.000  84 52.902  50.000  12.447  22.200  44.400  62.500  75.000  62 
insti (%) 34.748  31.660  20.940  0.000  20.855  49.566  89.000  84 35.235  34.764  16.863  0.000  25.670  44.752  72.720  62 
lnnas 10.956  11.002  1.172  7.601  10.240  11.711  14.095  84 11.773  11.851  1.640  6.908  10.779  12.882  15.274  62 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. ceoch is the dummy 
variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. multi is the dummy variable that code 
as 1 if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise 0. prem is the takeover premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the 
original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is percentage of ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number 
of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times the number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm 
of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry 
median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (ICB-code) sorting. fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital 
expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is the natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the 
target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ned is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. insti is the total common shares 
held by institutional investors divided by total common outstanding shares, where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. lnnas is the natural logarithm of the non-audit fees.  
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Panel C of Table 2.3 also reports the descriptive statistics for the determinants 
of takeover premiums. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Bugeja, 2011; 
Bargeron et al., 2008), target shareholders usually receive significant positive 
abnormal returns four weeks before the takeover announcement with the mean 
(median) of 45.889% (43.21%) and 46.44% (38.545%) in MBOs and third-party 
LBOs respectively. In terms of board independence, on average 45.476% 
(MBOs) and 52.902% (third-party LBOs) of board directors are non-executives. 
External shareholdings held by institutions have a mean value of 34.748% 
(35.235%) in MBOs (third-party LBOs), which means that large institutional 
shareholders held three times (six times) as many as executive shareholders. 
Finally, the statistics for audit independence (lnnas) show a mean (median) 
value of 10.956 (11.002) in MBO deals and 11.773 (11.851) in third-party LBO 
deals, which indicate that MBO firms tend to have more independent audit than 
third-party LBO firms.  
 
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 in the Appendix report the Pearson correlation matrix 
between the variables used in estimating the models of takeover resistance and 
bid premiums, each one associated with the corresponding significance level. 
Reading through the columns, it can be observed that exeown and ceoown are 
highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.752 (MBOs) and 0.807 
(third-party LBO) in determining takeover resistance, and 0.736 (MBOs) and 
0.806 (third-party LBOs) in determining the bid premium. In MBOs, exeownv 
and ceoownv are also highly correlated, which should not be included in the 
same equation to avoid multicollinearity. According to the research of 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the correlation for every variable in our models is 
below 0.7, which indicates that multicollinearity will not be a problem in the 
regression analysis. Moreover, this study applies the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) test, which verifies that the results are not distorted by multicollinearity. 
 
In the correlation tables, it is found that the following factors are significantly 
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correlated with takeover premiums and bid resistance. Specifically, panel A of 
Table 2.9 in the Appendix demonstrates that ceoch (0.199) is significantly 
associated with a higher level of resist in MBOs. Panel B in the same table 
shows that resist is significantly positively correlated with exeownv (0.39), size 
(0.419) and ceoch (0.266) in third-party LBOs. In Panel A, Table 2.10 in the 
Appendix reports that prem exhibits a significantly negative correlation with 
exeso (−0.333) but a significantly positive correlation with pe (0.329) and lnnas 
(0.216) in MBO deals. Panel B, Table 2.10 in the Appendix observes that prem 
is negatively correlated with pe (-0.331), roa (-0.475) and level (−0.211) but 
positively associated with multi (0.229) in third-party LBOs. 
 
2.5.2 Main results 
Table 2.4 presents the logistic regression results to test the association between 
managerial interests and the likelihood of takeover resistance (resist) in the 
context of MBOs and third-party LBOs. The research tests the influence of 
executive ownership, executive share options and their joint effects on takeover 
resistance. In addition, the robust regression method is used to make 
adjustments in terms of heteroscedasticity by estimating the regression models 
with robust standard errors or including the industry cluster option of the four-
digit ICB code. 
 
Overall, in Table 2.4 and 2.5, the research finds that the pseudo R-squares in 
examining the influence of managerial ownership and share options on 
takeover resistance are 0.14 (0.55) and 0.16 (0.6) in MBOs (third-party LBOs). 
This is an acceptable level. The previous literature on the determinants of 
hostility finds that the R-square of the model is about 0.1 (Maheswaran and 
Pinder, 2005). Carline and Yadav (2008) identify that the R-square for the model 
in examining the influence of corporate governance on target board resistance 
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is about 0.39. Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014) find that the R-square of the 
model for the determinants of target resistance is 0.22.  
 
As shown in Table 2.4, the general performance of the models is satisfactory. 
The Wald-Chi2 tests show that all the equations are highly significant (p-
value<0.01). The pseudo R-squares in third-party LBO models are much 
greater than those of MBO models. Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 show that the executive 
ownership (exeown) is not significant correlated with takeover resistance in 
MBOs ( 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙1,2 = 1.733 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙1 = 0.657 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙2 = 0.665 ; 
𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙4,5 = 0.993 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙4 = 0.378 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙5 = 0.382 ). This result 
may suggest that, in MBOs, increased executive share ownership does not 
significantly influence takeover resistance from the board, which rejects 
Hypothesis 2.1. Although it may be expected that, in MBOs, increasing 
executive share ownership provides managers with greater influence and 
voting power to prevent takeover resistance from other board directors, the 
results suggest otherwise. This might because management’s direct 
involvement in MBOs can provide them with stronger incentives that affect their 
decision-making, independent of their prior shareholding in the firm.  
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Table 2.4 The relationship between managerial ownership, share options and takeover resistance 
 Dependent Variable=RESIST 
 MBO Third-party LBO 
 
Expected 
Signs 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model 5 Model6 
Expected 
Signs 
Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12 
exeown - 1.733 1.733   0.993 0.993 + 13.701* 13.701*   15.105*** 15.105*** 
  (0.657) (0.665)   (0.378) (0.382)  (1.825) (1.796)   (2.630) (2.639) 
exeso +   0.182** 0.182* 0.170* 0.170 -   -0.468** -0.468** -0.375*** -0.375*** 
    (2.059) (1.733) (1.897) (1.602)    (-2.447) (-2.298) (-2.801) (-2.767) 
pe  -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005* -0.005 -0.005**  0.013 0.013 -0.059** -0.059* -0.049* -0.049** 
  (-0.916) (-1.159) (-1.542) (-1.936) (-1.542) (-2.057)  (0.545) (0.557) (-1.978) (-1.958) (-1.785) (-2.040) 
fcf  5.474 5.474 7.157 7.157 7.137 7.137  -3.637 -3.637 -2.745 -2.745 0.849 0.849 
  (1.233) (1.112) (1.540) (1.515) (1.449) (1.429)  (-0.553) (-0.557) (-0.436) (-0.481) (0.085) (0.084) 
roa  -1.752 -1.752 -2.321 -2.321 -2.519 -2.519  -18.748 -18.748 -29.375 -29.375 -31.557** -31.557** 
  (-0.277) (-0.276) (-0.403) (-0.415) (-0.417) (-0.430)  (-1.347) (-1.336) (-1.587) (-1.557) (-2.230) (-2.210) 
size  0.562** 0.562** 0.586** 0.586** 0.613** 0.613**  1.327*** 1.327*** 2.013** 2.013** 1.892*** 1.892*** 
  (2.034) (2.306) (2.171) (2.469) (2.117) (2.360)  (2.695) (2.716) (2.303) (2.210) (3.396) (3.373) 
other-own  -1.295 -1.295 0.942 0.942 0.600 0.600  -7.671 -7.671 3.584 3.584 -8.387 -8.387 
  (-0.417) (-0.434) (0.268) (0.277) (0.218) (0.227)  (-1.526) (-1.487) (0.733) (0.658) (-1.418) (-1.347) 
level  0.129 0.129 0.069 0.069 0.140 0.140  -7.429 -7.429 -12.058** -12.058** -11.395* -11.395* 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017)  (-1.408) (-1.335) (-2.255) (-2.345) (-1.954) (-1.896) 
prem  1.974* 1.974** 2.999** 2.999*** 2.990** 2.990***  -2.707 -2.707 -4.270 -4.270 -4.883** -4.883** 
  (1.656) (1.984) (2.343) (2.656) (2.362) (2.675)  (-1.100) (-1.111) (-1.475) (-1.518) (-2.083) (-2.099) 
ceoch  2.872** 2.872** 3.045** 3.045** 3.173** 3.173**  3.127* 3.127* 4.238* 4.238* 4.218** 4.218** 
  (2.155) (2.202) (2.106) (2.003) (2.254) (2.131)  (1.680) (1.683) (1.769) (1.759) (2.316) (2.398) 
Industry Cluster   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
               
Constant  
-
14.825*** 
-
14.825*** 
-
17.834*** 
-
17.834*** 
-
18.288*** 
-
18.288*** 
 
-
25.862*** 
-
25.862*** 
-32.182** -32.182** 
-
30.757*** 
-
30.757*** 
  (-3.168) (-3.600) (-3.807) (-4.321) (-3.714) (-4.192)  (-3.039) (-3.071) (-2.320) (-2.211) (-3.451) (-3.469) 
Chapter 2 
74 
               
Wald Chi2  29.980*** 63.520*** 23.550*** 38.250*** 22.780*** 42.600***  23.180*** 39.050*** 24.220*** 22.110*** 27.080*** 26.620*** 
Prob>Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.000  0.006 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.003 
Pseudo R Square  0.142 0.142 0.160 0.160 0.162 0.162  0.555 0.555 0.604 0.604 0.624 0.624 
Observations  92 92 90 90 90 90  65 65 65 65 65 65 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover 
premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is percentage of 
ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price earnings 
ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. fcf is the 
free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is the natural 
logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the dummy 
variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0.  
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However, as expected in Hypothesis 2.3, the results of Models 3, 4 and 5 in 
Table 2.4 suggest that increases in executive share option holdings tend to 
increase takeover resistance (resist) in MBOs. The coefficient of executive 
share options (exeso) is significantly positive at the 0.05 (Model3, z-stat=2.059) 
and 0.1 (Model4, z-stat=1.733; Model5, z-stat=1.897) levels. This result may 
further indicate that option-based compensation allows the board of directors 
to observe management efforts to improve the firm’s performance. While the 
share options are available to exercise immediately after MBOs, managers are 
likely to exercise them to increase their ownership in the firm rather than in a 
cash-payment. The board of directors might be more cautious about the MBO 
offers and may tend to resist the offer when they are aware of managers’ 
incentives from share option. 
 
The results of control variables for determinant takeover resistance in MBOs 
are generally consistent with prior studies. The coefficient of pe and resist is 
negatively significant at the 0.1 level, while size and ceoch are positively related 
to resist at the 0.05 level. Moreover, the results suggest that a higher prem 
results in a higher resist at the 5% level in MBOs. This further indicates that 
managers would like to provide higher premiums to overcome resistance from 
the board in MBOs. However, the coefficients of fcf, roa, other-own, and level 
are all insignificant.  
 
Next this study tests the relation between executive ownership and takeover 
resistance in the setting of third-party LBOs. In Models 7, 8, 11 and 12 of Table 
2.4, the results suggest that an increased exeown is positively significantly 
correlated with resist ( 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙7,8 = 13.701 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙7 = 1.825 ; 𝑧 −
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙8 = 1.796 ; 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙11,12 = 15.105 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙11 = 2.63 ; 𝑧 −
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙12 = 2.639 ). Consistent with Hypothesis 2.5, that since the 
management is not involved in buyout transactions, managers with higher 
share ownership are likely to have greater power and influence to affect the 
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board’s decision (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). This allows them to reject 
buyout offers in order to protect their own interests as regards their long-term 
job security and discretion within the firm.  
 
However, instead of ownership with share options, the coefficient of exeso is 
significantly negative ( 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙9,10 = −0.468 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙9 = −2.447 ; 𝑧 −
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙10 = −2.298 ; 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙11,12 = −0.375 ; 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙11 = −2.801 ; 𝑧 −
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙12 = −2.767) as shown in Models 7, 8, 11 and 12 in Table 2.4. This 
result confirms that ownership and options could provide managers with 
different incentives. As share options allow managers to realise additional 
personal profits without conditions or restrictions (Sanders, 2001), higher 
options can increase their motivation to accept an third-party LBO offers and 
accrue higher returns from the exercise of share options immediate after buyout.  
 
With respect to the control variables of takeover resistance in third-party LBO 
context, the coefficients of size and ceoch are significantly positive, as expected, 
in all models. These findings are consistent with the predictions and results of 
prior studies, which indicate that larger firms and newly designated CEOs tend 
to generate more resistance to buyout offers. A significantly negative coefficient 
of level indicates that firms with high debt have less takeover resistance. 
However, this study does not find evidence that fcf, roa and other-own have 
significant effects on resist. 
 
The hypotheses relating to managerial interests and takeover premiums are 
tested in a similar method as in Table 2.5, by including robust standard errors 
and the industry cluster option of the four-digit ICB code. Table 2.5 reports the 
regression results of managerial interests on both measures of share ownership 
and options. The F-test shows that Models 14, 18 and 19 to 24 are highly 
significant at the 1% level, Model 15 is significant at the 10% level and Model 
16 is significant at the 5% level, while Model 13 and 17 are statistically 
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insignificant. The research finds that the R-squares of the model in examining 
the influence of managerial ownership and share options on takeover premiums 
are 0.25 (0.57) and 0.32 (0.56) in MBOs (third-party LBOs). Compare with the 
earlier studies, the R-squares in this research are in an acceptable range. The 
previous literature of Bugeja (2011) identifies that the R-square of the model in 
examining the influence of auditor independence and reputation on takeover 
premiums is 0.076. Moreover, in examining the determinants of takeover 
premiums, the R-squares are 0.22 in Sudarsanam and Sorwar (2010), and 0.68 
in Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014). 
 
Models 13 and 14 in Table 2.5 report the results for exeown on takeover 
premiums in MBOs; Models 15 and 16 repeat the exercise for exeso, while 
Model 17 and 18 test the joint effects of exeown and exeso on premiums. 
According to Hypothesis 2.2, that in MBOs managers who hold higher 
ownerships may offer a lower takeover premium, as managers are likely to 
purchase the firm with a lowest possible price. However, the result suggests 
that none of the coefficients of exeown variables is significant in MBOs; the 
coefficients in Models 13 and 14 are 0.01 (t-stat=0.031) and 0.01 (t-stat=0.034), 
respectively. One possible explanation for this insignificant relation might be 
that although managers are likely to pay the lowest possible price to take over 
the firms, high takeover premiums can easily attract the interest of other 
shareholders and increase the success of takeover.  
 
The negative coefficient on exeso in Model 15 of Table 2.5 (−0.027) is 
statistically significant at the 10% level but insignificant after including the 
industry cluster option in Model 16. These results suggest that as the instigators 
of buyouts, managers are more likely to offer lower premiums to reduce their 
cost of buyouts. Share options do not have cash incentive in MBOs, but to 
increase managers’ ownership in the firms after the takeovers. Hence, 
managers are less likely to offer higher premiums in MBOs when they have 
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higher share options within the firms. 
 
Turning to control variables of takeover premiums in third-party LBOs, the 
coefficient of size confirms the significantly negative relation with prem at the 
5% level, as expected in all models. Consistent with the existing literature, such 
as Bugeja (2011), the coefficient of lnnas is significantly positive. However, this 
study fails to find evidence that the effects of pe, fcf, roa, other-own, level, ned, 
multi and insti are significant.  
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Table 2.5 The relationship between managerial ownership, share options and takeover premiums 
 Dependent Variable=PREM 
 MBO Third-party LBO 
 
Expected 
Signs 
Model13 Model14 Model15 Model16 Model17 Model18 
Expected 
Signs 
Model19 Model20 Model21 Model22 Model23 Model24 
exeown - 0.010 0.010   0.023 0.023 + 1.234*** 1.234***   1.196*** 1.196*** 
  (0.031) (0.034)   (0.077) (0.089)  (3.035) (3.182)   (3.210) (3.088) 
exeso -   -0.027* -0.027 -0.027* -0.027 -   -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025** -0.025*** 
    (-1.830) (-1.564) (-1.815) (-1.561)    (-2.874) (-2.930) (-2.591) (-2.928) 
pe  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (1.275) (1.151) (1.418) (1.267) (1.395) (1.247)  (-3.568) (-3.562) (-4.648) (-4.733) (-3.823) (-4.126) 
fcf  0.073 0.073 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020  -0.042 -0.042 0.295 0.295 0.175 0.175 
  (0.224) (0.232) (-0.069) (-0.064) (-0.066) (-0.062)  (-0.077) (-0.085) (0.491) (0.533) (0.312) (0.329) 
roa  0.041 0.041 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001  -2.654*** -2.654*** -2.737*** -2.737*** -2.934*** -2.934*** 
  (0.100) (0.113) (0.008) (0.009) (-0.002) (-0.002)  (-5.460) (-6.065) (-5.214) (-5.511) (-6.310) (-6.622) 
size  -0.110** -0.110** -0.095** -0.095** -0.095** -0.095**  -0.044 -0.044 -0.041 -0.041 -0.031 -0.031 
  (-2.292) (-2.516) (-2.143) (-2.309) (-2.107) (-2.248)  (-1.229) (-1.139) (-1.134) (-1.099) (-0.843) (-0.809) 
other-own  0.197 0.197 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003  -1.165*** -1.165** -0.589 -0.589 -1.075** -1.075** 
  (0.893) (1.028) (0.003) (0.004) (-0.010) (-0.012)  (-2.719) (-2.564) (-1.124) (-1.125) (-2.553) (-2.446) 
level  -0.036 -0.036 -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017  -0.959*** -0.959*** -1.058*** -1.058*** -1.093*** -1.093*** 
  (-0.119) (-0.099) (-0.047) (-0.044) (-0.053) (-0.047)  (-3.022) (-3.267) (-3.473) (-3.800) (-3.578) (-3.986) 
ned  -0.044 -0.044 -0.181 -0.181 -0.167 -0.167  0.353 0.353 -0.141 -0.141 0.223 0.223 
  (-0.114) (-0.130) (-0.518) (-0.560) (-0.403) (-0.395)  (0.695) (0.745) (-0.249) (-0.252) (0.413) (0.414) 
multi  0.133 0.133 0.131 0.131 0.132 0.132  0.222** 0.222*** 0.236** 0.236** 0.263*** 0.263*** 
  (1.361) (1.580) (1.531) (1.587) (1.517) (1.616)  (2.387) (2.758) (2.332) (2.484) (2.715) (3.052) 
insti  0.051 0.051 0.062 0.062 0.069 0.069  0.447 0.447 0.239 0.239 0.358 0.358 
  (0.253) (0.286) (0.303) (0.329) (0.324) (0.397)  (1.312) (1.527) (0.695) (0.732) (1.059) (1.106) 
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lnnas  0.122** 0.122** 0.111*** 0.111** 0.112*** 0.112**  0.083*** 0.083*** 0.067** 0.067** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
  (2.569) (2.655) (2.682) (2.574) (2.687) (2.601)  (3.127) (3.100) (2.612) (2.412) (3.417) (3.042) 
Industry Cluster   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
               
Constant  0.992 0.992 1.225* 1.225* 1.208* 1.208  0.251 0.251 1.083* 1.083* 0.378 0.378 
  (1.561) (1.692) (1.881) (1.893) (1.735) (1.684)  (0.366) (0.340) (1.910) (1.890) (0.584) (0.543) 
               
F-test  1.450 8.100*** 1.700* 2.400** 1.590 3.450***  21.460*** 33.370*** 19.110*** 22.350*** 30.760*** 43.250*** 
Prob>f  0.168 0.000 0.090 0.027 0.115 0.003  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared  0.253 0.253 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324  0.568 0.568 0.563 0.563 0.604 0.604 
Root MSE  0.336 0.336 0.324 0.324 0.326   0.373 0.373 0.375 0.375 0.361 0.361 
Observations  84 84 82 82 82 82  62 62 62 62 62 62 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover 
premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is percentage of 
ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price earnings 
ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. fcf is the 
free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is the natural 
logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the dummy 
variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. multi is the dummy variable that code 
as 1 if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise 0. ned is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. insti is the total common shares 
held by institutional investors divided by total common outstanding shares, where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. lnnas is the natural logarithm of the non-audit fees. 
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Moreover, Models 19, 20, 23 and 24 in Table 2.5 provide evidence that 
increasing exeown tends to increase prem in third-party LBOs. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2.6, the coefficient of exeown is significantly positive (𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙19,20 =
1.234 ; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙19 = 3.035 ; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙20 = 3.182 ; 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙23,24 = 1.196 ; 
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙23 = 3.21 ; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙24 = 3.088 ). This finding indicates that 
ownership could align the interests of managers and shareholders, as the 
growth of premiums will increase managers’ gains in wealth.  
 
In addition, the significantly negative coefficient of exeso reported in Models 21 
(t-stat=-2.874), 22 (t-stat=-2.93), 23 (t-stat=-2.591) and 24 (t-stat=-2.928) for 
third-party LBOs suggests that higher options reduce the incentive of 
management to require a higher premium. As higher takeover premiums may 
increase the difficulty for acquirers to raise funds and increase the risk of 
takeover failure, managers with higher share options in third-party LBOs may 
have less incentives to drive up the takeover premiums.  
 
Finally, the results for the control variables in third-party LBOs suggest that the 
coefficients of pe and roa are negatively significant with prem at the 1% level. 
The coefficient of level is negatively significant, consistent with Hafzalla (2009). 
Consistent with Flanagan and O'Shaughnessy (2003), the coefficient of multi is 
significantly positive. Consistent with Bugeja (2011), the coefficient of lnnas is 
significantly positively correlated with the level of takeover premiums. 
 
2.5.3 Additional analysis 
2.5.3.1 The effects of managerial interests in LBOs  
This study conducts a number of additional sensitivity analyses to test the 
robustness of the results. As the sample of LBOs is the combination of MBOs 
and third-party LBOs and the characteristics of undervaluation, and free cash 
Chapter 2 
82 
flows are the common motivations for firms going private, this study estimates 
the influence of managerial interests on shareholder wealth protection using the 
whole sample of LBOs.  
 
Table 2.6 presents results of regressing the managerial interests based on 
exeown, exeso and their joint effects with takeover resistance in LBOs. The 
results in Table 2.6 suggest that exeown is significantly positive associated with 
resist in LBOs, which is consistent with the results in third-party LBOs but 
contrary to the results in MBOs in Table 2.4. Moreover, the coefficients of exeso 
in Models 27 to 30 have the same sign as the results reported for third-party 
LBOs but contrary to the results reported for MBOs in Table 2.4. This indicates 
that executive ownership and share options are likely to have different effects 
in MBOs and third-party LBOs. It further provides evidence that MBOs and 
third-party LBOs could offer managers different incentives. Therefore, it is 
necessary to analyse the effects of managers’ interests by splitting LBOs into 
MBOs and third-party LBOs.  
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Table 2.6 The relationship between managerial ownership, share options 
and takeover resistance in LBOs 
 Dependent Variable=RESIST 
 Model25 Model26 Model27 Model28 Model29 Model30 
exeown 3.482** 3.482**   3.843** 3.843** 
 (2.075) (2.286)   (2.029) (2.129) 
exeso   -0.056 -0.056 -0.074 -0.074 
   (-0.920) (-1.122) (-1.295) (-1.494) 
pe 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.745) (0.763) (0.486) (0.529) (0.580) (0.608) 
fcf 2.352 2.352 1.526 1.526 2.348 2.348 
 (0.560) (0.831) (0.409) (0.650) (0.521) (0.793) 
roa -5.231 -5.231 -4.760 -4.760 -5.919 -5.919 
 (-1.379) (-1.452) (-1.509) (-1.563) (-1.548) (-1.630) 
size 0.921*** 0.921*** 0.883*** 0.883*** 0.978*** 0.978*** 
 (3.622) (3.604) (3.698) (3.736) (3.627) (3.608) 
other-own -1.481 -1.481 -0.949 -0.949 -2.147 -2.147 
 (-0.601) (-0.560) (-0.374) (-0.365) (-0.960) (-0.910) 
level -2.400 -2.400 -2.991 -2.991 -2.745 -2.745 
 (-1.090) (-0.993) (-1.336) (-1.207) (-1.243) (-1.125) 
prem 0.213 0.213 0.289 0.289 0.144 0.144 
 (0.330) (0.317) (0.453) (0.426) (0.214) (0.198) 
ceoch 2.662*** 2.662*** 2.483** 2.483*** 2.789*** 2.789*** 
 (2.747) (3.613) (2.492) (3.217) (2.967) (4.247) 
Industry Cluster  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Constant -20.123*** -20.123*** -18.426*** -18.426*** -20.239*** -20.239*** 
 (-4.086) (-4.058) (-4.019) (-4.034) (-3.979) (-3.973) 
       
Wald Chi2 28.670*** 39.160*** 27.530*** 60.300*** 32.440*** 63.080*** 
Prob>Chi2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.313 0.313 0.304 0.304 0.320 0.320 
Observations 157 157 155 155 155 155 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 
0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover premiums of offer price to target 
closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive 
shareholding. ceoown is percentage of ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times 
the number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of 
executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price earnings ratio that calculate by 
adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry 
classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation 
minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size 
is the natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors 
other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the dummy variable that takes value 
of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and 
otherwise 0. 
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In the analysis of managers’ behaviour to maximise takeover premiums, Table 
2.7 presents the results based on Models 31–36 for LBOs. To analyse 
robustness, this study re-estimates all the regressions involving exeown and 
exeso in LBOs, which increases the sample size to 146 observations. In Model 
31 and 35, the coefficient of exeown is significantly positive with prem 
(𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙31 = 1.702 ; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙32 = 1.705 ), consistent with Song and 
Walkling (1993), Morck et al. (1988b) and Fama and Jensen (1983). Although, 
in Model 32, exeown is positive but statistically insignificant, the sign of the 
results is consistent with the hypothesis, which expects that higher ownership 
may result in higher takeover premiums. In Table 2.7, Models 33 to 36, the 
exeso is significantly negatively related to takeover premiums in LBOs 
(𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙33 = −2.459 ; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙34 = −2.394 ; 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙35 = −2.43 ; 
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙36 = −2.284. This confirms the robustness of the results in third-
party LBOs but different with the expectation in MBOs. This further implies that 
it is necessary to examine managers’ incentives in MBOs and third-party LBOs 
respectively. 
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Table 2.7 The relationship between managerial ownership, share options 
and takeover premiums in LBOS 
 Dependent Variable=PREM 
 Model31 Model32 Model33 Model34 Model35 Model36 
exeown 0.422* 0.422   0.417* 0.417 
 (1.702) (1.577)   (1.705) (1.517) 
exeso   -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** 
   (-2.459) (-2.394) (-2.430) (-2.284) 
pe -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.223) (-0.231) (-0.409) (-0.454) (-0.421) (-0.452) 
fcf 0.080 0.080 0.125 0.125 0.127 0.127 
 (0.210) (0.204) (0.323) (0.338) (0.336) (0.344) 
roa -0.956** -0.956*** -1.061*** -1.061*** -1.126*** -1.126*** 
 (-2.393) (-3.832) (-2.626) (-4.623) (-2.838) (-4.624) 
size -0.075*** -0.075** -0.071*** -0.071** -0.067** -0.067** 
 (-2.742) (-2.540) (-2.745) (-2.421) (-2.544) (-2.281) 
other-own -0.097 -0.097 -0.142 -0.142 -0.221 -0.221 
 (-0.493) (-0.497) (-0.607) (-0.655) (-0.988) (-1.023) 
level -0.543** -0.543** -0.594*** -0.594** -0.612*** -0.612** 
 (-2.426) (-2.162) (-2.705) (-2.536) (-2.782) (-2.682) 
ned 0.530 0.530 0.225 0.225 0.423 0.423 
 (1.448) (1.374) (0.701) (0.731) (1.143) (1.101) 
multi 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 
 (2.962) (2.742) (3.131) (2.773) (3.241) (2.860) 
insti 0.052 0.052 -0.064 -0.064 0.044 0.044 
 (0.250) (0.273) (-0.330) (-0.365) (0.208) (0.212) 
lnnas 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (3.736) (3.313) (3.396) (2.718) (3.798) (3.086) 
Industry Cluster  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Constant 0.763 0.763* 1.272*** 1.272** 0.969* 0.969* 
 (1.604) (1.773) (2.896) (2.648) (1.946) (1.924) 
       
F-test 3.370*** 8.230*** 3.580*** 5.220*** 3.480*** 5.490*** 
Prob>f 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.254 0.254 0.296 0.296 0.309 0.309 
Root MSE 0.377 0.377 0.369 0.369 0.367 0.367 
Observations 146 146 144 144 144 144 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 
0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover premiums of offer price to target 
closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive 
shareholding. ceoown is percentage of ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times 
the number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of 
executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price earnings ratio that calculate by 
adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry 
classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation 
minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is 
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the natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors 
other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the dummy variable that takes value 
of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and 
otherwise 0. multi is the dummy variable that code as 1 if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for 
the target and otherwise 0. ned is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. insti is the total 
common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common outstanding shares, where the 
shareholding is in excess of 3%. lnnas is the natural logarithm of the non-audit fees. 
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2.5.3.2 Endogenous tests  
Endogeneity is a major methodological concern for corporate governance and 
accounting research that rely on regression analysis to draw the causal 
inference (Abdallah et al., 2015; Chenhall and Moers, 2007). That is, the 
endogeneity is likely to occurre as a consequence of explaining how the 
explanatory variables is associated with a specified outcome. Specifically, the 
mathematical equations are based on theories to represent the relationship 
between a set of defined variables. Data are used to test these theories through 
the statistical analysis (Chenhall and Moers, 2007). Ideally, in regression 
analysis, the explanatory variables are supposed to be significantly associated 
with outcome variable, which provides support for the theoretically proposed 
causal relationship (Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Abdallah et al., 2015; Roberts 
and Whited, 2012). However, the model may include an endogenous 
explanatory variable that can lead to endogeneity. If endogeneity exists, the 
regression may produce a biased estimation. In essence, endogeneity can lead 
to biased and inconsistent estimators when testing the theoretical propositions, 
which may make inferences problematic and consequently reduce the reliability 
of the results that drawing from the conclusions. Therefore, during the analysis, 
it is important to understand how the theory and data can comply with the 
specification of the model, including the assumptions implied by separating the 
exogenous and endogenous variables (Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Coles et al., 
2012). 
 
In statistics, the endogeneity is defined as “a correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the error term in a regression” (Roberts and Whited, 
2012: 6). The endogeneity then can be raised due to omitted variables and 
simultaneity. First, if there is omitted explanatory variables in the regression, 
the error term will be correlated with explanatory variables, which violates the 
basic assumption of ordinary least squares regression (OLS). Second, the 
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endogeneity can also be caused by the dual correlations between dependent 
and explanatory variables, in which the explanatory variables can influence the 
dependent variable and in turn being influenced by the dependent variable 
(Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Abdallah et al., 2015). Such endogeneity can be 
addressed by using two-stage least squares regression (2SLS), which may 
require employing the instrumental variables. The instrumental variables are 
variables that are correlated with the explanatory variable but are not correlated 
with the error term (Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Diamond and Tolley, 2013; 
Badertscher, 2011; Greene, 2011).  
 
This study concerns for the endogeneity biases, as the previous literature has 
found that managerial ownership and firm’s performance outcomes affect each 
other. Moreover, there is a significant previous literature recognises that models 
containing managerial ownership variables may suffer from endogeneity; for 
example, Himmelberg et al. (1999), Weir et al. (2002), Kole (1996) and Coles 
et al. (2012). Therefore, this study tests for the possible endogenous selection 
of the percentage of executive ownership and firm performance (roa) in MBOs 
and third-party LBOs by adopting the approach used by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Himmelberg et al. (1999).  
 
The 2SLS regression is then used to address the endogeneity, which requires 
employing instrument variables in the analysis. According to Himmelberg et al. 
(1999), corporate governance is determined exogenously by the firm’s 
contracting environment, such as share price volatility, regulation and the rules 
relating to the market for corporate control. Hence, this study employs CEO 
tenure and risk of volatility as the instruments. Moreover, the accounting and 
corporate governance literature suggest that the lagged value is able to be the 
instrument variable as it cannot be affected by the current value, which in turn 
can affect the current value (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). In line with this 
argument, this study also employs the lagged values of the endogenous 
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variables as instruments. Overall, it is assumed that the firm’s performance (roa) 
is a function of executive ownership, CEO tenure,2 the risk of volatility,3 and 
the lagged roa.4. The Hausman test is then used to test the endogeneity in 
MBOs (p=0.235) and third-party LBOs (p=0.6235). The results suggest that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected and the endogeneity does not exist (p>0.05). 
Therefore, the results are not biased to the simultaneous selection of roa and 
executive ownership (see Table 2.11 in the Appendix). Moreover, to test the 
weakness of instruments, this study applies F-statistic. It is recognised that 
2SLS can produce a biased estimation over the OLS when the instruments are 
weak (Hadri and Mikhail, 2014; Baum, 2006; Adkins and Hill, 2011). The results 
suggest that all the instruments are not weak. 
 
2.5.3.3 Alternative measures of managerial ownership 
So far, this study has used the percentage of the shareholding and the value of 
share options of top executives as a proxy for the degree of alignment between 
managers and shareholders. In this section, this study uses alternative 
measures of managerial ownership that examine how takeover resistance and 
bid premium vary with (1) the percentage of shareholding owned by the CEO, 
and (2) the pound value of the CEO’s and executive managers’ ownership.  
 
As the key agent of the shareholder in charge of the firm’s operations, the CEO 
is the primary person affecting management’s actions to maximise shareholder 
wealth. Greater ownership of the firm may provide the CEO with incentives to 
take action to maximise premiums and protect shareholder interests (Ali-
Ahmed, 2009; Baek et al., 2009; Mallin et al., 2005). To access the economic 
effect of CEO ownership on takeover resistance, this study repeats the exercise 
                                                             
2 CEO tenure is measured as the number of years as CEO of the firm. 
3 The risk of volatility is measured as the annualised standard deviation of daily share returns. 
4 Lagged roa is measured as the two-year lagged value of return on asset (roa).   
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for MBOs and third-party LBOs.  
 
In Table 2.13 in the Appendix, Models 55, 56, 61 and 62 present the results for 
the third-party LBO context, which are consistent with the findings in Table 2.4 
(Models 7, 8, 11 and 12), where a higher managerial ownership may result in a 
high likelihood of takeover resistance in third-party LBOs. This result does not 
reject Hypothesis 2.5, which expects that, in third-party LBOs, higher ownership 
may provide managers with greater power to reject the takeover offers in order 
to protect their long-term job security and discretion (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
1985). Moreover, Table 2.15 in the Appendix reports that CEO ownership is 
significantly positively related to takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. This 
result is also consistent with the findings in Table2.5. It suggests that ownership 
has aligned managers’ interests with shareholders, where higher premiums can 
maximise shareholder wealth in third-party LBOs. 
 
Although the percentage of ownership has been extensively used to measure 
the alignment of managers and shareholders, the pound value of managerial 
ownership is also used in studies such as Holderness et al. (1999) and Lafond 
and Roychowdhury (2008). This study examines whether the pound value of 
ownership exhibits a similar association to takeover resistance and bid 
premiums. Table 2.12 in the Appendix reports the results from estimating the 
relation between the value of executive and CEO ownership, and takeover 
resistance in MBOs. However, it is found that the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. The coefficients of the takeover resistance for third-party LBOs are 
positive but insignificant for both the top executive and CEO pound value of 
ownership variables (see Table 2.13 in the Appendix). This study also analyses 
the effect of the pound value of executive ownership on takeover premiums in 
MBOs (Table 2.14). The results suggest that the findings are consistent when 
using alternative measurement in third-party LBOs. However, it is found that the 
value of managerial ownership is positive significant related to takeover 
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premiums in MBOs. This might because both the takeover premiums and the 
value of managerial ownership are correlated with firms’ share price, which may 
affect the results. 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
This study examined the impacts of managerial interests, including share 
ownership and options, on shareholder wealth protection prior to MBOs and 
third-party LBOs. Overall, this research is likely to have implications for the 
board of directors and shareholders to understand the changes of managerial 
motivations and reactions in different buyout settings. The different effects of 
managerial incentive schemes in MBOs and third-party LBOs imply that these 
settings are likely to provide managers with different incentives and thus affect 
their reactions towards takeovers. In particular, managers’ direct involvement in 
MBOs is likely to provide them with incentives to purchase the firms at the 
lowest possible price, while in third-party LBOs, managers are likely to have 
strong incentives to protect their long-term job security, discretion, control and 
power within their firms (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b). 
 
Furthermore, this research may have implications for the board of directors and 
investors in understanding the effects of managerial incentives, including 
ownership and share options on shareholder wealth protection. This has further 
implication for the development of corporate governance. The different effects 
of managerial ownership and share options on takeover premiums imply that 
the different payoff structures of share ownership versus options may motivate 
managers to pursue different risk appetites, which drive their decision-making 
behaviours. This suggests that managers who paid with share options may 
prefer to take more risks in terms of opportunistic benefits, if they have nothing 
to lose but something to gain from a buyout. Moreover, this study implies that 
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different with options, ownership can additionally provide managers with power 
to pursue their self-interest activities during the takeovers (Sanders, 2001; 
Sitkin and Weingart, 1995; Burns and Kedia, 2006). 
 
In particular, the results suggested that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and takeover resistance was significantly positive in third-party 
LBOs. This implies that high levels of ownership can provide managers with 
greater power and influence on boards, which is helpful for them to pursue their 
own interests (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). Hence, managers with high 
levels of ownership are likely to resist buyout offers, which results in protecting 
their long-term job security and discretion within the firm. However, the results 
show that there is no significant association between managerial ownership and 
takeover resistance in MBOs. This might be because managers’ involvement in 
MBOs can provide stronger incentives and influence for managers in making 
decisions, independent of their prior shareholding in the firm. 
 
Moreover, this study suggested that, the levels of managerial share options 
were negatively related to takeover resistance in third-party LBOs. This result 
indicates that, since the options allow management to exercise them 
immediately after the takeover, high values of share options may motivate 
management to pursue additional returns from their exercise and thus lead to 
a lower likelihood of takeover resistance (Weir et al., 2005b; Renneboog et al., 
2007; Sanders, 2001).  
 
However, in MBOs, high levels of managerial share options were likely to 
increase takeover resistance from the board. This result further indicates that 
options could be an instrument for the board of directors to monitor 
management. Share options are more likely to exercise immediately after 
MBOs to increase managers’ ownership in the firms rather than a cash-payment 
incentive. In this event, boards are likely to be more cautious about the MBO 
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and tend to resist the takeovers.  
 
In addition, this study found that the relation between managerial ownership 
and takeover premiums was significantly positive in third-party LBOs. This 
result indicates that, in third-party LBOs, managers with higher ownership are 
likely to accept offers with high premiums, as the premiums will increase their 
wealth after the buyout or the higher premiums may help them to stop a 
takeover offer (Song and Walkling, 1993; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, the results suggested that managerial share options were 
negatively related to takeover premiums in both MBOs and third-party LBOs. 
This may indicate that managers have incentives to exercise their share options 
after third-party LBOs, which may reduce their incentives to drive up the 
takeover premiums. Although share options are also exercisable after MBOs, 
managers are more likely to exercise them to increase their shareholdings 
within the firms rather than a cash-payment. Hence, managers have less 
incentive to drive up premiums to increase their costs of takeovers.  
 
Furthermore, the additional sensitivity tests indicate that these results are 
robust to alternative settings of LBOs and to alternative independent variable 
specifications, such as CEO ownership and the pound value of executive 
ownership and CEO ownership. 
 
However, this research has some limitations. First, the time frame of this study 
is from 1997 to 2011, while the corporate governance information is limited to 
reports before 2006. The independent non-executives are not reported before 
2006. Therefore, this study only control for the proportion of non-executives. 
The future study should investigate data after 2006 to provide a profound 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 2 
94 
Second, this study does not match the firm sizes and industries of MBOs with 
those of third-party LBOs, because the sample size of each setting is too small 
(MBOs: 124; third-party LBOs: 88). The matching exercise can dramatically 
reduce the sample size and the reliability of the study (Kline, 2015). In particular, 
artificially reduce the sample size can lead to Type II error, where the loss of 
information may reduce the statistical power of the analysis (Frazier et al., 2004; 
Fitzsimons, 2008; Kline, 2015; Freiman et al., 1978). Moreover, it may also lead 
to the opposite effect of the results, which is the Type I error (Irwin and 
McClelland, 2001; MacCallum et al., 2002; Roussos and Stout, 1996; Kline, 
2015). Hence, instead of matching exercise, this research control for firm size 
and industry group in the analysis.  
 
Third, this study measures the takeover resistance through the initial mood of 
the boards, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if the bid is 
friendly and 1 otherwise. However, this definition could not measure takeover 
resistance precisely. The target resistance is raising from the actions by target 
management and board potentially indicating dissatisfaction with the takeover 
offer. This may include any verbal statement indicating the offer is not supported 
or inadequate, definitive actions such as legal maneuvering or any restructuring, 
and initiating or actively participating in the cancellation of a proposed 
acquisition (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993; Bradley et al., 1983; Dimopoulos and 
Sacchetto, 2014; Bates and Becher, 2015; Carline et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
due to the sample is going private companies starting from 1997, which tend to 
have limited information about the deals, this study only measures resistance 
via the initial mood of the boards. Moreover, it is found that the sample sizes of 
hostile takeovers in third-party LBOs and MBOs are relatively small, which may 
affect the validity, power and robustness of the results. Nayak (2010) and Button 
et al. (2013) suggest that a smaller sample may not be able to provide sufficient 
power in detecting a real effect. The study may then turn out to be falsely 
negative and leading to a type II error. Therefore, the future study could use an 
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alternative measure of takeover resistance and focuses on large sample size 
in the analysis. 
 
Fourth, this study includes limited corporate governance variables in the 
analysis. The future research could include more corporate governance factors, 
such as the board qualification, expertise and other board characteristics in the 
analysis. 
 
In summary, this chapter investigates the relationship between managerial 
equity ownership structure and takeover resistance/bid premiums in MBOs and 
third-party LBOs. The findings suggest that managers and shareholders are 
likely to have clear conflicts of interests in relation to the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth in MBOs and third-party LBOs. Managerial incentive 
schemes appear to have different effects on shareholder wealth protection in 
MBOs and third-party LBOs, as managers have played different roles in these 
settings. However, how could managers protect their private interests before 
the buyouts. Moreover, how and to what extent does the corporate governance 
mechanism protect the interests of shareholders before the buyouts become 
an interesting question.  
 
It is recognised that, in MBOs, managers are the buyers, who tend to have 
strong incentives to purchase the firms with lowest possible price. The high 
extent of undervaluation may lead to more interests for managers after MBOs. 
However, as the future owners of firms, managers may also have concerns for 
firm’s long-term interests, in order to protect their interests after the takeover. 
By contrast, in third-party LBOs, managers may have incentives to reduce the 
chance of firm’s undervaluation and the possibility of taken over, in order to 
protect their long-term job security (Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
Accounting conservatism usually indicates that bad news will be recognised as 
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economic losses in a timelier manner than good news to be recognised as gains 
that are supposed to protect the long-term interests of shareholders. However, 
the conservative accounting approach tends to reduce the firm’s current value 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Basu, 1997; Chan et al., 2009; Chen and 
Zhang, 2007). Therefore, prior to MBOs and third-party LBOs, managers may 
engage in different levels of accounting conservatism to manipulate the 
earnings and protect their interests in the buyouts (Beekes et al., 2004; Begley 
et al., 2003). The next chapter then aims to explore the influence of corporate 
governance on accounting conservatism prior to MBOs and third-party LBOs. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
97 
Chapter 3: Accounting Conservatism and Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts 
 
3.1  Introduction 
A leveraged buyout occurs when the equity of a publicly quoted company is 
purchased by private investors using a high percentage of debt (Fox and 
Marcus, 1992; Weir et al., 2005a). Since the early 1990s, there has been a 
significant increase in the number and value of leveraged buyouts in the UK 
(Weir et al., 2005a). During the years under study, from 1997 to 2011, firms 
going private generated sales worth £73 billion. As increasingly larger 
corporations were being targeted, as shown in Appendix Table 3.6, the average 
deal value rose from £57.3 million in 1997 to £90.8 million in 2011 and reached 
peak at £1.27 billion in 2006. The UK provides, after the US, the second largest 
leveraged buyout market in the world, making it possible to examine a large 
sample of buyouts (Geddes, 2011; Nash, 2011). Leveraged buyouts in the UK 
have been the subject of much academic interest (e.g. Weir et al., 2005b; Weir 
et al., 2005a; Weir and Wright, 2006; Wright, 1991; Renneboog et al., 2007), 
because buyouts are important mechanisms for corporate restructuring and 
business recovery creating new incentives for managers to engage in self-
interested behaviours. Therefore, this study extends the literature on 
accounting conservatism by examining the effects of managerial incentives on 
conservatism in the financial reporting choices of firms preceding leveraged 
buyouts in the UK.  
 
Accounting conservatism is usually perceived, possibly as it indicates that 
managers have adopted prudent attitudes towards the recognition of economic 
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gains than losses, so that bad news is disclosed in a timelier manner than good 
news (Basu, 1997). Asymmetric verification due to conservatism has been 
hypothesised to facilitate efficient contracting between managers and 
shareholders under the separation of ownership and control (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). Watts (2003a) and Ball (2001) propose that under 
conservative accounting regimes, managers who care about short-term 
earnings effects are less likely to exert efforts to overstate current-period 
earnings for the sake of private benefits. Moreover, accounting standards 
boards, such as FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board), which 
advocates conservatism, further state that conservative accounting reporting is 
a prudent reaction to the uncertainties and risks of business activities (FASB, 
1980; FASB, 2010). As the overstating of current earnings will be offset by an 
eventual decline in firm value when these overstatements reverse in the future, 
conservatism helps to address the issues of limited horizons that protects the 
long-term interests of shareholders (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Watts, 
2003a).  
 
Within the rules, managers can choose a degree to which they practise 
accounting conservatism. More conservative accounting often tends to be 
interpreted as a sign of a higher degree of managerial integrity (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010). However, because the 
asymmetric recognition of losses and gains underlying conservative accounting 
can directly affect the current value of a firm and managerial self-interests, 
managers may have different incentives for engaging in accounting 
conservatism, depending on whether they participate in leveraged buyouts or 
not. Hence this study has differentiated MBOs from third-party LBOs (Weir et 
al., 2005a).  
 
As the purchasers will always seek the lowest possible purchase price, while 
selling shareholders seek the highest possible price, in the case of either MBOs 
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or third-party LBOs, the price paid for the purchase will directly affect the profits 
accruing to both sides of the transactions. Accordingly, the interests of 
managers and shareholders may change when buyouts are imminent (Hafzalla, 
2009). This makes the MBO setting an ideal context in which to examine the 
effects of managerial incentives on accounting conservatism for several 
reasons. First, management’s direct involvement in the transaction generates 
clear incentives for them to engage in opportunistic disclosure behaviours in 
order to reduce the perceived value of their firm (Elitzur et al., 1998; Fox and 
Marcus, 1992; Hafzalla, 2009). Second, opportunistically selecting more bad 
news to disclose but delay the recognition of good news can be effective in 
managing shareholders’ perception of firm value by increasing the information 
asymmetry between managers and outsiders (Hafzalla, 2009; Perry and 
Williams, 1994). Therefore, before MBOs, managers have strong incentives to 
apply more conservative accounting disclosure to manipulate earnings 
downwards and to reduce the possible purchase price (Beekes et al., 2004; 
Begley et al., 2003).  
 
In addition, third-party LBO firms, where managers do not participate in the 
transactions, serve as an ideal comparison group for MBOs (Hafzalla, 2009). 
Generally, the market valuations of buyout targets are comparatively cheap 
relative to firms that remain in public (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). 
This market undervaluation has made the companies become potential 
candidates for both third-party LBOs and MBOs. However, compared with 
MBOs, it is more difficult for managers to predict when a third-party LBO is likely 
to be made. Hence, before managers decide to initial an MBO, their incentives 
and disclosure behaviours are similar in both cases. But, if managers choose 
to participate in an MBO, their incentives will have significant changes. 
Managers’ behaviours concerning information disclosure may be different from 
that of their peers in third-party LBOs afterwards. Since these two transactions 
are relatively similar, except for management participation, the comparison 
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eliminates the general effects of leveraged buyouts on disclosure behaviours 
(Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
In contrast to MBOs, managers’ long-term job security is threatened prior to 
third-party LBOs, either because the outside buyers may change the firms’ 
existing management team to improve the efficiency of monitoring and control, 
or the buyout firms may later be resold. Therefore, in order to minimise the risk 
of job loss, managers are likely to have strong incentives to apply less 
conservative accounting disclosure to manipulate earnings upwards to prevent 
their firm becoming the target of any third-party LBO (Weir et al., 2005b; 
Renneboog et al., 2007).  
 
However, in either case, managers’ opportunistic selection of information to 
disclose may conflict with the best interests of firms’ shareholders. Corporate 
governance mechanisms are then placed to ensure that the assets of the firms 
are managed efficiently in the interests of shareholders, thus preventing the 
inappropriate expropriation of resources by managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Lara et al., 2009). Accordingly, good corporate governance leads to better 
controlling and effective motivation schemes, which is expected to restrict 
managers’ self-interested behaviours in information disclosure (Lara et al., 
2007). In particular, by effective controlling the behaviours of management, 
governance mechanisms include board directors, institutional shareholders and 
internal auditing are expected to ensure that managers are acting in the best 
interests of shareholders (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Beekes et al., 2004). 
Specifically, good governance control can reduce managers’ opportunities to 
overstate gains or withhold information on expected losses, which push 
managers to adhere the spirit of conservatism more faithfully. In contrast, poor 
corporate governance weakens the companies’ monitoring and control, and 
may enable greater managerial discretion to manipulate earnings (Lara et al., 
2009; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007).  
Chapter 3 
101 
 
This study, therefore, examines three research questions. First, what are the 
differences between the degrees of conservatism prior to MBOs and third-party 
LBOs? This is important, because managers play a different role in MBO and 
third-party LBO deals. This difference may be due to different incentives for 
managers and therefore affect their behaviours. Comparing MBOs with third-
party LBOs can provide direct insight in observing the changes of managerial 
behaviours.  
 
Second, it provides additional insights in analysing: how does the degree of 
accounting conservatism change over time preceding MBOs and third-party 
LBOs? This is important because, in leveraged buyouts, buyers wish to pay the 
lowest possible purchase price, while selling shareholders wish to sell their 
shares for the highest possible price. The price paid for the buyouts will affect 
the interests accruing to managers and shareholders (Hafzalla, 2009). 
Comparing managers’ disclosure behaviours over time in MBOs and third-party 
LBOs provides additional evidence on the extent to which the buyout event can 
affect managers’ incentives and behaviours. Previous literature (e.g. Perry and 
Williams, 1994) suggest that managers often plan MBOs for a year or 
occasionally as much as two or three years prior to the public offer. This 
indicates that earnings could be manipulated by managers at least one annual 
report before the MBO offer is issued. On the other hand, as managers are 
more uncertain about the happening of a third-party LBO than an MBO, their 
behaviours concerning accounting conservatism prior to MBOs and third-party 
LBOs may differ in both degree and timing. This paper therefore examines the 
degree of accounting conservatism in the period of three years prior to 
leveraged buyouts.  
 
Third, this study tests: what are the influences of corporate governance 
mechanisms that proxy for board control and the strength of managerial 
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incentives on firms’ financial reporting conservatism prior to MBOs and third-
party LBOs? The period of interests is one year before the announcement of a 
leveraged buyout, because managers’ behaviours of information disclosure 
may have more obvious change when it is closer to the announcement date of 
buyouts. 
 
The findings suggest that managers are likely to behave more conservatively 
in MBO firms than third-party LBO firms. Moreover, the results show that the 
degree of accounting conservatism may change from less to more conservative 
for MBOs, but from more to less conservative for third-party LBOs. To measure 
governance control, this study includes board characteristics and ownership 
characteristics with regard to CEO duality, the fraction of non-executive 
members, managerial ownership, non-executive shareholdings, the existence 
of an audit committee and institutional shareholdings. It is documented that the 
selected corporate governance variables can significantly affect the degree of 
accounting conservatism.  
 
Overall, this study contributes to the accounting and corporate governance 
literature in several ways. First, this study contributes to the accounting 
literature by providing direct empirical evidence on the effects of managerial 
incentives on the choice of information disclosure. The MBO setting has 
provided direct evidence on the links between managerial incentives and 
disclosure choice, as well as a unique opportunity to observe the change of the 
degree of accounting conservatism. Comparing the third-party LBOs with 
MBOs provides an additional insight in observing the changes in managerial 
disclosure choices as well as the changes to the transaction itself. This is 
because, contrary to managerial incentives around most events (such as the 
studies of listed firms, e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007) to increase firm value, the 
MBO setting provides specific incentives for managers to decrease firm value, 
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which affects managers to disclose bad news in a more timely manner than 
good news (Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
Second, this study also contributes to the mergers and acquisitions literature. 
Much of the buyout literature (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005a; Weir et al., 
2005b) suggests that MBOs create conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders in relation to the maximisation of firm value. However, there is 
little evidence about the mechanisms that managers use to exploit their 
shareholders. This study provides direct evidence that managers can denigrate 
the firm value through more conservative accounting disclosure before the 
announcement of MBOs.  
 
Third, this study aims to contribute to the corporate governance literature by 
providing additional insights in analysing how governance mechanisms 
influence managers’ behaviour concerning information disclosure in MBO and 
third-party LBO settings. In MBOs, managers have clear incentives to engage 
in activities to depress the possible purchase price. By contrast, in third-party 
LBOs, managers have incentives to manipulate earnings upwards to reduce 
the possibility of takeover and protect their long-term job security. These 
activities are clearly conflict with the interests of shareholders. This study 
documents evidence that the independence of audit committees and 
institutional shareholdings can significantly affect managers’ self-interested 
behaviours regarding information disclosure prior to MBOs. Moreover, the 
research finds that CEO duality, the proportion of non-executives, managerial 
ownership, institutional shareholdings and audit committee independence have 
significant effects on the degree of accounting conservatism prior to third-party 
LBOs. 
 
Fourth, this study extends previous research of corporate governance and 
accounting conservatism, by using updated data from 1997 to 2011 in the UK. 
Chapter 3 
104 
A number of previous studies (e.g. Lara et al., 2009; Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007) have examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
accounting conservatism in the US market, this research provides evidence for 
the extent to which the US findings can be generalised to a different governance 
and financial reporting regime. According to Beekes et al. (2004), Aguilera et al. 
(2006) and O'connell (2006), there are significant differences in the accounting 
and corporate governance environment between the UK and other countries, 
which make the UK market a specific setting. For example, compared to the US 
GAAP, the IFRS is less conservative, which increases the risk that income is 
overstated in companies’ financial statements (Briginshaw, 2008; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). However, UK firms usually have greater 
institutional ownership than US firms, meaning that they are more actively 
monitored. As institutional investors tend to have long-term investment horizons 
(Aguilera et al., 2006; Black and Coffee, 1994), they might pressure managers 
and boards to perform a more conservative accounting. Additionally, in contrast 
to US LBO transactions, UK deals have some specific characteristics that may 
affect managers’ incentives concerning information disclosure. For instance, 
UK LBOs are less likely to be hostile, they tend to involve less debt finance and 
focus more on target growth opportunities; and they are more commonly 
financed by privately placed mezzanine rather than junk bonds (Renneboog et 
al., 2007; Toms and Wright, 2005).  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the 
theoretical framework and reviews relevant previous empirical research on 
accounting conservatism. Section 3.3 develops the hypotheses in the setting of 
third-party LBOs and MBOs. Section 3.4 introduces the sample and presents 
summary univariate statistics. Section 3.5 analyses and interprets the main 
findings, and Section 3.6 presents conclusions. 
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3.2  Literature Review 
3.2.1 Accounting conservatism 
Basu (1997: 4) recognises conservatism as an asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings that captures “accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of 
verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements”. 
Hence, conservative accounting is expected to protect the interests of long-
term shareholders through requiring a prudent reaction towards uncertainty and 
risks of firm business (FASB, 1980; Weir et al., 2005a). However, conservatism 
tends to make firms appear less profitable, which might impact on the share 
price, if investors cannot recognise that firms are using conservative 
approaches to accounting (Chan et al., 2009; Chen and Zhang, 2007). As a 
consequence, under a more conservative accounting system, more bad news 
is voluntarily disclosed in the short run then recognised in a timely manner than 
good news, which may reduce firms’ earnings and its share prices. In contrast, 
when the company makes a less conservative disclosure, managers are 
opportunistically choosing to reduce the speed of recognising bad news, but 
recognise good news in a shorter time, which may increase firms’ earnings and 
share prices in the short-term (Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
Managers may engage in more or less conservative accounting either because 
of board and institutional investors’ pressure (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; 
Lara et al., 2009; Wang, 2006) or shareholders’ demand to manage inefficient 
corporate governance (e.g. LaFond and Watts, 2008; Bushman and Smith, 
2001; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). The complementary perspective, 
suggests that managers have incentives to report accounting information for 
their own private benefits rather than the interests of shareholders (Christie and 
Zimmerman, 1994; Healy, 1985; Warfield et al., 1995; Leuz et al., 2003). It is 
recognised that the published financial statements are an important source of 
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information for managers because accounting numbers are widely used in their 
compensation contracts (Beekes et al., 2004). Since then, managers may have 
incentives to withhold from reporting any information that would adversely affect 
their compensation. In other words, earning related pay creates incentives for 
managers to manipulating earnings upwards which in turn motivate the 
managers to disclose good news as gains in a timelier manner than recognise 
bad news as losses (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Beekes et al., 2004). 
Beekes et al. (2004: 51) suggest that “there is natural tendency for managers 
to emphasise available good news for their own bonus and promotional 
prospects”. Therefore, the higher levels of earning related pay may push 
managers to exercise less conservative accounting disclosure in order to 
maximise their own interests through the immediate recognition of good news 
as gains. A stronger governance structure may result in an effective control and 
a better alignment of management, which will favour a more conservative 
accounting information disclosure (Lara et al., 2009; Chi et al., 2009; Lara et al., 
2007). In contrast, boards dominated by insiders or boards with weak 
monitoring and control incentives are likely to apply less conservative 
accounting (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Wang, 2006).  
 
The substitutive perspective, on the other hand, treats conservatism as a 
mechanism to capture the agency problems and facilitate efficient contracting 
between managers and shareholders in the presence of a less solid 
governance structure (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Christie and Zimmerman, 
1994; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Watts (2003a) proposes that information 
asymmetry between managers and other contracting parties could lead 
managers to use accounting information for the advantage of their own interests. 
By requiring a higher verification for recognising gains than losses, 
conservatism decreases managers’ ability and incentives to overstate earnings, 
which further reduces the occurrence of moral hazard problems (Beekes et al., 
2004; Lara et al., 2009). Another argument for conservatism facilitating 
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governance, noted by (Ball, 2001), suggests that conservatism plays the role 
of monitoring and control of firms’ investment policies. By requiring more timely 
recognition of bad news than good news, managers are not able to defer the 
losses’ recognition to the future (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) and manipulate 
financial reports upwards (Guay and Verrecchia, 2006) that provide 
disincentives for managers to undertake poorly performing investments. In 
addition, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) further suggest that conservatism can 
quickly trigger debt covenant violations that allow lenders to restrict managers’ 
actions, and thereby increase the efficiency of corporate governance.  
 
3.2.2 The influence of corporate governance 
The agency conflicts between managers and shareholders may motivate 
managers to pursue objectives that differ from those of the owners (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Managers are then likely to act in their own best interests 
when opportunities arise, usually at the expense of shareholders (Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2009). For example, managers are more likely to engage in activities 
such as shirking their duties, manipulating performance measures and paying 
themselves excessive salaries and perquisites. The agency conflicts cannot be 
eliminated completely, because it is too costly to fully enforce shareholder–
management contracts (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that residual losses arise because the costs 
of fully enforcing principal–agent contracts would far outweigh the benefits 
derived from doing so. Therefore, in a world with incomplete contracts, 
corporate governance mechanisms (such as managerial ownership, board 
directors, institutional shareholders, internal auditing, etc.) are implemented to 
mitigate agency conflicts by efficient bonding and control of managerial 
behaviours (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lara et al., 2009).  
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With regard to the effects of managerial ownership on managers’ incentives, 
previous studies identify two types of effects: the alignment and the 
entrenchment. Managerial ownership can align the objectives of shareholders 
with managers because managers then bear a part of the costs for their actions 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with this 
argument, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Morck et al. (1988b) show, 
theoretically and empirically, that higher managerial ownership generates 
greater incentives for them to perform in the interests of shareholders. However, 
the literature (e.g. Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Mueller and Spitz‐Oener, 2006; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) provides theoretical evidence that large managerial 
ownership may signify greater entrenchment, because a high ownership gives 
the owner-managers the power to disregard the interests of other shareholders 
and makes it difficult for them to control the behaviours of managers. In turn, 
managers with high ownership are less likely to be disciplined when they 
engage in activities that serve their own interests but conflict with those of other 
shareholders’.  
 
In the context of a third-party LBO, it is expected that the different levels of 
managerial ownership will provide managers with different incentives in 
information disclosure. On the one hand, the effective incentive schemes in 
relation to managerial ownership can generate a great alignment of interests 
between shareholders and managers. From this point, larger managerial 
shareholdings are expected to provide managers with stronger incentives to act 
in line with the interests of other shareholders. This suggests that, as managers 
and shareholders have fewer conflicts of interest, corporate performance 
increases and opportunistic managerial behaviour decreases (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010). Thereby, the equity-aligned 
managers are less likely to apply more conservative accounting disclosure, 
because it can deliberately cut firms’ perceived value via a delay in the 
recognition of good news as gains, rather than bad news as losses, which act 
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against the maximisation of shareholder wealth (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; 
Basu, 1997). However, since the poorly aligned managers will have fewer 
incentives to perform in the interests of shareholders (Renneboog et al., 2007; 
Weir et al., 2005b), their behaviours are often disciplined through an effective 
corporate monitoring and control system which may pressure managers to be 
more conservative in information disclosure.  
 
On the other hand, ownership may also have entrenchment effects, in that 
managers with larger shareholdings are likely to have greater control over firms, 
and therefore can more easily get away with acting in their own interests rather 
than the interests of other shareholders (Morck et al., 1988b). Since the 
prediction of a third-party LBO is difficult, managers are likely to be more 
prudent in accounting reporting when they have larger shareholdings within the 
firm. Consequently, managerial ownership may have a non-monotonic relation 
with accounting conservatism.  
 
Consistent with the entrenchment effects, in the context of MBOs, larger 
shareholdings are expected to provide managers with greater power to engage 
in self-interested activities. Therefore, managers may apply more conservative 
accounting disclosure so as to reduce the content of information disclosure to 
keep managers have an informational advantage over other shareholders and 
to lower the possible purchase price (Morck et al., 1988b; Hafzalla, 2009). 
 
Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms, including boards of directors, 
institutional shareholders and internal auditing have played central roles in 
monitoring and controlling the behaviour of managers, which reduce the agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders (Beekes et al., 2004; Lara et al., 
2007). Directors are given the power to hire and fire managers, determine 
managers’ compensation and provide advice and outside expertise for 
managers on proposed strategies (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Grinstein and 
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Tolkowsky, 2004; Raheja, 2005). However, since inside directors’ behaviours 
are usually controlled by top managers such as CEOs, the task of monitoring 
management falls mainly on non-executive members. Existing empirical 
evidence (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Peasnell et al., 2005; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988) generally supports that outside 
directors play an important part in protecting shareholders’ wealth in situations 
where the interests of managers and owners are inconsistent. In addition, by 
requiring high quality and transparency of financial statements, institutional 
shareholders and audit committees can push directors to exert more effective 
control on and monitoring of managerial behaviour (Lara et al., 2007; Ajinkya et 
al., 2005; Klein, 2002a). Thus, effective governance control and monitoring are 
important to limit the potential for suboptimal managerial behaviours. 
 
3.2.3 Previous literature 
Existing research has addressed the link between board control and monitoring, 
and financial reporting quality has focused primarily on the issues of earnings 
management. For example, Peasnell et al. (2000), Klein (2002a) and Bowen et 
al. (2008) provide evidence that boards with a higher proportion of outside 
directors are less likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management. 
Beasley (1996), Dechow et al. (1996) and Francis et al. (2005) suggest that the 
incidence of financial statement fraud is lower for firms where there is a higher 
proportion of outside directors.  
 
A number of recent studies (e.g. Beekes et al., 2004; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008; Lara et al., 2009; Lara et al., 2007; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Shuto 
and Takada, 2010) have sought to investigate the link between corporate 
governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism. Beekes et al. (2004) 
test the influence of outside directors on monitoring and controlling the 
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behaviours of management in financial reporting (proxied by earnings 
timeliness and conservatism) for the UK listed non-financial firms from 1993 to 
1995. The finding suggests that firms with a high proportion of non-executives 
are likely to engage in more conservative accounting with regard to the 
recognition of bad news. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) examines the 
relationship between board composition and accounting conservatism of the 
S&P 500 over the year 1999 to 2001. Specifically, they find robust evidence of 
a negative relation between the proportion of inside directors and conservatism, 
while a positive relation between outside directors’ ownership and accounting 
conservatism.  
 
Moreover, Lara et al. (2007) examines the association between the board of 
directors’ characteristics and accounting conservatism of Spanish list firms for 
the period 1997 to 2002. They suggest that firms, where the CEO has lower 
influence over the function of the board, tend to apply a high degree of 
accounting conservatism. The influence of the CEO over the board is measured 
by the index of combining characteristics of board size, the proportion of non-
executives, proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, board meeting, 
the existence of audit /nomination/remuneration committee and executive 
committee. Lara et al. (2009) focus on the influence of corporate governance 
provisions, such as board size, CEO duality, outside director ownership and 
board meetings, on firms’ accounting conservatism using US sample during 
1992 to 2003. They find that firms with strong corporate governance are more 
likely to engage in more conservative accounting disclosure. 
 
In addition, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada (2010) 
examine the relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism based on US and Japanese market respectively. They suggest 
that conservatism is one potential mechanism to address the agency problems. 
They find that as managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency 
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problem may increase, which also increase the demand for accounting 
conservatism.  
 
3.3  Hypotheses Development 
3.3.1 The role of conservatism in third-party LBOs 
In third-party LBOs, public companies are taken private by a small group of 
outside investors (Fox and Marcus, 1992; Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 
2006). The direct involvement of outsiders leads to a great uncertainty for 
managers’ job security and their discretion, which ultimately intensifies the 
incentives for management to engage in opportunistic activities to prevent the 
potential of any third-party buyouts.  
 
It is known that the only purpose of the acquirers is to extract the maximum 
profits from their investments (Hafzalla, 2009). Consequently, in most cases, 
outside investors would like to continue to hire the targets’ managers in firms 
after the buyouts, because they are more familiar with the firms’ operations 
(Renneboog et al., 2007). However, managers’ discretion will be constrained 
after third-party LBOs. This is because professional private equity investors 
tend to be more active in monitoring and participating in the firms’ operations, 
in order to increase their benefits from firms’ actual profitability and dividend 
payments after the buyouts (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005a; Weir et al., 
2005b). Moreover, it is also known that the benefits of outside investors might 
derive from the re-sale of firms in the future (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b). 
Hence, if the bought-out firms plan to relist in the next few years, managers in 
third-party LBOs may not keep their jobs for a long time, but are threatened by 
the risk of being fired (Hafzalla, 2009). On the other hand, previous literature 
(e.g. Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006) has suggested that, compared 
to firms that remain public, leveraged buyout targets have a relatively low 
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market value. This undervaluation of the targets may derive from poor decisions 
of the incumbent management (Weir et al., 2005b; Renneboog et al., 2007). 
Consequently, outside buyers may make changes to the firm’s existing 
management after buyout, in order to improve the firm’s governance as well as 
its performance (Weir et al., 2005b).  
 
Therefore, it is expected that, before third-party LBOs, managers are likely to 
apply less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting disclosure to protect 
their power of control and long-term job security. This is because less 
conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting delays the consequence of 
reporting a loss for the firm’s current performance, which helps managers 
manipulate earnings upwards (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Reducing the 
likelihood of the firm’s undervaluation is then expected to be an effective way 
to avoid the incidence of third-party LBOs (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 
2006). In addition, as managers may leave the firm or hold a lower level of 
ownership after a third-party LBO, less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) 
accounting may have less impact on the profits of management (Francis and 
Martin, 2010).  
 
However, compared with MBOs, it is hard for managers to know exactly when 
a third-party offer is likely to be made; they are only able to predict its potential 
possibility by identifying some specific signals or characteristics (such as a 
firm’s undervaluation) (Renneboog et al., 2007). Hence, it is difficult to know 
when does the firm is under the threats of third-party LBOs. Under this situation, 
less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting disclosure does not benefit 
the interests of long-term shareholders. This is because any increase from 
overstating current earnings can be offset by an eventual decline in firm value 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). As the prediction of third-party LBOs is 
difficult, shareholders tend to be more prudent in earnings manipulation, so as 
to avoid overpaying the incompetent management. Consequently, before third-
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party LBOs, managers and shareholders may have a conflict of interest; that is, 
managers have incentives to apply less conservative accounting to prevent 
third-party buyouts to keep their power and ensure their long-term job security, 
while this is not always in the best interests of shareholders. Accordingly, the 
third-party-LBO setting becomes an ideal setting to compare managerial 
incentives and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms within 
the setting of MBOs.   
 
3.3.2 The role of conservatism in MBOs 
The most obvious difference between third-party LBOs and MBOs is the 
involvement of management. Managers’ choice to participate in the 
transactions may be because of hostile or unwanted third-party LBOs of their 
firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1987; Fox and Marcus, 1992; Renneboog et al., 2007). 
Moreover, Hafzalla (2009) suggests that managers’ pre-buyout shareholdings, 
their ability to procure funding and their risk appetite could contribute to the 
decision to undertake MBOs. On the other hand, third-party LBOs where 
management are excluded from the transactions can occur when outside 
buyers want to make changes to the targets’ current management team, or they 
want to enhance their control power within the firms after the takeovers 
(Hafzalla, 2009). Regardless of who participates in the transactions, MBOs and 
third-party LBOs tend to be used as an avenue for corporate restructuring and 
business recovery. As long as firms that are candidates for an MBO are also 
candidates for third-party LBOs, comparing these two groups of buyouts is 
appropriate and are ideal settings to examine the accounting information 
disclosure choice of management (Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007).  
 
An MBO is the purchase of all the outstanding equity of the firm by incumbent 
management, so that the current management is likely to remain in post after 
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the buyout (Weir et al., 2005a; Weir et al., 2005b; Wright, 1991). The essential 
characteristic of MBOs is that the management of the target company “is on 
both sides of the table, acting on behalf of the shareholders to determine 
whether a sale is in their interest and to seek the best possible price, all the 
while acting in their own proprietary interest as purchasers” (Lowenstein, 1985: 
732). As management have better information than anybody else involved in 
the transaction, they are likely to do better as buyers rather than sellers. 
Consequently, there is a conflict of interests between management and 
shareholders, because managers can directly benefit from the transactions at 
the expense of the shareholders (Hafzalla, 2009). A similar dilemma faced 
Stefano Pessina with the MBO offer to Alliance Boots. He does not manage the 
firm, but he is the founder of the business, and has a position as a large 
shareholder and member of the board. Despite the fact that Pessina said he 
would not be involved in any further discussions about the KKR approach, his 
involvement apparently affected the buyout process (Moore, 2012).  
 
Management’s direct involvement in MBO transactions generates a conflict of 
interests between the firm’s managers, who want to pay the lowest possible 
purchase price, and the shareholders, who want to sell their shareholdings for 
the highest possible price (Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir and 
Wright, 2006). More conservative accounting disclosure can reduce the 
incidence of overstatements and cut the current firm value by delaying the 
recognition of good news as gains rather than bad news as losses (Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007; Basu, 1997; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Beekes et al. 
(2004) suggest that managers can successfully manage the firm’s value by 
manipulating the timeliness of the recognition of good or bad news. Hence, prior 
to MBOs, managers are likely to choose more conservative accounting 
disclosure, to manipulate the firm’s value downwards and to depress their 
possible purchase price (Hafzalla, 2009; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
According to the arguments for third-party LBOs and MBOs, this study makes 
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hypotheses that: 
 
H3.1a: Managers are likely to engage in conservative accounting disclosure prior 
to MBOs.  
 
H3.1b: Managers are likely to engage in more conservative accounting prior to 
MBOs than prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
However, the degree of accounting conservatism may change over time. Before 
managers decide to take over the firms themselves, they may have incentives 
to overstate the value they create to obtain a larger earnings-based bonus 
(Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Specifically, since financial reports are the 
primary sources of information to evaluate managerial performance, managers 
may have disincentives to embrace conservatism faithfully but to seek to offset 
the downward bias for opportunistic reasons. For example, Watts (2003a) 
highlight that, as accounting numbers are widely used in management 
compensation contracts, firms’ managers in a situation without accounting 
conservatism may be able to achieve large earnings-based bonuses through 
overstating earnings. Weisbach (1988) further suggests that the negative 
association between financial performance and managerial turnover has 
created powerful incentives for managers to manipulate reported earnings to 
further their own interest. Moreover, preventing any competing bid from third-
party buyers is also the main task for managers before they initial an MBO. 
Less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting seeking to increase the 
current firm’s value may reduce the risk and possibility that outside buyers to 
take over the firm (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008). Consequently, the degree of accounting conservatism may change over 
time prior to MBOs. 
 
On the other hand, managers feel their long-term job security is threatened prior 
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to third-party LBOs (Weir et al., 2005b; Renneboog et al., 2007), which provides 
strong incentives for managers to prevent being taken over by other outside 
buyers. Hence, managers are motivated to apply less conservative (i.e. more 
aggressive) accounting disclosure to a higher extent, to deliberately increase 
the difficulty of third-party LBOs. However, compared with MBOs, it is hard for 
managers to know when a third-party LBO is likely to be made; they can only 
predict it because of some signals (such as undervaluation) (Renneboog et al., 
2007). The persistence of less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting 
disclosure may not fulfil the interests of long-term shareholders, nor the 
managers themselves. This is because any declared increase in earnings from 
an overstatement will be offset by an eventual decline in the future (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). Persistently overstating earnings will cause the firm’s 
share price to drop considerably when these overstatements are reversed. 
Then, the company is likely to suffer takeover threats as the low share price will 
attract outside investors for an LBO. Shareholders are also more prudent in 
earnings manipulation in order to avoid overpaying the management. Moreover, 
persistently overstating earnings may result in poor quality reporting, which is 
bad for managers’ reputations. Managers are less likely to take such actions 
unless they bring commensurate increases in returns, because these activities 
may result in higher costs to their own human capital (Francis et al., 2008; 
Hirshleifer, 1993). Accordingly, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H3.2: Before MBOs, the degree of accounting conservatism change over time, 
from less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) to more conservative.  
 
H3.3: Before third-party LBOs, the degree of accounting conservatism change 
over time, from more conservative to less conservative (i.e. more aggressive).  
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3.3.3 The impacts of corporate governance mechanisms on accounting 
conservatism 
3.3.3.1 Board characteristics 
The board of directors plays a central role of control and monitoring when 
performing their duties regarding shareholder wealth protection (Ball et al., 
2000; Beekes et al., 2004). Both roles imply that the board need to verify 
information in order to perform their duties. The accounting and financial 
reporting systems are critical sources of verifiable information that is useful in 
evaluating the behaviour of management (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; 
Bushman and Smith, 2001). Conservative accounting is an important 
characteristic for the accounting system that reflects managers’ behaviours 
concerning information disclosure (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Basu, 1997). 
Lara et al. (2009) find evidence from a US sample that firms with strong (weak) 
governance exhibited higher (lower) degrees of conditional accounting 
conservatism. Therefore, examining the relation between board characteristics 
and accounting conservatism is interesting.  
 
3.3.3.1.1 CEO duality 
The separation of the position of CEO and chairman is the proxy for the 
influence and power of the CEO (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2001; Baliga et al., 1996). Jensen (1993) argues that CEO duality 
facilitates the CEO effectively controlling information available to other board 
members. Cornett et al. (2008) support that CEO duality gives the CEO a 
concentrated power and position in decision-making. In turn, it is expected that 
in firms where the CEO has less influence over the board, directors will be more 
disciplined in disclosing accounting information in the interests of shareholders.  
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As the prediction of third-party LBOs is difficult, managers and shareholders 
may have a conflict of interests. That is, if managers want to avoid the firm being 
taken over so as to adopt less conservative accounting, this is not always in the 
best interests of shareholders (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Duality is 
able to furnish CEOs with power and influence to control the disclosure of 
accounting information for the sake of their own interests. In line with this, CEOs 
are able to adopt less conservative accounting disclosure prior to third-party 
LBOs to avoid being taken over and to maintain their job security and power 
within the firm.  
 
However, before MBOs, managers are more likely to purchase the company at 
the lowest possible price (Hafzalla, 2009). Hence, if CEO duality gives CEOs 
power and influence to control firms’ accounting disclosure, managers are likely 
to apply more conservative accounting before MBOs to manipulate earnings 
downwards in order to maximise their own interests within a buyout (Ahmed 
and Duellman, 2007; Beekes et al., 2004). Accordingly, it is hypothesised that:  
 
H3.4a: CEO duality is negatively related to accounting conservatism prior to 
third-party LBOs.  
 
H3.4b: CEO duality is positively related to accounting conservatism prior to 
MBOs.  
 
3.3.3.1.2 Non-executive directors5 
Non-executive directors have a fiduciary duty towards shareholders to 
scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and 
objectives (FRC, 2012). Accordingly, non-executives are viewed as a 
                                                             
5 To alleviate concerns about potential misspecification, this study controls for board size. 
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governance mechanism to supervise and control the behaviour of managers. 
Previous research (e.g. Ajinkya et al., 2005) in this area has found that non-
executive directors positively influence board decisions aimed at enhancing 
shareholder interests. Consistent with this argument, Dechow et al. (1996) and 
Beasley (1996) document a negative association between non-executive 
directors and the likelihood of financial fraud. The previous work of Lara et al. 
(2007) and Ajinkya et al. (2005) in studying information disclosure suggests that 
non-executive directors can mitigate managerial self-interest behaviours by 
directly reviewing the disclosure policy and earnings releases. In line with this, 
the Cadbury Report (1992) further suggests that boards should have at least 
three non-executive directors. However, an alternative view suggests that non-
executive directors may be ineffective. Patton and Baker (1987) and Gilson and 
Kraakman (1991) argue that, in practice, non-executive directors may usually 
exert little or no real control as they lack the time, expertise and information to 
challenge the efficiency of management. Following the method Beekes et al. 
(2004), this study measures this variable as the fraction of non-executive 
directors on the board.  
 
As discussed before, prior to third-party LBOs, less conservative accounting 
disclosure may not fulfil the interests of shareholders (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). Therefore, if non-executive directors are able to control 
managers’ behaviours so that they perform in the interests of shareholders, 
firms that have a greater proportion of non-executive directors are less likely to 
experience less conservative accounting before a buyout.  
 
However, prior to MBOs, more conservative accounting disclosure may 
decrease firm value as well as share prices, which harms the interests of 
shareholders, since more bad news is recognised as losses in a timely manner 
than good news as gains. Hence, if non-executive directors are helpful in 
control managers’ disclosure behaviour to perform in the interests of 
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shareholders, a higher proportion of non-executives may be negatively 
associated with more conservative disclosure. According to the above 
arguments, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H3.5a: The proportion of non-executive members is positively related to 
accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
H3.5b: The proportion of non-executive members is negatively related to 
accounting conservatism prior to MBOs. 
 
3.3.3.1.3 Audit committee independence 
The audit committee has oversight of the process of the firm’s financial 
reporting, including the financial statements, disclosures in regulatory filings 
and earnings releases (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). It meets regularly 
with the firm’s outside auditors and internal financial managers to review the 
integrity of the firm’s financial statements, and the effectiveness of company’s 
internal financial controls and audit processes (Klein, 2002b; FRC, 2012; Klein, 
2002a). Overall, the existing literature has suggested that the audit committee 
has played the role of arbiter to weight and broker divergent views between 
managers and shareholders to ultimately produce a balanced and accurate 
report (Klein, 2002a). Moreover, audit committee members with accounting 
financial expertise are able to better control the quality of financial reporting 
through their knowledge, job expectations, economic incentives and reputation 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). Therefore, it is expected that shareholders’ 
interests may be better protected if audit committee members can effectively 
perform their duties of corporate supervision and control. The independence of 
audit committees becomes the key factor that affects the performance of duties 
of their members, because such committees can function effectively only if all 
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members are free from managerial influence (Klein, 2002a). Follow the 
definition of Klein (2002a), this study defines an audit committee as 
independent only if all members are outside directors.  
 
As discussed, since less conservative accounting does not benefit 
shareholders’ interests in the long-term, more independent audit committees 
are helpful to discipline managers’ self-interested behaviours, and therefore 
reduce the probability that managers will apply less conservative accounting 
disclosure prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
In contrast, prior to MBOs, audit committee independence may negatively 
associate with more conservative accounting. This is because, prior to MBOs, 
managers have strong incentives to hide information via more conservative 
disclosure, in order to increase their profits through the MBOs. Independent 
audit committee members have the best ability to identify and control managers’ 
self-interested behaviours (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Klein, 2002a). 
According to these arguments, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H3.6a: Audit committee independence is positively related to accounting 
conservatism prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
H3.6b: Audit committee independence is negatively related to accounting 
conservatism prior to MBOs.  
 
3.3.3.2 Ownership and shareholdings 
3.3.3.2.1 Managerial ownership 
The ultimate effects of managerial ownership on agency problems such as the 
implication of financial reporting conservatism are determined by a trade-off 
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between alignment and entrenchment effects (Short and Keasey, 1999). 
Agency theory suggests that greater managerial shareholdings generate 
greater alignment of interests between shareholders and management, which 
mitigates agency problems between the two parties (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, the alignment effect of ownership predicts that managers with 
larger shareholdings are less likely to expropriate wealth from shareholders, 
because the wealth of managers is also closely tied to firm value. In contrast, 
low levels of managerial ownership may generate greater agency costs (Lafond 
and Roychowdhury, 2008; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wang, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, at certain levels, high managerial ownership stakes may 
signify greater managerial entrenchment. The entrenchment effect suggests 
that high ownership provides managers with greater control over firms. It is 
possible that managers with high levels of ownership are less likely to be 
disciplined when they engage in self-interested actions rather than pursuing 
shareholders’ goal (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). This allows managers to 
undertake a specific disclosure of accounting information to enrich themselves 
at the expense of the company or other shareholders’ wealth (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Consequently, considering 
these two motivations among managers, it is expected that the relation between 
the level of managerial ownership and their application of accounting is non-
monotonic. 
 
As discussed, managers and shareholders may have a conflict of interests prior 
to third-party LBOs; that is to say, managers have strong incentives to keep the 
firm from being taken over so as to adopt a less conservative accounting 
disclosure, but this is not always in the best interests of the other shareholders 
(Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). According to incentive alignment 
effects, as a greater level of ownership better aligns the interests of managers 
and outside shareholders, managers may have disincentives to act 
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opportunistically, which helps to improve the firm’s performance (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010). Therefore, managers with a 
higher ownership may be less likely to apply accounting disclosure more 
conservatively, because it can deliberately cut the firm’s perceived value, via 
timely recognition of bad news as losses while deferring the recognition of good 
news as gains (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Basu, 1997). This undervaluation 
further increases the risks of an under-priced takeover by outside investors, 
which may act against the maximisation of shareholder wealth. In contrast, 
poorly aligned managers may have stronger incentives to perform in line with 
their own interests rather than those of other shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; 
Renneboog et al., 2007). Consequently, managers have incentives to reduce 
the risks that the firm is being undervalued and taken over, as their 
compensation will correlated with firm performance and their long-term job 
security and discretion will be threatened after a buyout (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir 
et al., 2005b; Beekes et al., 2004). But, a lower degree of ownership may give 
managers less power on the board, which makes it easier for other board 
members, who represent the interests of shareholders, to monitor and control 
them (Lasfer, 2006; Johnson et al., 1993; Peasnell et al., 2003). Hence, 
managers who are less aligned with shareholders are likely to apply more 
conservative accounting disclosure due to the impacts of corporate monitoring 
and control.  
 
On the other hand, at certain levels, managerial ownership may result in 
managerial entrenchment. Then, managers are more likely to engage in 
opportunistic behaviours to serve their own interests, since they are less likely 
to be disciplined. Therefore, managers may apply more conservatism in 
reporting when they have higher levels of ownership. This is because it is 
difficult to predict the occurrence of third-party LBOs. Any overstatement of 
earnings via less conservative reporting will be offset by an eventual decline in 
the firm’s value when these overstatements are reversed in the future (Morck 
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et al., 1988b; Shuto and Takada, 2010). However, this activity may attract 
outside investors for LBOs, because companies are likely to have a low value 
once they have withheld good news but released bad news in a timely manner. 
Considering the influence of the need to attract outside investors for third-party 
LBOs and potential mitigating effects, it is expected that managerial ownership 
may have a non-monotonic relation with accounting conservatism. This study 
therefore makes the hypothesis that: 
 
H3.7a: There is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
On the other hand, it has long been recognised that higher levels of ownership 
can also provide managers with greater power and incentives to engage in 
activities that satisfy their own interests, but usually at the expenses of other 
investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1987; St-Pierre et al., 
1996). That is to say, managers have influence and power to choose the most 
favourable manner for them to disclose information when their levels of 
ownership are high. By recognising bad news in a timely manner but delaying 
or stopping the release of good news, conservative accounting can effectively 
depress the value placed in the firm’s current performance (Basu, 1997). 
 
Prior to MBOs, higher ownership provides managers with greater power and 
incentives to apply more conservative accounting so as to lower the purchase 
price, as well as to increase their own benefits after the buyout. This is because 
managers’ direct involvement in the transactions has caused them to have a 
longer horizon and focus more on their interests rather than other investors’ 
after an MBO. More conservative accounting disclosure can help managers 
manipulate earnings downwards and depress the possible purchase price for 
MBOs. Reducing the content of information disclosure can help managers to 
keep an informational advantage over other shareholders or outside competing 
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bidders (Hafzalla, 2009). Therefore, it is expected that higher managerial 
ownership provides managers with power and incentives to apply more 
conservative information disclosure before MBOs. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H3.7b: Managerial ownership is positively related to accounting conservatism 
prior to MBOs. 
 
3.3.3.2.2 Non-executive shareholdings 
As discussed above, non-executive directors have a fiduciary duty towards 
shareholders to control the behaviours of management in meeting the interests 
of shareholders (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Jensen, 1993). However, non-
executive directors will not have sufficiently strong incentives and intentions to 
perform their duties of control if they have little economic affiliation within the 
firm (Fama, 1980; Vafeas, 2005; Jensen, 1993). Agency theory suggests that 
the distributions of shareholdings may provide incentives and abilities for non-
executive directors to supervise and control management behaviours (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Previous literature (e.g. Beasley, 1996) suggests that 
higher non-executive ownership is related to lower likelihood of financial fraud. 
Accordingly, higher non-executive ownership is expected to enhance the 
incentives of non-executive directors to fulfil their function of governance control.  
 
As discussed before, since it is difficult to predict the occurrence of third-party 
LBOs, in the long term perspective shareholders’ interests can be harmed via 
a less conservative approach to accounting disclosure (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). Since higher levels of ownership provide the ability and 
incentives for non-executive directors to fulfil their function of corporate control 
to discipline managers’ opportunistic behaviours, firms with higher non-
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executive ownership are less likely to apply less conservative (i.e. more 
aggressive) accounting prior to a third-party LBO. In line with this, prior to an 
MBO, higher non-executive ownership may better discipline the behaviours of 
management and reduce the chances that managers will apply more 
conservative disclosure to advantage their own interests from a reduced 
valuation of the firm. Accordingly, this study hypothesises that: 
 
H3.8a: Non-executive ownership is positively related to accounting conservatism 
prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
H3.8b: Non-executive ownership is negatively related to accounting 
conservatism prior to MBOs. 
 
3.3.3.2.3 Institutional shareholdings 
As outside investors, institutional shareholders desire and demand more 
specific, unbiased and accurate disclosure of information regarding the firm’s 
performance (Ajinkya et al., 2005). Prior literature (e.g. Healy et al., 1999; 
Bushee and Noe, 2000) suggests that institutions prefer to buy shares in firms 
that have a better degree of disclosure. High levels of shareholdings provide 
institutional shareholders with a strong incentive to control corporate 
information disclosure, because they possess greater interests within the firm 
and enjoy greater power and influence to push the boards to take corrective 
actions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Consistent with this argument, Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1987) and Brickley et al. (1988) document that institutional 
shareholders are likely to vote against harmful actions that reduce shareholder 
wealth. Higher levels of institutional shareholding provides institutions with 
incentives and power to push and influence the boards and management to 
take actions that secure their interests within the firms (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 
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2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Accordingly, concentrated shareholdings 
causes institutional investors to have longer investment horizons, hence 
stronger power to push the board and management to against the implications 
of less conservative accounting (Brickley et al., 1988; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 
2012). The board of directors may being worried that aggressive accounting 
may be detected by institutional investors, which might increase the perceived 
investment risk for institutional investors. Consequently, this study 
hypothesises that: 
 
H3.9a: Institutional shareholding is positively related to accounting conservatism 
prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
H3.9b: Institutional shareholding is positively related to accounting conservatism 
prior to MBOs.  
 
3.4  Research Design and Sample Selection 
3.4.1 Measurements of accounting conservatism 
Conservatism represents the principle that the accountants should have 
prudent reactions in financial accounting and reporting (FASB, 1980). 
Accounting standards in most countries have advocated conservatism in some 
form. Examples include Accounting Standards Board (ASB) No.18, Accounting 
Policies (2000), which suggests that the principle of prudence requires that the 
accounting policies take account of uncertainties when accountants recognise 
and measure the firm’s assets, liabilities, gains, losses and changes to 
shareholders’ funds. Accordingly, appropriate accounting policies will require 
that the companies have more confirmatory evidence and reliability of 
measurement in recognising the existence of assets or gains than recognising 
liabilities or losses. Financial Accountant Standards Board (FASB), Statement 
Chapter 3 
129 
of Financial Accounting Standards No.5: Accounting for Contingencies (1975) 
advocates conservatism which requires that loss contingencies are to be 
accrued once they are probable and reasonably estimated, but gain 
contingencies to be delayed until they are realised.  
 
The accounting literature identifies two types of accounting conservatism: 
unconditional and conditional conservatism. Unconditional conservatism is an 
ex ante or news-independent conservatism. It reflects the systematic 
understatement of book values of equity and net assets that are applied prior 
to (or independently of) related news releases (Ahmed and Henry, 2012; 
Manganaris et al., 2015). For example, unconditional conservatism may be 
related to the implementation of accelerated depreciation of long-lived tangible 
assets or amortisation of assets, or the immediate expensing of R&D 
expenditure and advertising costs (Chan et al., 2009; Ahmed and Henry, 2012). 
The implication of unconditional conservatism is expected to be strongly related 
to firms’ taxation considerations and regulation/political reasons (Qiang, 2007; 
Lara et al., 2009). Ahmed and Henry (2012) suggest that unconditional 
conservatism that has the outcome of accelerated depreciation also lowers the 
present value of taxation payments. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that 
firms are likely to lower their public profile and avoid political scrutiny by 
choosing accounting methods that minimise their reported earnings. 
 
On the other hand, conditional conservatism is interpreted as news-dependent 
or ex post conservatism, which requires stricter verification for recognising good 
news than bad news, resulting in asymmetric sensitivity to economic gains and 
losses (Basu, 1997). Basu (2005), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Qiang 
(2007) identify that contracting efficiency drives conditional conservatism. 
Ahmed and Henry (2012) and Guay and Verrecchia (2006) suggest that firms’ 
shareholders would desire conditional conservatism as it assists them in 
making correct judgements and investment decisions. However, in practice, 
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there will always be a tendency towards the application of accounting 
conservatism. Chan et al. (2009) suggest that conditional conservatism is 
associated with a higher degree of managerial discretion, because managers 
can decide the timing and amount of asset write-down or restructuring charges.  
 
This study, therefore, examines the relationship between board characteristics 
and conditional conservatism by comparing firms which have experienced 
MBOs against those which have experienced third-party LBOs. Conditional 
accounting conservatism is measured based on the following models. 
 
3.4.1.1 Conditional conservatism based on Basu (1997) 
Accounting conservatism is measured initially using Basu’s (1997) model. Basu 
(1997) defines conservatism as the asymmetry in reporting earnings timeliness 
with respect to negative returns (bad news) as compared with positive returns 
(good news). In an efficient market, share returns incorporate all the information 
from the market in a timely fashion, and thus are a valid proxy for economic 
shares to value (Basu, 1997; Dietrich et al., 2007; Ball et al., 2013b). The 
rationale for specifying accounting income is due to it being a sensitive 
barometer of financial reporting in general. Since income statement variables 
are structurally correlated with changes of variables on the balance sheet, 
income statement timeliness thus is an indicator of financial reporting timeliness 
(Ball et al., 2013a). Then, in a piecewise linear regression of accounting income 
on fiscal-period share return, the incremental coefficient on negative share 
return is assumed to be a valid measure for asymmetric timeliness in 
recognition of losses (Ball et al., 2013b). This news-dependent conservatism 
that gives rise to asymmetric timeliness in recognising earnings is termed as 
‘conditional conservatism’ (Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). Many studies (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Beekes et 
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al., 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; 
Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Yunos et al., 2010; Ahmed and Henry, 2012) have 
reported that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient is associated with 
contracting cost-related items and other items predicted to be associated with 
conditional conservatism, consistent with it being a reliable conditional 
conservatism measure. Consequently, this study uses Basu’s regression as 
follows: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ε                         (3.1) 
 
Where xi,t is the earnings per share (EPS) before extraordinary items for firm i 
in fiscal year t; pi,t-1 is firm i’s price per share at the beginning of the fiscal year 
t; ri,t is the stock return on firm i from nine months before fiscal year-end t to 
three months after fiscal year-end t; dri,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ri,t is 
negative, and equal to 0 otherwise. Here, the coefficient 𝛼2 measures the 
levels of asymmetric timeliness of conservatism with respect to positive returns 
(or good news); the 𝛼3  measures the levels of asymmetric timeliness of 
conservatism with respect to negative returns (or bad news).  
 
Basu’s model is the most widely used empirical measure of condition 
conservatism (Callen and Segal, 2013). The timely accounting recognition of 
bad news (as losses) rather than good news (as gains) has provided fresh 
insight into understanding the role of conservatism in efficient contracting with 
the firm (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). However, there are grounds to question 
the validity of Basu’s coefficient as an indicator of conditional conservatism. In 
particular, Dietrich et al. (2007) argue that Basu’s approach may produce 
biased results due to earnings driving returns. They also argue that partitioning 
share return and earnings data by the sign of the share return may produce 
biased inferences. Bagnoli and Watts (2005), Givoly et al. (2007) and Gigler 
Chapter 3 
132 
and Hemmer (2001) suggest that share returns are not equivalent to non-
earnings information, and usually reflect good and bad news differentially, 
depending on firms’ disclosure policies. Givoly et al. (2007) and Ball et al. 
(2013a) argue that Basu’s model is criticised because it fails to include some 
important controls for issues such as information environment, disclosure 
policies and some risk factors, which may lead to incorrect results. However, 
many previous studies such as Dhole (2010), Ettredge et al. (2012) and Ball et 
al. (2013b) have presented strong support for Basu’s (1997) experimental 
methodology that helps to reduce the concerns about its validity. 
 
Moreover, there have been a number of studies that suggest Basu’s 
asymmetric timeliness coefficient is flawed as a proxy for conditional 
conservatism. Hsu et al. (2012) claim that Basu’s coefficient may reflect factors 
not directly related to conservatism, and that this might adversely affect its 
validity as an indicator of conditional conservatism. Roychowdhury and Watts 
(2007), Dietrich et al. (2007) and Patatoukas and Thomas (2011) suggest that 
Basu’s coefficient is not a valid measure of conditional conservatism because 
it is unduly affected by variables, such as market-to-book ratio. Ball et al. (2013b) 
propose that Basu’s coefficient derives from an interaction between 
asymmetrically conservative accounting rules and practices and underlying 
economic characteristics. Moreover, Khan and Watts (2009) and Callen and 
Segal (2013) suggest that Basu’s measure does not provide a rigorous 
measure of the degree of conditional conservatism. For these reasons, this 
study uses alternative measures of conditional conservatism to validate the 
robustness of inferences drawn with Basu’s approach. Consequently, this study 
applies Khan and Watts’s (2009) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) models as 
robust tests for conditional conservatism. 
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3.4.1.2 Firm-specific asymmetric timeliness test of conservatism by Khan 
and Watts (2009) 
Basu’s measure of conservatism is estimated either for an industry-year, by 
using a cross-section of firms in the industry, or for an individual firm, by using 
a time-series of firm-years. However, both estimation methods have limitations. 
The industry-year measure obscures the cross-sectional variation of firms’ 
conservatism by assuming that all firms in the industry are homogeneous. The 
individual firm measure obscures timing of changes of the firm’s conservatism 
by assuming that the firm’s operating characteristics are stationary. Many 
changes affecting firms’ financial reporting conservatism are likely both time- 
and firm-specific (Khan and Watts, 2009; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Khan 
and Watts (2009) develop a firm-specific estimation of the timeliness of good 
news (G-score) and bad news (C-score). The theory of conservatism in Watts 
(2003a) suggests that conservatism varies with contracts, litigation, taxation 
and regulation. These four factors vary with the firm’s set of investment 
opportunities. For example, firms with more conservative accounting are likely 
to have fewer accounting-based compensation contracts, a higher probability 
of litigation and lower taxable earnings, and are more likely to be unregulated 
(Khan and Watts, 2009). Therefore, Khan and Watts (2009) modify Basu’s 
(1997) model by capturing a set of the firm’s characteristics – the market-to-
book ratio, size and leverage – that are commonly used as proxies for the firm’s 
investment opportunity. The G-score and C-score are estimated as follows: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α2r + α3𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ε                           (3.2) 
 
𝐺 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = α2 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀              (3.3) 
 
𝐶 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = α3 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀              (3.4) 
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Where mvi,t is the log of the market value of the equity, mtbi,t is the market value 
of the equity divided by the book value of the equity, and leveli,t is the total debt 
divided by the total assets. Replacing 𝛼2 and 𝛼3 from equation (3.3) and (3.4) 
into regression (3.2) yields: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ (𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡) + (𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇5𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇6𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜀                                                  (3.5) 
 
However, Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score model may have some limitations. 
First, Dhole (2010) suggests that firm-specific conservatism is not a pure 
measure for conditional conservatism. It is recognised that the firm-specific 
conditional conservatism is likely to be influenced by reporting requirements 
imposed by the specific conditions of firm, industry and the accounting 
principles. Moreover, firm-specific conservatism may also reflect the way of 
managers to interpret the accounting principles. Therefore, to some extent, the 
metric of firm-specific accounting conservatism may not only reflect the levels 
of conditional conservatism, but also capture aspects of unconditional 
conservatism (Dhole, 2010). Compare with Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score 
model, Basu-based (1997) metric model only focuses on conditional accounting 
conservatism. As the basic assumption of this study suggests that managers 
tend to engage in different levels of accounting conservatism to protect their 
interests, this research concerns for conditional conservatism rather than 
unconditional conservatism.  
 
Second, Lara et al. (2011) suggest that the C-score model has modified the 
Basu’s (1997) model by additionally capturing the firm’s characteristics of size, 
market-to-book value and leverage. However, these three variables are also 
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proxies for risk, which may lead to the C-score being a proxy for these three 
risk factors. Third, in Khan and Watts’ (2009) model, the C-score (bad news) 
and G-score (good news) are calculated separately. Hence, the research can 
only test the influence of corporate governance on the levels of asymmetric 
timeliness of conservatism with either the respect to positive returns (G-score 
or good news) or with respect to negative returns (C-score or bad news) 
through separate regression models. In other words, the research may fail to 
test the influence of corporate governance on accounting conservatism with 
respect to bad and good news at the same time. Therefore, this study uses the 
both measures of Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score and Basu (1997) in the 
analysis. 
 
3.4.1.3 Accruals-based test of conservatism by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
Another measure of conservatism is based on the approach of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), who use regressions based on accruals and 
contemporaneous cash flows. Basu (1997) suggests that earnings are the sum 
of cash flow and accruals. The unrealised losses only reduce the current 
earnings but do not impact on current cash flows, while unrealised gains will 
not affect current earnings and cash flows. Consequently, the sensitivities of 
earnings and cash flow to bad news are greater than to good news (Basu, 1997; 
Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). This study tests the asymmetry in accruals in the 
model of Ball and Shivakumar (2005): 
 
accr𝑖,𝑡 = γ0 + γ1𝑑𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + γ2𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + γ3𝑑𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑓𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + ε                (3.6) 
 
Where accri,t denotes annual total accruals in year t, standardised by beginning 
total assets. Accruals are defined as income before extraordinary items. Cash 
flow from operations. cfo i,t denotes the cash flow from operations in year t, 
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standardised by total assets at the end of t−1. dcfo i,t is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if the cfo i,t is negative, and 0 otherwise. It predicts a 
negative coefficient for cash flow 𝛾2 and a positive incremental coefficient 𝛾3 
for negative cash flows. 
 
Lara et al. (2009) suggest that the accruals-based model presents the 
advantages of not relying on market measures, which may reduce the effects 
due to market inefficiencies. However, I believe that as cash flow and accruals 
are parts of earnings, the accruals-based model may have an endogeneity 
problem.  
 
3.4.2 Corporate governance mechanisms 
The executive managers are the key agents of the shareholders in charge of 
the firms’ operational strategies and policies. This study uses two proxies of 
CEO ownership and top executive ownership to measure managerial incentives 
in relation to accounting conservatism. According to agency theory, greater 
levels of managerial shareholding may lead to greater goal congruence 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
degree to which the interests of managers are collectively aligned with 
shareholders’ interests, therefore, is also likely to affect the implementation of 
accounting conservatism during buyouts (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). 
Therefore, two proxies for managerial ownership are used. CEO ownership 
(ceoown) is defined as the number of shares held by the CEO divided by the 
total number of outstanding shares. Executive ownership (exeown) is defined 
analogously. 
 
This study uses five governance characteristics that focus on the efficiency of 
corporate control: (i) CEO duality (dual) is a dummy variable that takes a value 
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of 1 if the positions of CEO and chairman of the board are occupied by the 
same person, 0 otherwise; (ii) the fraction of non-executive directors on boards 
(ned); (iii) audit committee independence (auditn) is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if all members are outside directors, 0 otherwise; (iv) non-
executive ownership (nedown) is the percentage of shares held by non-
executives; (v) institutional shareholdings (insti) are the percentage of 
shareholdings of institutional investors. 
 
3.4.3 Control variables 
In an experiment, it is necessary not only to identify the dependent and 
independent variables, but also the control variables. It is recognised that the 
independent variables are the inputs that can cause the dependent variable 
(Sproull, 2002). The independent variables include the elements or 
characteristics that can reflect the scope of the research. However, the control 
variables are usually referred to as constant variables. It is supposed to affect 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, by 
eliminating or holding the variable constant. During the analysis, the control 
variable is used to reduce the effects of confound variables on an experiment. 
(Sproull, 2002; Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero, 2014; Spector and 
Brannick, 2011; Becker, 2005). In other words, the control variables are factors 
that can be used to reduce error terms and increase statistical power (Schwab, 
2013). 
 
This study controls for the firm size based on the size effects hypothesis. Large 
firms are likely to face large political costs that may induce managers to be 
more conservative in financial reporting (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
However, large firms usually have less information asymmetry, as they produce 
more public information which, in turn, reduces the demand of shareholders for 
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conservatism (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Moreover, large firms usually have 
some aggregative projects which can lead to incorrect inferences that reduce 
the extent of conservative accounting reporting (Givoly et al., 2007). Therefore, 
firm size may affect the exercise of accounting conservatism. This study 
controls firm size (size) by including the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets as an explanatory variable. 
 
This study includes leverage (level) which is measured as the total debt divided 
by the total assets as a control variable. Firms with higher leverage tend to have 
greater conflicts between bondholders and shareholders, which in turn affect 
the contractual demand for conservative accounting. Ahmed et al. (2002) 
suggest that conservatism can mitigate the conflicts between bondholders and 
shareholders over dividend policy and reduce the cost of debt. Furthermore, 
high leverage may imply that lenders have strengthened the supervision of debt 
covenant violation (Press and Weintrop, 1990). In line with this, lenders will put 
pressure on managers to employ more conservative accounting practices 
(Zhang, 2004). 
 
This research controls for market-to-book value (mtb) as a proxy of firms’ 
growth opportunities. Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) suggest that low mtb 
indicates the scarcity of growth opportunities. When a company has low mtb, 
managers are tempted to inflate the firm’s accounting numbers and maintain 
the appearance of consistent growth, because growth opportunities indicate the 
current and future performance of the firm (Summers and Sweeney, 1998). 
Firms with low growth opportunities may signal financial distress and depress 
security prices, which provides managers with stronger incentives to avoid 
recognising economic losses, and thereby apply less conservative accounting 
disclosure. However, an alternative view (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Khan and Watts, 
2009; Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b; Huijgen and Lubberink, 2005) suggests that 
low growth opportunity firms are likely to face higher expected litigation costs 
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than high growth opportunity firms. Higher expected litigation costs may further 
motivate managers and auditors to be more conservative in preparing financial 
statements (Kothari et al., 2009). This is because, if managers are likely to 
withhold bad news from investors, firms may suffer even greater losses and 
lawsuits may be triggered when this bad news is revealed. Litigation plays a 
role of deterrence rather than the incentive to offset moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Watts, 2003a). The possibility of severe litigation costs will make 
managers to be more prudent in exercising their discretion to recognise 
accounting earnings. Consistent with previous studies (e.g.Khan and Watts, 
2009), this study defines mtb as market value of equity divided by book value 
of equity, measure at the end of the fiscal year.  
 
This study controls for board size (boar) based on the view that by allowing 
directors to specialise, a large board can lead to a more effective control over 
a firm’s management. For example, Klein (2002b) suggests that a larger board 
results in fewer committee assignments per director, enabling directors to 
specialise, which improves the efficiency of monitoring. Moreover, resource 
dependence theory also suggests that the board of directors is a provision of 
resources for advice, counsel, legitimacy, communicating information and use 
of external connections, which could be thought of as the strength of a particular 
firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer, 2003). 
Consequently, adding more directors to serve on the board can expand the 
resources directors bring to it, which effectively improves the quality of 
corporate control (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). However, large board size can 
also negatively affect communication within the board, and give non-executive 
directors an incentive to ‘free ride’ (John and Senbet, 1998; Jensen, 1993). In 
this sense, each board member will rely on the other members to monitor 
management, which affects the effectiveness of board control (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2001). As a consequence, this research follows the standard 
procedure to control for board size. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Ahmed 
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and Duellman, 2007), this study measure board size as the natural logarithm of 
the total number of board directors.6 
 
This study controls for a firm’s undervaluation, because buyout targets tend to 
experience low share prices on the market relative to firms that remain public 
(Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). As discussed before, managers 
may have different reactions towards firms’ undervaluation prior to third-party 
LBOs and MBOs (Hafzalla, 2009). Specifically, prior to third-party LBOs, 
managers may try to reduce undervaluation by applying less conservative 
accounting disclosure, either to prevent being taken over or to increase the 
possible selling price (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005a; Weir et al., 2005b). 
This is because a low price is always the main factor in attracting the interests 
of outside investors. Managers are likely to lose their long-term job security and 
discretion within the firm once it is taken over by any third-party investors.  
 
In contrast, prior to an MBO, managers are likely to use this undervaluation to 
decrease the firm’s purchase price. Consequently, exercising more 
conservative accounting tends to make firms appear less profitable, which may 
reduce the possible purchase price (Dechow et al., 1996; Weir et al., 2005b; 
Hafzalla, 2009). Following the approach of Alford (1992), Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) and Francis et al. (2005), this study uses industry-adjusted price 
earnings (pe) to measure the extent of the target firm’s undervaluation. Firms 
with a comparatively low price earnings ratio to their industry peers are 
expected to be undervalued. This is because investors are excessively 
pessimistic over lower levels of earnings or bad news. If future earnings turn 
out to be better than expected, the price is considered to be undervalued (Bondt 
and Thaler, 1985). 
 
                                                             
6 As a robust test, this study employs another method to measure board size (BSIZE: the total number 
of board directors on the board).  
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3.4.4 Empirical model for tests using Basu (1997) conservatism measure 
Using the following empirical model, this study tests the associations between 
conservatism and six board characteristics, by considering the five control 
variables discussed above: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α4𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 + α5𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 + α6𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 + α7𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 + α8𝑛𝑒𝑑 + α9𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑑 + α10𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑑
+ α11𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑑 + α12𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑛 + α13𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑛 + α14𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑛 + α15𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑛 + α16𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
+ α17𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + α18𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + α19𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + α20𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 + α21𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
+ α22𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 + α23𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 + α24𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + α25𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + α26𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + α27𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + α28𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + α29𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + α30𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + α31𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + α32𝑚𝑡𝑏 + α33𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑚𝑡𝑏 + α34𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑡𝑏 + α35𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑡𝑏 + α36𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + α37𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + α38𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + α39𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + α40𝑝𝑒 + α41𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑒
+ α42𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑒 + α43𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑒 + α44𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟 + α45𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟
+ α46𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟 + α47𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟 + ε                 (3.7) 
 
Where independent variables include: CEO duality (dual); non-executive 
directors (ned); audit committee independence (auditn); managerial ownership 
(ceoown, exeown); non-executive shareholding (nedown); and institutional 
shareholding (insti). The control variables include firm size (size); leverage 
(level); market-to-book value (mtb); price earnings ratio (pe); and board size 
(boar). 
 
In Regression 3.7, the coefficient of 𝛼2 measures earnings’ timeliness with 
respect to good news, and 𝛼3  measures the asymmetric timeliness with 
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respect to bad news. In order to test the effects of corporate governance 
variables on conservative accounting disclosure, this study constructs the 
regression model by using the interaction effects of governance variables with 
the indicators of good and bad news. The coefficient of 𝛼6,10,14,18,22,26 
measures the association of 𝛼2 (good news) with independent variables dual, 
ned, auditn, managerial ownership, nedown, and insti respectively; 
𝛼7,11,15,19,23,27 measures the association of 𝛼3 (bad news) with independent 
variables dual, ned, auditn, managerial ownership, nedown, and insti 
respectively.  
 
3.4.5 Sample and data 
The sample of this study consists of all the complete leveraged buyout 
transactions of UK public firms that took place in the London Share Exchange 
during 1997−2011 for which full data are available. LBOs are defined as public-
to-private transactions in which listed companies were taken over by financial 
institutions, by the executive directors or another individual blockholder (Weir 
et al., 2005a). The data is restricted to leveraged buyouts (Thomson One 
Acquisition Techniques code (ATC #12) for UK public companies that are going 
private (ATC #11) only. The initial sample includes 100 third-party LBOs and 
145 MBOs during 1997–2011 (see Table 3.7 in the Appendix). After removing 
those involving financial firms (24 MBOs and 12 third-party LBOs), the final 
sample consists of 88 third-party LBO and 124 MBO deals. The sample 
excludes non-UK firms and financial services companies because they are 
subject to a different set of financial structures, regulatory disclosure 
requirements and corporate governance systems. To be included, 
conservatism proxies for the three years preceding LBOs, and complete 
governance and financial data at the last year-end before the announcement of 
the buyout are required.  
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All data is taken from four sources. Deal information and firms’ annual reports 
were collected from the Nexis UK-Lexis database, the Thomson One Banker 
database and Thomson Research. DataStream was used to access the 
accounting and financial information. All the corporate governance information 
was collected by hand from the companies’ annual reports.  
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Table 3.1 Variable names 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variables:  
Earnings per share/price 
(epsp#) 
EPS before extraordinary item/price at the beginning of year # 
(#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Total accruals (accrb#) (Δinventory+Δdebtors+Δother current assets-Δcreditors-Δother 
current liabilities-depreciation)/total assets at the beginning of 
year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
C-score (cscore) C-score is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include 
firm size, market to book value and leverage in Khan and Watts 
(2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
G-Score (gscore) G-score is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include 
firm size, market to book value and leverage, in Khan and Watts 
(2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Independent variables:  
Cash flow from operation 
(cfo#) 
Cash flow from operation/total assets at the beginning of year # 
(#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Negative cash flow from 
operation (dcfo#) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise at 
year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Cash flow from operation * 
Negative cash flow from 
operation (dcfocfo#) 
Cash flow from operation * Negative cash flow from operation 
at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Share returns (r#) Share returns from 9 months before year # end to three months 
after the year # end, # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Negative returns (dr#) Dummy variable coded 1 if share return (R#) is negative, 0 
otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Share return * Negative 
returns (drr#) 
Share return * Negative returns at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the 
year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
  
Audit committee 
independence (auditn#) 
Audit committee independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if 
all the members in audit committee are non-executives, 0 
otherwise at year # (#=1 denote the year Y-1) 
CEO ownership (ceoown#) CEO share ownership as a percentage of the total number of 
outstanding shares at year # (#=1 denote the year Y-1) 
CEO ownership 
(ceoown#^2) 
The square of the CEO share ownership as a percentage of the 
total number of outstanding shares at year # (#=1 denote the 
year Y-1) 
CEO duality (dual#) Dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, 0 otherwise at year # (#=1 denote the year Y-1) 
Executive ownership 
(exeown#) 
Executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number 
of outstanding shares at year # (#=1 denote the year Y-1) 
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Executive ownership 
(exeown#^2) 
The square of the executive share ownership as a percentage 
of the total number of outstanding shares at year # (#=1 denote 
the year Y-1) 
Institutional shareholdings 
(insti#) 
Total common shares held by institutional investors divided by 
total common shares outstanding at year # (#=1 denote the year 
Y-1)  
Non-executive directors 
(ned#) 
Number of non-executive directors divided by the total number 
of board directors at year # (#=1 denote the year Y-1)  
Non-executive 
shareholdings (nedown#) 
Total common shares held by non-executive directors divided 
by total common shares outstanding at year # (#=1 denote the 
year Y-1)  
Control variables:  
Board size (boar#) Natural logarithm of the number of board directors at year # (#=1 
denote the year Y-1) 
Board size (bsize#) Number of board directors on the board at year # (#=1 denote 
the year Y-1) 
Firm size (size#) Natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year # (#=1,2,3 denote 
the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Leverage ratio (level#) Total debts divided by total assets at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the 
year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Market to book value (mtb#) Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at 
year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3) 
Price earnings ratio (pea#) The industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year # (#=1 denote 
the year Y-1) 
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3.5  Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 in the Appendix report the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the tests of accounting conservatism and the tests of the 
association between conservatism and governance in MBO and third-party 
LBO transactions. Panels A in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 in the Appendix contain the 
variables used in the Basu (1997), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Khan and 
Watts (2009) regressions, which use asymmetric timeliness of bad and good 
news as a measure of conservatism. As most leveraged buyouts take about a 
year or occasionally as much as two or three years to execute (Perry and 
Williams, 1994), this study performs the analysis of the differences in the 
degree of accounting conservatism within three years before a leveraged 
buyout announcement (labelled Y−1, Y−2, Y−3). Panels B in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 
in the Appendix contain the governance and financial variables for one year 
before the announcement of the transactions.  
 
Table 3.2 summarises the results in Panels B of Tables 3.7 and 3.8 in the 
Appendix for the governance and financial variables. The descriptive statistics 
of the sample for MBO firms (N=117) and third-party LBO firms (N=80) in the 
table reports the mean, median, and the number of observations, as well as t-
tests on whether the differences between the two types of transactions are 
significant. Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of dummy 
variable for firms in the sample indicate that 28.2% of the MBO firms have a 
chairman of the board who is also the current CEO, which is significantly higher 
than it in third-party LBO firms (11.3%). This is consistent with the findings in 
Weir and Wright (2006), who report that MBO firms have a greater incidence of 
duality. They suggest that managers involved in MBO transactions often display 
stronger leadership, which might lead to a high incidence of CEO duality. In 
Chapter 3 
147 
71.8% of MBO firms and 90% of third-party LBO firms, the audit committees 
are wholly composed of non-executive directors (auditn). The difference is 
statistically significantly at 1% level. 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for board characteristics and control 
variables on MBO deals and third-party LBO deals in year Y−1 
 MBOs  third-party LBOs  Significance tests 
Panel A: Observations Value Percent Cum. Observations Value Percent Cum z p > |z| 
  0 71.8 71.8  0 88.7 88.7 
2.900***  (0.004)  
dual1 117 1 28.2 100 80 1 11.3 100 
  0 28.2 28.2  0 10 10 
-3.153***  (0.002)  
auditn1 117 1 71.8 100 80 1 90 100 
 MBOs  third-party LBOs  Significance tests 
Panel B: Observations Mean Median  Observations Mean Median  t p > |t| 
           
ned1 117 0.444 0.429  80 0.532 0.556  -4.495***  (0.000)  
ceoown1 117 0.123 0.035  80 0.061 0.006  2.844***  (0.005)  
ceoown1^2 117 0.045 0.001  80 0.016 0.000  2.276**  (0.024)  
exeown1 117 0.157 0.066  80 0.071 0.013  3.448***  (0.001)  
exeown1^2 117 0.062 0.004  80 0.021 0.000  2.854***  (0.005)  
nedown1 117 0.055 0.003  80 0.036 0.002  1.211  (0.227)  
insti1 117 0.354 0.321  80 0.369 0.370  -0.515  (0.607)  
size1 117 17.865 17.802  80 18.413 18.465  -2.413**  (0.017)  
level1 117 0.170 0.144  80 0.252 0.230  -3.190***  (0.002)  
mtb1 117 2.262 1.225  80 0.826 1.655  1.203  (0.231)  
pe1 117 -3.829 -5.280  80 0.700 -3.185  -0.682  (0.496)  
boar1 117 1.768 1.792  80 1.881 1.946  -3.113***  (0.002)  
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp1: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning of year 
y-1. r1: share returns from 9 months before year 1 end to three months after the year end. dr1: dummy variable coded 1 if share 
return (r1) is negative, 0 otherwise at year y-1. drr1: share return (r1) * negative returns (dr1) at year y-1. dual1: dummy variable 
coded 1 if the ceo is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of non-executive directors divided 
by the total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit committee independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the 
members in audit committee are non-executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: ceo share ownership as a percentage of 
the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share ownership as a percentage of the 
total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1: executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number of 
outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number 
of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total common shares held by non-executive directors divided by total common 
shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common shares 
outstanding at year y-1. size1: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year y-1. level1: total debts divided by total assets at year 
y-1. mtb1: market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio 
at year y-1. boar1: natural logarithm of the number of board directors at year y-1.  
 
Moreover, Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of continuous 
variables for MBOs and third-party LBOs. Of the MBO firms, 44.4% of the 
directors are non-executives (ned). The corresponding percentage of non-
executive board members (ned) in third-party LBO firms is 53.2%. MBOs tend 
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to have significant lower proportion of non-executives on boards than third-party 
LBOs. The mean ownership by the CEO is 12.3% in MBOs and 6.1% in third-
party LBOs, while the average shareholding of all top executives is 15.7% in 
MBOs and 7.1% in third-party LBOs. The relatively high values of managerial 
ownership in the MBO sample are most likely due to the fact that managers are 
the initiators of the buyouts. Institutional investors own approximately 34.8% of 
the share in MBO firms and 36% in third-party LBO firms. The non-executives, 
on average, hold approximately 5.5% ownership in the MBO sample and 3.6% 
ownership in the third-party LBO sample. As previous research into listed firms 
by Ahmed and Duellman (2007) finds that outside directors’ ownership is about 
1.4% in US listed firms during 1999–2001, and Ozkan (2011) reports that UK 
non-executive directors hold about 2% ownership during 1999–2005, this 
suggests that buyout firms may have a comparatively large non-executive 
ownership. This result further indicates that non-executive directors in the 
leveraged buyout sample may have stronger incentives to protect the interests 
of shareholders, because a higher level of ownership strengthens their 
alignment of interests.  
 
In comparison, the means of firm size (size), leverage (level), and board size 
(boar) are 17.865 (18.413), 0.17 (0.252), and 1.768 (1.881) for MBO firms 
(third-party LBO firms), respectively. The results indicate that, on average, 
managers in MBOs are likely to take over firms of smaller size and with lower 
debt levels. Fox and Marcus (1992) and Hafzalla (2009) suggest that it would 
be easy for managers to raise funds when the target firms are smaller and have 
lower debt levels. Moreover, it suggests that MBO targets have smaller board 
sizes. This is because it may be easier for management to negotiate with 
smaller boards and persuade them to accept an MBO offer. The average 
market-to-book value (mtb) in MBO firms is 2.262, which indicates that buyout 
targets have high growth opportunities, while the average mtb in third-party 
LBO firms is 0.826, which indicates that these firms experience a low growth 
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opportunity. This provides further explanation that managers in third-party LBO 
firms have an incentive to hide bad news from investors due to the low growth 
opportunity, which may signal financial distress and depressed security prices. 
In addition, although the average industry-adjusted price earnings ratios (pe) 
are −3.829 for the MBO sample and 0.7 for the third-party LBO sample, the 
medians of the pe ratios are −5.28 and −3.185, respectively. The negative pe 
suggests that buyout targets have smaller price earnings ratios than the 
industry average, indicating that buyout firms are likely to be undervalued 
relative to their peer listed companies.  
 
Comparing MBO and third-party LBO firms with regard to these variables yields 
mixed results. Overall, MBO firms have significantly larger CEO influence and 
power than third-party LBO firms, based on CEO duality (dual) and managerial 
ownership (ceoown; exeown). On the other hand, third-party LBO firms often 
have significantly stronger boards than MBO firms, because the high levels of 
non-executives and audit committee independence could provide effective 
monitoring and control to mitigate managers’ self-interested behaviours.  
 
Moreover, compared with MBO firms, third-party LBO firms are significantly 
larger (size) and have larger boards (boar), as well as higher leverage ratios 
(level). This is not surprising, because MBO firms tend to be smaller than third-
party LBO firms (Weir and Wright, 2006; Weir et al., 2005b). One constraint to 
the execution of an MBO is that the managers are likely to find it more difficult 
to raise finance for large firms than for small ones (Hafzalla, 2009). MBO and 
third-party LBO firms appear to have no significant difference in terms of 
institutional shareholding (insti), non-executive ownership (nedown), growth 
opportunity (mtb), and price earnings ratio (pe).
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3.5.2 Correlation 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in the Appendix report the Pearson correlation matrix 
between conservatism measures and governance and control variables in 
MBOs and third-party LBOs, respectively. The conservatism regression models 
based on Basu (1997), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), and Khan and Watts (2009) 
contain many interaction variables. There is a good chance that those variables 
will be highly correlated. Robinson and Schumacker (2009), Allison (2012), 
Hayes (2013) and Cohen et al. (2013) suggest that the high correlations of 
interaction variables can be greatly reduced by ‘centring’ or ‘standardising’ the 
variables. However, the p-value for these interaction variables will be exactly 
the same, regardless of whether or not they are centred. Moreover, all the 
results for the other variables including the R-square will be the same in either 
case. So the multicollinearity has no adverse consequences (Allison, 2012). 
Therefore, since the p-value for interaction variables is not affected by 
multicollinearity (Allison, 2012), which is consistent with previous research on 
accounting conservatism (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman, 2013; Beekes et al., 2004; 
Lara et al., 2009; Lara et al., 2007), this study ignores the multicollinearity of 
the interaction variables and then reports the Spearman correlation matrix 
without interaction variables.  
 
As expected, CEO ownership and executive ownership are highly correlated, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.926 and 0.984 in the MBO sample and the 
third-party LBO sample, respectively. The correlations among other dependent, 
independent and control variables are less than 0.5 in both the MBO sample 
and the third-party LBO sample. Earnings before extraordinary items (epsp) is 
positively correlated with share return (r) and negatively correlated with the 
negative return indicator (dr), indicating that reported earnings reflect at least a 
portion of the information revealed in share returns.  
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3.5.3 Primary results 
3.5.3.1 Conservatism measure 
Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score model measures the firm-specific accounting 
conservatism which is assumed to be the primary approach to testing the 
degree of accounting conservatism. However, this model may have limitations, 
because the firm-specific conservatism is not a pure measure for conditional 
conservatism, but may also capture aspects of unconditional conservatism 
(Dhole, 2010). Dhole (2010) suggests that the firm-specific conditional 
conservatism is influenced by reporting requirements imposed by the specific 
conditions of firm, industry and the accounting principles. Compare with C-
score model, Basu’s (1997) model focuses only on conditional accounting 
conservatism, while it does not express the degree of conservatism at firm-year 
level (Khan and Watts, 2009). Hence, this study also employs Basu’s (1997) 
model in the analysis. 
 
Tables 3.12 to 3.14 in the Appendix calculate and report the asymmetric 
timeliness of bad (C-score) and good news (G-score) on a firm-specific level 
based on Khan and Watts (2009) model. In particular, Table 3.12 in Appendix 
reports the regressions to estimate C-score and G-score. The R-squares in 
estimate C-score are 0.25 and 0.98 in MBOs and third-party LBOs at year Y-1, 
0.11 and 0.66 in MBOs and third-party LBOs at year Y-2, and 0.84 and 0.49 in 
MBOs and third-party LBOs at year Y-3. These are at acceptable levels, as 
previous study (e.g. Khan and Watts, 2009) reports that the adjust R-square in 
the equation to estimate C-score and G-score is 0.24. 
 
Table 3.13, Panels A and B in the Appendix report the descriptive statistics of 
the G-score (good news) and C-score (bad news) for the MBO sample and the 
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third-party LBO sample in different time periods. In general, Table 3.13 reports 
that the mean value of C-score (bad news) is 0.254 in MBOs, where a higher 
C-score indicates a high levels of accounting conservatism. This is consistent 
with Hypothesis 3.1a that managers are likely to engage in more conservative 
accounting prior to MBOs. Moreover, comparing the mean and median of the 
C-score (G-score) suggests that the C-score and G-score distributions are not 
skewed in MBOs and third-party LBOs in years Y−1, Y−2, and Y−3. The first 
quartile (p25) of the C-score is positive, suggesting that conservatism is a 
widespread feature of financial reporting in years Y−1 and Y−3 in MBOs, and 
in years Y−2 and Y−3 in third-party LBOs. 
 
Table 3.14 in the Appendix shows that the Pearson correlations between the C-
score and G-score are negative in years Y−1 and Y−2 in MBOs and in year Y−3 
in third-party LBOs. This implies that timeliness of bad news recognition (high 
C-score) is associated with deferring the recognition of good news (low G-
score). This is consistent with the argument of LaFond and Watts (2008) that 
higher asymmetric timeliness (incremental timeliness of bad news over good 
news) partly stems from lesser timeliness of good news. Hence, the C-score 
can be used to measure a firm’s degree of accounting conservatism. 
 
In addition, Table 3.3 reports the t-tests for the C-score by comparing MBOs to 
third-party LBOs across years preceding the announcement of buyouts. Panel 
A reports the differential accounting reporting of MBO firms and third-party LBO 
firms from the significance tests of C-scores. As reported, MBO firms have 
significantly higher C-score than third-party LBO firms in year Y−1, and 
significantly lower C-score in year Y−2. This suggests that, for MBO firms, 
managers’ direct involvement creates strong incentives for them to decrease 
the firm’s value and then decrease their possible purchase price through 
applying a more conservative accounting disclosure (Hafzalla, 2009).  
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However, due to concerns about job losses or future restrictions, a third-party 
LBO may ultimately intensify managers’ incentives to reduce the risks of the 
firm’s undervaluation and prevent a third-party buyout via less conservative (i.e. 
more aggressive) accounting disclosure. This is because, after a third-party 
LBO, the new owners may make changes to the ineffective management of the 
target firm, in order to maximise their interests through improved firm 
governance and performance (Renneboog et al., 2007). Moreover, new owners 
are likely to benefit from the resale of the firm in the future (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir 
et al., 2005b). However, these activities may directly affect managers’ long-term 
job security and their discretion within the firm (Weir et al., 2005a; Weir et al., 
2005b). This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.1b, that MBO firms are likely to 
apply more conservative accounting than third-party LBO firms one year before 
the buyout is announced. Comparing third-party LBOs with MBOs provides 
direct evidence that managers have different incentives in these settings, which 
further affect their choices about information disclosure differently.  
 
Moreover, the average values of the C-score are −0.271 (0.254) and 0.0657 
(−6.558) for MBO and third-party LBO firms in year Y−2 (Y−1). This result 
supports the theoretical inference and indicates that when managers do not 
participate in an MBO, they may have strong incentives to apply low levels of 
conservative (i.e. high levels of aggressive) disclosure to protect their own 
interests from the firm’s increased performance (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008).  
 
Furthermore, this result may also suggest that when there is no potential threat 
of a third-party LBO, managers may have incentives to apply high levels of 
conservative accounting. This is because the overstatements will be offset by 
an eventual decline in the future; persistently less conservative (i.e. more 
aggressive) accounting disclosure may hurt earnings in the long-term view. In 
addition, a significant reversal of overstatements may imply a poor quality of 
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financial report. Such poor quality financial reporting is bad for managers’ 
reputation and may even affect their job security, especially when the company 
is taken over by other firms. In turn, managers are less likely to take actions 
that result in poor quality reporting in order to protect their reputations (unless 
such actions bring commensurately increased interests in returns) (Francis et 
al., 2008; Hirshleifer, 1993). Francis et al. (2008) and Hirshleifer (1993) suggest 
that reputable managers are likely to avoid such actions, as they may have 
more to lose in terms of their own human capital (e.g. reputation). Therefore, 
due to the concern over their reputation and their own interests, it is necessary 
to test whether the degree of accounting conservatism may change over time.  
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Table 3.3 Information disclosure descriptive statistics on MBO deals and 
third-party LBO deals in years Y−1, Y−2, and Y−3, based on Khan & 
Watts’s (2009) model 
Panel A: C-Score (Bad news) compare MBOs with third-party LBOs 
 MBOs  third-party LBOs  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
Y-1 119 0.254  87 -6.558  92.712*** (0.000) 
Y-2 118 -0.271  83 0.657  -7.587*** (0.000) 
Y-3 113 0.371  74 0.328  0.876 (0.383) 
         
Panel B: C-Score (Bad news) compare year Y-1 with Y-2 
 Y-1  Y-2  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
MBOs 118 0.254  113 -0.302  7.062*** (0.000) 
third-party LBOs 81 -6.551  70 0.654  -55.812*** (0.000) 
         
Panel C: C-Score (Bad news) compare year Y-1 with Y-3 
 Y-1  Y-3  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
MBOs 118 0.254  110 0.365  -2.280** (0.024) 
third-party LBOs 81 -6.551  68 0.310  -71.283*** (0.000) 
         
Panel D: C-Score (Bad news) compare year Y-2 with Y-3 
 Y-2  Y-3  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
MBOs 113 -0.302  110 0.365  -7.425*** (0.000) 
third-party LBOs 70 0.654  68 0.310  3.192*** (0.002) 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. cscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics 
include firm size, market to book value and leverage in Khan and Watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-
2, Y-3). gscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage, in 
Khan and Watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year Y-1, Y-2, Y-3). 
 
Turning to the question of how the degree of conservatism changes over time 
prior to a buyout, Panels B, C and D of Table 3.3 report the significance tests 
of the C-score by comparing its differences in years Y−1, Y−2, and Y−3, in both 
the MBO sample and the third-party LBO sample. The results in Panel B show 
that MBO firms are likely to apply more conservative accounting in year Y−1 
than year Y−2. Initially, the changes of the degree of accounting conservatism 
across years indicate that an MBO could provide managers with significantly 
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stronger incentives to behave opportunistically in recognising gains versus 
losses one year before the announcement of a buyout. This is consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994) that managers often plan 
MBOs for a year or occasionally as much as two or three years prior to the 
public offer. Besides, it provides further evidence that managers’ choice to 
participate in transactions makes them focus on their own interests, especially 
those after the buyouts (Hafzalla, 2009; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
Managers involved in MBO transactions are trying to pay the lowest possible 
purchase price. Therefore, they may choose to disclose accounting information 
more conservatively to reduce the perceived value of the firm when they initiate 
an MBO offer (Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
Moreover, since managers have to undertake the costs of overstatements when 
these overstated earnings are reversed after an MBO, more conservative 
accounting disclosure reduces the incidence of overstatements, which is in the 
interests of managers (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). However, as 
discussed previously, before managers initiate an MBO offer, they may have 
incentives to apply a less conservative accounting disclosure, either to 
overstate the value they create to obtain a larger earning-based bonus or to 
prevent any competing bid from third-party buyers (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008). Therefore, this is consistent with Hypothesis 3.2 that, prior to MBOs, the 
degree of accounting conservatism changes over time, from less conservative 
(i.e. more aggressive) to more conservative.  
 
In addition, the results in Panels C and D of Table 3.3 show that managers are 
likely to be more conservative in year Y−3 than in years Y−2 and Y−1. These 
results may indicate a mean reversion such that, before managers initiate an 
MBO, they are less likely to implement less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) 
disclosure persistently. As overstatements from current earnings will be offset 
through an ultimate decline in the firm’s value, persistent less conservative (i.e. 
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more aggressive) accounting financial information may result in poor quality 
reporting. Because managers who currently have good reputations are likely to 
avoid taking actions that result in higher costs to their own human capital 
(unless such actions bring commensurate increases in returns), they are less 
likely to persistently apply more aggressive accounting disclosure (Francis et 
al., 2008; Hirshleifer, 1993). Therefore, this result further supports the proposal 
that managers’ disclosure behaviours will vary over time depending up their 
own interests within the firm. 
 
Conversely, the results in Panels B, C, and D of Table 3.3 report that third-party 
LBO firms have a significantly higher C-score in year Y−2 or Y−3 than in year 
Y−1. This indicates a mean reversion in that managers are likely to reduce the 
possibility of the firm’s undervaluation and decrease its risk of being taken over, 
by applying less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting disclosure 
(Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b; Dechow et al., 1996). As the prediction of 
third-party LBOs is difficult, it may simply be impossible to carry out more 
aggressive accounting disclosure over long periods. Managers are likely to 
avoid taking such action, because the persistence of less conservative (i.e. 
more aggressive) accounting disclosure may result in poor quality accounting 
reporting that is harmful for managers’ reputation (Francis et al., 2008; 
Hirshleifer, 1993). Therefore, the degree of accounting conservatism may vary 
over time prior to third-party LBOs. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.3, that 
managers may change the degree of accounting conservatism from more to 
less conservative (i.e. more aggressive).  
 
In addition, the results of the t-tests in Panels B and C of Table 3.3 show that 
the third-party LBO sample has a much larger coefficient than the MBO sample. 
This suggests that firms are likely to make more obvious changes in accounting 
information disclosure when they are faced with a third-party LBO rather than 
a MBO. Third-party LBOs are special events that may sometimes push 
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managers to make disclosure choices that are bad for shareholders but good 
for the managers. This provides further evidence for the analysis of managerial 
incentives in third-party LBOs that the threat of long-term job security and 
discretion will significantly affect managers’ behaviour regarding disclosure.  
 
Moreover, Table 3.11 in the Appendix reports the results of the ordinary least 
squares regressions using the standard Basu (1997) model to estimate the 
timeliness of earnings. It is found that the R-squares for the accounting 
conservatism measure based on Basu (1997) model are 0.2 and 0.118 for 
MBOs and third-party LBOs at year Y-1, 0.02 and 0.11 for MBOs and third-party 
LBOs at year Y-2, and 0.04 and 0.13 for MBOs and third-party LBOs at year Y-
3. These are at an acceptable level, as previous literature (e.g. Lara et al., 2009; 
Basu, 1997) reports that the R-squares for the estimation of accounting 
conservatism are range from 0.07 and 0.13. 
 
Table 3.4 summarises the results of the estimation for firms’ conditional 
conservatism in Appendix Table 3.11. The regressions are based on the 
standard Basu (1997) model, which examine the timeliness of good (r#) versus 
bad news (drr#)7 for the MBO sample and the third-party LBO sample in years 
Y−1, Y−2 and Y−3 respectively. In general, the main parameter of interest in 
Model 1, the coefficient of drr (bad news), is statistically significant at the 5% 
level and has a predicted positive sign in year Y−1. This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3.1a, that MBO firms are likely to disclose information 
conservatively before the announcement of an MBO. This result suggests that 
managers’ participation in buyouts has made them focus on their own interests 
to decrease the possible purchase price (Hafzalla, 2009; Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008). Conservatism is in the interests of managers prior to an 
MBO, because more conservative disclosure is helpful in reducing firms’ 
                                                             
7 r#: Negative share return in year #; drr#: Negative share return in year # (#=1,2,3 denote the years Y-
1, Y-2, Y-3). 
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perceived value (Hafzalla, 2009). The coefficients of r (good news) and drr (bad 
news) for MBO firms are insignificant in years Y−2 and Y−3, indicating that 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings is not obvious in this time period. This result 
supports the findings in previous studies (e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994) that 
managers’ decisions whether to conduct an MBO or the point at which they start 
achievably working towards it often take no longer than a year. 
 
In Table 3.4, Models 4 and 6 are significant at p<0.05. The coefficients of drr8 
(negative share returns) for third-party LBO sample are positively significant in 
years Y−1 and Y−3, which implies that third-party LBO firms tend to disclose 
bad news in a timely manner over the period. This further suggests that third-
party LBO firms are likely to apply conservative accounting disclosure in years 
Y−1 and Y−3. In other words, conservative accounting reporting is less likely to 
continue to be used over the testing period before a third-party LBO. This 
means that there might have a mean-reversion, the degree of accounting 
conservatism may change according to managers’ incentives over time 
preceding the announcement of buyouts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 drr#: Negative share return in year # (#=1,2,3 denote the years Y-1, Y-2, Y-3). 
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Table 3.4 Summary of Table 3.11 in the Appendix – Results from cross-
sectional regressions of beginning of period price deflated earnings on 
contemporaneous annual returns based on the Basu (1997) model 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ε                                    
  MBOs   third-party LBOs 
  Y-1 Y-2 Y-3   Y-1 Y-2 Y-3 
  Model1 Model2 Model3   Model4 Model5 Model6 
Variables 
Expected 
sign 
epsp1 epsp2 epsp3  
Expected 
sign 
epsp1 epsp2 epsp3 
          
dr1  +     +*   
r1 - +    + +   
drr1 + +**    - +*   
dr2   +     +  
r2 -/+  +   -/+  -  
drr2 +/-  +   +/-  +**  
dr3    +     - 
r3 +   +  -   - 
drr3 -   +  +   +** 
F-test  +*** + +   +** + +** 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp#: eps before extraordinary item/price at the 
beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). r#: share returns from 9 months before year # end to 
three months after the year # end, # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr#: dummy variable coded 1 if share 
return (r#) is negative, 0 otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). drr#: share return (r#) * negative 
returns (dr#) at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
 
3.5.3.2 Accounting conservatism and board characteristics 
Equation (3.7) in section 3.4.4 examines the association between six corporate 
governance variables, including CEO duality (dual), audit committee 
independence (auditn), non-executive ownership (nedown), managerial 
ownership (ceoown/exeown), non-executives (ned), institutional shareholding 
(insti), and accounting conservatism in MBO firms and third-party LBO firms 
one year before the announcement of a buyout. The results are presented in 
Table 3.15 of the Appendix.  
 
In Table 3.15 of the Appendix, the research finds that the R-square in examining 
the influence of corporate governance on accounting conservatism are 0.51 
and 0.92 in MBOs and third-party LBOs. This is an acceptable level. The 
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previous literature (e.g. Beekes et al., 2004) examines the link between board 
composition and accounting conservatism and reported the R-square are 0.15. 
Lara et al. (2007) report that the R-square in examining the effects of corporate 
governance on accounting conservatism is 0.15. Lafond and Roychowdhury 
(2008) find that the R-square for the effects managerial ownership on 
accounting conservatism is 0.34. Shuto and Takada (2010) identify that the R-
square is 0.13 in the relation between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism. 
 
Table 3.5 summarises the results from the estimations in Table 3.15, focusing 
on the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients of the corporate 
governance variables only. Models 13 and 14 present the results of MBO firms 
using ownership by CEO and all top executive managers respectively, while 
Models 15 and 16 run the same tests for third-party LBO firms. As discussed 
earlier, prior to MBOs, less conservative accounting is likely to function in the 
interests of shareholders, as managers are likely to make firms appear less 
valuable to reduce the value of the takeover (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 
2006). However, prior to third-party LBOs, more conservative accounting tends 
to protect the long-term interests of shareholders, because the prediction of 
third-party LBOs is difficult (Weir and Wright, 2006; Hafzalla, 2009). It is found 
that the high level of CEO duality (dual), audit committee independence (auditn) 
and non-executive ownership (nedown) may allow managers to apply less 
conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting disclosure prior to a third-party 
LBO. Higher percentages of non-executive directors (ned), managerial 
ownership, and institutional shareholding (insti) may lead to more conservative 
disclosure before a third-party LBO.  
 
However, compared with third-party LBO firms, corporate governance 
mechanisms, including CEO duality (dual), non-executive ownership (nedown), 
managerial ownership (ceoown/exeown), and non-executives (ned) do not 
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have significant effects on managers’ choice of a conservative approach in 
MBO firms. For MBO companies, audit committee independence (auditn) is 
significantly negative correlated with conservatism, while institutional 
ownership (insti) is significantly positive correlated with conservatism. 
 
Concentrating first on third-party LBO firms, Models 15 and 16 report that CEO 
duality has a significantly negative relation with bad news (r* dr*dual) but a 
significantly positive relation with good news (r* dual). The results suggest that 
third-party LBO firms with CEO duality are likely to have greater asymmetry in 
recognising bad news as losses, rather than good news as gains. That is to say, 
such firms are likely to recognise good news as gains in a timely manner, but 
delay the recognition of bad news as losses. Therefore, this is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3.4a that CEO duality may result in firms applying less conservative 
(i.e. more aggressive) accounting prior to the announcement of third-party 
LBOs. This indicates that, prior to a third-party LBO, duality could enable CEOs 
with the power to control firms’ information disclosure for the sake of their long-
term job security and control power within the firm. 
 
In Model 16, the coefficient of r* dr*ned (bad news) is positive and significant, 
indicating that third-party LBO firms with a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board will recognise bad news in a more timely manner. This 
does not reject Hypothesis 3.5a, that a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board may effectively control managers’ behaviours and 
encourages them to apply more conservative accounting disclosure prior to a 
third-party LBO. This is consistent with the findings of Beekes et al. (2004), 
which suggest that a higher proportion of non-executive directors are helpful in 
controlling the disclosure behaviour of management to act in the interests of 
shareholders prior to third-party LBOs.  
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Table 3.5 The summary results of Table 3.15 in the Appendix - Relation 
between asymmetric timeliness (accounting conservatism) and board 
characteristics in year Y−1. Dependent variable: EPS before extraordinary 
item divided by the price at the beginning of year Basu (1997) model 
  MBOs   
third-party 
LBOs 
  Model13 Model14   Model15 Model16 
Variables Expected Sign epsp1 epsp1  Expected Sign epsp1 epsp1 
        
rdual1 - - -  + +*** +*** 
drrdual1 + + +  - -*** -*** 
rned1 + + +  - + + 
drrned1 - + +  + + +* 
rauditn1 + + +  - +*** +*** 
drrauditn1 - -* -*  + -*** -*** 
rceoown1 - -      
drrceoown1 + +      
rexeown1 -  -     
drrexeown1 +  +     
rceoown1^2     - -***  
drrceoown1^2     + +***  
rexeown1^2     -  -*** 
drrexeown1^2     +  +*** 
rnedown1 + + +  - +*** +*** 
drrnedown1 - - +  + -*** -*** 
rinsti1 - -*** -***  - -* -** 
drrinsti1 + +** +**  + +* +** 
F-test  +*** +***   +*** +*** 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp1: eps before extraordinary item/price 
at the beginning of year y-1. r1: share returns from 9 months before year 1 end to three months after 
the year 1 end, 1 (1=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr1: dummy variable coded 1 if share return 
(r1) is negative, 0 otherwise at year y-1. drr1: share return (r1) * negative returns (dr1) at year y-1. 
size1: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year y-1. level1: total debts divided by total assets at year 
y-1. mtb1: market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year y-1. dual1: dummy variable 
coded 1 if the ceo is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of non-
executive directors divided by the total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit committee 
independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the members in audit committee are non-executives, 
0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: ceo share ownership as a percentage of the total number of 
outstanding shares at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share ownership as a percentage of 
the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1: executive share ownership as a 
percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the 
executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. 
nedown1: total common shares held by non-executive directors divided by total common shares 
outstanding at year y-1. insti1: total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total 
common shares outstanding at year y-1. boar1: natural logarithm of the number of board directors at 
year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1.  
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The coefficient for audit committee independence on bad news (r* dr*auditn) is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, which suggests that before third-party 
LBOs, there is greater deferral of bad news recognition when firms’ audit 
committees consist wholly of non-executives. Further, the coefficient on good 
news (r*auditn) is significantly positive, indicating that as audit committees 
become more independent, it is likely that the recognition of good news on 
earnings will be timely in third-party LBO firms. Then, audit committee 
independence is negatively associated with accounting conservatism prior to 
third-party LBOs. Surprisingly, the result is inconsistent with the expectation in 
Hypothesis 3.6a. This might be because the third-party LBOs are more difficult 
to predict. The non-executives might unable aware of the potential conflicts of 
interests between managers and shareholders prior to third-party LBOs. The 
audit committee independence may not be effectively working on protecting the 
shareholder interests preceding a third-party LBO. Moreover, this result may be 
consistent with the substitution effect; as independent audit committees can 
closely monitor and control managers’ behaviours within firms, firms with a 
highly independent audit committee are less likely to require more conservative 
practices (Yunos et al., 2010).  
 
This research tests the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and accounting conservatism in all samples but only 
finds significant results in the third-party LBO sample. Primarily, this study 
employs CEO ownership to test its effects on accounting conservatism, 
because CEOs are the key agents of the firm and are in charge of business 
operations (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). In Model 15, the coefficient for 
CEO ownership on bad news (r* dr*ceoown^2) and good news (r*ceoown^2) 
are significantly positive and negative respectively. This indicates that there is 
a ‘U-shaped’ relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism prior to third-party LBOs. These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 3.7a, that the relationship between CEO ownership and accounting 
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conservatism is significantly negative for low levels of CEO ownership but 
positive for high levels. Thus, this result verifies the inference that at low levels, 
due to the effects of incentives, greater managerial ownership better aligns 
managerial and shareholder interests. Then, managers have a disincentive to 
act opportunistically. Therefore, managers with a higher ownership stake are 
less likely to apply higher conservatism practices, because they can 
deliberately cut firms’ perceived value, which is harmful to shareholders’ 
interests (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Basu, 1997).  
 
In contrast, managers whose interests are less aligned with shareholders may 
have stronger incentives to protect their own interests rather than those of other 
shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; Renneboog et al., 2007). But, a low level of 
ownership does not provide managers with strong control power over the board. 
Then, prior to third-party LBOs, managers whose interests are less aligned with 
shareholders may be easily monitored and controlled by other board members 
to apply more conservative disclosure in the interests of long-term shareholders 
(Lasfer, 2006; Johnson et al., 1993; Peasnell et al., 2003).  
 
Moreover, this result provides evidence that at high levels, due to the effects of 
entrenchment, large shareholdings provide managers with greater control over 
firms. Hence, managers are more likely to looking out for their own interests but 
less likely to be disciplined. Managers are likely to apply higher levels of 
conservatism in financial reporting when they have higher ownership. This is 
because the prediction of a third-party LBO is difficult. Overstated earnings 
arising via less conservative reporting will be offset by an eventual decline in 
firm value when these overstatements are reversed in the future (Morck et al., 
1988b; Shuto and Takada, 2010).  
 
To access the economic significance of the effect of managerial ownership on 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings, note that in Model 16, this study alternatively 
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tests executive ownership (exeown). The results indicate that for third-party 
LBO firms, the relationship between managerial ownership and accounting 
conservatism is consistent when using CEO ownership and executive 
ownership. 
 
In third-party LBOs, the coefficients for non-executive ownership on bad news 
(r*dr*nedown) and good news (r*nedown) are negative and positive 
respectively at a significance level of 1%. This is contrary to the expectations in 
Hypothesis 3.8a. It suggests that an increased level of non-executive ownership 
does not have any incentive effects that encourage non-executives to support 
a higher degree of conservatism. However, this finding may be consistent with 
the substitution effect, that as firms are closely monitored by non-executive 
directors, non-executives are less likely to require higher conservatism 
practices (Yunos et al., 2010).  
 
In third-party LBOs, the coefficients for institutional ownership on bad news 
(r*dr*insti) and good news (r*insti) are significantly positive and negative as 
predicted. The results indicate that, as institutional ownership increases, firms 
are likely to apply more conservative accounting. This evidence has confirmed 
Hypothesis 3.9a, that the concentration of shareholding has caused institutional 
investors to have longer investment horizons, and hence made them have a 
greater incentive to push the board and management apply for conservative 
accounting (Brickley et al., 1988; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). In turn, 
higher ownership may provide institutional shareholders with strong power and 
influence to pressure the board to take actions that secure their long-term 
interests within the firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 
2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007).  
 
In the MBO sample, the coefficient for audit committee independence on bad 
news (r* dr*auditn) is negative and significant at the 10% level. As non-
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executives may able aware of potential conflicts of interests between managers 
and shareholders prior to MBOs, more independent audit committee are likely 
to support less conservative accounting to protect the interests of shareholders. 
The result confirms the expectation (Hypothesis 3.6b) that a more independent 
audit committee will better constrain managers’ opportunistic disclosure 
behaviours to avoid them deliberately cutting firms’ perceived value, by 
requiring them to recognise bad news in a less timely manner in MBO 
transactions. This result is consistent with the existing literature (Klein, 2002b; 
Klein, 2002a) showing that audit committees have played the role of arbiter to 
produce a balanced and accurate report. In order to reduce the possibility that 
firms are undervalued, more independent audit committees are likely to support 
less conservative accounting disclosure prior to MBOs. This also suggests that 
the temptation to manipulate earnings might be more obvious to see in MBOs 
than in third-party LBOs.  
 
Moreover, the coefficient for institutional ownership on bad news 
(r*dr*insti)/good news (r*insti) are positive/negative with a p-value<0.05/0.01 in 
MBO setting. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3.9b, suggesting 
that greater institutional ownership is associated with more conservative 
accounting disclosure. This indicates that concentrated ownership can cause 
institutional investors to have longer investment horizons, which further 
provides them with incentives and power to push the boards to take actions to 
protect their long-term interests within the firm (Brickley et al., 1988; 
Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). 
 
However, in contrast to the findings on third-party LBO firms, CEO duality (dual), 
the proportion of non-executives (ned), managerial ownership (ceoown/exeown) 
and non-executive shareholdings (nedown) have insignificant effects on firms’ 
choice of accounting conservatism in the MBO sample. The insignificant 
relations between CEO duality (dual), managerial ownership (ceoown/exeown) 
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and conservatism indicate that managers’ involvement in MBOs can provide 
them with stronger incentives that affect their behaviours of information 
disclosure, independent of their duality and prior shares in the firm. 
 
Moreover, no evidence is found that the higher proportion of non-executives 
(ned) and the distribution of non-executive ownership (nedown) in MBO firms 
can effectively discipline managers’ behaviours. This may indicate that these 
governance mechanisms have failed to effective monitoring and control 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours prior to MBOs. This is consistent with 
Patton and Baker (1987) and Gilson and Kraakman (1991) that, in practice, 
non-executive directors may perform little or no real control over management’s 
behaviour, because they lack the time, expertise and information to challenge 
the efficiency of management.  
 
The different findings of the effects of corporate governance on accounting 
conservatism in MBOs and third-party LBOs may indicate that it is more difficult 
for governance mechanisms to control managers’ opportunistic behaviours in 
MBOs than in third-party deals. This might be because of the unique 
characteristics of accounting conservatism that are to the benefit of the long-
term interests of shareholders. Therefore, although conservative accounting 
may harm the interests of current shareholders during the takeover, it may be 
more difficult for the other board of directors to challenge the decision of 
managers to apply a more conservative accounting disclosure. 
 
Turning to control variables, the effects of leverage (level), market-to-book 
value (mtb), price earnings ratio (pe) and board size (boar) on firms’ choice of 
conservatism are different in MBO firms and third-party LBO firms. The 
significantly positive coefficient on r*dr*level and significantly negative 
coefficient on r*level in the third-party LBO sample indicate that firms with 
greater leverage (level) are likely to perform more conservatively. This finding 
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is consistent with the nature of asymmetric payoffs to debtholders (Ahmed et 
al., 2002; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Zhang, 2000; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008).  
 
The coefficient on r*dr*mtb in the MBO sample confirms the negative relation 
between accounting conservatism and market-to-book value (mtb), as 
documented in previous studies (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; 
Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). The coefficient on r*dr*pe is negatively 
significant, which implies that there is less timeliness in earnings with respect 
to bad news in firms with a higher extent of undervaluation. This may be 
because managers are likely to reduce the possibility of competing bids when 
they are planning to initial an MBO.  
 
3.5.4 Additional analysis 
Tables 3.16 to 3.20 in the Appendix contain a number of additional robustness 
tests. First, Tables 3.16 and 3.17 report the results of testing firms’ information 
asymmetry and the difference of conservatism between MBO and third-party 
LBO across certain years utilising Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model and 
Banker et al. (2012) modified-C-score model. Second, Table 3.18 repeats the 
tests of the relationships between corporate governance variables and 
conservatism, based on Khan and Watts (2009) model. Third, Tables 3.19 and 
3.20 use an alternative measure of board size in analysing the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and conservatism to test 
whether the measure of board size affects the results. 
 
As Ball and Shivakumar (2005) point out, losses are likely be recognised in a 
timely manner through unrealised accruals, while gains are recognised with a 
less timeliness on a cash basis. To test the robustness of the results, this study 
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also examines accounting conservatism prior to MBOs and third-party LBOs 
using Ball and Shivakumar (2005) model. Table 3.16 in the Appendix reports 
the results of regressions used to estimate the asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient for the MBO sample and the third-party LBO sample, in years Y−1, 
Y−2, and Y−3. The results are consistent with the findings in Table 3.4 (full 
results can be found in Table 3.11 in the Appendix) that managers’ direct 
involvement appears to provide them with strong incentives to behave 
opportunistically. The coefficient for bad news on dcfo*cfo in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) model is also statistically positive significant at year Y−1 in 
the MBO sample. Further, the coefficient for good news on cfo is significantly 
negative in the MBO sample but significantly positive in the third-party LBO 
sample in year Y−1. This implies that managers are likely to apply more 
conservative accounting disclosure before they initiate MBOs, but less 
conservative disclosure before the announcement of third-party LBOs. 
Consistent with the findings in Table 3.4 (the full results can be found in Table 
3.11 in the Appendix), the models also show that the coefficient for bad news 
(good news) on dcfo*cfo (cfo) is significantly negative (negative) in MBO firms 
in year Y−3, but positive (negative) in third-party LBO firms in year Y−2, which 
further indicates that the degree of accounting conservatism may change over 
time. 
 
Table 3.17 in the Appendix further presents the results of significant tests for 
the modified-C-score (Banker et al., 2012) by comparing the MBO sample and 
the third-party LBO sample in years Y−1, Y−2, and Y−3. The results are 
consistent with the findings in Table 3.7, that MBO firms have a lower C-score 
in year Y−3 but a higher one in year Y−1. This further indicates that managers 
in the MBO sample are likely to change the degree of accounting conservatism 
from less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) to more conservative. Moreover, 
this is consistent with the findings in Khan and Watts (2009) model that MBO 
firms are likely to apply more conservative accounting disclosure than third-
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party LBO firms before a buyout is announced. The results show that MBO firms 
have a higher C-score than third-party LBO firms in year Y−1, but the t-test is 
negatively insignificant. In year Y−3, MBO firms have a significantly lower C-
score than third-party LBO firms.  
 
Appendix Table 3.18 reports the results of regressions used to test the effects 
of board characteristics on accounting conservatism (C-score). Consistent with 
the findings in Table 3.5 (the full results can be found in Table 3.15 in the 
Appendix), managerial ownership for CEO and executive directors has a non-
monotonic relationship with conservatism (C-score) in the third-party LBO 
sample. The coefficient of managerial ownership is statistically significant at the 
10% level. Furthermore, third-party LBO firms with higher institutional 
ownership are more conservative in recognising good news rather than bad 
news. The coefficient of institutional ownership in the third-party LBO sample is 
statistically more significant than the corresponding coefficient in Table 3.5 (the 
full results can be found in Table 3.15 in the Appendix). Moreover, the results 
for duality, non-executive directors and audit committee independence on 
conservatism (C-score) are consistent with the previous findings. These results 
further indicate that duality could provide managers with the power to behave 
opportunistically, but non-executive directors and audit committees are used to 
monitor and control the management’s behaviours prior to third-party LBOs.  
 
In order to test whether the measure of board size9 will affect the results, 
Appendix Table 3.19 reports the results of replicating the tests in Table 3.5 (the 
full results can be found in Table 3.15 in the Appendix) with alternative measure 
of board size, which is measured as the total number of directors on the board. 
The results are significant and consistent with the previous findings. The 
                                                             
9 In the main tests, board size is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of the board of directors 
on the boards. In the robustness tests, board size is alternatively measured as the total number of the 
board of directors on boards. 
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coefficient of dr*r*dual indicates that duality could provide managers with power 
to behave opportunistically, which motivates them to disclose information less 
conservatively (i.e. more aggressively) in third-party LBOs. Moreover, there is 
a significantly negative association between audit committee independence 
and accounting conservatism with respect to bad news in both the MBO sample 
and the third-party LBO sample, as the coefficient of dr*r*auditn indicates. The 
results also indicate that there is a non-linear relation between managerial 
ownership and conservatism. Non-executive ownership has a significantly 
negative association with conservatism in third-party LBOs. However, firms with 
higher institutional ownership are likely to behave more conservatively, both in 
the MBO sample and the third-party LBO sample.  
 
Appendix Table 3.20 reports the regression of replicating the tests in Appendix 
Table 3.18 but substituting the measurement of board size10, which is measured 
as the total number of directors on the board. It is found that the results are 
consistent with the previous findings. The results indicate that managerial 
ownership has a non-linear relation with conservatism, while institutional 
ownership is significantly positively related with conservatism in the third-party 
LBO sample.  
 
3.6  Conclusion 
This research examined accounting conservatism and its relationship with 
corporate governance prior to third-party LBO and MBO transactions in the UK 
market. Specifically, it tested three research questions: (i) What are the 
differences in the degrees of conservatism prior to third-party LBO and MBO 
transactions? (ii) How does the degree of conservatism change over time 
                                                             
10 In the main tests, board size is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of the board of directors 
on the boards. In the robustness tests, board size is alternatively measured as the total number of the 
board of directors on boards. 
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preceding third-party LBO and MBO transactions? (iii) What are the influences 
of corporate governance mechanisms, including CEO duality (dual), the 
proportion of non-executives (ned), audit committee independence (auditn), 
managerial ownership (ceoown/exeown), non-executive shareholding (nedown) 
and institutional shareholding (insti) on firms’ financial reporting conservatism 
prior to the announcement of third-party LBOs and MBOs?  
 
Overall, relating to the first question, this study found evidence that MBO firms 
and third-party LBO firms were likely to have significantly different degrees of 
accounting conservatism at one year before the announcement of the buyouts. 
These findings have implications for the board of directors and shareholders in 
understanding the opportunistic behaviours of management preceding LBOs, 
and regulating and developing the accounting disclosure. In particular, this 
result provides direct evidence of the relationship between managerial 
incentives and accounting information disclosure choice. For MBO firms, 
managers’ direct involvement has generated clear incentives for them to 
engage in opportunistic disclosure behaviours to reduce the possible purchase 
price (Elitzur et al., 1998; Fox and Marcus, 1992; Hafzalla, 2009). More 
conservative accounting disclosure may possibly reduce the perceived value of 
the firm by delaying the recognition of good news as economic gains but 
opportunistically selecting bad news to be disclosed (Hafzalla, 2009; Perry and 
Williams, 1994).  
 
However, the findings imply that managers may have strong incentives to apply 
less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting disclosure prior to third-
party LBOs than prior to MBOs to manipulate earnings and prevent takeovers. 
This is because undervaluation may attract outside investors for third-party 
LBOs (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b). Third-party LBOs may threaten 
managers’ long-term job security and their discretion, because the new owners 
are likely to displace ineffective management to maximise their interest through 
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improved firm governance and performance (Renneboog et al., 2007). 
Moreover, new owners may also obtain benefits from the resale of the firm in 
the future (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). Hence, 
this study implies that managers’ different motivations in MBOs and third-party 
LBOs will cause them to make different choices when disclosing accounting 
information.  
 
Moreover, by testing the question two, this research found that managers were 
likely to change the degree of accounting conservatism over time preceding 
MBOs and third-party LBOs. The findings have implications for the board of 
directors and shareholders to understand the extent to which the buyout event 
could affect managers’ incentives and behaviours. Moreover, it has implication 
for understanding the application of accounting conservatism prior to MBOs and 
third-party LBOs. In particular, the research found that managers’ direct 
involvement in MBO transactions has generated incentives for managers to 
reduce the firm’s value by applying more conservative accounting disclosure 
(Hafzalla, 2009). However, before managers decide to initiate MBOs, they may 
have incentives to overstate the firm’s value to obtain a larger earnings-based 
bonus and to prevent the occurrence of any third-party LBO (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Hence, the degree of 
accounting conservatism changes over time, from less conservative (i.e. more 
aggressive) to more conservative.  
 
On the other hand, since the prediction for third-party LBO is difficult, managers 
will not apply less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting disclosure 
persistently. As overstatements will be offset by an eventual decline (Lafond 
and Roychowdhury, 2008), companies may suffer takeover threats once the 
overstatements are reversed. Because persistent aggressive accounting 
disclosure may result in a poor quality of reporting, managers are likely to avoid 
such actions that result in higher costs to their own human capital (unless such 
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actions bring commensurate increases in returns) (Francis et al., 2008). 
Therefore, third-party LBOs will change the degree of conservatism from more 
conservative to less. Moreover, third-party LBO firms have a much larger 
coefficient than MBOs when running significance tests over several years. This 
indicates that third-party LBO firms make more obvious changes in accounting 
information disclosure than do MBO firms. 
 
Furthermore, relating to the third question, the results for the effects of 
corporate governance on conservatism suggested that at the one-year point 
before the announcement of an MBO or third-party LBO, board characteristics 
including the proportion of non-executive directors and institutional 
shareholdings had positive effects, while CEO duality, non-executive 
shareholdings and audit committee independence had negative effects in 
restricting managers’ self-interested disclosure behaviours.  
 
This study then has implications for the understanding of the effects of 
corporate governance regarding the managerial incentive and board control 
and monitoring on shareholder wealth protection. It then has implication for 
regulate and develop the corporate governance systems. Specifically, with 
regard to the effects of managers’ ownership on their incentives, this study 
identified alignment and entrenchment effects. In the third-party LBO sample, 
managerial ownership including the CEO and executives had a non-monotonic 
relationship with accounting conservatism. Managers whose interests align with 
shareholders are less likely to apply more conservative accounting disclosure, 
because this can deliberately cut the firm’s value, which acts against the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth. However, as managers whose interests 
align poorly with shareholders may have a greater conflict of interests with them 
(Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2005b), their behaviours are often 
restrained through an effective corporate monitoring and control system. As the 
prediction for third-party LBO is difficult, effective corporate governance 
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mechanisms may further pressure managers to behave conservatively. Instead, 
due to entrenchment effects, higher levels of ownership may motivate 
managers to engage in conservative accounting disclosure. As overstatements 
will be offset by reversals and the firm’s value will eventually decline, greater 
levels of ownership may make managers take on more of the costs of 
overstatements (Morck et al., 1988b; Shuto and Takada, 2010).  
 
Moreover, the research found that CEO duality has positive effects for 
managers to apply less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting 
disclosure, prior to a third-party LBO. This implies that duality gives CEOs a 
concentrated power and position that enable them to behave opportunistically 
prior to third-party LBOs (Cornett et al., 2008). Additionally, the results also 
indicate that ownership has disincentives for non-executives in applying 
accounting conservatism prior to a third-party LBO. However, the research 
found that institutional shareholdings and the proportion of non-executives are 
positive correlated with accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs. This 
implies that institutional shareholders and non-executives are effectively in 
monitoring and control managers’ opportunistic behaviours before third-party 
LBOs. In particular, a concentrated shareholding by institutional investors 
provides them with a longer investment horizon that motivates them to push 
boards apply for conservative accounting disclosure (Brickley et al., 1988; 
Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the research found that audit committee independence was 
negatively related to accounting conservatism prior to MBOs and third-party 
LBOs. This implies that audit committees can effectively supervise managers’ 
disclosure behaviours in the MBO sample, but are ineffective in constraining 
managers’ self-interested disclosure behaviours in the third-party LBO sample. 
This might because the non-executives may be aware of potential conflicts of 
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interests prior to MBOs, whereas third-party LBOs are more difficult to predict. 
Hence, the audit committee independence may less effectively in protecting the 
interests of shareholders prior to third-party LBOs than prior to MBOs (Brickley 
et al., 1988; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). Thus, the results provide 
additional evidence that effective corporate governance mechanisms are 
expected to result in better control and motivation to prevent managers’ self-
interested behaviours (Lara et al., 2007).  
 
However, this research has some limitations. First, it is based on the 
assumption that managers do not change during the period in question. The 
degree of accounting conservatism will be different when the previous 
managers leave.  
 
Second, the sample of this study mainly focused on the successful LBOs in the 
market, while there are more unsuccessful buyouts in the market that are not 
observed. Managers’ behaviours of accounting information disclosure and the 
impact of corporate governance may be different in these settings. The future 
research could extend the study in unsuccessful group to figure out to what 
extend does the findings of this research can be applied in the other setting. 
 
Third, the time span for this research covers the period from 1997 to 2011. 
However, before 2006, the independent non-executives are not reported in the 
annual reports. Hence this research focused on non-executives instead. 
Nevertheless, some non-executive directors may have additional relationships 
with the firm which cause them to be subject to pressure by managers (e.g. as 
family members or suppliers) (FRC, 2012). Therefore, the findings of the 
research may have bias. The future study should focus on data after 2006 to 
provide additional analysis.  
 
Fourth, due to data limitations, this study did not match the size of MBO firms 
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with third-party LBO firms in the analysis. It is found that the sample size of 
MBOs and third-party LBOs are 124 and 88 in the study. The matching exercise 
will dramatically reduce the sample size of the study, which may result in 
misinterpretations and affect the reliability of the results (Kline, 2015). 
Specifically, artificially reduce the sample size may result in loss of information 
and reduction of statistical power, which may lead to Type II error (Frazier et al., 
2004; Fitzsimons, 2008; Kline, 2015; Freiman et al., 1978). Moreover, it may 
lead to the opposite effect, which is a Type I error (Irwin and McClelland, 2001; 
MacCallum et al., 2002; Roussos and Stout, 1996; Kline, 2015). Therefore, 
instead of matching the two groups, this study used firm size as a control in the 
analysis. 
 
Overall, the first empirical chapter examines the influence managerial incentive 
schemes on shareholder wealth protection in MBOs and third-party LBOs. The 
results suggest that buyouts are likely to provide strong incentives for managers 
to engage in self-interests activities. However, the research finds that there is 
no significant relationship between board structures and shareholder wealth 
protection (in this study it is the takeover premiums). The inclusive findings of 
the impact of board structures on the performance outcomes are not unusually 
(e.g. Yermack, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; 
Klein, 1998; Belkhir, 2009; Pacini et al., 2008; Bliss, 2011; Brickley et al., 1997). 
This inconsistency is puzzling as it may indicate that research fails to model the 
impact of boards on shareholder wealth protection correctly.  
 
It is recognised that the overall impact of the board it determined by its 
structures as well as its effectiveness. In particular, board structures are the 
makeup of the board, which are able to affect the ability of board members to 
corporate and collaborate with each other. Board effectiveness, instead, is 
mainly concerned with the outcomes of the tasks, which usually occurs when 
the directors have fulfilled their responsibilities. It encapsulates directors’ 
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knowledge, experience, expertise and ability in performing their roles (Cornforth, 
2001; Payne et al., 2009; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Kirkpatrick et al., 2015; 
Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2007; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Conflating board 
structures with board effectiveness can result to misleading (Bedard et al., 2004; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Kang et al., 2007). However, it is found that most 
previous studies tend to ignore this issue or draw on fairly poor proxies, such 
as board structures (Kang et al., 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Bedard et al., 
2004). Thereby, the next chapter aims to investigate the effects of the board by 
distinguishing board structures from board effectiveness. It is suggested that 
correctly model the impact of boards has significant implications for 
shareholders and institutional investors to oversee the directors’ behaviours. 
Moreover, it has implication for the development of corporate governance 
system, not only at the firm but also at market level.  
 
Lim (2011) suggests that effective boards are likely to demand the managers to 
adopt conservative accounting to protect the long-term interests of 
shareholders. Moreover, the second empirical study suggests that boards are 
able to adjust the approach of accounting conservatism to protect the interests 
of shareholders. The research finds that effective boards tend to push the 
managers to engage in less conservative accounting prior to MBOs, possibly 
to avoid the managers to deliberately cut the firm value. It is also found that as 
the prediction of third-party LBOs is difficult, effective boards are likely to push 
the management to engage in more conservative accounting, in order to protect 
the long-term interests of shareholders. Therefore, accounting conservatism 
does not merely reflect a general accounting approach, but a reasonable 
measure of board effectiveness. The next chapter is purposed to examine the 
influence of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in 
MBOs and third-party LBOs by employing accounting conservatism as a 
measure of board effectiveness. 
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Chapter 4: Board Effectiveness, Board Structures and 
Takeover Premiums: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The first empirical study (Chapter 2) investigated the relationship between 
board structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs. The 
findings of that chapter suggest that there is no empirical evidence to support 
the relation between board structures and takeover premiums. Specifically, it is 
found that the proportion of non-executive directors on boards is not 
significantly associated with takeover premiums in both third-party LBO and 
MBO cases. Inconclusive findings of the impact of board structures on 
performance outcomes are not unusual, even if the research uses the same 
proxy for firm performance. For example, early works by Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990), Krivogorsky (2006) and Lefort and Urzúa (2008) report that the 
proportion of outside directors is positively related to firm performance, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio and return on assets. However, 
Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Bhagat and Black (2001), and 
Coles et al. (2008) find a significantly negative relationship between board 
independence and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, there are 
several other studies (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995; Klein, 
1998; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010), which all report that there is no significant 
correlation between board independence and various measures of corporate 
performance, such as Tobin’s Q and return on assets. Inconsistent results also 
exist in investigating the impact of board size (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg 
et al., 1998; Belkhir, 2009; Pacini et al., 2008) and CEO duality (e.g. Baliga et 
al., 1996; Bliss, 2011; Brickley et al., 1997; Elsayed, 2007) on firm performance. 
 
However, these inconsistences are puzzling/concerning as they may indicate 
that research fails to model the impact of boards on performance outcomes 
correctly. In order to carry out their tasks, boards of directors are required to 
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cooperate with each other, e.g. by sharing their experiences and perspectives, 
and discussing and mutually agreeing on decisions (Levrau and Van den 
Berghe, 2007; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). The overall impact of the boards is 
expected to be determined by their structure as well as their qualifications and 
experiences, their engagement, integrity and the ability of directors to work 
together effectively (Cornforth, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001; Roberts 
et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2009; Kirkpatrick et al., 2015).  
 
Board structures related to board size, the proportion of executives and 
(independent) non-executives on boards, and CEO duality are likely to affect 
the ability of board members to cooperate and collaborate with each other, and 
thereby affect board effectiveness. Board effectiveness encapsulates the ability, 
expertise, experience, social skills, engagement and integrity of board of 
directors in performing their roles of control, service and strategy (Cornforth, 
2001; Payne et al., 2009; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Kirkpatrick et al., 2015). 
However, these factors are difficult to measure empirically. Prior research tends 
either to ignore these issues or draw on fairly poor proxies, such as using board 
structures (Kang et al., 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Bedard et al., 2004), 
directors’ age (Carter et al., 2003), gender (Bear et al., 2010; Levi et al., 2014) 
and academic qualifications (Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Hashim and Abdul 
Rahman, 2011; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009) as proxies. Although, in the 
previous literature, board structures are sometimes conflated with board 
effectiveness, board structures are essentially different from board 
effectiveness and cannot replace its impact. Failure to find consistent results in 
the relationship between board structures and performance outcomes might be 
related to missing variables, which indicate that the research should take into 
account directors’ ability, qualifications and their way of their working together. 
 
The study of board characteristics is used to justify or reject the best practice 
recommendations or the legal rules of governing the structures of boards. It is 
also a means to inform, in particular, the institutional investors about the 
directors’ voting behaviours in general meetings. How to correctly model the 
impact of boards then has significant implications for the effectiveness of 
corporate governance systems, not only at firm but also at market level. This 
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research, therefore, aims to improve the understanding of the link between 
board structures, board effectiveness and performance outcomes (in this case, 
takeover premiums). Specifically, this study examines the following research 
questions: (1) What is the impact of board structures and board effectiveness 
on takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs? (2) By taking into 
account the potential interrelationships between board structures and board 
effectiveness, this study further explores are there any mediating or moderating 
effects of board structures and board effectiveness, which affect takeover 
premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs? 
 
The existing literature reveals that there are multiple roles of the board of 
directors. Regarding agency theory, the board of directors has a primary role to 
monitor management who are expected to carry out their duty to serve in the 
best interests of the owners of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). From a resource-dependence perspective, the board of 
directors is supposed to be a valuable source of knowledge and expertise to 
provide advice and counsel to the organisation (Rindova, 1999; Pugliese et al., 
2009; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
 
Takeover premiums are those that shareholders receive for selling their shares, 
which reflect the target shareholder wealth gains of the takeover. Board 
effectiveness, which encapsulates the directors’ ability, knowledge, experience, 
skills, engagement and integrity, is likely to affect how well directors discharge 
their duties and responsibilities, which is expected to affect the level of the 
takeover premium. Board members with relevant experience, knowledge and 
skills are likely to have superior capability of monitoring and counsel, which will 
productively assist management in making decisions that protect shareholder 
wealth (Sánchez et al., 2015; Tuggle et al., 2010). In particular, Wan and Ong 
(2005), Kroll et al. (2008), Lichtenstein et al. (2011) and Sánchez et al. (2015) 
argue that the knowledge, expertise, experience, skills and integrity of the 
directors are the boards’ resources that can shape and frame their views and 
approaches to decision-making. A wider range of directors’ knowledge, 
experience, expertise and skills allows them to undertake more in-depth 
analysis and discussion that can produce competitive advantages in monitoring 
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and management. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) and Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) further indicate that the relevant experience, skills, expertise and 
knowledge could allow the board of directors to have a better understanding of 
the firm’s inner workings that contribute to their effectiveness of monitoring and 
management. In facing a buyout offer, directors who have more relevant 
knowledge, expertise, experience and skills are able to offer superior counsel 
concerning takeover prospects and better monitoring of opportunistic 
management behaviours. More effective boards are expected to benefit the 
interests of shareholders and lead to higher takeover premiums. 
 
Previous studies concerning boards of directors have examined the influence 
of directors’ knowledge, expertise and skills on firms’ performance outcomes. 
Zona and Zattoni (2007) examine the influence of directors’ knowledge and 
efforts on firm performance in Italy. They find that board effort norms and use 
of knowledge and skills are positively related to board monitoring and service 
task performance. Moreover, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) examine US listed 
firms and find that with financial expertise are valuable in providing independent 
directors’ oversight of firms’ financial reporting, which is negatively associated 
with the probability of restating earnings. Defond et al. (2005) examine the 
market reaction to the announcement of newly appointed outside directors to 
audit committees prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. They find that the 
appointment of accounting financial experts on to audit committees is positively 
related to firms’ cumulative abnormal returns. They suggest that directors’ 
accounting-based financial skills could improve the audit committee’s 
monitoring ability to ensure high-quality financial reporting that helps channel 
expertise towards enhancing shareholder wealth. Besides, De Villiers et al. 
(2011) test the effects of legal experts on US companies and find a significant 
positive relationship between the number of legal experts on boards and firms’ 
environmental performance.  
 
Board structures related to board size, the proportion of non-executives and 
CEO duality tend to influence the ability of directors to cooperate and 
collaborate, which is expected to affect the takeover premiums. As discussed 
in the first empirical study (Chapter 2), previous research indeed finds mixed 
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evidence on the impact of board structures on shareholder wealth protection. 
For example, by examining US listed firms, Yermack (1996) finds board size is 
statistically significantly negatively related to firm performance as measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Eisenberg et al. (1998) also discovers a negative relationship 
between board size and return on assets in a sample of small- and medium-
sized Finnish firms. Cheng (2008) finds that board size is negatively related to 
performance outcomes such as return on assets, market value of firms and 
Tobin’s Q in the sample of S&P. However, Dalton et al. (1999) and Pearce and 
Zahra (1992) discover a positive association between board size and firm 
performance and suggest that a board with more members could help the 
shareholders to protect their wealth.  
 
Moreover, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and 
Jaggi et al. (2009) uncover a positive relationship between the proportion of 
outside directors and the interests of shareholders. However, Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Klein (1998) find that a high proportion of independent 
directors perform worse in shareholder wealth protection.  
 
In addition, empirical studies (e.g. Lee, 2009; Goyal and Park, 2002; Bassett et 
al., 2007) discover that CEO duality is negatively related to firm performance. 
However, Baliga et al. (1996), Brickley et al. (1997) and Bliss (2011) document 
that CEO duality does not have a significant impact on shareholder wealth 
protection. 
 
Board structure is not a substitute mechanism to board effectiveness. There 
may, nevertheless, be a potential link between the two. On the one hand, board 
structures may affect board effectiveness by defining the conditions within 
which the board of directors can effectively bring their experience, expertise, 
knowledge, engagement, integrity and social skills together. Board structures 
are likely to affect the ability of the board to cooperate and draw on their skills, 
experience and expertise. In particular, an effective board structure may 
facilitate cooperation and collaboration among board members to allow them to 
fully use their abilities to work together. However, an ineffective board structure 
may hamper the ability of the board to carry out its duties.  
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The number of directors on the board is expected to affect board effectiveness. 
Pfeffer (1973) and Pearce and Zahra (1992) argue that large boards can 
facilitate board effectiveness by providing a large pool of expertise and 
resources for organisations. Klein (2002b), Pacini et al. (2008) and Belkhir 
(2009) further indicate that large boards can broaden the variety of 
backgrounds and bring a greater breadth of experience, expertise and social 
skills to the board, which enhances effectiveness. Goodstein et al. (1994) and 
Belkhir (2009) support the idea that boards with more members may facilitate 
effectiveness, because large boards enable the directors to have more 
specialised knowledge and skills in dealing with issues. Moreover, Gertner and 
Kaplan (1996) and Larmou and Vafeas (2010) suggest that the workload can 
be better allocated among a larger number of directors. Small board size may 
lead to a greater workload for individual directors, which may reduce board 
effectiveness, as the time commitment required may exceed that available for 
individual directors.  
 
However, the opposite view argues that increased board size can significantly 
inhibit the board’s ability to make decisions. Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen 
(1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that large boards are less cohesive and have 
more difficulty communicating and coordinating action due to the large number 
of potential interactions among group members. Pearce and Zahra (1992) 
suggest that a board consisting of more directors is likely to have a broader set 
of backgrounds and experiences that may result in more conflicts of views and 
approaches to problem solving, which may hamper the effectiveness of the 
board. A board consisting of fewer directors may encourage the engagement of 
individual directors and possibly reduce occurrence of free-rider problems; this 
may facilitate board effectiveness (Lehn et al., 2009; Harris and Raviv, 2008). 
 
In addition, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board is expected 
to affect its effectiveness positively by improving its ability to monitor and control. 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Baysinger and Butler (1985), Buchholtz and Ribbens 
(1994) and Cotter et al. (1997) argue that a high percentage of non-executives 
on the board can benefit monitoring by increasing the directors’ independence 
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and objectivity in decision-making. They explain that, as the outsiders, the non-
executives are less tied to the firm or its executive managers, who may be more 
successful in fulfilling the function of monitoring and control the activities of 
management. The high proportion of non-executives on the board can increase 
the power of non-executive directors in decision-making, giving them the 
possibility to outvote executive directors when they behave opportunistically. 
For example, Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Lara et al. (2007) find that a high 
proportion of non-executives is negatively related to managers’ earning 
manipulations.  
 
However, a high proportion of non-executives may hamper the board’s ability 
to monitor. Patton and Baker (1987) and Gilson and Kraakman (1991) argue 
that, in practice, outside directors may usually perform little or no real 
monitoring as they lack the time, expertise and information to challenge the 
efficiency of management. Wan and Ong (2005) and Levrau and Van den 
Berghe (2007) support the idea that a high proportion of non-executives may 
hamper communication and collaboration within the board, because the 
outsiders may lack the knowledge and acquaintance with insiders. 
 
Furthermore, duality could give the CEO concentrated power and position in 
decision-making, which would be expected to reduce the board’s effectiveness 
in monitoring and exercising control over the CEO’s self-interested activities 
(Cornforth, 2001; Elsaid and Davidson, 2009). Jensen (1993) argues that 
internal control may fail when the firm’s CEO also holds the position of board 
chairman, because the duality gives the CEO more control and power, which 
may lead to the board failing to perform its function to fully evaluate CEO 
performance. Duality could limit the board’s ability of monitoring and control 
over CEO, since the concentrated power and position of the CEO allows them 
to pursue their self-interests (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Kim et al., 2009; Desai 
et al., 2003). Also, Baliga et al. (1996), Goyal and Park (2002) and Bliss (2011) 
indicate that duality may make the CEO hard to challenge, which may lead to 
a lower level of effort and usage of knowledge and skills on the part of the board.  
 
On the other hand, board effectiveness may also have an influence on the 
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structure of the board. Nadler and Tushman (1980) and Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) suggest that from a long-term perspective, patterns of past activity, 
behaviour and effectiveness of the board may affect current board structures. 
Directors’ past ability, knowledge, skills, experience and expertise of work will 
affect who will be on the board and how the board functions.  
 
Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that board structures are 
the functions of the bargaining process between the CEO and the rest of the 
board. In particular, the board is likely to make the decision on whether to 
replace the current CEO. The CEO and the rest of the board then negotiate on 
the composition of the board (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). The 
CEO and board’s bargaining positions and power in these negotiations are 
expected to come from their ability. A CEO may have a relatively low level of 
knowledge, expertise, experience, skills and poor ability, implying that 
substitutes are more widely available (Arthur, 2001). Moreover, a low level of 
board effectiveness is associated with a lack of ability by the board to exercise 
monitoring and control over management, which may result in a change of 
board structure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Since the CEO and board’s 
power could be the function of their ability to carry out particular work, board 
structures depend on directors’ ability, effectiveness and performance. For 
example, the CEO’s perceived ability is relatively low when they perform poorly, 
which may increase the likelihood that the board will replace them. Alternatively, 
low effectiveness of boards reduces their bargaining ability and power, which 
may lead to a change in board structure (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998).  
 
Moreover, previous studies have often mixed and conflated board structures 
with board effectiveness. For example, the empirical works of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), Bange and Mazzeo (2004), Peasnell et al. (2005), Levrau 
and Van den Berghe (2007), Lee (2008), He et al. (2009) and Gonzalez and 
André (2014) use board structures such as board size, the proportion of outside 
directors and CEO duality as proxies for board effectiveness. However, in 
essence, board structure is different from board effectiveness. Structures are 
likely to affect the effectiveness of boards by defining the conditions within 
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which the directors can bring their experience, expertise and knowledge 
together (e.g. Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Cheng, 2008). Therefore, in order 
to test for completion, this study also considers the potential effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures. Taking into account the interrelationship 
between board structures and board effectiveness, this study models the 
impact of boards on takeover premiums by testing the moderating/mediating 
effects of board structures and board effectiveness. 
 
In general, moderating effect11 is indicated by the interaction of independent 
(X) and moderator (Mo). It illustrates the conditions under which the association 
between independent (X) and outcome (Y) is enhanced, reduced, or 
directionally changed due to the moderator (Mo) (Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010). 
Whereas, mediating effect12 explains a causal link between independent (X), 
mediators (Me) and outcome variables (Y) (Baron and Kenny, 1986). In the 
model, the independent variable (X) is expected to influence an outcome 
variable (Y) through the mediator (Me) (Rose et al., 2004; Fairchild and 
MacKinnon, 2009; Hayes, 2013; Ro, 2012; Kenny, 2008). 
 
This study distils and tests hypotheses derived from four models of the impact 
of boards on takeover premiums, by taking into account the interrelationship 
between board structures and board effectiveness (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). In 
particular, under the circumstance that board structures may affect board 
effectiveness, this study first tests the moderating effects of board structures in 
relationship to board effectiveness and takeover premiums. As moderator, 
board structures are expected to interact with board effectiveness to contribute 
to takeover premiums. The structural characteristics of the board, such as its 
size, the proportion of non-executives and CEO duality are likely to explain the 
conditions under which the directors can effectively bring their skills, experience, 
expertise and knowledge together to contribute to maximising shareholder 
wealth. Therefore, this study makes the hypothesis that the impact of board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums is affected by board structures.  
                                                             
11 More details are explained in Appendix 4.105. 
12 More details are explained in Appendix 4.105. 
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Moreover, taking into account the causal chain that board effectiveness is likely 
to be affected by board structures and to impact on takeover premiums, this 
study additionally tests the mediating effects of board effectiveness in 
relationship to board structures and takeover premiums. In the model, board 
effectiveness is the intermediary variable through which board structures are 
able to influence the level of takeover premiums. Directors’ skills, experience, 
expertise and knowledge, as well as their engagement and integrity, are used 
to explain whether and to what degree board structures may affect takeover 
premiums. Hence, this study makes the hypothesis that board effectiveness 
mediates the relationship between board structures and takeover premiums. 
 
Figure 4.1 Research models under board structures affect board 
effectiveness 
 
 
Under the circumstance that board effectiveness may affect board structures, 
this study further tests the moderating effects of board effectiveness in 
relationship to board structures and takeover premiums. As moderator, the 
levels of board effectiveness illustrate the conditions under which the 
association between board structures and takeover premiums is enhanced, 
reduced, or changed in direction. Directors’ skills, experience and expertise are 
expected to explain the conditions under which board structures may affect the 
level of takeover premiums. Hence, this study makes the hypothesis that the 
impact of board structures on takeover premiums is affected by board 
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effectiveness.  
 
Moreover, this research considers how the impact of board structures on 
takeover premiums might be mediated by board effectiveness, as the 
experience and social skills of directors are likely to mediate, i.e. either to 
enhance or reduce the impact of board structures. As mediator, board 
structures explain whether or to what degree an association occurs between 
board effectiveness and takeover premiums. From that point, the directors’ 
skills, experience, expertise and knowledge are expected to contribute to the 
level of takeover premiums through the appropriate makeup of the board. 
Thereby, it is hypothesised that board structures mediate the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums. 
 
Figure 4.2 Research models under board effectiveness affect board 
structures 
 
 
This study uses both the approach of multiple regression analysis and structural 
equation modelling (SEM) in analysing the moderating and mediating effects. 
The multiple regression approach is a general statistical technique to explore 
the cause-effect relationships. However, this approach has some limitations. 
For example, in the moderating analysis, it is difficult to distinguish independent 
(X) from the moderator (Mo) by using multiple regression analysis (Ro, 2012; 
Cohen et al., 2013). Moreover, in multiple regression analysis, the interaction 
term may generate compound measurement errors that can underestimate the 
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interaction effect and dramatically reduce the reliability of the results (Aguinis 
et al., 2001; Jaccard and Wan, 1996).  
 
The SEM is suggested to be an alternative method because this approach is 
able to control the measurement errors and minimise the problem of 
underestimation (Holmbeck, 1997; Hoyle and Smith, 1994; Hoyle, 2014). 
Moreover, in SEM, a multiple group approach can be used to detecting the 
moderating effects when the moderator is categorical. Under the approach, the 
independent (X) is able to distinguish from the moderator (Mo). Additionally, 
SEM is able to detect a more complex relationship, which has been widely used 
in mediation analysis (Hox and Bechger, 1998). However, SEM approach also 
has some limitations, such as SEM is a large sample technique (Kline, 2015; 
Tomarken and Waller, 2005). The sample of this study includes 76 third-party 
LBOs and 108 MBOs, which is less the minimum requirement of 200 (Kline, 
2015). Nevertheless, this sample size meets the less ideal sample size to the 
parameter is 10:1 (Jackson, 2003). Furthermore, when independent (X) and 
moderator (Mo) are continuous variables, the SEM approach requires to 
convert continuous variables into categorical, while this may lead to loss of 
information (Type II error) and opposite effect (Type I error) (Frazier et al., 2004; 
Fitzsimons, 2008; Irwin and McClelland, 2001; MacCallum et al., 2002). 
Therefore, by considering the strength and weakness of the both approach, this 
study employs both the two approaches to analyse the mediating and 
moderating effects. It is expected that the multiple regression can provide more 
reliable results when the moderators (Mo) are continuous variables, while the 
SEM is more reliable when moderators (Mo) are categorical. Besides, the 
mediation results in SEM are more reliable. 
 
In this study, board structures are distinguished from board effectiveness. 
Board structures are defined as the makeup of the board, which can be 
recognised through board size, the proportion of non-executives on boards and 
CEO–chairman duality. In contrast, board effectiveness is mainly concerned 
with the outcomes of the tasks, which occurs when the directors have fulfilled 
their roles of control, service and strategy (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Levrau 
and Van den Berghe, 2007). Specifically, the previous studies (e.g. Hackman 
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et al., 1975; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Lemieux‐Charles et al., 2002) have 
emphasised two attributes of board effectiveness – board performance and the 
ability of directors to work together over time. However, the proxy for board 
effectiveness is still the subject of considerable debate in empirical studies. 
Existing studies use various techniques to proxy board effectiveness. 
Behavioural studies try to create or directly observe such measures. For 
example, Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) suggest using behavioural or 
attitudinal measures of board effectiveness, including cohesiveness, debate 
and conflict norms. Although their deliberations are extensive and informative, 
no empirical data are tested. Wan and Ong (2005) and Zona and Zattoni (2007) 
use an interview and survey approach to capture data for board effectiveness. 
They examine the effectiveness of boards from behavioural-based measures 
including their norms of effort, their conflict in cognitive, affective processes and 
the usage of their skills and knowledge. Furthermore, Pahuja (2011) collects 
data on board effectiveness via a survey of executive directors in charge of the 
functions of the board and board committees, the structure of the board, and 
access to information, general support, compensation and liability.  
 
Since such behavioural measures either rely on the integrity and self-
awareness of the people surveyed or are constructed based on a limited 
number of firms, most empirical studies of boards of directors suggest the use 
of a proxy for board effectiveness by one of its determinants. Typically, the 
unobservable ‘board effectiveness’ is replaced with some characteristics of the 
board, such as directors’ tenure, social network ties and academic qualifications 
(Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Hashim and Abdul Rahman, 2011; Brenner and 
Schwalbach, 2009; Kim, 2005; Anderson et al., 2004; Kang et al., 2007). 
However, these proxies are inevitably noisy because there are too many 
possible determinants of board effectiveness. Empirically, it is impossible to 
include them all. There will always be some determinants/characteristics that 
are not being considered during the analysis. The researchers then have to 
choose which characteristics may be used as a proxy for board effectiveness 
and which may not, which severely limits the analysis and the understanding of 
important relationships with effectiveness. Thereby, this study attempts to 
Chapter 4 
193 
employ an alternative measure of board effectiveness in order to study it 
comprehensively. 
 
Conservatism in accounting indicates that firms are more cautious about 
publishing good news than bad news (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2006). A cautious 
approach to financial reporting is proposed to protect the long-term interests of 
shareholders. Prior research (e.g. LaFond and Watts, 2008; Watts, 2003a; 
Ahmed and Duellman, 2011) has examined the incentives of managers and 
suggests that in listing firms with more conservative accounting disclosure, 
managers are expected to have less opportunity to manipulate earnings 
upwards to improve their performance-related bonus, which protects the 
interests of shareholders. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Francis and Martin 
(2010) and Ahmed and Duellman (2011) indicate that accounting conservatism 
is associated with more profitable investments by firms. As conservative 
accounting causes economic losses from poorly performing projects to be 
recognised quickly, more conservative accounting reduces the risk of 
investment in negative NPV projects (Francis and Martin, 2010; Watts, 2003a; 
Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Research by Watts (2003a), Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) and Lim (2011) further suggests that firms with more conservative 
accounting have a comparatively low probability of corporate bankruptcy, 
possibly because problems are likely to be discovered sooner, so that remedial 
actions can be taken earlier.  
 
Moreover, Lim (2011: 1010) suggests that “an effective board is likely to 
demand that managers adopt conservative accounting practices to prevent 
overcompensation, to reduce litigation risks and to reduce the probability and 
magnitude of corporate collapses”. It is assumed that more knowledgeable and 
experienced directors are likely to favour accounting conservatism to prevent 
overcompensation, reduce the probability of corporate collapses and protect 
the long-term interests of shareholders (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Xie et al. (2003: 295) suggest that board members’ 
“financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity 
of managers to engage in earnings management”. Fadzil and Ismail (2014) also 
support that directors with better social skills are more likely to be able to 
Chapter 4 
194 
cooperate positively in order to influence management to effectively implement 
accounting conservatism. An effective board is likely to have more integrity in 
financial reporting and may voluntarily opt for a more conservative approach to 
accounting (Iatridis, 2011; Lim, 2011).  
 
A previous study by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) finds that greater 
accounting financial expertise of the audit committee enhances accounting 
conservatism. They reason that this is probably due to a better monitoring 
capability, driven by the directors’ knowledge, job requirements and incentives 
to protect their reputation capital. In addition, Fadzil and Ismail (2014) examine 
the relationship between financial expertise among boards of directors and 
accounting conservatism and suggest that boards with a high proportion of 
financial expertise are likely to practice more conservative disclosure over 
accounting financial reports. This finding is consistent with the notion that 
directors’ expertise may affect the ability of the board to monitor management 
and provide a high level of quality of financial reports, either to make financial 
information more transparent or to limit manipulation. Moreover, Lara et al. 
(2007) and Lara et al. (2009) also find that board effectiveness which reflects 
the directors’ monitoring effort is positively associated with conservative 
accounting. 
 
The second empirical study (Chapter 3) into accounting conservatism prior to 
MBOs and third-party LBOs suggested that boards are able to adjust their 
approach to accounting to protect shareholder interests. The research finds that 
firms tend to engage in less conservative accounting prior to an MBO, possibly 
to avoid shareholders’ exploitation by managers who might have incentives to 
make the firms appear less valuable to reduce the value of the takeover, and 
thereby exploit existing shareholders who do not participate in the takeover 
(Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). Effective boards are likely to have 
better control and monitoring over management that constrain managers from 
engaging in more conservative accounting disclosure prior to an MBO. 
Ineffective boards, however, tend to provide managers with more opportunities 
to practice more conservative accounting prior to an MBO, as the directors are 
less likely to protect the interests of shareholders (Weir and Wright, 2006; 
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Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
By contrast, prior to third-party LBOs, which are less predictable, firms are likely 
to engage in more conservative accounting than firms involved in MBOs, 
possibly to avoid overcompensating managers for unrealistic valuations of the 
firms and to protect the long-term interests of shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; 
Weir and Wright, 2006; Hafzalla, 2009). Effective boards are likely to constrain 
managers from engaging in aggressive accounting (i.e. less conservative 
accounting) prior to third-party LBOs, as they are able to provide better 
monitoring and control to protect the interests of shareholders (Weir and Wright, 
2006; Hafzalla, 2009). However, an ineffective board tends to provide 
opportunities for managers to engage in aggressive accounting (i.e. less 
conservative accounting) prior to a third-party LBO, within which managers 
might have incentives to make the firm appear much more valuable in order to 
meet share price-related performance targets and avoid undervaluation that 
might trigger a takeover (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006; Hafzalla, 
2009). 
 
The second empirical study (Chapter 3) also indicates that board structures 
affect board effectiveness, as better board structures are able to enhance the 
board’s ability to protect shareholder wealth, which is associated with more 
conservative accounting prior to a third-party LBO. In particular, it is found that, 
prior to a third-party LBO, the proportion of non-executives on the board is 
positively and significantly associated with the degree of accounting 
conservatism. This confirms that a high proportion of non-executives can 
facilitate the effectiveness of board monitoring (Roberts et al., 2005; Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1990).  
 
Moreover, the result suggests that CEO duality is significantly negatively related 
to conservative accounting prior to a third-party LBO. This may be because 
duality facilitates the CEO’s power and thereby their ability to engage in 
opportunist behaviours. Duality is then expected to be harmful to the 
effectiveness of the board, as CEO–chairman duality may increase the difficulty 
of monitoring management by other board members (Baliga et al., 1996; 
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Elsayed, 2007) and may even lower the use of knowledge and skills in the board 
(Baliga et al., 1996; Bliss, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, this research indicates that board structures affect board 
effectiveness, as better board structures facilitate boards’ ability to protect 
shareholder wealth, which is associated with less conservative accounting prior 
to an MBO. Specifically, it is found that audit committee independence is 
negatively associated with conservative accounting prior to an MBO. This 
confirms that the independence of the audit committee increases the integrity 
of firms’ financial reporting, which contributes to the effectiveness of monitoring 
(Klein, 2002b; Klein, 2002a).  
 
Therefore, it is suggested that accounting conservatism does not merely reflect 
a general approach to accounting which boards tend to take, but a reasonable 
measure of board effectiveness. Accounting conservatism can reflect the extent 
to which the board of directors have the ability, knowledge, expertise, 
experience, skills and integrity to carry out their duties that is attributed to the 
effectiveness of the board of directors. Firms can improve the effectiveness of 
the board in affecting the degree of accounting conservatism. 
 
However, prior research does suggest that board structures may impact on the 
degree of accounting conservatism (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005; Lara et al., 2009), so this measure is not a particularly ‘pure’ 
measure of board effectiveness. Because of this, it is necessary to consider 
alternative proxies for board effectiveness. Vandenberg et al. (1999), Forbes 
and Milliken (1999), Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) and Payne et al. (2009) 
suggest that key attributes of board effectiveness include sufficient knowledge, 
information, engagement, integrity and social skills. Board tenure refers to the 
length of service of the directors. Directors with long tenures within firms may 
confer their expert power through the cumulative knowledge, information and 
experience of the firm, and the increased familiarity with the firm’s resources 
and methods of operation (Finkelstein, 1992; Alderfer, 1986; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995). Peasnell et al. (2005) suggest that the existence of outside 
directors with longer tenures may imply that directors are more competent in 
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undertaking their responsibilities. However, Vafeas (2003) and Canavan et al. 
(2004) suggest that long-serving directors may lose independence and could 
rob the board of critical expertise. Hence, this study uses board tenure as an 
alternative proxy for board effectiveness to test for the robustness of the results.  
 
Moreover, directors’ financial expertise can provide them with knowledge and 
information to monitor and constrain managers’ irregularities in financial 
reporting (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). A high proportion  of financial 
expertise on boards tends to indicate that the boards have a high level of 
integrity in financial reporting that functions effectively to protect the interests of 
shareholders (Payne et al., 2009; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). However, 
acquirers are likely to pay lower premiums when target firms have high-quality 
financial reports, as they can bid more closely to the target’s reserve price 
(McNichols and Stubben, 2014). Therefore, the proportion of financial expertise 
on boards is also used as an alternative proxy for board effectiveness. 
 
This study uses the regression model and the structural equation model to test 
the hypotheses based on the above argument. It is found that the relationship 
between board effectiveness and level of takeover premiums is negatively 
influenced by or moderated by board size in MBOs. Moreover, this research 
finds evidence for the existence of moderating effects by board effectiveness 
on the relationship between CEO duality and takeover premiums in MBOs. It 
illustrates that high levels of board effectiveness are associated with high 
premiums when firms do not have CEO duality relative to low levels of board 
effectiveness and receive low premiums when CEO duality exists.  
 
The findings of this study aim to contribute to corporate governance and 
mergers and acquisitions literature. First, the study enriches empirical research 
on the impacts of boards of directors on performance outcomes. In the existing 
literature concerning boards, studies have primarily focused on the impacts of 
board structures, but have failed to find conclusive results. This study 
contributes to the literature by investigating the mediating/moderating effects of 
board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party 
LBO and MBO settings. 
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Second, on the methodological front, this study extends the measure of board 
effectiveness to accounting conservatism rather than board structures and 
financial expertise. The key attributes of board effectiveness include the 
directors’ expertise, experience, engagement, integrity and social skills 
(Cornforth, 2001; Payne et al., 2009; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). However, 
these factors are difficult to measure in empirical analysis. Prior studies have 
either ignored these issues or drawn on fairly poor proxies for board 
effectiveness, such as those regarding board structures (Kang et al., 2007; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Bedard et al., 2004) as well as directors’ age, tenure, 
gender and academic qualifications (Anderson et al., 2004; Westphal and Zajac, 
1995; Peasnell et al., 2005). Moreover, some research (e.g. Wan and Ong, 
2005; Pahuja, 2011; van der Walt and Ingley, 2000) tends to limit board 
effectiveness in directors’ effort norms, cohesiveness, and the usage of their 
skills and knowledge. 
 
This study develops a new measure of board effectiveness, which is the degree 
of accounting conservatism. Nicholson and Kiel (2004) suggest that board 
effectiveness is likely to occur when the directors have fulfilled their 
responsibilities. Accounting conservatism is proposed to be a new measure for 
board effectiveness, as a cautious approach to financial reporting is seen to 
protect the long-term interests of shareholders (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008; Watts, 2003a; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). Moreover, the degree of 
accounting conservatism often reflects the directors’ knowledge, expertise, 
engagement and integrity to carry out their responsibilities. The analysis of 
accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs also indicates that 
boards are able to adjust their approach to accounting to protect shareholder 
interests. Therefore, accounting conservatism is assumed to be a measure of 
board effectiveness. 
 
Third, buyouts present a unique opportunity to investigate the implications of 
board structures and effectiveness, as the transactions generate a clear conflict 
of interest between the firms’ managers and their shareholders (Weir et al., 
2005a; Hafzalla, 2009). This study contributes to the literature by extending the 
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study of boards of directors in a new setting. 
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the 
methodology and the hypotheses. Section 4.3 discusses the summary 
univariate statistics, the main results and robustness tests. Section 4.4 presents 
the conclusion. 
 
4.2  Methodology 
4.2.1 Sample and data 
The sample of this study consists of the complete leveraged buyout 
transactions of UK listed firms that took place on the London Stock Exchange 
during 1997 to 2011 for which full data were available. LBOs are public-to-
private transactions where listed firms are taken over by private financial 
institutions, executive directors or individual investors and large-block 
shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). The data was 
restricted to leveraged buyouts (Thomson One Acquisition Techniques code 
(ATC) #12) for UK public companies that went private (ATC #11) between Jan 
1st January 1997 and 31st December 2011. The initial sample consisted of 100 
third-party LBOs and 145 MBOs. Financial services companies (12 third-party 
LBOs and 24 MBOs) and non-UK companies were eliminated from the sample, 
since they were subject to a different set of financial structures, regulatory 
disclosure requirements and corporate governance systems. The final sample 
consists of 76 third-party LBO and 108 MBO deals with full data available. 
 
All data is taken from four sources. The deal information and the firms’ annual 
reports were collected from the Thomson One Banker database, Thomson 
Research and the Nexis UK-Lexis database. All the corporate governance 
information was hand collected from companies’ annual reports. The 
accounting and financial data were collected from DataStream. 
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4.2.2 Method of analysis 
As previously discussed, this study analyses the moderating or mediating 
effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
based on the following research models: 
 
 (1). Moderating analysis:  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 1 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀                                           (4.1) 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀(4.2) 
 
 (2). Mediating analysis – mediating effects of board structures:  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀       (4.3) 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(4.4) 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀                                             (4.5) 
 
(3). Mediating analysis – mediating effects of board effectiveness: 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0+𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀           (4.6) 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0+𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(4.7) 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0+𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀                                             (4.8) 
 
Regression analysis and structural equation modelling (SEM) are the most 
commonly used multivariate techniques for testing the moderating and 
mediating effects in the model (Kim et al., 2001; Ro, 2012). However, each of 
these statistical techniques has certain characteristics that determine its 
applicability for the analysis. Understanding the techniques and their 
characteristics are essential when selecting the most appropriate approach to 
the data. 
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4.2.2.1 Multiple regression approach 
The multiple regression approach is a general statistical technique to explore 
and model the relationship between two or more variables. It is widely used to 
identify and evaluate the cause–effect relationships between independent and 
outcome variables. More specifically, regression analysis can help one to 
understand which independent variables are related to the dependent variables, 
and to explore the forms of these relationships (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). 
The OLS estimation is the most commonly used method to carry out regression 
analysis. Estimates in the multiple regression approach are based on 
coefficients that minimise the error sum of squares (Muthén and Muthén, 1998).  
 
Multiple regression analysis is an excellent tool to predict variance in a 
continuous dependent variable, based on linear combinations of continuous, 
dichotomous or dummy independent variables (Ro, 2012). It allows the 
researcher to control for many other factors that simultaneously affect the 
dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2015). It also works in small data sets (Kuiper, 
2008; Freund et al., 2006). However, there are some limitations when using the 
multiple regression approach.  
 
First, in moderation analysis, the interaction terms (X*Mo) are added to the 
regression model to measure the joint effect of the independent (X) and 
moderator (Mo) variables (i.e. 𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑜 + 𝛼3𝑋 ∗ 𝑀𝑜 + 𝜀). However, 
the creation of the interaction term can lead to the independent and moderator 
variables generating compound measurement errors that dramatically reduce 
the reliability of the interaction term, particularly when the measurement error 
in the independent and moderator increases (Aguinis et al., 2001; Jaccard and 
Wan, 1996). In turn, the low reliability of the interaction term can reduce the 
power of the test (Frazier et al., 2004), thus resulting in an underestimation of 
the moderating effects (Holmbeck, 1997). Therefore, due to the increase in 
measurement errors of the independent and moderator variables, regression 
analysis could underestimate the size of the effect of the interaction term 
(Holmbeck, 1997; Jaccard and Wan, 1996). SEM is suggested as an alternative 
test method, because the measurement errors in SEM can be controlled, thus 
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minimising the problem of underestimation (Holmbeck, 1997; Hoyle and Smith, 
1994). However, when the independent and moderator variables are 
continuous latent variables with multiple indicators, SEM is more complicated 
for testing interactions due to multiple interaction term indicators. It is suggested 
that the continuous moderator should turn into a categorical variable and then 
a multi-group approach should be used (Ro, 2012).  
 
Second, in the regression model, there is no distinction between a moderator 
(Mo) and an independent (X) variable (see Equation 4.2 in section 4.2.2). In 
moderation analysis, a moderator (Mo) interacts with the independent variable 
(X) so that the relationship between independent (X) and outcome (Y) variables 
depends on the level or value of the moderator (Mo) (Ro, 2012). However, from 
the regression equation, this conditional relationship is symmetrical (Cohen et 
al., 2013). It can also be assumed that the relationship between moderator (Mo) 
and outcome (Y) variables depends on the level or value of the independent (X) 
variable. In other words, the regression model for Variable A which moderates 
the relationship between Variable B and Variable C (i.e. 𝐶𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑋 +
𝛼2𝐴𝑀𝑜 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑋 ∗ 𝐴𝑀𝑜 + 𝜀 ), and the regression model for Variable B which 
moderates the relationship between Variable A and Variable C (i.e. 𝐶𝑌 = 𝛼0 +
𝛼1𝐴𝑋 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑀𝑜 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑋 ∗ 𝐵𝑀𝑜 + 𝜀 ) are the same. This means that if the 
regression analysis finds a moderating effect, it is difficult to know whether the 
moderator is Variable A or B. Therefore, the multi-group approach of SEM is 
suggested to be followed. 
 
4.2.2.2 Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
Structural equation models are a powerful statistical modelling technique that 
allows complex relationships between one or more independent and outcome 
variables (Hox and Bechger, 1998). They usually have two parts: a 
measurement model and a structural model. Simply, a measurement model is 
analogous to a confirmatory factor analysis, which is essential to examine the 
relationship between indicators and latent variables. The structural model is 
used to represent the pattern of variation and/or correlation among the 
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constructs (e.g. among observed variables, among latent variables or between 
observed and latent variables) (Hoyle, 2014). SEM usually consists of many 
regression equations. Each equation in a structural equation model is much like 
a standard linear regression model. SEM is capable of simultaneously 
examining a set of interrelated dependence relationships among constructs 
(Amorim et al., 2010; Hoyle, 2014). 
 
In particular, SEM is an analytical tool for moderating and mediating analysis, 
which is often based on the maximum likelihood method – an estimation 
method that chooses the set of parameter values with the highest probability of 
generating the sample observations (Valluzzi et al., 2003). Although multiple 
regression analysis is useful for testing moderating and mediating effects, SEM 
has some advantages over regression in investigating these effects. First, in 
SEM, the multiple group approach is used to detecting the moderating effects 
when the moderator is categorical. Compare with multiple regression analysis, 
SEM is able to distinguish independent (X) from the moderator (Mo) (Ro, 2012). 
 
Second, SEM is particularly useful when the study has multiple indicators for 
the unobserved (or latent) variables under investigation (Pedhazur, 1997; 
Holmbeck, 1997). SEM is able to link observed indicators to latent variables 
that provide separate estimates of relations among latent variables and their 
manifest indicators (Tomarken and Waller, 2005; Valluzzi et al., 2003).  
 
Third, SEM allows the researchers to investigate more complicated models, 
which may include multiple mediators, moderators and dependent variables 
(Hoyle and Smith, 1994). Bollen (2014) suggests that SEM enables researchers 
to characterise real-world processes better than simple correlation-based 
models via the complicated causal networks among variables. Iacobucci et al. 
(2007) and Zhao et al. (2010) suggest that simultaneously fitting components 
of models in SEM is more efficient for the analysis of mediating effects than the 
multiple regression approach that offering three regression pieces.  
 
Fourth, SEM not only allows the analyst to make quantitative estimates of 
model parameters but also to estimate the goodness of fit of the data to the 
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model.  Although there is a wide variety of criteria (fitting indexes) to assess 
how well the data fit the model, there is no general agreement about the 
appropriateness of the tests (Mehdi Karimimalayer and Anuar, 2012). The key 
fitting indexes are presented below: 
 
The likelihood-ratio chi-square (χ2)  is the most basic model test statistic. 
Technically, the chi-square (χ2) statistic compares whether the actual data and 
the theoretical structure of the model are different from each other; therefore, 
the chi-square (χ2) test should be insignificant when indicating a good model 
fit (Munro, 2005; Kline, 2015; Blunch, 2012). However, the chi-square (χ2) test 
is likely to have a number of limitations in its use. For example, some analysts 
such as Hayduk et al. (2007) and Yuan et al. (2005) suggest that the value of 
the chi-square (χ2) can be affected by the particular pattern and severity of 
non-normality, so that the model fit appears either worse or better than it really 
is. Moreover, Kline (2015) argues that the chi-square (χ2) test has limitations, 
where high correlations among observed variables generally lead to a high 
value of the chi-square (χ2) for incorrect models. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989), 
Kim et al. (2001) and Mehdi Karimimalayer and Anuar (2012) do not 
recommend the chi-square (χ2), because it is highly related to the volume of 
the sample, and a small sample decreases the quality of the chi-square (χ2).  
 
Due to the restrictiveness of the chi-square (χ2) , alternative indices are 
employed to assess the model fit. One example of a statistic that reduces the 
sensitivity of the chi-square (χ2) model to the sample size, the ratio of χ2 to 
the degrees of freedom, is sometimes examined. Although there is no 
consensus regarding an acceptable ratio for this index, Hair (1995), Hair (1998) 
and Hair et al. (2013) suggest that the ratio of χ2 to the degrees of freedom 
should be between 1 and 2. Chin and Todd (1995) recommend that a ratio of 
the chi-square (χ2) to the degrees of freedom smaller than 3:1 is acceptable. 
 
In addition, the goodness of fit (GFI) is an absolute fit index for an alternative 
use of the chi-square (χ2)  that estimates the proportion of variances or 
covariance in the sample data explained by the model (Kline, 2015; Gefen et 
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al., 2000). That is to say, the GFI estimates how much better the structural 
model fits compared with no model at all (Jöreskog, 2004). The range of values 
for goodness of fit (GFI) is generally between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates the 
best fit (Kline, 2015; Mehdi Karimimalayer and Anuar, 2012). The goodness of 
fit index (GFI) is acceptable for amounts more than 0.09 (Mehdi Karimimalayer 
and Anuar, 2012; Hair et al., 2010). A general formula is: 
 
𝐺𝐹𝐼 = 1 −
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
                                                (4.9)   
 
Where 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙  and 𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  estimate, respectively, the residual and total 
variability in the sample covariance matrix (Jöreskog, 2004). However, a 
limitation of the goodness of fit (GFI) is that this index may vary with the size of 
the sample (Kline, 2015). The study by Marsh et al. (1988) finds that mean 
values of goodness of fit (GFI) tend to increase along with the sample size. 
Kline (2015) suggests that the value of goodness of fit (GFI) may sometimes 
fall outside the range 0 to 1. A GFI greater than 1 can be found with just 
identified models or with over identified modes where the chi-square(χ2) is 
close to 0, and values of GFI less than 0 are most likely to be found in small 
samples or when the model fit is very poor. 
 
The Bentler & Bonett comparative fit index (CFI) is an incremental fit index that 
measures the relative improvement in the fit of the hypothesised model over 
that of a baseline model, typically an independence model (Kline, 2015). The 
range value of this index is between 0 and 1, where a value of CFI close to 1 
indicates a better fit. The CFI is acceptable for amounts greater than 0.09 
(Mehdi Karimimalayer and Anuar, 2012; Hair et al., 2010). The formula is: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 1 −
𝜒𝑀
2 − 𝑑𝑓𝑀
𝜒𝐵
2 − 𝑑𝑓𝐵
                                             (4.10) 
 
Where 𝜒𝑀
2  and 𝑑𝑓𝑀 are the chi-square and the degree of freedom of the 
hypothesised model respectively; and 𝜒𝐵
2 and 𝑑𝑓𝐵 are the chi-square and the 
degree of freedom of the baseline model respectively (Kline, 2015). This index 
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is one of the most popular fit indices, as it is less affected by sample size than 
other tests (Fan et al., 1999).  
 
However, the CFI is often criticised when the baseline model is independent. 
The independence model is the default baseline model, which assumes all 
relationships among measured variables are zero. In practice, the assumption 
of zero covariance among the observed variables in the independent model is 
improbable in most studies. Therefore, the finding of an improved fit of the 
hypothesised model over the corresponding independence model is not very 
impressive (Kline, 2015).  
 
The root mean square residual (RMR) is an absolute fit index that is used to 
measure the differences between the observed and predicted covariances, 
based on the residual (Kline, 2011). The perfect model fit is indicated by an 
RMR equal to zero, and a large RMR value indicates a poorly fitting model. 
However, as the RMR is computed with unstandardised variables, if the scales 
of these observed variables are all different, it is difficult to interpret a given 
value of the RMR (Kline 2015). Therefore, the standardised root mean square 
residual (SRMR) is computed. Values for the SRMR range from 0 to 1, where 
a value of 0 indicates a perfect model fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that 
values of SRMR less than 0.08 are deemed acceptable (SRMR ≤0.08). 
Similarly, Kline (2015) suggests that an SRMR higher than 0.1 indicates a poor 
fit. However, it must be noted that the SRMR will be lower when there is a large 
sample size (Hooper et al., 2008). 
 
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is an absolute fit index, 
which indicates the badness of fit where a value of zero indicates the best fit 
(Kline, 2015). Specifically, if 𝜒𝑀
2  ≤ 𝑑𝑓𝑀, then RMSEA=0, but this result does 
not necessarily mean a perfect fit. For models where 𝜒𝑀
2  > 𝑑𝑓𝑀, the value is 
calculated by the formula: 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐴 = √
 𝜒𝑀
2 − 𝑑𝑓𝑀
𝑑𝑓𝑀(𝑁 − 1)
                                          (4.11) 
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Where 𝜒𝑀
2  is the chi-square of the hypothesised model and 𝑑𝑓𝑀 is the degree 
of freedom of the hypothesised model. The original threshold from Browne and 
Cudeck (1993) suggest that RMSEA ≤ 0.05 may indicate a good fit. They also 
suggest that an RMSEA in the range of 0.05 to 0.1 is considered as an 
indication of fair fit and RMSEA ≥ 0.1 may indicate a serious problem. 
MacCallum et al. (1996) suggest that an RMSEA in the range of 0.08 to 0.1 
provides a mediocre fit and values below 0.08 show a good fit.  
 
However, RMSEA has some limitations. First, the interpretation of RMSEA and 
the lower and upper bounds of its confidence interval requires that this statistic 
follows non-central chi-square distributions. The studies by of Olsson et al. 
(2004) and Yuan (2005) suggest that the empirical distributions often do not 
typically follow non-central chi-square distributions, and they therefore question 
the generality of thresholds for RMSEA. Second, Breivik and Olsson (2001) 
suggest that RMSEA may favour larger models over smaller ones. This is 
because smaller models are likely to have relatively fewer degrees of freedom 
than larger models that may increase the value of RMSEA. Therefore, RMSEA 
tends to impose a harsher requirement for smaller models to satisfy the 
threshold criteria.  
 
SEM techniques may also have some limitations in an analysis. First, SEM is 
only rarely used to test interaction hypotheses (i.e. moderating effects) 
(Tomarken and Waller, 2005). Although the multiple-group approach is a 
valuable SEM strategy for testing moderating effects, it has limitations when 
both independent (X) and moderator (Mo) are continuous variables (Tomarken 
and Waller, 2005; Ro, 2012).  
 
Moreover, the specification and estimation of a SEM model with latent variable 
interactions are associated with potential problems and complexities. 
Researchers have to test the latent interaction effects by computing all possible 
products of the measured indicators and creating indicators of latent interaction 
variables. To avoid complications, researchers have to convert the continuous 
moderator (Mo) into a categorical variable and then use the multi-group 
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approach (Tomarken and Waller, 2005; Ro, 2012). However, this artificial 
grouping may result in loss of information and reduction in power to detect 
interaction effects, which is a Type II error (Frazier et al., 2004; Fitzsimons, 
2008). Furthermore, the artificial dichotomising of two continuous variables 
(independent (X) and moderator (Mo)) may result in the opposite effect and 
spurious main and interaction effects, which is a Type I error (Irwin and 
McClelland, 2001; MacCallum et al., 2002).  
 
Third, although attempts have been made to accommodate smaller sample 
analysis (e.g. Nevitt and Hancock, 2004), it is still generally true that SEM is a 
large sample technique (Kline, 2015; Tomarken and Waller, 2005). Jackson 
(2003) suggests that the ideal sample size-to-parameters ratio should be 20:1. 
A less ideal sample size-to-parameter ratio should be 10:1. Kline (2015) 
suggests that the ‘typical’ sample size in studies that use the SEM approach is 
about 200. Failure to meet this requirement may mean that the SEM approach 
is untenable, because the maximum likelihood does not perform well in the 
presence of small samples (Kline, 2015). Kenny (2014) also suggests that small 
sample sizes may result in a Type I error. Considering the strengths and 
limitations of the multiple regression and SEM approaches, this study uses both 
approaches in examining the moderation and mediating effects of board 
structures and board effectiveness in the third-party LBO and MBO samples. 
 
4.2.3 Statistical strategies for testing moderating effects 
Moderator variables can exist at the continuous and categorical level (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986; Ro, 2012). Depending on the type of moderator variables, 
different statistical analyses are used to measure and test the moderating 
effects. This study uses two types of statistical strategies in testing the 
moderating effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover 
premiums, which are multiple regression analysis and SEM (Baron and Kenny, 
1986; Ro, 2012). 
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4.2.3.1 Multiple regression approach 
 
Figure 4.3 Statistical model of moderation effects – Multiple regression 
approach 
 
 
4.2.3.1.1 Continuous moderator variables 
When independent and moderator variables are continuous scales, multiple 
regression analysis is used to test moderating effects. Figure 4.3 depicts the 
multiple regression approach for moderating effects as a path diagram. A 
moderating effect is an interaction effect, which represents a joint effect of the 
independent (X) and moderator (Mo) variables. Sometimes researchers (e.g. 
Appel et al., 2011; O'Donnell et al., 2006; Tiggemann, 1997) have tested the 
moderating effects by using a single model in which the interaction terms are 
entered with independent and moderator variables simultaneously. However, in 
this case, the main effects of the independent and moderator variables on the 
outcome variable (Y) cannot be seen, unless the interaction term is entered in 
a separate step (Ro, 2012). Thus, the usual procedure is to use the multi-step 
regression approach to test the moderating effects.  
 
The procedure for the regression approach to testing moderating effects 
consists of two steps (see Figure 4.3). In the first step of the regression, the 
independent variable (X) and the moderator (Mo) are entered into the 
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regression equation to test their main effects on the outcome variable (Y). In 
order to test the moderating effects, the independent variable (X) and/or the 
moderator (Mo) do not have to be significant to affect the outcome variable (Y). 
In the second step, an interaction term, the product of the independent and 
moderator variables (X*Mo), is added into the equation. A t-test of the 
regression coefficient associated with the interaction term (X*Mo) is one way to 
determine whether there is a statistical moderating effect. If the coefficient of 
the interaction term (X*Mo) explains a statistically significant amount of 
variance in the outcome variable (Y), it could be argued that a moderating effect 
exists (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Ro, 2012; Hayes, 2013). In lieu of the t-test, 
one can also evaluate the moderating effects according to the significance of 
the change in R squared (△ 𝑅2) for the models with and without the interaction 
term added model (Aiken et al., 1991; Ro, 2012). The △ 𝑅2 test is distributed 
as an F-statistic.  
 
4.2.3.1.2 Categorical moderator variables 
When the independent variable is continuous and the moderator is a categorical 
variable, the first step is to code the categorical variable. Similarly to the above 
procedure, the next step is to test the main effects of the independent variable 
(X) and the moderator (Mo) on the outcome variable (Y). The product of the 
independent and moderator variable (X*Mo) needs to be created for each level 
of the code variable. Then, the independent (X), the moderator (Mo) and their 
product term are entered into the model to test for moderating effects. 
Depending on the value of the moderator variable, several different regression 
slopes, rather than just one, represent the association between the independent 
(X) and the outcome (Y) variables  (Ro, 2012). 
 
4.2.3.1.1 Regression analysis 
To illustrate the impact of the moderator at different levels, simple regression 
equations are then required to solve for each level of the moderator variables. 
Several steps are required to interpret the significant moderating effects at each 
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level. First, the study has to calculate the low, medium and high levels for the 
independent (X) and moderator (Mo) variables which are usually defined as the 
minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for 
medium levels and the 67th to the maximum for high levels (Osborne, 2012). 
Simple regression equations are then solved for each level of the moderator. 
The regression lines obtained for low, medium and high values of the 
moderators are then plotted to determine whether there is a decreasing, 
enhancing or situation-specific effect of the moderator (Holmbeck, 1997; Cohen 
et al., 2013; Aldwin and Werner, 2012). 
 
Moreover, given the manner in which the interaction term (X*Mo) is created, the 
independent and moderator variables are likely to be highly correlated with the 
interaction term. This might cause a multicollinearity problem, which may lead 
to ‘bouncing betas’, whereby the direction of the beta terms may switch from 
previously positive to negative relationships or vice versa (Cohen et al., 2013). 
Previous studies (e.g. Frazier et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2013; Hayes, 2013; 
Kim and Dong-Ku, 1999; Aho, 2013) recommend that the predictor and 
moderator variables, which are measured on a continuous scale, should be 
centred or standardised to reduce the problems associated with 
multicollinearity among the variables in the moderation analysis.  
 
This study applies the approach of standardising (subtracting the sample mean 
then divided by standard deviation) continuous independent and moderator 
variables, as doing so makes it easier to plot significant moderating effects 
(Cohen, 2003). Moreover, standardisation is easy to create within standard 
statistical packages. Therefore, this study standardises the proxies for board 
structures including board size (bsize), the proportion of non-executives on the 
board (ned), as well as the proxy for board effectiveness – the levels of 
accounting conservatism (cscore) – in the regression approach to test 
moderating effects.  
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4.2.3.1 Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
When the moderator is categorical, particularly dichotomous, a straightforward 
multi-group approach is to be used to test the moderating effects in the SEM 
strategy (Ro, 2012). However, when the independent (X) and moderator (Mo) 
are continuous variables, the SEM strategy can test moderating effects by 
turning the continuous moderator (Mo) into a categorical variable (Ro, 2012). 
Hence, the low, medium and high levels for moderator (Mo) variables are 
calculated, by defining the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th 
to 66th percentiles for medium levels and the 67th to the maximum for high levels 
(Osborne, 2012).  
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Figure 4.4 Statistical model of moderation effects – SEM approach  
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A multi-group approach is used to model moderating effects in an SEM strategy 
in which the relation between the independent and the outcome variables is 
estimated separately for the multi-groups (Ro, 2012; Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
Specifically, to test for the presence of moderating effects, the overall fit of the 
model is assessed under the conditions (1) when the relationship between the 
independent (X) and outcome (Y) variables is equal for moderator (Mo) 
(constrained model: an assumption without interaction effects) and (2) when 
the relationship between the independent (X) and outcome (Y) variables can 
vary by moderator (Mo) (unconstrained model: an assumption of interaction 
effects) (see Figure 4.4). Two models are compared, and if there is a significant 
improvement in the model fit, it would indicate that the moderating effect is 
present (Han et al., 2009; Ro, 2012). To conduct the multi-group analysis, an 
SEM is run by adding the hypothesised paths between variables. The specific 
path across groups is then assessed to compare the particular parameter 
difference. In particular, the nested models are compared with the baseline 
model, each with a specific parameter constraint between groups, by using a 
chi-square difference test (Han et al., 2009). 
 
4.2.4 Statistical strategies for testing mediating effects 
The mediation analysis implies a causal chain where the independent variable 
(X) is likely to affect the mediator (Me), which in turn affect the outcome variable 
(Y). Both the multiple regression and SEM approaches are able to test the 
mediating effects. 
 
4.2.4.1 Multiple regression approach 
Path analysis is a series of regression equations that track the direct and 
indirect pathways between predictor (including independent (X) and mediator 
(Me) variables) and outcome variables (Y). According to Baron and Kenny 
(1986), four conditions can be tested with three regression models in mediation 
analysis (see Figure 4.5). In the first regression, the significance of the path 
from the independent variable (X) to the outcome variable (Y) is examined. 
Chapter 4 
215 
However, previous studies Kenny (2008), Kenny et al. (1998) and Zhao et al. 
(2010) argue that this first step is not required, because there might be a chance 
that when direct and indirect effects are opposite in sign, the first step may not 
be met, but mediation still exists. Shrout and Bolger (2002) suggest that the 
inclusion of the first step is based on the argument whether the independent 
variable (X) is temporally distal or proximal to the outcome variable (Y). 
Therefore, they recommend skipping the first step when the independent 
variable (X) is distal, as such studies often lack power to detect the direct 
relationship between independent (X) and outcome (Y) variables. In the second 
regression model, the significance of the path from the independent variable (X) 
to the mediator variable (Me) is tested. In the third regression model, the 
independent variable (X) and the mediator variable (Me) are simultaneously 
entered into the model with the outcomes variable (Y) (X, Me→ Y) (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986; Kim et al., 2001). Two conditions must be met here, if mediating 
effects exist: (1) the mediator (Me) is significantly related to the outcome 
variable (Y) after controlling for the effect of the independent (X) variable on the 
outcome (Y) variable and (2) comparing the difference of the effect of the 
independent variable (X) and outcome variable (Y) when the model includes 
the mediator (Me) and when it does not (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Ro, 2012). If 
the relation between the independent variable (X) and the outcome variable (Y) 
is significantly smaller when the model contains the mediator (Me) than when it 
does not, but is still greater than zero, it is called a partial mediation. If the 
relation between the independent variable (X) and the outcome variable (Y) is 
zero when taking into account the mediator (Me), this is called complete (full) 
mediation (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
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Figure 4.5 Statistical model of mediation effects – Multiple regression 
approach  
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To test the significance of the mediating effect (the difference between paths c 
and c’), Sobel’s (1982) z-test is one of the most well-known methods, where 
𝑍 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝛾2/𝑆𝛽1𝛾2. Specifically, 𝛽1 is the coefficient for the independent variable 
(X) in predicting the mediator (Me); 𝛾2 is the coefficient for the mediator (Me) 
in predicting the outcome variable (Y) when the controlling independent variable 
(X) is in the model; 𝑆𝛽1𝛾2 = √𝛽1
2 ∗ 𝑆𝛾2
2 + 𝛾2
2 ∗ 𝑆𝛽1
2  is the variance of the 𝛽1 ∗ 𝛾2 
coefficient; 𝑆𝛽1 is the variance of the 𝛽1 coefficient; and 𝑆𝛾2 is the variance of 
the 𝛾2 coefficient (Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010; Fairchild and MacKinnon, 
2009). However, Sobel’s z-test has a limitation, which is that it requires the 
sampling distribution of the indirect effect to be normal (Ro, 2012). When the 
sample size is small or medium, there might be a non-normal sample 
distribution of the indirect effect, and therefore Sobel’s z-test may not be 
appropriate (MacKinnon et al., 1995).  
 
Recently, an alternative procedure, the bootstrapping procedure, has been 
suggested to replace Sobel’s z-test in testing the significance of the mediating 
effect (Cheung and Lau, 2008; Hayes, 2009; Shrout and Bolger, 2002). The 
bootstrapping approach is based on repeatedly resampling during analysis 
(Hayes, 2009; Shrout and Bolger, 2002). The coefficients 𝛽1  and 𝛾2  are 
estimated from this resampled data set and the product of the path coefficient 
is recorded (MacKinnon et al., 2007; Hayes, 2009).  
 
4.2.4.2 Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
SEM strategies are an alternative approach to test mediating effects which are 
based on maximum likelihood analysis (Ro, 2012; Kim et al., 2001). The logic 
for testing a mediating effect in SEM is similar to that in the regression approach. 
First, the study should assess the fit of the direct effect of the independent (X)→ 
outcome (Y) model. Assuming an adequate fit, it then tests the fit of the 
independent (X)→ mediator (Me)→ outcome (Y) model. If the overall model 
provides an adequate fit, the independent (X)→ mediator (Me) path and the 
mediator (Me)→ outcome (Y) path coefficients are examined (Ro, 2012). 
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However, Holmbeck (1997) suggests that it is relatively common only to test the 
significance of an indirect pathway in mediation analysis when using the SEM 
approach. 
 
Figure 4.6 Statistical model of mediation effects – SEM approach  
 
 
 
To test the significance of the mediated effect, the fit of the independent (X)→ 
mediator (Me)→ outcome (Y) model is tested under two conditions: (1) when 
the independent (X)→ outcome (Y) path is constrained to zero (which means 
the path is not estimated), and (2) when the independent (X)→ outcome (Y) 
path is not constrained (see Figure 4.6) (Holmbeck, 1997; Kim et al., 2001). 
The modification index for the constrained path provides a guide to decide 
whether the path should be included or deleted (generally, a modification index 
value of < 2 means that to add the path would not significantly improve the 
overall fit of the model) (Kim et al., 2001). The mediating effect is present if the 
independent (X)→ outcome (Y) path of the constrained model does not improve 
the fit. This means that the independent (X)→ outcome (Y) path is reduced to 
non-significant (i.e. it does not improve the fit of the model) when the mediator 
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(Me) is included in the model. However, if the independent (X)→ outcome (Y) 
path remains significant even when the mediator (Me) is included in the model, 
the mediating effect cannot be assumed (Holmbeck, 1997; Kim et al., 2001). 
Finally, Sobel’s z-test and bootstrapping are suggested to explicitly test the 
relative size of the mediated path (independent (X)→ mediator (Me)→ outcome 
(Y)) versus the direct path (independent (X)→ outcome (Y)) (Iacobucci et al., 
2007). If the size of the mediated path is significantly greater than that of the 
direct path, then it is assumed that there is a significant mediating effect (Ro, 
2012). 
 
4.2.5 Hypotheses 
4.2.5.1 Moderation effects 
In this study, the moderation analysis is used to explain the condition under 
which the relationship between board effectiveness (or board structures) and 
takeover premiums occurs. As previous research (e.g. Yermack, 1996; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Klein, 1998; Belkhir, 
2009; Pacini et al., 2008; Bliss, 2011; Brickley et al., 1997) has found 
inconsistent relationships between board effectiveness (or board structures) 
and takeover premiums, this study makes hypotheses that this relationship 
might be strengthened or weakened by the moderators of board structures (or 
board effectiveness).  
 
In the first place, this study tests the moderating effects of board structures on 
the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-
party LBOs and MBOs. It is expected that good board structures can provide 
better opportunities or conditions for directors to work together that are able to 
enhance the impact of board effectiveness encapsulates directors’ knowledge, 
expertise and expertise on shareholder wealth maximisation.  
 
Specifically, large board size is expected to provide large pool or opportunities 
for directors that enable them to have variety backgrounds, greater breadth of 
experience, expertise and resources to be more effective to contribute to the 
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shareholder wealth protection (Klein, 2002b; Pacini et al., 2008; Belkhir, 2009; 
Goodstein et al., 1994). Moreover, Gertner and Kaplan (1996) and Larmou and 
Vafeas (2010) suggest that board with large size can lead to less workload for 
individual directors that provide good opportunities and conditions for the board 
of directors to better utilise their knowledge, ability and resources to effectively 
protect the shareholder wealth. However, the opposite view suggests that 
smaller boards are able to provide opportunities or conditions for directors to 
better communicate and coordinate with each other that may enhance the 
shareholder wealth (Lehn et al., 2009; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Therefore, board effectiveness is expected to 
better contribute to the shareholder wealth protection when the board is better 
structured. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4.1a: The board size moderates the relationship between board effectiveness 
and takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting such that the relationship 
is more positive when the board size is small than when it is large. 
 
H4.1b: The board size moderates the relationship between board effectiveness 
and takeover premiums in an MBO setting such that the relationship is more 
positive when the board size is small than when it is large. 
 
Moreover, the large proportion of non-executives are expected to offer more 
opportunities for the board of directors to provide effective monitoring and 
control that can better contribute to the shareholder wealth protection  
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Cotter et al., 1997; 
Ajinkya et al., 2005; Lara et al., 2007; Guo and Masulis, 2015). However, Patton 
and Baker (1987), Gilson and Kraakman (1991) and Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) 
suggest that non-executives may lack time, information and expertise, which 
provide poorly conditions and opportunities for directors to challenge the 
decision of management. This may reduce the efficiency of board control and 
monitoring that deteriorate the interests of shareholders. Besides, as the non-
executives may lack knowledge and acquaintance with insiders, the large 
proportion of non-executives may provide poorly conditions for directors’ 
communication and collaboration that may hamper the shareholder wealth 
Chapter 4 
221 
(Wan and Ong, 2005; Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2007). Hence, this study 
makes hypotheses that: 
 
H4.2a: The proportion of non-executives on the board moderates the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in a third-party LBO 
setting such that the relationship is more positive when the proportion of non-
executives is high than when it is low. 
 
H4.2b: The proportion of non-executives on the board moderates the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in an MBO setting such 
that the relationship is more positive when the proportion of non-executives is 
high than when it is low. 
 
Furthermore, duality may enable CEOs to have more concentrated power and 
position, which offering poor conditions or situations for board monitoring and 
control that may hamper the shareholder wealth maximisation (Cornforth, 2001; 
Elsaid and Davidson, 2009). Additionally, the concentrated power and position 
of CEOs may provide opportunities for them to engage in self-interested 
activities rather than protecting the interests of shareholders (Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991; Kim et al., 2009; Desai et al., 2003). Therefore, this study makes 
hypotheses that: 
 
H4.3a: CEO duality moderates the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting such that the relationship is 
more negative when firms have CEO duality rather than a separate CEO and 
chairman. 
 
H4.3b: CEO duality moderates the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in an MBO setting such that the relationship is more 
negative when firms have CEO duality rather than a separate CEO and 
chairman. 
 
In the second place, this study examines the moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
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premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs. Previous studies (e.g. Yermack, 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Belkhir, 2009; Pacini et al., 2008; Baliga et al., 1996; 
Bliss, 2011; Elsayed, 2007; Klein, 1998; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1991) have found an inconsistent relationship between board 
structures and performance outcomes. High levels of board effectiveness may 
indicate that boards have more knowledge, expertise, experience and skills, 
which is expected to provide better opportunities or conditions for directors to 
facilitate the association between board structures and shareholder wealth 
protection. Therefore, board structures include board size, the proportion of 
non-executives and CEO duality are expected to better contribute to the 
shareholder wealth protection when the board has high levels of effectiveness. 
Consequently, this study makes the following hypotheses that: 
 
H4.4a: Board effectiveness moderates the relationship between board size and 
takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting such that the relationship is 
more negative when board effectiveness is high than when it is low. 
 
H4.4b: Board effectiveness moderates the relationship between board size and 
takeover premiums in an MBO setting such that the relationship is more 
negative when board effectiveness is high than when it is low. 
 
H4.5a: Board effectiveness moderates the relationship between the proportion 
of non-executives on the board and takeover premiums in a third-party LBO 
setting such that the relationship is more positive when board effectiveness is 
high than when it is low. 
 
H4.5b: Board effectiveness moderates the relationship between the proportion 
of non-executives on the board and takeover premiums in an MBO setting such 
that the relationship is more positive when board effectiveness is high than 
when it is low. 
 
H4.6a: Board effectiveness moderates the relationship between CEO duality and 
takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting such that the relationship is 
more negative when board effectiveness is high than when it is low. 
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H4.6b: Board effectiveness moderates the relationship between CEO duality and 
takeover premiums in an MBO setting such that the relationship is more 
negative when board effectiveness is high than when it is low. 
 
4.2.5.1 Mediation effects 
In contrast, mediation analysis usually concerns with the mechanisms that how 
and why the board structures (or board effectiveness) could affect the takeover 
premiums. In another word, board effectiveness (or board structures) is 
supposed to explain the relationship between board structures (or board 
effectiveness) and takeover premiums. Therefore, this research makes 
hypotheses that board structures (or board effectiveness) could affect the 
takeover premiums through the mediator of board effectiveness (or board 
structures). 
 
First, this study tests the mediating effects of board effectiveness on the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs and MBOs. It is expected that good board structures can improve the 
shareholder wealth due to the enhanced board effectiveness. In particular, good 
board structures enhance the effectiveness of board by enriching the directors’ 
knowledge, expertise and expertise, and enhancing their abilities of monitoring, 
control, communication, collaboration and corporation. The high levels of board 
effectiveness such as effective control and monitoring, better corporation and 
collaboration and directors’ enriched knowledge, expertise and experience are 
likely to contribute to the increase of shareholder wealth. 
 
Previous studies (Pfeffer, 1973; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Klein, 2002b; Pacini 
et al., 2008; Belkhir, 2009) suggest that large boards can improve the 
effectiveness of boards by broadening the backgrounds and bring more 
experience, expertise and skilled directors to the boards. Gertner and Kaplan 
(1996) and Larmou and Vafeas (2010) suggest that large boards can reduce 
the workload for individual directors, which can improve the effectiveness of 
Chapter 4 
224 
boards, as the directors are likely to have less time commitment requirement. 
However, Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Lehn et 
al. (2009) and Harris and Raviv (2008) argue that boards with more members 
may have communication and coordination problems that hamper the board 
effectiveness.  
 
Whereas the levels of board effectiveness, which encapsulates directors’ 
knowledge, experience, expertise, skills, engagement and integrity, is expected 
to affect the ability of directors in discharging their responsibilities that can 
contribute to the size of takeover premiums. Wan and Ong (2005), Kroll et al. 
(2008), Lichtenstein et al. (2011), Tuggle et al. (2010) and Sánchez et al. (2015) 
suggest that the relevant experience, knowledge and skills can improve 
directors’ capability of monitoring and counsel, which are helpful in protecting 
the shareholder wealth. Therefore, board size may affect the takeover 
premiums through board effectiveness. This research then makes the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H4.7a: Board effectiveness mediates the relationship between board size and 
takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting. 
 
H4.7b: Board effectiveness mediates the relationship between board size and 
takeover premiums in an MBO setting. 
 
In addition, the high proportion of non-executives can enhance directors’ 
independence and objectivity in decision-making and improve the boards’ 
ability of monitoring that contribute to the effectiveness of boards (Buchholtz 
and Ribbens, 1994; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Lara et al., 2007; Guo and Masulis, 
2015). However, Wan and Ong (2005), Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) and 
Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) suggest that a high proportion of non-executives 
may hamper the communication and collaboration within boards that 
deteriorate the board effectiveness. Moreover, as discussed before, board 
effectiveness encapsulates directors’ experience, knowledge and skills is likely 
to affect their ability of monitoring that are able to affect the shareholder wealth 
(Wan and Ong, 2005; Kroll et al., 2008; Lichtenstein et al., 2011; Tuggle et al., 
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2010). Hence, this study makes hypotheses that: 
 
H4.8a: Board effectiveness mediates the relationship between the proportion of 
non-executives on the board and takeover premiums in a third-party LBO 
setting. 
 
H4.8b: Board effectiveness mediates the relationship between the proportion of 
non-executives on the board and takeover premiums in an MBO setting. 
 
In addition, duality may provide CEOs with more concentrated power and 
position that may enable greater managerial opportunistic activities and hamper 
the effectiveness of board monitoring (Cornforth, 2001; Elsaid and Davidson, 
2009; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Kim et al., 2009; Desai et al., 2003). Besides, 
as discussed, high levels of board effectiveness may indicate effective 
monitoring that is able to protect the shareholder wealth (Wan and Ong, 2005; 
Kroll et al., 2008; Lichtenstein et al., 2011; Tuggle et al., 2010). Therefore, this 
study makes hypotheses that: 
 
H4.9a: Board effectiveness mediates the relationship between CEO duality and 
takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting. 
 
H4.9b: Board effectiveness mediates the relationship between CEO duality and 
takeover premiums in an MBO setting. 
 
Second, this study examines the mediating effects of board structures on the 
relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs and MBOs. It is expected that board effectiveness can affect the takeover 
premiums through the structure of board. Previous studies (e.g. Nadler and 
Tushman, 1980; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Lehn et al., 2009; Linck et al., 2008; 
Boone et al., 2007) suggest that from a long-term perspective, the past activity, 
behaviour and effectiveness of the boards are likely to affect their current 
structures. For example, low levels of board effectiveness are associated with 
the poor ability of board monitoring and control, which may lead to the directors 
to be replaced. Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Arthur (2001) 
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indicate that board structures are the functions of the bargaining between the 
CEO and the other board of directors. The CEO and the rest of board of 
directors’ ability, experience, expertise and skills are likely to affect their 
bargaining positions and power in the negotiation, which may result in the 
change of board structures. 
 
Moreover, previous studies find that board structures related to board size, the 
proportion of non-executives and CEO duality are likely to affect the 
cooperation and collaboration among directors, which is expected to affect the 
performance outcomes. For example, Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), 
Cheng (2008) and Kumar and Singh (2013) find a significant negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance. However, Dalton et al. 
(1999), Pearce and Zahra (1992), Larmou and Vafeas (2010) and Shukeri et al. 
(2012) suggest that a board with more members is positively associated with 
shareholders wealth protection. Furthermore, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and Jaggi et al. (2009) find that a high proportion 
of non-executives can improve shareholder wealth, while. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Klein (1998) and Guo and Kga (2012) find a negative 
relationship between the two. In addition, empirical studies (e.g. Lee, 2009; 
Goyal and Park, 2002; Bassett et al., 2007) report a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance. However, Baliga et al. (1996), 
Brickley et al. (1997) and Bliss (2011) document that the impact of CEO duality 
on shareholder wealth protection is not significant. Therefore, this research 
makes the following hypotheses that:  
 
H4.10a: Board size mediates the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting. 
 
H4.10b: Board size mediates the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in an MBO setting. 
 
H4.11a: The proportion of non-executives on the board mediates the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in a third-party LBO 
setting. 
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H4.11b: The proportion of non-executives on the board mediates the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in an MBO setting. 
 
H4.12a: CEO duality mediates the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in a third-party LBO setting. 
 
H4.12b: CEO duality mediates the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in an MBO setting. 
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Table 4.1 The summary table of Hypotheses 
 Mo/Me Moderation Analysis Mediation Analysis 
H
y
p
o
th
e
s
e
s
 
Board 
structures 
 H4.1a: Board size moderates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in 
third-party LBOs  
 H4.7a: Board size mediates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in third-party LBOs  
 H4.1b: Board size moderates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in 
MBOs 
 H4.7b: Board size mediates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in MBOs 
 H4.2a: The proportion of non-executives 
on the board moderates the relationship 
between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBOs 
 H4.8a: The proportion of non-
executives on the board mediates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in third-party LBOs 
H4.2b: The proportion of non-executives 
on the board moderates the relationship 
between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in MBOs 
 H4.8b: The proportion of non-
executives on the board mediates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in MBOs 
 H4.3a: CEO duality moderates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in 
third-party LBOs 
 H4.9a: CEO duality mediates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in third-party LBOs 
 H4.3b: CEO duality moderates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in 
MBOs 
 H4.9b: CEO duality mediates the 
relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in MBOs 
Board 
effectiveness 
 H4.4a: Board effectiveness moderates 
the relationship between board size and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBOs  
 H4.10a: Board effectiveness mediates 
the relationship between board size 
and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs  
 H4.4b: Board effectiveness moderates 
the relationship between board size and 
takeover premiums in MBOs 
 H4.10b: Board effectiveness mediates 
the relationship between board size 
and takeover premiums in MBOs 
 H4.5a: Board effectiveness moderates 
the relationship between the proportion 
of non-executives on the board and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBOs 
 H4.11a: Board effectiveness mediates 
the relationship between the proportion 
of non-executives on the board and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBOs 
 H4.5b: Board effectiveness moderates 
the relationship between the proportion 
of non-executives on the board and 
takeover premiums in MBOs 
 H4.11b: Board effectiveness mediates 
the relationship between the proportion 
of non-executives on the board and 
takeover premiums in MBOs 
 H4.6a: Board effectiveness moderates 
the relationship between CEO duality 
and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs 
 H4.12a: Board effectiveness mediates 
the relationship between CEO duality 
and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs 
 H4.6b: Board effectiveness moderates 
the relationship between CEO duality 
and takeover premiums in MBOs 
 H4.12b: Board effectiveness mediates 
the relationship between CEO duality 
and takeover premiums in MBOs 
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4.2.6 Measurement 
4.2.6.1 Dependent variable 
Takeover premiums (prem) are the premiums that shareholders may receive 
from selling their shares within a takeover transaction (Buchholtz and Ribbens, 
1994). They may reflect the gains in shareholder wealth from the takeover 
transactions, where a high takeover premium indicates greater gains in 
shareholder wealth and vice versa. Takeover premiums are calculated by the 
percentage increase in the share price of the target firm in the time frame from 
four weeks before the announcement of the buyout to the final offer price. 
Following its definition in Thomson One Banker: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =
(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 4 )
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 4 
                       (4.16) 
 
Where the offer price is the final offer price to the targets, share price 4 is the 
share price four weeks before the announcement of the takeover. 
 
4.2.6.2 Independent, moderator and mediator variable 
Board structures are the makeup of the boards that are measured through the 
proxies of board size (bsize), the proportion of non-executive directors on 
boards (ned) and CEO–chairman duality (dual). Board size (bsize) is measured 
as the total number of directors on the board. The proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board (ned) is measured by dividing the number of non-
executive directors by the total number of directors on the board. CEO–
chairman duality (dual) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the position of CEO 
and chairman of the boards are occupied by the same person, and is 0 
otherwise. 
 
Moreover, in order to test the moderating effects of board structures in the 
relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums by using the 
multi-group approach in a SEM strategy, this study converts the continuous 
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variables of board size (bsize) and the proportion of non-executives (ned) to 
categorical variables. Specifically, Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Harris and 
Raviv (2008) and Lehn et al. (2009) suggest that small boards can improve the 
cooperation and communication among board of directors and further reduce 
the free-rider problems that are helpful in protecting shareholder wealth. 
However, a board size that is too small is negatively associated with boards’ 
ability to protect shareholder wealth. This is because the smaller board may 
increase individual directors’ workload. A board that is too small may not able 
to handle the workload, as the time commitment required may greatly exceed 
the time individual directors have available (Gertner and Kaplan, 1996; Larmou 
and Vafeas, 2010). According to Jensen (1993), Johnson et al. (1996) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), a board size that is too large negatively affects 
communication between board members, which can inhibit the effectiveness of 
the board. Therefore, this study converts the board size continuous variable 
(bsize) into a categorical variable with three groups: low, medium, and high 
levels. According to the approach as noted in Osborne (2012), low-level board 
size is defined as the minimum to the 33rd percentiles, coded as 1; medium-
level as the 34th to 66th percentiles, coded as 2; and high-level as the 67th to the 
maximum, coded as 3. 
 
Furthermore, Dechow et al. (1996), Cotter et al. (1997), Ajinkya et al. (2005), 
Lara et al. (2007) and Guo and Masulis (2015) suggest that a high proportion 
of non-executive directors can improve a board’s ability to supervise and control 
management behaviours, which positively influences the board’s decisions 
regarding shareholder wealth protection. However, an extremely high 
proportion of non-executives on boards may be harmful to the interests of 
shareholders, as non-executive directors usually lack the time and information 
to challenge the decisions of management (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and 
Kraakman, 1991; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). Additionally, an extremely low 
proportion of non-executives on boards may be negatively associated with 
shareholder wealth protection because the non-executives may lack the power 
to challenge the decisions made by the managers. Hence, this study transforms 
the proportion of non-executives on boards (ned) continuous variables into a 
categorical variable. Similarly, the proportion of non-executives on boards (ned) 
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is grouped into three levels, divided at the 33rd and the 66.7th percentiles, to 
give low, medium and high groups.  
 
Accounting conservatism is used to measure the level of board effectiveness, 
where in a third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting, and in an 
MBO context, less conservative accounting are expected to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness. Based on the C-score model of Khan and Watts (2009), 
the levels of accounting conservatism are estimated at firm-specific levels. 
Hence, C-score (cscore) is the proxy of board effectiveness. As stated in 
empirical study two (Chapter 3), Khan and Watts’s (2009) C-score is estimated 
as follows: 
 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ε                        (4.13) 
 
𝐺 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = α2 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀             (4.14) 
 
𝐶 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀            (4.15) 
 
Where 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the earnings per share (eps) before extraordinary items for firm i 
in fiscal year t; 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 is firm i’s price per share at the beginning of the fiscal 
year t; 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the share return on firm i from nine months before fiscal year-end 
t to three months after fiscal year-end t; 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is negative, and equal to 0 otherwise. Here, the coefficient α2 measures 
the levels of asymmetric timeliness of conservatism with respect to positive 
returns (or good news); the α3 measures the levels of asymmetric timeliness 
of conservatism with respect to negative returns (or bad news); 𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the 
logarithm of the market value of the equity; 𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 is the market value of the 
equity divided by the book value of equity; and 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is the total debt divided 
by the total assets. Replacing 𝛼2 and 𝛼3 from Equations 4.14 and 4.15 into 
Regression 4.20 yields: 
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𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ (𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡) + (𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇5𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇6𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝜀                                                (4.16) 
 
Moreover, in order to test the moderating effects of board effectiveness in the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums by using the 
multi-group approach in a SEM strategy, this study transforms the accounting 
conservatism (cscore) continuous variable into a categorical variable. Hence, 
accounting conservatism (cscore) is grouped into two levels, divided at the 50th 
percentile to give low and high groups. 
 
4.2.6.3 Control variable 
4.2.6.3.1 Control variables expected to impact on takeover premiums  
This study controls for the firm size. Firm size (size) is measured by the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s total assets (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; 
Zona, 2015). Morck et al. (1988a), Cotter et al. (1997), and Bauguess et al. 
(2009) suggest that firm size is likely to affect the level of takeover premiums, 
because the acquisition of large firms is usually difficult as it requires high 
magnitudes of credit to finance the transactions. Hence, firm size is negatively 
associated with the level of takeover premiums. Moreover, they argue that as 
the expected synergies from the acquisition of large firms are usually uncertain, 
lower premiums are usually paid. In addition, large firms tend to be subjected 
to lower managerial ownership, which may accept lower premiums (Morck et 
al., 1988a; Cotter et al., 1997; Bauguess et al., 2009; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 
1994; Shrivastava, 1986). Therefore, firm size may affect the level of takeover 
premiums.  
 
This study controls for firm performance (roa) which is measured by return on 
asset (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Maury, 2006; Hitt et al., 1997). Return on asset is 
calculated by dividing the net income by the total assets. Better firm 
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performance may indicate firms are likely to have effective boards (Hackman et 
al., 1975; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Effective 
boards can facilitate the shareholder wealth protection that may associate with 
high takeover premiums. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Hartzell et 
al. (2004) suggest that the ex-ante firm performance is likely to affect the level 
of takeover premiums, as a better firm performance may result in fewer 
available takeover gains and target returns for acquirers, who may reduce offer 
premiums. 
 
This study also controls for board ownership (bown). Board ownership is the 
percentage of shares owned by the board of directors (e.g. Al Farooque et al., 
2007; Ferris et al., 2003). According to agency theory, high levels of ownership 
by the board of directors are purposed to lead to greater incentives for directors 
to be involved with and pursue common interests with shareholders (Buchholtz 
and Ribbens, 1994; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Carline et al., 2011). Hence, 
higher board ownership tends to be positively associated with the level of 
takeover premiums.  
 
This study controls for audit independence (lnnas) in investigating the impacts 
of boards on takeover premiums. Audit independence is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the non-audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor (e.g. 
Bugeja, 2011; Defond et al., 2002). Audit independence is positively associated 
with the level of takeover premiums because the high degree of reliance on and 
confidence in the financial information will positively affect the evaluation of the 
target firm, for which the bidders may pay higher premiums (Weir et al., 2005a; 
Fox and Marcus, 1992; Lowenstein, 1985). Therefore, when the target firm has 
a high degree of audit independence, the bidders’ valuation of the firm may be 
higher, which may result in higher takeover premiums paid. However, the 
opposite view suggests audit independence tends to improve the quality of 
accounting information. Acquirer can value the firms with greater precision 
when the targets have high quality accounting information, which may make 
their bidding more effectively and ultimately pay less for acquisition (McNichols 
and Stubben, 2009). 
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This study includes the leverage (level) as a control variable in investigating the 
impacts of boards on the level of takeover premiums. Leverage is measured as 
the total debts divided by the total assets (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Cassar 
and Holmes, 2003; Ahangar, 2011). Leverage is associated with the level of 
takeover premiums, as the debt may work to bind the management to act in the 
interests of shareholders. Fox and Marcus (1992), Jensen (1986a), Jensen 
(1986b), Williamson (1988) and Renneboog et al. (2007) suggest that the 
issuing of debt establishes a covenant between creditors and debtors that 
increases monitoring from the external debtors of interest payments, the 
liquidity of the business and the redeployability of assets. However, an LBO is 
usually financed with a high percentage of debt (typically 85%–90%) (Hafzalla, 
2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Jensen, 1986a; Jensen, 1986b). Consequently, 
if the target firm has high leverage before a buyout, it will be more difficult for 
acquirers to issue new debt for the target, which may further reduce the 
premiums they can offer. 
 
Free cash flow is often used to achieve the self-interested objectives of 
managers rather than to maximise shareholder wealth. However, after an LBO, 
it is initially used to pay off debt (Weir et al., 2005a; Weir and Wright, 2006; Fox 
and Marcus, 1992). Free cash flow is one of the determinants of an LBO, as it 
could provide financial support to ensure the firm’s ability to pay its debts 
(Renneboog et al., 2007; Toms and Wright, 2005). Therefore, this study controls 
for free cash flow (fcf) in investigating the impacts of boards on takeover 
premiums in LBO transactions. Free cash flow is measured as the funds from 
operations after subtraction of the capital expenditure and cash dividends, 
divided by the firm’s total assets (e.g. Renneboog et al., 2007). 
 
This study controls for firms’ undervaluation (pe). Weir et al. (2005b) and Weir 
and Wright (2006) suggest that buyout targets are likely to have lower share 
prices in the market compared with firms that remain public. Firms’ perceived 
undervaluation is one of the significant reasons for LBOs (Weir et al., 2005b; 
Weir and Wright, 2006). In order to investigate the effects of boards on takeover 
premiums in LBO transactions, this study controls for firms’ undervaluation. 
Following the approach of Alford (1992), Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Francis 
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et al. (2005), a firm’s undervaluation is measured as the industry-adjusted price 
earnings ratio. Firms with comparatively low price earnings ratios than their 
industry peers are likely to be undervalued.  
 
4.2.6.3.2 Control variables expected to impact on board effectiveness and 
board structures  
Firm size is likely to affect board effectiveness. Large firms are often more 
complex and likely to generate more work for supervision, which therefore may 
lead large firms to establish larger boards to deal with the workload. As larger 
firms tend to be more visible, they may also be under more pressure to comply 
with best practice recommendations, e.g. on the proportion of non-executives 
and CEO–chairman duality. Larger firms may find it easier to attract better 
directors but they may also be more difficult to supervise and control 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999). Therefore, according to the approach of Anderson 
and Reeb (2003), Maury (2006) and Zona (2015), this study controls for firm 
size (size), which is measured by the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets. 
 
The performance of a firm is a potential indicator for board effectiveness, where 
firms performing better are likely to have more effective boards, and vice versa 
(Hackman et al., 1975; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
In addition, the historical performance of firms tends to affect current board 
structures, where poor performance can lead to the board of directors being 
fired (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Hence, this study includes firm 
performance and follows the approach of Hitt et al. (1997), Core et al. (1999) 
and Maury (2006) that measures firm performance as return on asset (roa).13 
 
Board ownership is likely to affect board effectiveness, as ownership can 
provide directors with incentives to perform their roles. In addition, board 
ownership is able to affect the board structures, since ownership can provide 
directors with power when they are negotiating board structure (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1988). Hence, this study follows the approach of Ferris et al. (2003) 
                                                             
13 See section 4.2.6.3.1., where return on asset = net income/total assets. 
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and Al Farooque et al. (2007), and controls for board ownership (bown), which 
is measured as the percentage of shareholdings owned by the board of 
directors. 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between board structures and board 
effectiveness, this study controls for firms’ audit quality. Audit quality is expected 
to affect board effectiveness, as high-quality audits may limit the ability of 
managers to behave opportunistically, which, in turn, improves the 
effectiveness of board monitoring (Becker et al., 1998). Moreover, audit quality 
may affect board structure, as poor audit quality may result in a financial 
scandal that leads to a change in the board structure (Becker et al., 1998; 
Francis et al., 1999). In the study, Firm’s audit quality is measured through the 
proxy of big4. Big4 is a dummy variable, which is coded as 1 if the firm’s auditor 
is one of the big six, five or four companies,14 and otherwise as 0. Larger offices 
of big 4 auditors are predicted to provide higher quality audits due to greater in-
house experience, reputation and their sheer size can provide more robust 
training programs and standardised audit methodologies (Lawrence et al., 2011; 
Francis and Yu, 2009; Dopuch and Simunic, 1980; Liti, 2014; Smith, 2008). 
However, this measure may have limitations because the most of the listed 
companies may hire big 4 audit companies. For example, big 4 account for 
about 70 per cent of audits of MBO firms and 87 per cent of audits of third-party 
LBO firms. This may reduce the ability of the proxy to measure the real audit 
quality of the company. 
 
This study also controls for CEO change (ceoch) which is coded as 1 if the new 
CEO has been appointed in the year prior to the takeover bid, and otherwise 
as 0. A newly appointed CEO may improve board effectiveness by bringing 
more skills, experience and expertise to the board (Weisbach, 1988; Wu, 2004). 
Moreover, Mace (1986) and Vancil (1987) suggest that the CEO plays an 
                                                             
14 In this study, big4 is a dummy variable that is used to measure the audit quality of firms. Big4 denotes 
the top six (after 1989) or five (after 1998) or four (after 2002) audit companies of the world. In 1998, Price 
Waterhouse merged with Coopers & Lybrand to form PricewaterhouseCoopers. Ernst and Young, Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG and Arthur Andersen together made up the big five. However, after 
2002, Arthur Andersen was dropped from this list after the Enron scandal. The big five became the big 
four (Smith, 2008; Liti, 2014). 
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important role in choosing the members of the board of directors. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) and Raheja (2005) suggest that succession is one of the 
major concerns for a CEO. They suggest that, towards the end of a CEO’s 
tenure, more executive directors should be added to the board to compete for 
the succession. Some of the executives may leave the firm when they feel they 
do not have any chance of becoming the next CEO. Moreover, at the beginning 
of a new CEO’s tenure, a number of executives who failed in the competition to 
become CEO may leave the firm, as they will not have another chance to do so 
in the short term. Also, the new CEO may wish to fill board vacancies with non-
executives who can offer them more advice and consultation, and provide more 
effective monitoring (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Farrell and Whidbee, 2002; 
Daily and Dalton, 1995). Therefore, a change of CEO is likely to be associated 
with board structure. 
 
This study controls for sales growth (sg) which is defined as the percentage 
increase of sales from two years before the announcement of a takeover to one 
year before the announcement of a takeover (e.g. Short and Keasey, 1999; 
Bushman et al., 2004; Fan et al., 2007; Borisova et al., 2012). Firms’ growth 
prospects are likely to be associated with board effectiveness, as higher growth 
prospects may require the board of directors have more skills, experience and 
expertise in performing their roles (Brush et al., 2000). Moreover, firms’ growth 
prospects are related to board structures, because a poorly performing board 
of directors may be fired and more skilled directors appointed (Bhagat and 
Black, 2001). 
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Table 4.2 Variable names 
Variables Definitions 
Board structures 
measures: 
 
Board size (bsize) The total number of the board of directors 
Non-executives 
(ned) 
The proportion of non-executives on the board 
CEO duality (dual) Duality: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is 
the same person, otherwise 0 
sta bsize Standardised value for board size 
sta ned Standardised value for non-executives 
cat bsize Continuous variable bsize is converted to categorical variable which 
is defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th 
to 66th percentiles for median levels and the 67th to the maximum 
for high levels 
cat ned Continuous variable ned is converted to categorical variable which is 
defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 
66th percentiles for median levels and the 67th to the maximum for 
high levels 
Board 
effectiveness 
measures: 
 
cscore Denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism, which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model 
sta cscore Standardised value for c-score 
cat cscore Continuous variable cscore is converted to categorical variable which 
is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels and the 
51th to the maximum for high levels 
Financial expertise 
(fe) 
An alternative measure for board effectiveness, which is measured 
by the percentage of financial expertise on boards 
Board tenure 
(btenure) 
An alternative measure for board effectiveness, which is measured 
by the average tenure for board of directors 
sta fe Standardised value for the proportion of finanicla expertise on board 
sta btenure Standardise value for board tenure 
cat fe Continuous variable fe is converted to categorical variable which is 
defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels and the 
51th to the maximum for high levels 
cat btenure Continuous variable btenure is converted to categorical variable 
which is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels 
and the 51th to the maximum for high levels 
Dependent 
variable: 
 
Takeover 
premiums (prem) 
Takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement, 
which is calculated by the percentage increase in the stock price of 
the target firms for the time frame of four weeks before the 
announcement of the buyout to the final offer price. 
Interaction terms:  
sta bsize *sta 
cscore 
Interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore 
sta ned *sta cscore Interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore 
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duality *sta cscore Interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore 
Control variables:  
Firm size (size) Ln total assets 
Firm performance 
(roa) 
Return on assets 
Board ownership 
(bown) 
Board ownership 
Audit 
independence 
(lnnas) 
Ln non-audit fees 
Leverage (level) Total debts divided by total assets 
Free cash flows 
(fcf) 
Free cash flow is calculated by the funds from operation minus capital 
expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets 
Price-earnings 
ratio (pea) 
Price-earnings ratio 
big4 Dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big five or four audit 
firms 
CEO change 
(ceoch) 
Dummy variable, change equals to 1, otherwise 0 
Sales growth (sg) Sales growth  
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4.2.7 Empirical models for tests 
4.2.7.1 Moderating tests 
Using the following empirical models, this study tests the moderating effects of 
board structures in the relationship between board effectiveness and level of 
takeover premiums by considering the control variables discussed above. 
However, as the moderating effects are represented as an interaction term of 
independent (X) and moderator (Mo) variables in a multiple regression 
approach, these regression models can also be used to test the moderating 
effects of board effectiveness in the relationship between board structure and 
level of takeover premiums. 
 
Step1: 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀                                                (4.17) 
 
Step2: 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀                                                    (4.18) 
 
Where prem denotes the takeover premium; board structures are measured 
through board size (bsize), the proportion of non-executives on the board (ned) 
and CEO–chairman duality (dual); cscore denotes the level of accounting 
conservatism; board structures*cscore is the interaction term of board 
structures and board effectiveness; size denotes the firm size; roa denotes firm 
performance; bown denotes board ownership; lnnas denotes audit 
independence; level denotes leverage; fcf denotes the free cash flow of the firm; 
and pe denotes the price earnings ratio, which indicates undervaluation of firms. 
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4.2.7.2 Mediating tests 
Using the following empirical models, this study tests the mediating effects of 
board structures in the relationship between board effectiveness and level of 
takeover premiums by considering the control variables discussed above: 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀                                                (4.19) 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑏𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑠𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀                                                    (4.20) 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀                                                (4.21) 
 
Where prem denotes the takeover premium; board structures are measured 
through board size (bsize), the proportion of non-executives on the board (ned) 
and CEO–chairman duality (dual); cscore denotes the level of accounting 
conservatism; size denotes firm size; roa denotes firm performance; bown 
denotes board ownership; lnnas denotes audit independence; level denotes 
leverage; fcf denotes the free cash flow of the firm; pe denotes the price 
earnings ratio, which indicates undervaluation of firms; big4 denotes audit 
quality; ceoch denotes a change in CEO; and sg denotes the firm’s sales growth. 
 
Using the following empirical models, this study tests the mediating effects of 
board effectiveness in the relationship between board structure and level of 
takeover premiums, by considering the control variables discussed above: 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0+𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾5𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀           (4.22) 
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𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0+𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾5𝑏𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑠𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀                    (4.23) 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0+𝛾1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛾5𝑏𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾9𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀                                                (4.24) 
 
Where prem denotes the takeover premium; board structures are measured 
through board size (bsize), the proportion of non-executives on the board (ned) 
and CEO–chairman duality (dual); cscore denotes the level of accounting 
conservatism; size denotes firm size; roa denotes firm performance; bown 
denotes board ownership; lnnas denotes audit independence; level denotes 
leverage; fcf denotes the free cash flow of the firm; pe denotes the price 
earnings ratio, which indicates undervaluation of firms; big4 denotes audit 
quality; ceoch denotes a change in CEO; and sg denotes the firm’s sales growth. 
 
4.2.7.3 Robustness tests 
Endogeneity is a major methodological concern for corporate governance and 
accounting research that rely on regression analysis of the causal link between 
the explanatory and outcome variables (Abdallah et al., 2015; Chenhall and 
Moers, 2007). Ideally, the regression analysis is supposed to be used to find a 
significant relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables to 
provide support for the theoretically proposed causal relationship (Chenhall and 
Moers, 2007; Abdallah et al., 2015; Roberts and Whited, 2012). However, the 
model may include an endogenous explanatory variable that can lead to 
endogeneity and affect the reliability of the estimation. Therefore, it is important 
to understand how the theory and data can comply with the specification of the 
model, including identifying the endogenous variables (Chenhall and Moers, 
2007; Coles et al., 2012). 
 
In statistics, the endogeneity expresses “a correlation between the explanatory 
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variables and the error term in a regression”, which may arise either because 
of to the omitted variables or simultaneity (Roberts and Whited, 2012: 6). Under 
the first situation, the omitted variable may lead to the error term to be correlated 
with explanatory variables, which violates the basic assumption of OLS. Under 
the second situation, the endogeneity is raised due to the explanatory variables 
and outcome variable are likely to affect each other simultaneously (Chenhall 
and Moers, 2007; Abdallah et al., 2015). The endogeneity can be addressed by 
using 2SLS, which requires the employment of the instrumental variables. It is 
supposed that the instrumental variables are required to correlate with the 
explanatory variable but not correlate to the error term (Chenhall and Moers, 
2007; Diamond and Tolley, 2013; Badertscher, 2011; Greene, 2011).  
 
This study concerns for the endogeneity biases, as the previous literature has 
found that board structures can influence board effectiveness (e.g. Klein, 2002b; 
Pacini et al., 2008; Belkhir, 2009; Goodstein et al., 1994; Larmou and Vafeas, 
2010; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Lehn et al., 2009; Levrau and Van den Berghe, 
2007; Bliss, 2011), and, in turn, can also be influenced by board effectiveness 
(e.g. Nadler and Tushman, 1980; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998; Arthur, 2001). Therefore, this study tests for the possible 
endogenous selection of the board structures and board effectiveness in MBOs 
and third-party LBOs.  
 
The 2SLS regression is then used to address the endogeneity. The instrumental 
variables are generated to predict the values of the endogenous variables 
(Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). The accounting and corporate governance 
literature suggest that the lagged value is able to be the instrument variable as 
it can affect the current value but not vice versa (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011; Greene, 2011). In line with this argument, this study employs 
the lagged values of board structures and board effectiveness as instruments. 
In particular, the instruments for the interaction terms are the products of lagged 
values of board structures and board effectiveness. Moreover, the F-statistic is 
used to test for the weakness of instruments, as the 2SLS may produce a bias 
estimation over OLS approach when the instruments are weak (Hadri and 
Mikhail, 2014; Baum, 2006; Adkins and Hill, 2011). Valid instruments must be 
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highly correlated with the explanatory variables, but uncorrelated with the error 
term (Badertscher, 2011; Greene, 2011). The Hausman tests are then used to 
check for the endogeneity. The null hypothesis is rejected when the p-value is 
less than 0.05, then the endogeneity presents (Diamond and Tolley, 2013; 
Baum, 2006; Adkins and Hill, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, in order to test the robustness of the results, this study uses both 
multiple regression and SEM in moderation and mediation analysis. The 
robustness test of this study is also implemented by using alternative measures 
of board effectiveness, including board tenure and the proportion of financial 
experts on the board. 
 
4.3  Findings and Analysis 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.3 is the summary table of descriptive statistics of Tables 4.22 and 4.23 
in the Appendix and reports the mean, median and standard deviation of all 
variables for the 76 third-party LBOs and 106 MBOs in the sample. In particular, 
Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the results of t-tests on whether the differences 
in the continuous variables of board structures, board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums between the two types of leveraged buyouts are significant. 
On average, third-party LBO targets have approximately seven directors (bsize) 
and MBO targets have approximately six directors on the board. The difference 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that third-party LBO 
firms tend to have larger boards than MBO firms. Lipton and Lorsch (1992), 
Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) suggest that large boards may lead to less 
cohesion, communication and coordination among board members, indicating 
a worse corporate governance. Hence, MBO firms are likely to have better 
corporate governance than third-party LBO firms. 
 
Moreover, the research finds that there is a significantly lower proportion of non-
executive directors (ned) (44.5%) in MBO firms compared to third-party LBO 
firms (53.6%). Fama and Jensen (1983), Baysinger and Butler (1985), 
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Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) and Cotter et al. (1997) suggest that a high 
percentage of non-executives can increase board independence, which 
benefits board monitoring of opportunistic managerial behaviours. Therefore, 
this indicates that the boards in third-party LBO firms may have more effective 
monitoring than in MBO firms. 
 
The C-score represents the level of accounting conservatism, which is used to 
measure boards’ effectiveness in firms. As discussed earlier, effective boards 
are expected to demand more conservative accounting prior to third-party LBOs, 
either to avoid over-compensating managers for unrealistic firm valuations or 
to protect the long-term interests of shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and 
Wright, 2006). In contrast, preceding MBOs, effective boards are likely to 
demand less conservative accounting to avoid shareholder exploitation by 
managers who may have incentives to make firms appear less valuable, and 
thereby exploit the interests of current shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir 
and Wright, 2006; Hafzalla, 2009). Hence, less conservative accounting tends 
to indicate a lower level of board effectiveness in the third-party LBO context, 
but a higher level of board effectiveness in the MBO context. The C-score value 
for third-party LBO firms is −6.532, compared to 0.256 for MBO firms, which is 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that MBO firms are likely to apply more 
conservative accounting than third-party LBO firms. This is consistent with the 
argument that managerial incentives are different in MBOs and third-party 
LBOs, which may affect their behaviours towards accounting information 
disclosure during buyout transactions. 
 
The mean value of takeover premiums is 35.8% (median value 30%) for third-
party LBO firms and mean 41.5% (median value 39.7%) for MBO firms. 
However, the null hypothesis, that the difference in takeover premiums between 
MBO and third-party LBO firms is zero, cannot be rejected at conventional 
significance levels. This suggests that there is no evidence that takeover 
premiums differ between third-party LBOs and MBOs, despite the divergent 
interests of managers in the two cases. 
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Table 4.3 The summary table of descriptive statistics for MBOs and third-
party LBOs 
Panel A: MBO third-party LBO 
significance 
tests 
variables N mean median sd N mean median sd t-test 
p>│t
│ 
prem 106 0.415 0.397 0.314 76 0.358 0.3 0.468 0.989 0.162 
bsize 106 6.142 6 1.576 76 6.763 7 1.574 -2.626*** 0.005 
ned 106 0.445 0.429 0.148 76 0.536 0.563 0.118 -4.469*** 0.000 
cscore 106 0.256 0.288 0.247 76 -6.532 -6.597 0.766 85.332*** 0.000 
           
Panel B: MBO third-party LBO 
significance 
tests 
variables N value percent cum. N value percent cum. z-test 
p>│z
│ 
dual 106 
0 71.7 71.7 
76 
0 89.47 89.47 
2.910*** 0.002 
1 28.3 100 1 10.53 100 
big4 106 
0 30.19 30.19 
76 
0 13.16 13.16 
-2.689*** 0.004 
1 69.81 100 1 86.84 100 
ceoch 106 
0 91.51 91.51 
76 
0 93.42 93.42 
0.477 0.317 
1 8.49 100 1 6.58 100 
           
Panel C: MBO third-party LBO 
significance 
tests 
variables N mean median sd N mean median sd t-test 
p>│t
│ 
size 
(£000) 
106 
133,181.60
0 
54,727.500 363,045 76 
546,444.90
0 
104,704.50
0 
1,532,222 -2.677*** 0.004 
roa 106 0.048 0.062 0.141 76 0.018 0.051 0.147 1.396* 0.082 
bown 106 0.2 0.11 0.213 76 0.102 0.029 0.143 3.478*** 0.000 
lnnas 
(£000) 
106 131.008 65.500 196.270 76 324.263 107 607.481 -3.063*** 0.001 
level 106 0.504 0.492 0.185 76 0.589 0.552 0.242 -2.693*** 0.004 
fcf 106 -0.008 0.015 0.137 76 -0.011 0.009 0.11 0.203 0.420 
pe 106 -3.314 -4.425 16.923 76 1.407 -3.025 70.768 -0.662 0.255 
sg 105 0.394 0.039 2.292 76 0.237 0.085 0.757 0.575 0.283 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting conservatism 
in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: 
the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Size (£000): Firm 
size is measured using the total assets of firms. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas (£000): The audit independence is measured using the non-audit fees of firms. Lnnas: ln 
(non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow, defined as the funds 
from operations minus capital expenditure and cash dividends divided by total assets in year Y-1. Pe: price earnings ratio in 
year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, 
CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1.  
 
Panel B of Table 4.3 reports the z-tests on whether the differences of the 
dummy variables of board characteristics between MBOs and third-party LBOs 
are significant. Among the sample of MBO firms, 28.3% have one person 
serving as both chair and CEO (dual), compared with only 10.5% of the third-
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party LBO target firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Cornforth (2001) and Elsaid and Davidson (2009) suggest that CEO duality may 
indicate worse corporate governance, as it may give the CEO a concentrated 
power and position in decision-making. Goyal and Park (2002), Kim et al. (2009) 
and Bliss (2011) argue that CEO duality could deteriorate the board’s ability to 
monitor and exercise control over the CEO. Hence, this may imply that there 
are more powerful CEOs and poorer board monitoring in MBO firms than in 
third-party LBO firms. 
 
Moreover, the research finds that, on average, 69.8% of auditors in MBO firms 
belong to the big six, five or four audit companies (big4),15 which is significantly 
lower than that in third-party LBO firms (86.8%). This may indicate that third-
party LBO firms are likely to have a higher audit quality than MBO firms, as ‘big 
four’ auditors tend to deliver high-quality audits (Becker et al., 1998). As high-
quality audits can limit managers’ ability to behave opportunistically, which, in 
turn, improves the effectiveness of board monitoring, third-party LBO firms tend 
to have more effective board monitoring than MBO firms (Becker et al., 1998). 
Moreover, this may imply that MBO firms are more likely to make changes to 
the board structure than third-party LBO firms, because poor quality audits may 
lead to a financial scandal within the firm that results in the board structure 
changing (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999).  
 
Furthermore, it is reported that the proportion of CEO changes for MBO firms 
is 8.5%, compared to 6.6% for third-party LBO firms. However, this difference 
is not statistically significant. This may indicate that there is no evidence that 
CEO change differ between MBOs and third-party LBOs. 
 
Panel C of Table 4.3 examines the control variables of target firm characteristics. 
On average, the total assets of MBOs are £133,181.6 thousand, which is 
                                                             
15 In this study, big4 is a dummy variable that is used to measure the audit quality of firms. Big4 denotes 
the top six (after 1989) or five (after 1998) or four (after 2002) audit companies of the world. In 1998, Price 
Waterhouse merged with Coopers & Lybrand to form PricewaterhouseCoopers. Ernst and Young, Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG and Arthur Andersen together make the big five. However, in 2002, 
Arthur Andersen was dropped from this list after the Enron scandal. The big five became the big four (Liti, 
S., 2014; Smith, J. L., 2008). 
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significantly lower than that in third-party LBOs, (£546,444.9 thousand).  This 
indicates that third-party LBO firms are likely to be larger than MBO firms. As 
the expected synergies of buyouts for large firms are usually uncertain, which 
may lead to lower premiums being paid, this result might also imply that third-
party LBO firms may achieve lower premiums than MBO firms (Cotter et al., 
1997; Bauguess et al., 2009; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Shrivastava, 1986). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest that large firms tend to have more complex 
jobs and more work to be supervised, which requires larger boards to deal with 
the workload. Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that large firms may be under 
more pressure to comply with best practice recommendations of corporate 
governance. Therefore, this indicates that third-party LBO firms may have 
larger boards, a higher proportion of non-executives and, more often, a 
separate CEO and chairman than MBO firms. 
 
The average value of firm performance (roa) for MBO firms is 0.048, which is 
significantly higher than that in third-party LBO firms (0.018). This may indicate 
that third-party LBO firms can achieve lower premiums than MBO firms, since 
a better performance by the firm may be associated with a higher level of board 
effectiveness, which may facilitate shareholder wealth protection (Hackman et 
al., 1975; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
 
Moreover, the study finds that board ownership (bown) is 20% in MBO firms, 
compared to 10.2% in firms that are involved in third-party LBOs. Board 
ownership is significantly higher in MBOs than third-party LBOs. As board 
ownership can lead to greater incentives for directors to be involved in activities 
to protect shareholders’ interests, the findings may indicate that MBO firms are 
likely to achieve higher takeover premiums than third-party LBO firms 
(Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Carline et al., 2011).  
 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the non-audit fees in MBO firms are 
£131,008, which is significantly lower than that in third-party LBO firms 
(£324,263). This indicates that the MBO firms are likely to have a higher level 
of audit independence than third-party LBO firms. As audit independence can 
increase the reliance on and confidence in firms’ financial information, which 
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may positively affect the effectiveness of monitoring over management and the 
evaluation of target firms, MBO firms tend to achieve higher takeover premiums 
than third-party LBO firms (Weir et al., 2005a; Fox and Marcus, 1992; 
Lowenstein, 1985). 
 
In addition, the leverage ratio (level) is at 0.504 for targets of MBO offers, 
compared to 0.589 for targets of third-party LBO offers. MBO firms are likely to 
have significantly lower leverage ratios than third-party LBO firms. This might 
imply that MBO targets can achieve higher premiums than third-party LBO 
targets. This is because LBOs require a high percentage of debts (85–90%) 
(Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Jensen, 1986a; Jensen, 1986b). It will 
be more difficult for acquirers to issue new debt for LBOs when the target firms 
have higher leverage ratios, which may therefore reduce the acquirers’ offer 
premiums. 
 
The panel C, Table 4.3, also examines other characteristics of firms. Regarding 
free cash flow (fcf), price earnings ratio (pe) and sales growth (sg), the data 
suggests that there are no significant differences between MBO and third-party 
LBO target firms. This implies that buyout targets are likely to have similar 
characteristics, such as their free cash flow, price earnings ratio and sales 
growth. It also indicates that these characteristics can cause the firms to be the 
targets of both third-party LBOs and MBOs. 
 
In summary, on average, target firms that receive MBO offers have smaller 
boards of directors, a lower proportion of non-executives on the board and are 
more likely to have one person being both CEO and board chairman than those 
receiving third-party LBO offers. MBO firms have a significantly smaller firm size, 
a lower leverage ratio and are less likely to employ the big 6, 5 or 4 audit firms 
than third-party LBO firms. However, MBO firms are likely to perform better, 
have higher board ownership and greater audit independence compared to 
third-party LBO firms. 
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4.3.2 Correlations 
Tables 4.24 and 4.25 in the Appendix report the Pearson correlation matrices 
between board structures, board effectiveness, takeover premiums and control 
variables for third-party LBOs and MBOs. Given the manner in which the 
interaction terms are created (product terms of independent variables and 
moderators) in moderating analysis, this research also reports the correlation 
matrices including standardised variables (sta cscore, stab size and sta ned) 
and interaction terms (sta bsize*sta cscore, sta ned*sta cscore and sta dual*sta 
cscore) in third-party LBOs and MBOs. Standardisation is achieved by 
subtracting the sample mean from the respective variable, then dividing by its 
standard deviation (Cohen, 2003).  
 
The findings suggest that the correlations between board structure variables 
(sta bsize, sta ned and dual), board effectiveness (sta cscore) and control 
variables (size, roa, bown, lnnas, level, fcf, pe, big4, ceoch and sg) are below 
0.7 in MBOs and third-party LBOs. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) indicate that the correlations below 0.7 should not 
have multicollinearity problems during regression analysis. Moreover, this study 
applies the VIF test (see Appendix, Tables 4.26 to 4.33 (VIF)). The VIF test is 
used to verify that the results are not distorted by multicollinearity. The 
maximum VIF found within the models is far below the commonly used rule of 
thumb cut-off of 10 (Cohen et al., 2013), indicating that multicollinearity is not 
an issue in the analysis. 
 
4.3.3 Multiple regression analysis 
4.3.3.1 Moderation analysis 
First, this study uses the multiple regression approach to analyse the 
moderating and mediating effects of board structures and board effectiveness 
on takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs. In the models, board 
effectiveness is measured as the level of accounting conservatism, which is 
calculated through Khan and Watts’s (2009) C-score model. As discussed 
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before, more conservative accounting is expected to indicate a high level of 
board effectiveness in the third-party LBO setting, but a low level of board 
effectiveness in the MBO setting. Board structures are measured using the 
proxies of board size, the proportion of non-executives and CEO duality. In 
order to check the robustness of the results, this study uses different 
combinations of board size, the proportion of non-executives and CEO duality. 
Initially, the effects of these are tested individually. Then, this study runs an 
analysis by combining two of the proxies of board structures in the model. 
Finally, all three proxies of board structures are put in the same model to run 
the analysis. However, as in multiple regression analysis, the interaction terms 
cannot clearly differentiate independent variables from moderator variables, so 
this study further tests the moderating effects of board structures and board 
effectiveness using the multi-group approach in SEM, which will be discussed 
in section 4.3.5. 
 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the relationship between the proportion of non-
executives on boards and takeover premiums for third-party LBOs and MBOs 
in empirical study 1 (Chapter 2). The results suggest that there is no significant 
relationship between the proportion of non-executives (ned) and the level of 
takeover premiums in both third-party LBOs and MBOs. This may indicate that 
the research should look beyond board structures to better understand the 
impact of boards on performance outcomes. 
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Table 4.4 The results of relationship between the proportion of non-
executives on board and takeover premiums for third-party LBOs and 
MBOs in empirical study 1 (Chapter 2) 
 Dependent Variable=prem 
 MBO  Third-party LBO 
Variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4  Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
ned -0.044 -0.044 -0.181 -0.181  0.353 0.353 -0.141 -0.141 
 (-0.114) (-0.130) (-0.518) (-0.560)  (0.695) (0.745) (-0.249) (-0.252) 
exeown 0.010 0.010    1.234*** 1.234***   
 (0.031) (0.034)    (3.035) (3.182)   
exeso   -0.027* -0.027    -0.026*** -0.026*** 
   (-1.830) (-1.564)    (-2.874) (-2.930) 
size -0.110** -0.110** -0.095** -0.095**  -0.044 -0.044 -0.041 -0.041 
 (-2.292) (-2.516) (-2.143) (-2.309)  (-1.229) (-1.139) (-1.134) (-1.099) 
roa 0.041 0.041 0.003 0.003  -2.654*** -2.654*** -2.737*** -2.737*** 
 (0.100) (0.113) (0.008) (0.009)  (-5.460) (-6.065) (-5.214) (-5.511) 
other-own 0.197 0.197 0.001 0.001  -1.165*** -1.165** -0.589 -0.589 
 (0.893) (1.028) (0.003) (0.004)  (-2.719) (-2.564) (-1.124) (-1.125) 
level -0.036 -0.036 -0.015 -0.015  -0.959*** -0.959*** -1.058*** -1.058*** 
 (-0.119) (-0.099) (-0.047) (-0.044)  (-3.022) (-3.267) (-3.473) (-3.800) 
multi 0.133 0.133 0.131 0.131  0.222** 0.222*** 0.236** 0.236** 
 (1.361) (1.580) (1.531) (1.587)  (2.387) (2.758) (2.332) (2.484) 
insti 0.051 0.051 0.062 0.062  0.447 0.447 0.239 0.239 
 (0.253) (0.286) (0.303) (0.329)  (1.312) (1.527) (0.695) (0.732) 
lnnas 0.122** 0.122** 0.111*** 0.111**  0.083*** 0.083*** 0.067** 0.067** 
 (2.569) (2.655) (2.682) (2.574)  (3.127) (3.100) (2.612) (2.412) 
pe 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (1.275) (1.151) (1.418) (1.267)  (-3.568) (-3.562) (-4.648) (-4.733) 
fcf 0.073 0.073 -0.021 -0.021  -0.042 -0.042 0.295 0.295 
 (0.224) (0.232) (-0.069) (-0.064)  (-0.077) (-0.085) (0.491) (0.533) 
Industry Cluster  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.992 0.992 1.225* 1.225*  0.251 0.251 1.083* 1.083* 
 (1.561) (1.692) (1.881) (1.893)  (0.366) (0.340) (1.910) (1.890) 
          
F-test 1.450 8.100*** 1.700* 2.400**  21.460*** 33.370*** 19.110*** 22.350*** 
Prob>f 0.168 0.000 0.090 0.027  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.253 0.253 0.324 0.324  0.568 0.568 0.563 0.563 
Observations 84 84 82 82  62 62 62 62 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Prem: takeover premium of the offer price to 
the target closing share price four weeks prior to the original announcement date. Ned: percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. Exeown: percentage of executive shareholding. Exeso: logarithm of the 
valuation of executive share options with Black-Scholes’ (1973) model. Pe: price earnings ratio calculated 
by adjusting the target’s PE ratio by subtracting the industry median PE, and also using the two-digit 
industry classification benchmark (ICB-code) sort. Fcf: free cash flow, defined as the funds from operations 
minus capital expenditure and cash dividends divided by total assets. Ro: firm’s return on assets. Size: 
natural logarithm of the market value. Other-own: common shares held by the target firm’s board directors 
other than the CEO. Level: total debt divided by total assets. Multi: dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target and is otherwise 0. Insti: total amount of 
common shares held by institutional investors divided by the total amount of common outstanding shares, 
where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. Lnnas: natural logarithm of the non-audit fees. 
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Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the two-step regression approach for moderation 
analysis in third-party LBOs. In order to reduce the problems associated with 
multicollinearity among the variables in moderation analysis, the models 
include the standardised values of board effectiveness (sta cscore), board 
structures (i.e. sta bsize, sta ned and dual) and their interaction terms (i.e. sta 
bsize*sta cscore, sta ned*sta cscore and dual*sta score).  
 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the constrained model (an assumption of no 
interaction effects) in third-party LBOs. Model LO1 tests the effects of other 
variables, excluding board structures and board effectiveness, in third-party 
LBOs. In the model, the level of audit independence (lnnas) and leverage (level) 
are negatively related to takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. These results 
are consistent in all the models in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. This indicates that audit 
independence can improve the quality of accounting information, which may 
make the acquirers bid more effectively and ultimately reduce their payments 
(McNichols and Stubben, 2009). Moreover, as LBOs require a high percentage 
debt, usually of 85%–90%, it will be more difficult for acquirers to issue new 
debt when targets have high leverage, which may reduce the premiums they 
offer (Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Jensen, 1986a; Jensen, 1986b). 
 
Models LO2 to LO8 test the impact of board structures on takeover premiums 
in third-party LBOs with all the possible combinations of board size (sta bsize), 
the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) and CEO duality (dual). Consistent 
with the findings in empirical study 1 (Chapter 2), board structures are not 
significantly correlated with takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. Model LO9 
tests the impact of board effectiveness (sta cscore) on takeover premiums in 
third-party LBOs. The result suggests that there is no significant relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. 
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Table 4.5 The regression approach for moderation analysis: Step 1: the constrained model (an assumption of no interaction 
effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 lo1 lo2 lo3 lo4 lo5 lo6 lo7 lo8 lo9 lo10 lo11 lo12 lo13 lo14 lo15 lo16 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                 
Sta cscore         0.051 0.048 0.067 0.052 0.063 0.048 0.068 0.064 
         (0.646) (0.599) (0.836) (0.641) (0.786) (0.595) (0.833) (0.783) 
Sta bsize  -0.022   -0.027 -0.022  -0.027  -0.016   -0.020 -0.016  -0.020 
  (-0.376)   (-0.466) (-0.371)  (-0.461)  (-0.273)   (-0.345) (-0.268)  (-0.338) 
Sta ned   -0.048  -0.050  -0.049 -0.051   -0.057  -0.058  -0.057 -0.058 
   (-0.745)  (-0.770)  (-0.755) (-0.780)   (-0.847)  (-0.856)  (-0.862) (-0.871) 
dual    -0.019  -0.018 -0.024 -0.024    -0.024  -0.023 -0.032 -0.031 
    (-0.138)  (-0.132) (-0.173) (-0.168)    (-0.170)  (-0.164) (-0.221) (-0.214) 
size -0.051 -0.046 -0.048 -0.051 -0.041 -0.046 -0.048 -0.041 -0.040 -0.036 -0.032 -0.039 -0.028 -0.036 -0.032 -0.028 
 (-1.214) (-0.984) (-1.160) (-1.207) (-0.917) (-0.978) (-1.152) (-0.911) (-0.779) (-0.681) (-0.633) (-0.771) (-0.532) (-0.675) (-0.624) (-0.525) 
roa -1.101 -1.077 -1.165 -1.105 -1.139 -1.081 -1.170 -1.143 -1.146 -1.125 -1.235 -1.151 -1.211 -1.130 -1.242 -1.218 
 (-1.189) (-1.176) (-1.225) (-1.184) (-1.208) (-1.171) (-1.224) (-1.208) (-1.217) (-1.197) (-1.268) (-1.213) (-1.246) (-1.193) (-1.271) (-1.248) 
bown 0.163 0.185 0.109 0.163 0.134 0.185 0.109 0.134 0.193 0.208 0.140 0.194 0.157 0.208 0.140 0.157 
 (0.362) (0.394) (0.236) (0.360) (0.280) (0.392) (0.234) (0.278) (0.421) (0.435) (0.296) (0.419) (0.322) (0.433) (0.294) (0.320) 
lnnas 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 
 (2.829) (2.820) (2.754) (2.806) (2.753) (2.795) (2.730) (2.727) (3.072) (3.050) (3.050) (3.048) (3.032) (3.026) (3.023) (3.004) 
level -0.371* -0.366* -0.355* -0.369* -0.348* -0.364* -0.352* -0.345* -0.383** -0.378* -0.367* -0.381* -0.361* -0.376* -0.364* -0.358* 
 (-1.972) (-1.928) (-1.789) (-1.917) (-1.732) (-1.874) (-1.735) (-1.680) (-2.014) (-1.960) (-1.863) (-1.967) (-1.800) (-1.915) (-1.811) (-1.751) 
fcf 0.812 0.735 0.828 0.815 0.734 0.738 0.831 0.737 0.913 0.849 0.963 0.918 0.884 0.854 0.969 0.891 
 (0.839) (0.790) (0.837) (0.836) (0.773) (0.788) (0.836) (0.772) (0.855) (0.804) (0.878) (0.854) (0.817) (0.803) (0.879) (0.819) 
pe 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.387) (0.387) (0.300) (0.382) (0.298) (0.382) (0.294) (0.293) (0.346) (0.348) (0.221) (0.340) (0.225) (0.342) (0.214) (0.218) 
Constant 0.886 0.776 0.854 0.888 0.717 0.778 0.856 0.720 0.650 0.583 0.539 0.649 0.454 0.584 0.537 0.453 
 (1.234) (0.935) (1.197) (1.227) (0.886) (0.930) (1.191) (0.882) (0.733) (0.610) (0.599) (0.727) (0.475) (0.605) (0.592) (0.470) 
                 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.188 0.189 0.196 0.188 0.197 0.189 0.196 0.198 0.192 0.192 0.202 0.192 0.203 0.193 0.202 0.203 
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F-test 1.895 1.653 1.864 1.672 1.643 1.482 1.911 1.713 1.984 1.763 2.139 1.736 1.923 1.560 2.020 1.822 
Prob>F 0.084 0.127 0.081 0.121 0.121 0.173 0.065 0.097 0.062 0.092 0.038 0.098 0.058 0.139 0.045 0.068 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned 
in year Y−1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y−1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y−1. 
duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-
audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. 
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In addition, Models LO10 to LO16 add board effectiveness and board structures 
to these models. In these, all the possible combinations of board size (sta bsize), 
the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) and CEO duality (dual) are used to 
test the effects of board structures. The results suggest that the main effects of 
board effectiveness and board structures, including board size (sta bsize), the 
proportion of non-executives (sta ned) and CEO duality (dual), do not have 
significant effects on takeover premiums (prem) in third-party LBOs. This is 
consistent with the findings in Models LO2 to LO9. 
 
In Step 2, the interaction terms – the products of board structures and board 
effectiveness, which represent moderating effects – are added to the models. 
Table 4.6 shows the results of unconstrained models (an assumption of 
interaction effects) in third-party LBOs through Models LO17 to LO23. However, 
the results reveal that the coefficients corresponding to board structures and 
board effectiveness (i.e. sta bsize*sta cscore, sta ned*sta cscore and dual*sta 
cscore) are not statistically significant where the p-values are above 0.1. 
Therefore, moderating effects may not exist in third-party LBOs. Hypotheses 
4.1a, 4.2a, 4.3a, 4.4a, 4.5a and 4.6a are clearly rejected. 
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Table 4.6 The regression approach for moderation analysis: Step 2: the 
unconstrained model (an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects 
of board structures, board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
 lo17 lo18 lo19 lo20 lo21 lo22 lo23 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
sta cscore 0.055 0.028 0.061 0.031 0.060 0.028 0.029 
 (0.673) (0.342) (0.739) (0.351) (0.716) (0.338) (0.323) 
sta bsize -0.029   -0.037 -0.029  -0.037 
 (-0.457)   (-0.588) (-0.438)  (-0.573) 
sta ned  -0.056  -0.048  -0.049 -0.044 
  (-0.815)  (-0.697)  (-0.669) (-0.611) 
dual   -0.022  0.004 -0.065 -0.040 
   (-0.155)  (0.029) (-0.420) (-0.252) 
sta bsize *sta 
cscore 
-0.127   -0.100 -0.124  -0.085 
 (-1.269)   (-0.968) (-1.210)  (-0.761) 
sta ned *sta cscore  0.074  0.065  0.107 0.091 
  (0.844)  (0.696)  (0.878) (0.679) 
dual *sta cscore   -0.095  -0.055 -0.163 -0.122 
   (-0.696)  (-0.390) (-0.761) (-0.517) 
size -0.048 -0.038 -0.040 -0.042 -0.047 -0.041 -0.043 
 (-0.884) (-0.770) (-0.765) (-0.802) (-0.866) (-0.822) (-0.802) 
roa -1.040 -1.216 -1.149 -1.106 -1.041 -1.210 -1.109 
 (-1.151) (-1.281) (-1.205) (-1.215) (-1.127) (-1.303) (-1.218) 
bown 0.223 0.108 0.217 0.156 0.236 0.143 0.178 
 (0.462) (0.233) (0.461) (0.320) (0.478) (0.293) (0.352) 
lnnas 0.150*** 0.133*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.131*** 0.139*** 
 (3.252) (2.979) (3.007) (3.091) (3.141) (2.866) (2.868) 
level -0.436** -0.374* -0.344 -0.413** -0.413* -0.310 -0.358* 
 (-2.379) (-1.825) (-1.586) (-2.118) (-1.947) (-1.462) (-1.722) 
fcf 0.692 0.953 0.907 0.720 0.690 0.937 0.721 
 (0.690) (0.878) (0.842) (0.712) (0.677) (0.873) (0.710) 
pe 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.369) (0.135) (0.317) (0.186) (0.349) (0.049) (0.115) 
Constant 0.752 0.664 0.629 0.689 0.738 0.694 0.686 
 (0.782) (0.753) (0.698) (0.726) (0.759) (0.773) (0.713) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
F-test 2.100 1.890 2.870 2.030 2.650 3.370 2.978 
Prob>F 0.037 0.063 0.005 0.036 0.006 0.001 0.002 
R-squared 0.208 0.209 0.194 0.220 0.209 0.214 0.223 
△R-squared 0.016 0.007 0.002 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.02 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums four weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via 
Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion 
of non-executives on the board in year Y−1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm's CEO and chairman 
in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the 
standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. sta bsize *sta cscore: 
interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y−1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of 
standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y−1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO duality and 
standardised cscore in year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets 
in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. 
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Tables 4.7 and 4.8 report the two-step multiple regression approach for 
moderation analysis in MBOs. Table 4.7 shows the results of the constrained 
models in MBOs, where the interaction terms are not added. Model MO1 
reports the results of the impact of other variables, excluding board structures 
and board effectiveness, in MBOs. The results suggest that the level of audit 
independence (lnnas) is negatively related to takeover premiums in MBOs. 
However, this result is not consistent significant when including board size (sta 
bsize) and the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) in the models in Tables 
4.7 and 4.8. This may be because these factors are the extraneous variables 
that might affect the consistency of the effects of audit independence. 
 
Following the approach for third-party LBOs, Models MO2 to MO8 test the 
impact of board structures on takeover premiums in MBOs with all the possible 
combinations of board size (sta bsize), the proportion of non-executives (sta 
ned) and CEO duality (dual). The results suggest that there is no significant 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in MBOs, which 
is consist with the findings in empirical study 1 (Chapter 2). Moreover, the 
finding in Model MO9 suggests that board effectiveness (sta cscore) does not 
significantly impact the level of takeover premiums in MBOs. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
259 
Table 4.7 The regression approach for moderation analysis: Step 1: the constrained model (an assumption of no interaction 
effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 mo1 mo2 mo3 mo4 mo5 mo6 mo7 mo8 mo9 mo10 mo11 mo12 mo13 mo14 mo15 mo16 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                 
Sta cscore         0.033 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
         (1.565) (1.528) (1.541) (1.543) (1.489) (1.524) (1.521) (1.484) 
Sta bsize  0.002   -0.000 0.011  0.009  0.003   0.001 0.011  0.010 
  (0.050)   (-0.009) (0.227)  (0.184)  (0.070)   (0.019) (0.239)  (0.205) 
Sta ned   -0.018  -0.018  -0.011 -0.009   -0.015  -0.015  -0.009 -0.007 
   (-0.627)  (-0.638)  (-0.397) (-0.340)   (-0.542)  (-0.545)  (-0.316) (-0.250) 
dual    0.068  0.074 0.063 0.068    0.066  0.071 0.061 0.067 
    (1.032)  (0.944) (0.987) (0.876)    (0.994)  (0.919) (0.963) (0.867) 
size -0.026 -0.027 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.024 -0.033 -0.033 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.033 -0.028 -0.031 
 (-0.956) (-0.791) (-0.869) (-0.873) (-0.693) (-0.780) (-0.820) (-0.713) (-1.114) (-0.927) (-1.038) (-1.039) (-0.837) (-0.915) (-0.992) (-0.852) 
roa -0.378 -0.377 -0.380 -0.376 -0.380 -0.374 -0.377 -0.376 -0.286 -0.286 -0.292 -0.288 -0.292 -0.286 -0.292 -0.289 
 (-1.424) (-1.397) (-1.425) (-1.387) (-1.395) (-1.354) (-1.389) (-1.350) (-0.986) (-0.961) (-1.004) (-0.980) (-0.974) (-0.953) (-0.989) (-0.952) 
bown 0.074 0.072 0.053 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.067 0.064 0.050 0.070 0.049 0.060 0.060 0.054 
 (0.547) (0.524) (0.374) (0.566) (0.371) (0.488) (0.450) (0.407) (0.492) (0.462) (0.346) (0.512) (0.337) (0.432) (0.420) (0.372) 
lnnas 0.053* 0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 0.053* 0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 
 (1.677) (1.534) (1.636) (1.737) (1.511) (1.558) (1.701) (1.543) (1.687) (1.540) (1.649) (1.742) (1.519) (1.563) (1.711) (1.550) 
level 0.247 0.245 0.248 0.282 0.249 0.277* 0.280 0.276* 0.320* 0.317* 0.318* 0.350* 0.318* 0.345* 0.348* 0.344* 
 (1.514) (1.603) (1.523) (1.626) (1.629) (1.689) (1.614) (1.679) (1.737) (1.840) (1.732) (1.811) (1.842) (1.888) (1.792) (1.863) 
fcf -0.255 -0.254 -0.281 -0.237 -0.281 -0.232 -0.255 -0.247 -0.287 -0.286* -0.309 -0.269 -0.309 -0.263 -0.282 -0.274 
 (-1.483) (-1.506) (-1.434) (-1.375) (-1.469) (-1.367) (-1.305) (-1.303) (-1.644) (-1.672) (-1.561) (-1.542) (-1.601) (-1.548) (-1.443) (-1.454) 
pe -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.671) (-0.645) (-0.598) (-0.667) (-0.583) (-0.624) (-0.619) (-0.592) (-0.620) (-0.594) (-0.561) (-0.619) (-0.544) (-0.577) (-0.582) (-0.554) 
Constant 0.541 0.554 0.496 0.447 0.494 0.503 0.427 0.477 0.612 0.629 0.570 0.518 0.575 0.578 0.501 0.557 
 (1.234) (0.937) (1.161) (1.055) (0.846) (0.889) (1.015) (0.829) (1.336) (1.023) (1.269) (1.174) (0.939) (0.981) (1.137) (0.924) 
                 
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
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R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.140 0.146 0.140 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.146 0.146 0.148 0.154 0.148 0.155 0.155 0.156 
F-test 3.492 3.107 3.003 3.256 2.724 2.962 2.834 2.641 3.576 3.201 3.119 3.341 2.838 3.055 2.953 2.752 
Prob>F 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards 
in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y−1. Sta 
bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore 
in year Y−1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y−1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in 
year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. 
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Moreover, Models MO10 to MO16 test the main effects of board effectiveness 
and board structures with all the possible combinations of board size, the 
proportion of non-executives and CEO duality. The results suggest that board 
effectiveness (sta cscore) and board structures, including board size (sta bsize), 
the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) and CEO duality (dual), do not have 
significant effects on takeover premiums (prem) in the MBO sample. This may 
indicate that the main effects of the primary predictors do not fully characterise 
the relation between board structures, board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in MBOs. Instead, moderating effects are considered to be a 
potential explanation for this relationship. 
 
Table 4.8 (Models MO17 to MO23) reports the unconstrained model, where the 
interaction terms – the products of the board effectiveness and board structure 
(i.e. sta bsize*sta cscore, sta ned*sta score and dual*sta cscore), which 
represent moderating effects – are added to the models. In Model MO17, the 
regression coefficient associated with the interactive effect of board 
effectiveness and board size (stab bsize*sta cscore) is significant at an alpha 
level of 0.1 (𝛼3 = 0.074, 𝑡 = 1.845) (in MBOs, a lower C-score represents high 
levels of board effectiveness). Moreover, Model MO21 tests the moderating 
effects using the product term of board size and board effectiveness (sta 
bsize*sta cscore) as well as the product term of CEO duality and board 
effectiveness (dual*sta cscore). Consistent with the results in Model MO17, the 
coefficient corresponding to the interactive effect of board size and board 
effectiveness (sta bsize*sta cscore) in MBOs is positively significant at the 0.1 
level (𝛼3 = 0.09, 𝑡 = 1.936 ). Furthermore, Model MO23 tests the moderating 
effects using the product term of board size and board effectiveness (sta 
bsize*sta cscore), the proportion of non-executives and board effectiveness 
(sta ned*sta cscore) as well as the product term of CEO duality and board 
effectiveness (dual*sta cscore). Consistent with the findings of Models MO17 
and MO21, the coefficient associated with the interaction of board size and 
board effectiveness (sta bsize*sta cscore) is positively significant at the 0.1 
level (𝛼3 = 0.084, 𝑡 = 1.818).  
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The significant findings suggest that the magnitude of board effectiveness (in 
MBOs, a lower C-score represents a high level of board effectiveness) on the 
level of takeover premiums is negatively influenced by, or moderated by, the 
size of the board (i.e. there is significant moderation). Meanwhile, this could 
also indicate that the effects of board size on takeover premiums are negatively 
influenced by, or moderated by, board effectiveness (in MBOs, a lower C-score 
represents a high level of board effectiveness).16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
16 As the interaction terms cannot clearly differentiate independent variables from moderator variables, 
the significant coefficient of interaction terms may indicate either board structures (board effectiveness) 
are moderators or independent variables. Due to this limitation, this study further tests the moderating 
effects of board structures and board effectiveness using the multi-group approach in SEM, which will be 
discussed in section 4.3.5. 
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Table 4.8 The regression approach for moderation analysis: Step 2: the 
unconstrained model (an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects 
of board structures, board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover 
premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
 mo17 mo18 mo19 mo20 mo21 mo22 mo23 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
sta cscore 0.034* 0.069* 0.035* 0.063 0.038** 0.059 0.050 
 (1.740) (1.736) (1.811) (1.537) (2.090) (1.485) (1.257) 
sta bsize -0.011   -0.009 -0.005  -0.004 
 (-0.295)   (-0.223) (-0.128)  (-
0.099) 
sta ned  -0.001  -0.003  0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.029)  (-0.087)  (0.039) (-
0.014) 
dual   0.013  0.011 0.018 0.014 
   (0.210)  (0.164) (0.295) (0.196) 
sta bsize *sta 
cscore 
0.074*   0.061 0.090*  0.084* 
 (1.845)   (1.634) (1.936)  (1.818) 
sta ned *sta cscore  -0.098  -0.079  -0.065 -0.033 
 
 (-1.210)  (-0.952)  (-0.755) (-
0.388) 
dual *sta cscore   0.292  0.336* 0.248 0.311 
   (1.601)  (1.730) (1.312) (1.573) 
size -0.036 -0.035 -0.037 -0.037 -0.044 -0.038 -0.044 
 (-0.973) (-1.200) (-1.229) (-0.981) (-1.163) (-1.240) (-
1.105) 
roa -0.255 -0.252 -0.188 -0.233 -0.133 -0.179 -0.133 
 (-0.847) (-0.848) (-0.593) (-0.748) (-0.401) (-0.561) (-
0.393) 
bown 0.061 0.050 0.093 0.046 0.083 0.080 0.076 
 (0.434) (0.348) (0.685) (0.311) (0.597) (0.560) (0.518) 
lnnas 0.053 0.053 0.063** 0.052 0.062* 0.061* 0.061* 
 (1.526) (1.643) (2.020) (1.488) (1.862) (1.917) (1.790) 
level 0.327* 0.351* 0.458** 0.351* 0.481** 0.461** 0.480*
* 
 (1.898) (1.856) (2.020) (1.961) (2.229) (2.024) (2.190) 
fcf -0.294 -0.347* -0.263 -0.344* -0.265 -0.302 -0.286 
 (-1.658) (-1.690) (-1.477) (-1.675) (-1.457) (-1.467) (-
1.395) 
pe -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.651) (-0.733) (-0.497) (-0.730) (-0.510) (-0.582) (-
0.547) 
Constant 0.667 0.637 0.548 0.676 0.664 0.569 0.668 
 (1.068) (1.392) (1.217) (1.057) (1.104) (1.241) (1.056) 
        
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
F-test 3.460*** 3.150*** 3.570*** 3.030*** 3.320*** 3.000*** 2.848 
Prob>F 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.167 0.161 0.180 0.171 0.181 
△R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.025 0.016 0.025 
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Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums four weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated 
via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the 
proportion of non-executives on the board in year Y−1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm's 
CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year 
Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. sta bsize 
*sta cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y−1. sta ned *sta cscore: 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y−1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year 
Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided 
by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. 
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For a direct and visual presentation of the moderating effect, following the 
suggestion of Aiken et al. (1991), a simple slope analysis is conducted to aid 
the interpretation of the interaction effects. Figure 4.7 illustrates that MBO firms 
with smaller boards tend to achieve higher takeover premiums, both for 
effective and comparatively ineffective boards, with the premiums achieved by 
more effective boards being noticeably higher. In particular, takeover premiums 
for firms with medium-sized boards are noticeably lower than for firms with 
smaller boards, and, as above, lower board effectiveness also tends to lead to 
lower takeover premiums. However, for large boards, less effective boards 
actually lead to higher takeover premiums. This counterintuitive finding may be 
related to communication problems and greater divergence of interests in larger, 
ineffective boards, where the delay in making a decision might increase the 
pressure on bidders to increase the value of their offer in order to expedite the 
decision making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Lehn et al., 2009). In 
contrast, board size appears to affect the work of more effective boards very 
negatively, which may suggest that the communication problems associated 
with large boards may inhibit the collaboration and decision-making ability of 
boards with otherwise effective directors. This means that a comparatively 
quick decision-making process may be at the expense of constructive 
discussion and protracted negotiations, which might otherwise incentivise 
bidders to increase their offer price (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996; 
Harris and Raviv, 2008). 
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Figure 4.7 Board size and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in MBO deals: takeover premiums across board size  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
 
 
High C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High Bsize: is the 67th to the maximum of board size. 
Medium Bsize: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of board size. 
Low Bsize: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of board size. 
 
Figure 4.8 illustrates that, in MBOs, boards with high effectiveness (low C-score) 
the takeover premium tends to deteriorate with increasing board size. Similarly, 
for comparatively less effective boards, an increase in board size initially 
reduces the takeover premium achieved even further, as board size increases 
from small to medium size. However, when boards are particularly large, the 
takeover premium for firms with less effective boards increases noticeably, 
even above the premium paid to MBO firms with small effective boards. As 
indicated above, one potential reason for this counterintuitive finding may be 
that communication problems and greater divergence of interests in larger, 
ineffective boards, may delay decision making. Thereby, this may inadvertently 
increase the pressure on bidders to increase the value of their offer in order to 
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expedite the decision making, given the time limits imposed on takeover offers 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Lehn et al., 2009). This may imply that 
low levels of board effectiveness are associated with poor board monitoring and 
control, which may deteriorate the benefits of easy communication and 
coordination taking by smaller boards (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998). Therefore, levels of board effectiveness can facilitate or hamper 
shareholder wealth. 
 
Figure 4.8 Board size and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in MBO deals – takeover premiums across the levels of board 
effectiveness  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
 
High C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High Bsize: is the 67th to the maximum of board size. 
Medium Bsize: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of board size. 
Low Bsize: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of board size. 
 
However, the findings suggest that the results are inconsistent. Model MO20 
finds that there is no moderating effect where the coefficient associated with 
the interaction term of board size and board effectiveness (sta bsize*sta cscore) 
is not significant at conventional significance levels. This is because the models 
may suffer from omitted variable bias or might include extraneous variables. 
Omitted variable bias occurs when a model excludes one or more important 
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factors, which leads to the regression model being underspecified. Technically, 
the expected values of partial regression coefficients may be affected by the 
omitted variables, which may lead to an inaccurate estimation of the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables (Hsiao, 2003; 
Mukherjee et al., 2013; Lewis, 2012). Moreover, the inclusion of extraneous 
variables indicates that the model controls for additional extraneous noise or 
junk variables. Indeed, the inclusion of extraneous variables cannot improve 
data analysis results, but can significantly degrade them (Pearson, 2005; 
Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 2013). The value of R-squared is the statistical 
measure of how close the data are fitted to the regression model. In general, 
the higher R-squared, the better the model may fit the observations. Low R-
squared values would indicate that the dependent variables are not well 
explained by their predictors (Mora, 2012). The value of R-squared for Model 
MO20 is 0.161, which is lower than in Models MO21 (0.18) and MO23 (0.181). 
This indicates that the results in Models MO21 and MO23 might be slightly more 
reliable than MO20. 
 
In addition, Model MO21 finds that the regression coefficient associate with the 
interaction term of CEO duality and board effectiveness (dual*sta cscore)17 is 
significant at the 0.1 level (𝛼3 = 0.336, 𝑡 = 1.73). This finding may suggest that 
the relation between board effectiveness (in MBOs, a lower C-score represents 
a high level of board effectiveness) and takeover premiums is negatively 
influenced by, or moderated by, CEO duality. Therefore, this is consistent with 
hypothesis 4.3b, that, in MBOs, high levels of board effectiveness (a low C-
score) have a greater positive impact on shareholder wealth gains, which may 
result in higher takeover premiums, when firms have a separate CEO and 
chairman, rather than the CEO also being the chairman. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows a plot of the interaction for CEO duality and board 
effectiveness (dual*sta cscore) and illustrates that MBO firms without CEO 
                                                             
17 As the interaction terms cannot clearly differentiate independent variables from moderator variables, 
the significant coefficient of interaction terms may indicate that board structures (board effectiveness) are 
either moderators or independent variables. Due to this limitation, this study further tests the moderating 
effects of board structures and board effectiveness using the multi-group approach in SEM, which will be 
discussed in section 4.3.5. 
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duality tend to achieve higher takeover premiums with an effective board than 
with an ineffective one. Takeover premiums for firms with CEO duality are 
noticeably lower than those without it under high levels of board effectiveness 
(low C-score). However, it is surprising that CEOs with duality demonstrate 
higher takeover premiums relative to those firms that have separate positions 
for the CEO and the chairman under low levels of board effectiveness (high C-
score). This might be related to the fact that, in ineffective boards, duality 
provides the CEO with more concentrated power on the board and a strong 
desire to accomplish an MBO quickly, where a strong competitive advantage 
might be at the expense of a higher offer price (Cornforth, 2001; Elsaid and 
Davidson, 2009; Kim et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 4.9 CEO duality and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in MBO deals – takeover premiums across CEO duality  
 (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) 
 
High C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Not Duality: represents the separate position of CEO and chairman. 
CEO Duality: represents that firm’s CEO and chairman is the same person. 
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Furthermore, this result could indicate that the effect of CEO duality on takeover 
premiums is negatively influenced by, or moderated by, board effectiveness (in 
MBOs, a lower C-score represents a high level of board effectiveness). 
 
Figure 4.10 illustrates that the takeover premiums achieved for MBO firms 
without CEO duality are similar both for more and less effective boards. This 
may indicate that in companies whose boards are not characterised by CEO 
duality, board effectiveness appears to have little influence on takeover 
premiums. When CEO duality exists in more effective boards, MBO firms 
appear to have lower takeover premiums, since this is in the interests of the 
managers but not the shareholders. However, surprisingly, under CEO duality, 
MBO firms with high board effectiveness (a low C-score) tend to receive lower 
takeover premiums than firms with low board effectiveness (a high C-score). As 
indicated above, one potential reason for this counterintuitive finding might be 
that, in ineffective boards, the powerful CEO tends to have a strong desire to 
accomplish the MBOs quickly, and may incentivise bidders to increase their 
offer price (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Cornforth, 2001; Elsaid 
and Davidson, 2009; Kim et al., 2009). Thus, the results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 4.6b, that, in MBOs, CEO duality has a greater negative impact on 
takeover premiums when the board is characterised by comparatively higher 
levels of effectiveness.  
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Figure 4.10 CEO duality and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in MBO deals – takeover premiums across the levels of board 
effectiveness  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
 
High C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Not Duality: represents the separate position of CEO and chairman. 
CEO Duality: represents that firm’s CEO and chairman is the same person. 
 
However, the findings are rather inconsistent. In Models MO19 and MO22, the 
research finds that the interaction term of CEO duality and board effectiveness 
(dual*sta cscore) is not statistically significant at conventional significance 
levels. As discussed earlier, this inconsistent result may be related to the 
problem that the models might suffer from omitted variable bias or the inclusion 
of extraneous variables. Omitted variable bias indicates that the model has 
excluded important factors which may lead to an inaccurate estimation of the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables (Hsiao, 2003; 
Mukherjee et al., 2013; Lewis, 2012). Moreover, there is a risk of the presence 
of extraneous variables – in particular, confounding extraneous variables – 
which increases error variance and could result in the incorrect estimation of 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Pearson, 
2005; Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 2013). As companies allocated to third party 
LBOs and MBOs are not randomly assigned, but potentially targeted due to the 
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quality of their board and management (as e.g. evidenced in their 
undervaluation), it is impossible to take account of this problem 
methodologically within the sample available. While all models might be 
affected by problems related to omitted variable bias and extraneous variables, 
the impact of the problems is expected to vary depending on the model 
configuration. Mora (2012) suggests that higher R-squared values would 
indicate that the dependent variables are better explained by its predictors. The 
study finds that the R-squared values in MO19 (0.167) and MO22 (0.171) are 
lower than in MO21 (0.18). This implies that the results in Model MO21 may be 
slightly more reliable than MO19 and MO22. 
 
Also, Models MO18, MO20, MO22 and MO23 test for moderating effects, 
including the product term of the proportion of non-executives and board 
effectiveness (sta ned*sta cscore). However, the findings suggest that the 
hypotheses do not hold, as there are insignificant coefficients corresponding to 
the interactive effects of this term. 
 
During the analysis, it is found that the R-squares of the models are range from 
0.19 to 0.22 in third-party LBOs and from 0.14 to 0.18 in MBOs. These are 
expected to be at an acceptable range. Previous study Bange and Mazzeo 
(2004) examine the relationship between board characteristics and takeover 
premiums and report that the adjusted R-squares are range from 0.032 to 0.04. 
Kroll et al. (2008) explore the association between the interaction effects of 
corporate governance and board experience with acquisition performance, and 
report the adjusted R-squares are range from 0.39 and 0.45. 
 
4.3.3.2 Mediation analysis 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 report the results of mediation analysis in third-party LBOs 
using the multiple regression approach. Specifically, Table 4.9 reports the 
analysis of the mediating effects of board effectiveness on the relationship 
between board structures and takeover premiums (BS→BE→premiums) in 
third-party LBOs. Following the approach of Baron and Kenny (1986), three 
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criteria need to be satisfied in order to determine a mediator. First (Step 1), 
board structures are required to have a significant relationship with takeover 
premiums (BS→premiums). However, the results suggest that board structures, 
including board size (sta bsize), the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) and 
CEO duality (dual), are not significantly correlated to takeover premiums in 
third-party LBOs (see Model LE1 to LE7). As discussed in the methodology, 
although the research frequently requires that there is a significant direct 
association between an independent variable and outcome variables, previous 
studies by Kenny et al. (1998), Shrout and Bolger (2002), Kenny (2008) and 
Zhao et al. (2010) argue that the first step should be skipped. They suggest that 
the opposite signs of direct and indirect effects may mean there is still mediation, 
despite the fact that the requirements of Step 1 are not met.  
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Table 4.9 The regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between 
board structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals:  
LE1–LE7 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums); LE8–LE14 test the effects of board 
structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE); LE15-LE21 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, 
BE→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BS→ premiums Step 2: BS→ BE Step 3: BS, BE→ premiums 
 Le1 Le2 Le3 Le4 Le5 Le6 Le7 Le8 Le9 Le10 Le11 Le12 Le13 Le14 Le15 Le16 Le17 Le18 Le19 Le20 Le21 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta bsize -0.022   -0.027 -0.022  -0.027 -0.015   0.000 -0.015  0.001 -0.016   -0.020 -0.016  -0.020 
 (-0.376)   (-0.466) (-0.371)  (-0.461) (-0.172)   (0.005) (-0.167)  (0.010) (-0.273)   (-0.345) (-0.268)  (-0.338) 
Sta ned  -0.048  -0.050  -0.049 -0.051  0.138**  0.138**  0.140** 0.140**  -0.057  -0.058  -0.057 -0.058 
  (-0.745)  (-0.770)  (-0.755) (-0.780)  (2.153)  (2.161)  (2.134) (2.139)  (-0.847)  (-0.856)  (-0.862) (-0.871) 
dual   -0.019  -0.018 -0.024 -0.024   0.106  0.106 0.118 0.118   -0.024  -0.023 -0.032 -0.031 
   (-0.138)  (-0.132) (-0.173) (-0.168)   (0.397)  (0.393) (0.475) (0.472)   (-0.170)  (-0.164) (-0.221) (-0.214) 
Sta cscore               0.048 0.067 0.052 0.063 0.048 0.068 0.064 
               (0.599) (0.836) (0.641) (0.786) (0.595) (0.833) (0.783) 
size -0.046 -0.048 -0.051 -0.041 -0.046 -0.048 -0.041 -
0.256*** 
-
0.263*** 
-
0.261*** 
-
0.263*** 
-
0.256*** 
-
0.263*** 
-
0.263*** 
-0.036 -0.032 -0.039 -0.028 -0.036 -0.032 -0.028 
 (-0.984) (-1.160) (-1.207) (-0.917) (-0.978) (-1.152) (-0.911) (-4.213) (-5.812) (-5.545) (-4.373) (-4.163) (-5.758) (-4.322) (-0.681) (-0.633) (-0.771) (-0.532) (-0.675) (-0.624) (-0.525) 
roa -1.077 -1.165 -1.105 -1.139 -1.081 -1.170 -1.143 -0.109 0.053 -0.094 0.053 -0.100 0.064 0.065 -1.125 -1.235 -1.151 -1.211 -1.130 -1.242 -1.218 
 (-1.176) (-1.225) (-1.184) (-1.208) (-1.171) (-1.224) (-1.208) (-0.113) (0.053) (-0.094) (0.055) (-0.102) (0.064) (0.066) (-1.197) (-1.268) (-1.213) (-1.246) (-1.193) (-1.271) (-1.248) 
bown 0.185 0.109 0.163 0.134 0.185 0.109 0.134 -0.354 -0.229 -0.375 -0.230 -0.355 -0.229 -0.230 0.208 0.140 0.194 0.157 0.208 0.140 0.157 
 (0.394) (0.236) (0.360) (0.280) (0.392) (0.234) (0.278) (-0.710) (-0.447) (-0.714) (-0.473) (-0.716) (-0.449) (-0.477) (0.435) (0.296) (0.419) (0.322) (0.433) (0.294) (0.320) 
lnnas 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.129***        0.140*** 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 
 (2.820) (2.754) (2.806) (2.753) (2.795) (2.730) (2.727)        (3.050) (3.050) (3.048) (3.032) (3.026) (3.023) (3.004) 
level -0.366* -0.355* -0.369* -0.348* -0.364* -0.352* -0.345*        -0.378* -0.367* -0.381* -0.361* -0.376* -0.364* -0.358* 
 (-1.928) (-1.789) (-1.917) (-1.732) (-1.874) (-1.735) (-1.680)        (-1.960) (-1.863) (-1.967) (-1.800) (-1.915) (-1.811) (-1.751) 
fcf 0.735 0.828 0.815 0.734 0.738 0.831 0.737        0.849 0.963 0.918 0.884 0.854 0.969 0.891 
 (0.790) (0.837) (0.836) (0.773) (0.788) (0.836) (0.772)        (0.804) (0.878) (0.854) (0.817) (0.803) (0.879) (0.819) 
pe 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.387) (0.300) (0.382) (0.298) (0.382) (0.294) (0.293)        (0.348) (0.221) (0.340) (0.225) (0.342) (0.214) (0.218) 
big4        0.083 0.071 0.092 0.071 0.083 0.071 0.071        
        (0.369) (0.372) (0.452) (0.326) (0.361) (0.363) (0.319)        
ceoch        -0.255 -0.305 -0.271 -0.305 -0.264 -0.315 -0.315        
        (-0.454) (-0.564) (-0.491) (-0.570) (-0.483) (-0.598) (-0.606)        
sg        -0.011 -0.019 -0.008 -0.019 -0.008 -0.016 -0.016        
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        (-0.182) (-0.312) (-0.125) (-0.310) (-0.123) (-0.245) (-0.243)        
Constant 0.776 0.854 0.888 0.717 0.778 0.856 0.720 4.722*** 4.842*** 4.799*** 4.844*** 4.711*** 4.827*** 4.832*** 0.583 0.539 0.649 0.454 0.584 0.537 0.453 
 (0.935) (1.197) (1.227) (0.886) (0.930) (1.191) (0.882) (4.390) (5.888) (5.495) (4.616) (4.317) (5.802) (4.540) (0.610) (0.599) (0.727) (0.475) (0.605) (0.592) (0.470) 
                      
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.189 0.196 0.188 0.197 0.189 0.196 0.198 0.317 0.343 0.319 0.343 0.319 0.345 0.345 0.192 0.202 0.192 0.203 0.193 0.202 0.203 
F-test 1.653 1.864 1.672 1.643 1.482 1.911 1.713 7.898 9.303 7.908 8.169 6.985 8.266 7.340 1.763 2.139 1.736 1.923 1.560 2.020 1.822 
Prob>F 0.127 0.081 0.121 0.121 0.173 0.065 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.038 0.098 0.058 0.139 0.045 0.068 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), 
which is calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy 
variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year 
Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. 
Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four 
audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Second (Step 2), this study examines the relationship between board structures 
and board effectiveness in third-party LBOs (BS→BE). In Models LE8 to LE14, 
the results suggest that the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) is 
significantly positively related to board effectiveness, but board size (sta bsize) 
and CEO duality (dual) are not significantly correlated with board effectiveness 
in third-party LBOs (a high C-score indicates a high level of board effectiveness 
in third-party LBOs). The significant results indicate that a high proportion of 
non-executive directors can enhance board independence, monitoring and 
control, which benefit the effectiveness of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Cotter et al., 1997).  
 
Third (Step 3), the study investigates the relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBOs (BS, BE→premiums). 
However, the findings suggest that there is no significant relationship between 
board effectiveness (sta cscore) and takeover premiums (prem) in third-party 
LBOs. Therefore, this may indicate that there are no mediating effects of board 
effectiveness in the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBOs. Hypotheses 4.7a, 4.8a and 4.9a are therefore 
rejected. 
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Table 4.10 The regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between 
board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals:  
LE22 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums); LE23–LE25 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS); LE26–LE32 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: 
BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step 3: BE, BS→ premiums 
 Le22 Le23 Le24 Le25 Le26 Le27 Le28 Le29 Le30 Le31 Le32 
Variables prem Sta bsize Sta ned dual prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
            
Sta cscore 0.051 -0.025 0.277** 0.027 0.048 0.067 0.052 0.063 0.048 0.068 0.064 
 (0.646) (-0.174) (2.314) (0.407) (0.599) (0.836) (0.641) (0.786) (0.595) (0.833) (0.783) 
Sta bsize     -0.016   -0.020 -0.016  -0.020 
     (-0.273)   (-0.345) (-0.268)  (-0.338) 
Sta ned      -0.057  -0.058  -0.057 -0.058 
      (-0.847)  (-0.856)  (-0.862) (-0.871) 
dual       -0.024  -0.023 -0.032 -0.031 
       (-0.170)  (-0.164) (-0.221) (-0.214) 
size -0.040 0.328*** 0.085 0.006 -0.036 -0.032 -0.039 -0.028 -0.036 -0.032 -0.028 
 (-0.779) (4.391) (1.041) (0.201) (-0.681) (-0.633) (-0.771) (-0.532) (-0.675) (-0.624) (-0.525) 
roa -1.146 -0.389 -1.097 -0.084 -1.125 -1.235 -1.151 -1.211 -1.130 -1.242 -1.218 
 (-1.217) (-0.479) (-1.431) (-0.251) (-1.197) (-1.268) (-1.213) (-1.246) (-1.193) (-1.271) (-1.248) 
bown 0.193 1.300* -0.941 0.020 0.208 0.140 0.194 0.157 0.208 0.140 0.157 
 (0.421) (1.766) (-1.062) (0.078) (0.435) (0.296) (0.419) (0.322) (0.433) (0.294) (0.320) 
lnnas 0.140***    0.140*** 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.136*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 
 (3.072)    (3.050) (3.050) (3.048) (3.032) (3.026) (3.023) (3.004) 
level -0.383**    -0.378* -0.367* -0.381* -0.361* -0.376* -0.364* -0.358* 
 (-2.014)    (-1.960) (-1.863) (-1.967) (-1.800) (-1.915) (-1.811) (-1.751) 
fcf 0.913    0.849 0.963 0.918 0.884 0.854 0.969 0.891 
 (0.855)    (0.804) (0.878) (0.854) (0.817) (0.803) (0.879) (0.819) 
pe 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.346)    (0.348) (0.221) (0.340) (0.225) (0.342) (0.214) (0.218) 
big4  -0.574* 0.124 -0.001        
  (-1.669) (0.432) (-0.007)        
ceoch  0.454* 0.380 0.087        
  (1.929) (1.347) (0.433)        
sg  -0.001 0.064 -0.029        
  (-0.010) (0.657) (-1.287)        
Constant 0.650 -5.758*** -1.548 -0.005 0.583 0.539 0.649 0.454 0.584 0.537 0.453 
 (0.733) (-4.276) (-0.996) (-0.009) (0.610) (0.599) (0.727) (0.475) (0.605) (0.592) (0.470) 
            
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.192 0.278 0.128 0.017 0.192 0.202 0.192 0.203 0.193 0.202 0.203 
F-test 1.984 4.931 2.134 0.468 1.763 2.139 1.736 1.923 1.560 2.020 1.822 
Prob>F 0.062 0.000 0.051 0.855 0.092 0.038 0.098 0.058 0.139 0.045 0.068 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on 
boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year 
Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings 
ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 
in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
 
Chapter 4 
279 
In addition, Table 4.10 reports the analysis of mediating effects of board 
structures in the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBOs. According to the approach of Baron and Kenny 
(1986), the research examines the relationship between board effectiveness 
and takeover premiums (BE→premiums), the relationship between board 
effectiveness and board structures (BE→BS) and the relationship between 
board structures and takeover premiums (BE, BS→premiums) separately. The 
results show that there is no significant relationship between board 
effectiveness (sta cscore) (high C-score indicates high levels of board 
effectiveness in third-party LBOs) and takeover premiums (prem) in third-party 
LBOs. Moreover, the research finds that board effectiveness (sta cscore) is 
significantly positively related to the proportion of non-executives (sta ned), but 
there are no significant relationships between board effectiveness, board size 
(sta bsize) and CEO duality (dual) in third-party LBOs. This may indicate that 
an effective board would prefer to put more non-executives on the board as this 
may enhance their monitoring and control of management (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). Furthermore, the results suggest that there is no significant 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no mediating effects of board 
structures in the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBOs. Hypotheses 4.10a, 4.11a and 4.12a are 
therefore rejected. 
 
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 report the results for the multiple regression approach of 
mediation analysis in the MBO sample. Table 4.11 examines the mediating 
effects of board effectiveness in the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums (BS→BE→premiums) in MBOs. Following the approach of 
Baron and Kenny (1986), this research first examines the relationship between 
board structures and takeover premiums (BS→premiums). As the results show 
in Table 4.11, board structures, including board size, the proportion of non-
executives and CEO duality are not significantly related to takeover premiums 
in MBOs.  
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Table 4.11 The regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between 
board structure and takeover premiums in MBO deals:  
ME1–ME7 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums); ME8–ME14 test the effects of board 
structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE); ME15-ME21 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
(BS, BE→ premiums) (in the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BS→ premiums Step 2: BS→ BE Step 3: BS, BE→ premiums 
 Me1 Me2 Me3 Me4 Me5 Me6 Me7 Me8 Me9 Me10 Me11 Me12 Me13 Me14 Me15 Me16 Me17 Me18 Me19 Me20 Me21 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta bsize 0.002   -0.000 0.011  0.009 -0.046   -0.053 -0.033  -0.042 0.003   0.001 0.011  0.010 
 (0.050)   (-0.009) (0.227)  (0.184) (-1.225)   (-1.455) (-0.842)  (-1.086) (0.070)   (0.019) (0.239)  (0.205) 
Sta ned  -0.018  -0.018  -0.011 -0.009  -0.040  -0.047*  -0.031 -0.039  -0.015  -0.015  -0.009 -0.007 
  (-0.627)  (-0.638)  (-0.397) (-0.340)  (-1.479)  (-1.834)  (-1.125) (-1.497)  (-0.542)  (-0.545)  (-0.316) (-0.250) 
dual   0.068  0.074 0.063 0.068   0.114*  0.093 0.101 0.070   0.066  0.071 0.061 0.067 
   (1.032)  (0.944) (0.987) (0.876)   (1.821)  (1.382) (1.572) (1.029)   (0.994)  (0.919) (0.963) (0.867) 
Sta cscore               0.033 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
               (1.528) (1.541) (1.543) (1.489) (1.524) (1.521) (1.484) 
size -0.027 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.024 -0.005 -0.015 -0.014 0.005 -0.003 -0.010 0.005 -0.033 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.033 -0.028 -0.031 
 (-0.791) (-0.869) (-0.873) (-0.693) (-0.780) (-0.820) (-0.713) (-0.168) (-0.501) (-0.470) (0.182) (-0.102) (-0.318) (0.181) (-0.927) (-1.038) (-1.039) (-0.837) (-0.915) (-0.992) (-0.852) 
roa -0.377 -0.380 -0.376 -0.380 -0.374 -0.377 -0.376 -0.565** -0.585** -0.549** -0.604*** -0.558** -0.574** -0.593** -0.286 -0.292 -0.288 -0.292 -0.286 -0.292 -0.289 
 (-1.397) (-1.425) (-1.387) (-1.395) (-1.354) (-1.389) (-1.350) (-2.532) (-2.597) (-2.314) (-2.649) (-2.366) (-2.417) (-2.513) (-0.961) (-1.004) (-0.980) (-0.974) (-0.953) (-0.989) (-0.952) 
bown 0.072 0.053 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.143 0.091 0.119 0.104 0.132 0.092 0.102 0.064 0.050 0.070 0.049 0.060 0.060 0.054 
 (0.524) (0.374) (0.566) (0.371) (0.488) (0.450) (0.407) (0.880) (0.602) (0.775) (0.667) (0.834) (0.615) (0.662) (0.462) (0.346) (0.512) (0.337) (0.432) (0.420) (0.372) 
lnnas 0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053        0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 
 (1.534) (1.636) (1.737) (1.511) (1.558) (1.701) (1.543)        (1.540) (1.649) (1.742) (1.519) (1.563) (1.711) (1.550) 
level 0.245 0.248 0.282 0.249 0.277* 0.280 0.276*        0.317* 0.318* 0.350* 0.318* 0.345* 0.348* 0.344* 
 (1.603) (1.523) (1.626) (1.629) (1.689) (1.614) (1.679)        (1.840) (1.732) (1.811) (1.842) (1.888) (1.792) (1.863) 
fcf -0.254 -0.281 -0.237 -0.281 -0.232 -0.255 -0.247        -0.286* -0.309 -0.269 -0.309 -0.263 -0.282 -0.274 
 (-1.506) (-1.434) (-1.375) (-1.469) (-1.367) (-1.305) (-1.303)        (-1.672) (-1.561) (-1.542) (-1.601) (-1.548) (-1.443) (-1.454) 
pe -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001        -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.645) (-0.598) (-0.667) (-0.583) (-0.624) (-0.619) (-0.592)        (-0.594) (-0.561) (-0.619) (-0.544) (-0.577) (-0.582) (-0.554) 
big4        0.113 0.116 0.105 0.114 0.105 0.107 0.108        
        (1.362) (1.346) (1.240) (1.364) (1.259) (1.257) (1.283)        
ceoch        0.058 0.079 0.086 0.090 0.083 0.103 0.104        
        (0.610) (0.783) (0.842) (0.935) (0.853) (1.000) (1.064)        
sg        0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003        
        (0.074) (-0.344) (-0.844) (0.012) (-0.453) (-0.841) (-0.365)        
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Constant 0.554 0.496 0.447 0.494 0.503 0.427 0.477 0.127 0.320 0.258 -0.048 0.071 0.193 -0.062 0.629 0.570 0.518 0.575 0.578 0.501 0.557 
 (0.937) (1.161) (1.055) (0.846) (0.889) (1.015) (0.829) (0.252) (0.619) (0.524) (-0.094) (0.146) (0.379) (-0.123) (1.023) (1.269) (1.174) (0.939) (0.981) (1.137) (0.924) 
                      
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.137 0.140 0.146 0.140 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.117 0.114 0.123 0.137 0.132 0.131 0.144 0.146 0.148 0.154 0.148 0.155 0.155 0.156 
F-test 3.107 3.003 3.256 2.724 2.962 2.834 2.641 1.761 2.036 2.149 1.805 1.785 1.986 1.719 3.201 3.119 3.341 2.838 3.055 2.953 2.752 
Prob>F 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.104 0.058 0.045 0.085 0.089 0.056 0.095 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), 
which is calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy 
variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year 
Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year 
Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or 
four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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In the second step, this research tests the effects of board structures on board 
effectiveness (BS→BE) and finds that the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) 
is significantly positively related to board effectiveness (sta cscore) in MBOs 
(where a low C-score indicates a high level of board effectiveness). This 
confirms the argument by Fama and Jensen (1983), Baysinger and Butler 
(1985), Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) and Cotter et al. (1997) that a high 
percentage of non-executives on the board can increase the directors’ 
independence and objectivity in decision-making that benefits the board’s ability 
to monitor. Moreover, the findings suggest that CEO duality (dual) is 
significantly negatively related to board effectiveness (sta cscore) in MBOs, 
where a low C-score indicates a high level of board effectiveness. This is 
consistent with the argument that duality hampers the ability of the board to 
monitor opportunistic behaviours of management effectively (Cornforth, 2001; 
Elsaid and Davidson, 2009; Kim et al., 2009). However, the results are 
inconsistent. As discussed before, this may be because the models may suffer 
from omitted variable bias or the inclusion of extraneous variables.  
 
Moving to the next step (BS, BE→premiums), the result also suggests that 
board effectiveness (sta cscore) is not significantly correlated to takeover 
premiums in MBOs. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no mediating 
effects of board effectiveness in the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in MBOs. Hypotheses 4.7b, 4.8b and 4.9b are therefore 
rejected. 
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Table 4.12 The regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structure on the relationship between 
board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBO deals:  
ME22 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums); ME23-ME25 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS); ME26-ME32 tests the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (in the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step 3: BE, BS→ premiums 
 Me22 Me23 Me24 Me25 Me26 Me27 Me28 Me29 Me30 Me31 Me32 
Variables prem Sta bsize Sta ned dual prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
            
Sta cscore 0.033 -0.430 -0.393 0.230* 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 (1.565) (-1.391) (-1.419) (1.801) (1.528) (1.541) (1.543) (1.489) (1.524) (1.521) (1.484) 
Sta bsize     0.003   0.001 0.011  0.010 
     (0.070)   (0.019) (0.239)  (0.205) 
Sta ned      -0.015  -0.015  -0.009 -0.007 
      (-0.542)  (-0.545)  (-0.316) (-0.250) 
dual       0.066  0.071 0.061 0.067 
       (0.994)  (0.919) (0.963) (0.867) 
Size -0.033 0.361*** 0.154 -0.067 -0.033 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.033 -0.028 -0.031 
 (-1.114) (3.753) (1.442) (-1.407) (-0.927) (-1.038) (-1.039) (-0.837) (-0.915) (-0.992) (-0.852) 
roa -0.286 -0.492 -1.011 0.092 -0.286 -0.292 -0.288 -0.292 -0.286 -0.292 -0.289 
 (-0.986) (-0.666) (-0.929) (0.243) (-0.961) (-1.004) (-0.980) (-0.974) (-0.953) (-0.989) (-0.952) 
bown 0.067 0.423 -0.842 0.037 0.064 0.050 0.070 0.049 0.060 0.060 0.054 
 (0.492) (0.764) (-1.304) (0.169) (0.462) (0.346) (0.512) (0.337) (0.432) (0.420) (0.372) 
lnnas 0.053*    0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 
 (1.687)    (1.540) (1.649) (1.742) (1.519) (1.563) (1.711) (1.550) 
level 0.320*    0.317* 0.318* 0.350* 0.318* 0.345* 0.348* 0.344* 
 (1.737)    (1.840) (1.732) (1.811) (1.842) (1.888) (1.792) (1.863) 
fcf -0.287    -0.286* -0.309 -0.269 -0.309 -0.263 -0.282 -0.274 
 (-1.644)    (-1.672) (-1.561) (-1.542) (-1.601) (-1.548) (-1.443) (-1.454) 
pe -0.001    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.620)    (-0.594) (-0.561) (-0.619) (-0.544) (-0.577) (-0.582) (-0.554) 
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big4  0.010 0.079 0.060        
  (0.056) (0.330) (0.609)        
ceoch  0.136 0.685** -0.299***        
  (0.413) (2.049) (-4.659)        
sg  0.050 -0.018 0.043***        
  (1.401) (-0.641) (3.460)        
Constant 0.612 -6.428*** -2.582 1.410 0.629 0.570 0.518 0.575 0.578 0.501 0.557 
 (1.336) (-3.724) (-1.301) (1.650) (1.023) (1.269) (1.174) (0.939) (0.981) (1.137) (0.924) 
            
Observations 106 105 105 105 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.146 0.205 0.160 0.126 0.146 0.148 0.154 0.148 0.155 0.155 0.156 
F-test 3.576 4.750 2.834 5.735 3.201 3.119 3.341 2.838 3.055 2.953 2.752 
Prob>F 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on 
boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year 
Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings 
ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 
in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.12 reports the results of mediating effects of board structures in the 
relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums 
(BE→BS→premiums) in MBOs. Following the approach of Baron and Kenny 
(1986), it is found that board effectiveness is not significantly correlated to 
takeover premiums in MBOs (BE→premiums). Moreover, the research finds 
that board effectiveness (sta cscore) (low C-score indicates high levels of board 
effectiveness in MBOs) is significantly negatively associated with CEO duality 
(dual), while not significantly related to board size (sta bsize) and the proportion 
of non-executives (sta ned) in MBOs (BE→BS). The significant result may 
indicate that an effective board would prefer to separate the position of CEO 
and chairman, as duality may hamper their monitoring and control of 
management (Arthur, 2001). Furthermore, the results find that board structures 
are not significantly related to takeover premiums (BE, BS→premiums). 
Therefore, Hypotheses 4.10b, 4.11b and 4.12b are rejected, and there are no 
mediating effects of board structures in the relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs. 
 
In the mediation analysis, the R-squares are range from 0.02 to 0.35 in third-
party LBOs and 0.12 to 0.2 in MBOs, which are expected to be at an acceptable 
level. Although the previous research does not really test the mediating effects, 
there are many studies focus on examining the influence of board structures 
and board effectiveness on shareholder wealth. For example, Kroll et al. (2008) 
examine the influence of board expertise on performance outcomes and report 
that the R-square is 0.3. Jackling and Johl (2009) investigate the relationship 
between board characteristics and financial performance and find that the R-
squares are range from 0.19 to 0.39. Hashim and Abdul Rahman (2011) report 
that the adjusted R-square is 0.81 in examining the effects of board composition, 
board diligence and expertise on audit report lag.  
 
4.3.4 Endogeneity tests 
Multiple regression analysis is subject to a potential endogeneity bias, since 
board structures can influence board effectiveness, and, in turn, can also be 
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influenced by board effectiveness. Similar to prior studies (e.g. Abdallah et al., 
2015), this research uses a 2SLS regression model as the solution for 
endogeneity.  
 
Tables 4.38 to 4.40 of the Appendix report the results of endogeneity tests for 
moderation and mediation analysis in 2SLS. In the tables, the Hausman test is 
used to check for the endogeneity where the null hypothesis is rejected when 
p-values are less than 0.05; then, endogeneity arises (Diamond and Tolley, 
2013; Baum, 2006; Adkins and Hill, 2011).  
 
Moreover, in the tables, the validity of the instrumental variables is tested. The 
F-statistic for joint significance of these variables in the first-stage regression is 
the most commonly used diagnostic for the weakness of instrumental variables. 
The most widely used rule of thumb suggests that there exist weak instrumental 
variables when the F-statistic is less than 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1994). 
Furthermore, Cragg and Donald (1993) and Stock and Yogo (2005) suggest 
that the minimum eigenvalue statistic is used to test for weak instrumental 
variables where the minimum eigenvalue should be compared to the bound 
size of Wald tests. The Wald test is a way of testing the joint statistical 
significance of the endogenous regressors in the model at a level of 5%. If we 
are willing to tolerate distortion of a 5% Wald test based on the 2SLS estimator, 
the minimum eigenvalue exceeds the 15% of the size distortion, indicating that 
the null hypothesis can be rejected (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 
 
As shown in Tables 4.38 to 4.40 in the Appendix, the F-statistic for the joint 
significance of the instrumental variable of lagged board structures (sta bsize2, 
sta ned2, dual2) is greater than 10 for moderation and mediation analysis in 
MBO and third-party LBOs, which pass the rule of thumb. Moreover, in the 
mediation analysis, the F-statistic for joint significance of the instrumental 
variable lagged C-score (sta cscore2) is greater than 10, which rejects the null 
hypothesis that the instrumental variable is weak. However, in the moderation 
analysis, the F-statistic for lagged C-score (sta cscore2) is not always greater 
than 10, which may indicate that the lagged C-score (sta cscore2) is a weak 
instrumental variable in moderation analysis in MBOs and third-party LBOs.  
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Furthermore, the minimum eigenvalue of the F-statistic is greater than the 
critical values for mediation analysis in MBOs and third-party LBOs, which 
confirms that the instrumental variables are valid. However, in moderation 
analysis, the minimum eigenvalue of the F-statistic is not always greater than 
the critical values, which indicates that the instrumental variables are weak. 
 
Tables 4.38 to 4.40 report the results of the Hausman test. The findings suggest 
that, in most cases, the p-values of the Hausman test are greater than 0.05, 
which leads us to reject the null hypothesis that there are endogeneity problems. 
However, in some cases, the p-values of the Hausman test are less than 0.05, 
which indicates that endogenous problems may exist. Therefore, 2SLS 
methods can produce estimates that are more accurate than OLS methods.  
 
Table 4.13 reports the results of the 2SLS analysis for mediation analysis of the 
effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. The Hausman tests for Model 
ENDOLE23 and ENDOLE27 suggest that endogeneity exists; thus, the OLS 
methods are biased. The results in 2SLS suggest that there is a significantly 
negative relationship between board effectiveness (sta cscore) and board size 
(sta bsize) in third-party LBOs. This indicates that a more effective board (high 
C-score indicates high levels of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs) would 
not increase the number of directors on the board, as this might hamper 
cooperation and communication among board members (Arthur, 2001; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). However, as there is no significant relationship 
between board size (sta bsize) and takeover premiums (prem), board size does 
not have a mediating effect in the relationship between board effectiveness (sta 
cscore) and takeover premiums (prem) in third-party LBOs.  
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Table 4.13 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals:  
ENDOLE22 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ENDOLE23-ENDOLE24 test the 
effects of board effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ENDOLE26-ENDOLE32 tests the effects of board structures 
on takeover premiums (BE, BS→ premiums) (In third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) 
VARIABLES 
Step1: 
BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step3: BE, BS→ premiums 
endole22 endole23 endole24 endole26 endole27 endole28 endole29 endole30 endole31 endole32 
prem Sta bsize Sta ned prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
           
Sta cscore -0.135 -0.734* 0.864*** -0.114 -0.080 -0.135 -0.069 -0.115 -0.050 -0.040 
 (-0.772) (-1.858) (2.892) (-0.525) (-0.382) (-0.738) (-0.282) (-0.526) (-0.211) (-0.150) 
Sta bsize    0.017   0.008 0.017  0.008 
    (0.209)   (0.098) (0.209)  (0.098) 
Sta ned     -0.102  -0.103  -0.112 -0.113 
     (-1.191)  (-1.191)  (-1.304) (-1.301) 
dual      -0.001  0.005 -0.076 -0.074 
      (-0.002)  (0.021) (-0.281) (-0.274) 
size -0.094 0.157 0.221** -0.093 -0.073 -0.094 -0.072 -0.094 -0.064 -0.064 
 (-1.581) (1.225) (2.007) (-1.563) (-1.102) (-1.511) (-1.076) (-1.508) (-0.886) (-0.873) 
roa -0.994 -0.582 -1.231 -1.029 -1.184 -0.994 -1.202 -1.027 -1.235 -1.252 
 (-1.020) (-0.581) (-1.248) (-1.040) (-1.161) (-0.989) (-1.156) (-1.005) (-1.194) (-1.188) 
bown 0.213 1.010 -0.663 0.203 0.111 0.213 0.105 0.202 0.107 0.101 
 (0.528) (1.271) (-0.840) (0.478) (0.263) (0.526) (0.238) (0.475) (0.251) (0.228) 
lnnas 0.165***   0.166*** 0.151*** 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.166*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 
 (3.590)   (3.603) (3.450) (3.605) (3.455) (3.621) (3.351) (3.357) 
level -0.439**   -0.442** -0.408** -0.439** -0.409** -0.443** -0.395* -0.397* 
 (-2.197)   (-2.212) (-1.975) (-2.101) (-1.971) (-2.119) (-1.763) (-1.760) 
fcf 0.423   0.533 0.592 0.423 0.644 0.528 0.676 0.726 
 (0.378)   (0.416) (0.492) (0.363) (0.469) (0.401) (0.532) (0.507) 
Chapter 4 
289 
pe 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.594)   (0.571) (0.323) (0.592) (0.301) (0.573) (0.251) (0.233) 
Big4  -0.441 0.200        
  (-1.419) (0.747)        
ceoch  0.230 0.240        
  (0.574) (0.800)        
Sg  -0.005 0.073        
  (-0.039) (0.729)        
Constant 1.554 -2.697 -4.138** 1.539 1.227 1.554 1.216 1.547 1.088 1.081 
 (1.419) (-1.133) (-2.078) (1.405) (1.025) (1.368) (1.007) (1.367) (0.824) (0.815) 
           
Observations 73 81 81 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.188 0.140 0.028 0.192 0.192 0.188 0.193 0.192 0.194 0.194 
Chi2-test 22.16 56.54 16.86 22.69 24.38 22.41 24.78 22.90 27.36 27.53 
Prob>chi2 0.005 0.000 0.018 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.004 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 0.843 8.449 3.393 1.962 6.154 0.912 6.120 2.149 6.185 6.297 
Hausman Prob>Chi2 0.359 0.004 0.066 0.375 0.046 0.634 0.106 0.542 0.103 0.178 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta cscore2 16.630*** 26.232*** 26.232*** 9.972*** 10.861*** 10.588*** 7.887*** 7.742*** 8.482*** 6.572*** 
Sta bsize2    62.911***   45.728*** 48.323***  41.294*** 
Sta ned2     136.722***  100.522***  106.632*** 87.745*** 
Dual2      12.179***  8.935*** 12.961*** 9.612*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism at year Y-1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors at year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards 
at year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 at year Y-1. Cscore2: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism 
at year Y-2 (two year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors at year Y-2. 
Ned2: the proportion of non-executives on boards at year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 at year Y-2. Sta 
cscore: the standardised cscore at year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size at year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned at year Y-1. Sta cscore2: lagged variable, the 
standardised c-score at year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size at year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the 
standardised ned at year Y-2. Size: ln total assets at year Y-1. Roa: return on assets at year Y-1. Bown: board ownership at year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees at year Y-1. Level: 
total debts divided by total assets at year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow at year Y-1. Pe: price-earnings ratio at year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five 
or four audit firms at year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 at year Y-1. Sg: sales growth at year Y-1. 
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Furthermore, the research finds that the p-values of the Hausman test for 
Models ENDOMO13, ENDOLO2, ENDOLO9, ENDOME2, ENDOME27 and 
ENDOLE2 in Tables 4.34 to 4.40 of the Appendix are below 0.05. This may 
indicate that endogeneity exists, in which the results of the OLS method are 
more biased than in the 2SLS method. However, it is found that the regression 
coefficients associated with board structures – board effectiveness and the 
interactive effects of board structures and board effectiveness – have the same 
directions and significance in OLS and 2SLS. Therefore, endogeneity should 
not be a problem affecting the results of the models. 
 
4.3.5 Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
4.3.5.1 Moderation analysis 
Structural equation modelling, a variation of path analysis, is an extension to 
the multiple regression approach that simultaneously estimates the equations 
in the model. In SEM, the model-implied covariance matrix is compared to the 
observed covariance matrix, and goodness-of-fit statistics are then used to 
assess the discrepancy between the two (Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010). This 
study examines moderating/mediating models via SEM using AMOS.  
 
The multi-group approach is the most commonly used method for moderation 
analysis when the moderator is categorical (Ro, 2012). In the analysis, the 
overall fit of the constrained model (equal by the moderator) is compared with 
the unconstrained model (which varies by moderator) and the magnitude of the 
difference of the chi-square determines the presence of moderating effects. As 
previously discussed, the sample is split into large, medium and small board 
size groups; large, medium and small proportions of non-executive groups; 
duality and non-duality groups; and large and small C-score (board 
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effectiveness) groups. Grouping of board size and proportion of non-executives 
(ned) are carried out via a split into thirds. Board size and the proportion of non-
executives (ned) are grouped as the minimum to 33rd percentiles for the low 
group, the 34th to 66th percentiles for the medium group and the 67th to the 
maximum percentiles for the high group. Grouping of C-scores (board 
effectiveness) is carried out via split at the median. The C-score group below 
the median is named as the low C-score group, while the group above the 
median is named as the high C-score group (a high C-score indicates high 
board effectiveness in third-party LBOs, but low board effectiveness in MBOs). 
As the sample for CEO duality in third-party LBOs is too small and does not 
satisfy the requirements of multi-group analysis, this research tests the 
moderating effects of board structures including board size and the proportion 
of non-executives.  
 
Table 4.14 reports the results of the measurement invariance test for board size 
and ned groups in third-party LBOs. The baseline model for board size and ned 
shows an acceptable fit to the data (board size: χ2=100.128, df=63, χ2/df=1.589, 
RMSEA=0.09, CFI=0.798, GFI=0.819; ned: χ2=131.815, df=63, χ2/df=2.092, 
RMSEA=0.122, CFI=0.675, GFI=0.79). For the board size and ned groups, full-
metric invariance is not supported, in that the chi-square difference (Δχ2) 
between the unconstrained model and the constrained model is not significant 
(board size: Δχ2(2)=3.812, p>0.1; ned: Δχ2(2)=2.13, p>0.1). Therefore, the 
relationship between board effectiveness (sta cscore) and takeover premiums 
(prem) does not have significant differences across board size and ned. 
Hypotheses 4.1a and 4.2a are rejected. This is consistent with the findings in 
the multiple regression analysis that board size and the proportion of non-
executives do not have moderating effects in the relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. 
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Table 4.14 Structural equation modelling (SEM) approach for moderation 
analysis: the multi-group test for moderating effects of board structures 
on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness): measurement invariance test 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-
square
/df 
RMS
EA 
CFI GFI 
△Chi-
square 
Invariance 
Board 
size 
groups 
Unconstrain
ed 
100.128 63 1.589 0.090 0.798 0.819 Δχ2(2)= 
3.812, 
p=0.149 
Yes 
Fully 
constrained 
103.940 65 1.599 0.091 0.788 0.813 
          
NED 
groups 
Unconstrain
ed 
131.815 63 2.092 0.122 0.675 0.790 Δχ2(2)= 
2.130, 
p=0.345 
Yes 
Fully 
constrained 
133.945 65 2.061 0.121 0.674 0.787 
Board size group: The standardised board size is divided into three groups: minimum to 33rd percentiles for low 
levels, 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. Ned group: standardised 
proportion of non-executives on the board is divided into three groups: minimum to 33rd percentiles for low level, 
34th to 66th percentiles for medium level and 67th to maximum for high level. 
 
Table 4.15, Panel A shows the results of the measurement invariance test for 
C-score (board effectiveness) groups in third-party LBOs. The unconstrained 
model for the C-score (board effectiveness) shows a good fit to the data 
(χ2=94.21, df=78, χ2/df=1.208, RMSEA=0.053, CFI=0.824, GFI=0.831). It is 
found that for the C-score (board effectiveness), full-metric invariance is not 
supported, in that there is not a significant chi-square difference (Δχ2) between 
the unconstrained model and constrained model (Δχ2(3)=2.024, p>0.1). This 
implies that the impact of board structures on takeover premiums do not have 
a significant difference across C-score (board effectiveness) groups in third-
party LBOs. This is consistent with the finding in the multiple regression 
approach that the C-score (board effectiveness) does not moderate the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs.  
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Table 4.15 Structural equation modelling (SEM) approach for moderation 
analysis: the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness): measurement invariance test 
Panel A: 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-
square
/df 
RMS
EA 
CFI GFI 
ΔChi-
square 
Invariance 
C-score 
groups 
Unconstrain
ed 
94.210 78 1.208 0.053 0.824 0.831 Δχ2(3)= 
2.024, 
p=0.567 
Yes 
Fully 
constrained 
96.234 81 1.188 0.050 0.835 0.828 
 
Panel B: 
Board effectiveness: C-score 
Path 
High C-score Low C-score 
Unconstrained 
Fully 
constrained 
Difference Coeffici
ents 
p-
value 
Coeffici
ents 
p-
value 
sta size 
→prem 
0.018 0.905 -0.064 0.637 χ2(78)= 94.210 χ2(79)= 94.281 
Δχ2(1)=0.071, 
p>0.1 
sta ned 
→prem 
-0.025 0.855 -0.016 0.905 χ2(78)= 94.210 χ2(79)= 94.217 
Δχ2(1)=0.007, 
p>0.1 
Dual 
→prem 
-0.193 0.141 0.062 0.631 χ2(78)= 94.210 χ2(79)= 96.098 
Δχ2(1)=1.888, 
p>0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of accounting 
conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts’s 
(2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives 
on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same 
person, otherwise 0. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. 
The low and high levels for sta cscore is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to 
maximum for high levels. 
 
Panel B in Table 4.15 reports the results of the invariance test for C-score 
(board effectiveness) groups and the chi-square difference (Δχ2) test for each 
path. The results suggest that, for C-score (board effectiveness) groups, the 
links between board size (sta bsize) and takeover premiums (prem) is not 
significantly different (Δχ2(1)=0.071, p>0.1) in third-party LBOs. In addition, the 
link between the proportion of non-executive (sta ned) and takeover premiums 
(prem) (Δχ2(1)=0.007, p>0.1) and between CEO duality and takeover premiums 
(prem) (Δχ2(1)=1.888, p>0.1) are not significantly different across C-score 
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(board effectiveness) groups in third-party LBOs. Thus, consistent with the 
findings in multiple regression analysis, Hypotheses 4.4a, 4.5a and 4.6a are 
rejected. 
 
Table 4.16 shows the results of the measurement invariance test for board size, 
ned and duality groups in MBOs. The baseline model for these groups show a 
good fit to the data (board size: χ2=72.308, df=60, χ2/df=1.205, RMSEA=0.045, 
CFI=0.938, GFI=0.875; ned: χ2=82.921, df=66, χ2/df=1.256, RMSEA=0.05, 
CFI=0.917, GFI=0.86; CEO duality: χ2=56.272, df=40, χ2/df=1.407, 
RMSEA=0.063, CFI=0.914, GFI=0.892). The baseline (unconstrained) model 
is compared with the constrained model, by using a chi-square difference test. 
For the board size and ned groups, full-metric invariance is supported in that 
the chi-square difference (Δχ2) between the unconstrained model and 
constrained model is significant (board size: Δχ2(2)=4.649, p<0.1; ned: 
Δχ2(2)=5.715, p<0.1). The findings imply that the relationship between board 
effectiveness (sta cscore) and takeover premiums (prem) in MBOs may vary 
across the board size and ned groups. 
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Table 4.16 Structural equation modelling (SEM) approach for moderation 
analysis: multi-group test for moderating effects of board structures on 
the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in 
MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness): measurement invariance test 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
△Chi-
square 
Invariance 
Board 
size 
groups 
Unconstrained 72.308 60 1.205 0.045 0.938 0.875  Δχ2(2)= 
4.649, 
p=0.098 
No Fully 
constrained 
76.957 62 1.241 0.048 0.924 0.869 
          
NED 
groups 
Unconstrained 82.921 66 1.256 0.050 0.917 0.860 Δχ2(2)= 
5.715, 
p=0.057 
No Fully 
constrained 
88.636 68 1.303 0.054 0.899 0.852 
           
Duality 
groups 
Unconstrained 56.272 40 1.407 0.063 0.914 0.892 Δχ2(1)= 
1.198, 
p=0.274 
Yes Fully 
constrained 
57.470 41 1.402 0.062 0.913 0.891 
Board size group: The standardised board size is divided into three groups: minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, 34th 
to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. Ned group: standardised proportion of non-
executives on the board is divided into three groups: minimum to 33rd percentiles for low level, 34th to 66th percentiles for 
medium level and 67th to maximum for high level. Duality group: The CEO duality is divided into two groups: equals to 1 
denotes the duality group, otherwise denotes the not duality group. 
 
Table 4.43 in the Appendix reports that board size and the proportion of non-
executives have moderating effects in the relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs. Specifically, in MBOs, a small 
board is likely to have significantly higher takeover premiums than a medium 
board under the same levels of board effectiveness, but lower board 
effectiveness tends to lead to higher premiums. Also, the findings suggest that, 
in MBOs, boards with a lower proportion of non-executives tend to be 
associated with higher premiums than those with a medium proportion of non-
executives under the same levels of board effectiveness. 
 
Moreover, for the duality group, full-metric invariance is supported, in that the 
chi-square difference (Δχ2) between the unconstrained model and constrained 
model is not significant (Δχ2(1)=1.198, p>0.1) (see Table 4.16). This indicates 
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that the impact of probable variation does not display a significant difference 
across CEO duality groups. Therefore, CEO duality does not have moderating 
effects in the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in MBOs.  
 
However, these findings are not always consistent with those in multiple 
regression analysis. This might be because, in multiple group analysis, the 
continuous variables ‘board size’ and ‘proportion of non-executives’ are 
artificially convert into categorical variables. As discussed in the methodology, 
this may result in loss of information and reduce ability to detect interaction 
effects (Frazier et al., 2004; Fitzsimons, 2008). Moreover, artificially 
dichotomising two continuous variables (e.g. an independent variable and a 
moderator) may result in the opposite effect and spurious results (Irwin and 
McClelland, 2001; MacCallum et al., 2002).  
 
In addition, the inconsistence of the results may be because of the small sample 
size. Although attempts have been made to accommodate smaller sample 
analysis (e.g. Nevitt and Hancock, 2004), SEM is a technique that is commonly 
used for large samples (Kline, 2015; Tomarken and Waller, 2005). Previous 
studies (e.g. Jackson, 2003) suggest that the sample size-to-parameter ratio 
should be not less than 10:1. Kline (2015) suggests that the ‘typical’ sample 
size for the SEM approach is about 200. If this requirement is not met, the SEM 
approach may result in biased results. However, the sample size of this study 
for MBOs is only 106, which may lead to inconsistent results when using SEM 
and the multiple regression approach. 
 
Table 4.17, Panel A reports the results of the measurement invariance test for 
C-score (board effectiveness) groups in MBOs. The baseline model for C-score 
(board effectiveness) shows an acceptable fit to the data (χ2=148.775, df=80, 
χ2/df=1.86, RMSEA=0.091, CFI=0.655, GFI=0.813). By comparing the baseline 
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(unconstrained) model with the constrained model, it is found that for C-score 
(board effectiveness), full-metric invariance is not supported, in that the chi-
square difference (Δχ2) between the unconstrained model and constrained 
model is not significant (Δχ2(3)=4.48, p>0.1). The findings imply that the impact 
of board structures on takeover premiums do not vary across C-score (board 
effectiveness) groups in MBOs. This indicates that C-score (board 
effectiveness) does not moderate the relationship between board structures 
and takeover premiums in MBOs. 
 
Table 4.17 Structural equation modelling (SEM) approach for moderation 
analysis: multi-group test for moderating effects of board effectiveness 
on the relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in 
MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness): measurement invariance test 
Panel A: 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-
square
/df 
RMS
EA 
CFI GFI 
△Chi-
square 
Invariance 
C-score 
groups 
Unconstrain
ed 
148.775 80 1.860 0.091 0.655 0.813 Δχ2(3)= 
4.480, 
p=0.214 
Yes 
Fully 
constrained 
153.255 83 1.846 0.090 0.647 0.808 
 
Panel B: 
Board effectiveness: C-score 
Path 
High C-score Low C-score 
Unconstrai
ned 
Fully 
constrained 
Difference Coefficie
nts 
p-
value 
Coefficient
s 
p-
value 
sta bsize 
→prem 
0.009 0.937 0.012 0.921 
χ2(80)=148.
775 
χ2(81)= 
148.775 
Δχ2(1)=0, 
p>0.1 
sta ned 
→prem 
-0.058 0.666 0.069 0.617 
χ2(80)=148.
775 
χ2(81)= 
149.085 
Δχ2(1)=0.31, 
p>0.1 
Dual 
→prem 
0.192 0.095 -0.150 0.230 
χ2(80)=148.
775 
χ2(81)= 
151.862 
Δχ2(1)=3.08
7, p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated 
via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. Ned: the 
proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s CEO and 
chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. 
Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. The low and high levels for sta cscore is defined as the minimum 
to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels. 
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To check the path differences, the baseline (unconstrained) model is compared 
with a series of nested (constrained) models, each with a specific parameter 
constraint between groups, by using a chi-square difference (Δχ2) test. Panel B 
in Table 4.17 reports the results of the invariance test and the chi-square 
difference (Δχ2) test for each path. The results suggest that the links between 
board size (sta bsize) and takeover premiums (prem) (Δχ2(1)=0, p>0.1) and 
between the proportion of non-executive (sta ned) and takeover premiums 
(prem) (Δχ2(1)=0.31, p>0.1) in MBOs is not significantly different across C-score 
(board effectiveness) groups. This indicates that C-score (board effectiveness) 
does not have moderating effects on the relationship between board size, the 
proportion of non-executives and takeover premiums in MBOs.  
 
However, it is found that the path from CEO duality to takeover premiums (prem) 
is significantly different across C-score (board effectiveness) groups 
(Δχ2(1)=3.087, p<0.1). Specifically, the path coefficient for the high C-score (low 
board effectiveness) group is found to be greater than for the low C-score (high 
board effectiveness) group (high C-score group: β=0.192, p=0.095; low C-score 
group: β=−0.15, p=0.23) in MBOs. Accordingly, Hypothesis 4.6b is not rejected. 
Consistent with the finding in the multiple regression approach, in MBOs, 
boards with low effectiveness (high C-scores) tend to receive lower premiums 
when the positions of CEO and chairman are separate relative to highly 
effective boards (with low C-scores) and receive higher premiums when the 
CEO and chairman are the same person. This confirms the argument that the 
effective board would like a separate CEO and chairman, as this may facilitate 
their monitoring and control over management (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). 
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4.3.5.2 Mediation analysis 
The mediating effects of board structures and board effectiveness are further 
tested via SEM. Table 4.18 reports the mediation effects of board effectiveness 
(sta cscore) in the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBOs (for more detail, see Table 4.45 in the Appendix). 
The unconstrained model for the mediation effects of board effectiveness 
shows an acceptable fit to the data (χ2=114.469, df=74, χ2/df=1.547, 
RMSEA=0.085, CFI=0.744, GFI=0.852).  
 
Table 4.18, Panel C, reports that the independent (board structures) - outcome 
(takeover premiums) path of the constrained model is not significant. Moreover, 
the findings suggest that the independent-outcome path of the unconstrained 
model, which includes the mediator, is not significant. Specifically, it is found 
that the proportion of non-executives (ned) is significantly positive related to 
board effectiveness (sta cscore) in third-party LBOs, while all other links are 
insignificant. Hence, it is expected that there is no mediation effect. Moreover, 
the bootstrapping tests suggest that the standardise indirect effects of board 
structures (bsize, ned & dual) on takeover premiums (prem) are not significant, 
which indicate that there is not a significant mediation effect (Panel D, Table 
4.45 in Appendix). Therefore, Hypotheses 4.7a, 4.8a and 4.9a are rejected. 
Consistent with the findings in the multiple regression approach, board 
effectiveness does not have mediating effects in the relationship between board 
structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBOs. 
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Table 4.18 Summary table of the structural equation modelling (SEM) 
approach for mediation analysis: mediating effects of board effectiveness 
on the relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in 
third-party deals (BS→ BE→ premiums)  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 114.469 74 1.547 0.085 0.744 0.852 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE 
sta cscore <--- sta bsize -0.001 0.075 -0.012 0.991 
sta cscore <--- sta ned 0.136 0.077 1.764 0.078 
sta cscore <--- dual 0.109 0.222 0.494 0.622 
BE →Prem prem <--- sta cscore 0.064 0.081 0.795 0.426 
BS →Prem 
prem <--- sta bsize -0.020 0.053 -0.382 0.702 
prem <--- sta ned -0.058 0.056 -1.052 0.293 
prem <--- dual -0.031 0.156 -0.200 0.841 
Control 
variables 
sta cscore <--- sg -0.020 0.091 -0.222 0.824 
sta cscore <--- ceoch -0.358 0.275 -1.304 0.192 
sta cscore <--- big4 0.064 0.201 0.319 0.750 
sta cscore <--- roa 0.100 0.482 0.208 0.835 
sta cscore <--- size -0.270 0.048 -5.606 0.000 
sta cscore <--- bown -0.233 0.567 -0.412 0.680 
prem <--- size -0.028 0.046 -0.605 0.545 
prem <--- roa -1.218 0.424 -2.872 0.004 
prem <--- level -0.358 0.200 -1.794 0.073 
prem <--- lnnas 0.136 0.047 2.914 0.004 
prem <--- pe 0.000 0.001 0.180 0.857 
prem <--- fcf 0.891 0.543 1.640 0.101 
prem <--- bown 0.157 0.403 0.389 0.697 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without 
Mediator 
Direct with 
Mediator Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Bsize →sta cscore →prem -0.052 0.609 -0.038 0.702 
No 
mediation 
Sta Ned →sta cscore →prem -0.096 0.353 -0.109 0.293 
No 
mediation 
Dual →sta cscore →prem -0.015 0.880 -0.020 0.841 
No 
mediation 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
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calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s 
CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. 
Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year 
Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: 
free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit 
belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
302 
Table 4.19 reports the mediating effects of board structures in the relationship 
between board effectiveness (sta cscore) and takeover premiums in third-party 
LBOs (for more detail, see Table 4.46 in the Appendix). The unconstrained 
model for the mediating effects of board effectiveness shows an acceptable fit 
to the data (χ2=97.916, df=61, χ2/df=1.605, RMSEA=0.09, CFI=0.767, 
GFI=0.873). Table 4.19, Panel C, reports that the independent (board 
effectiveness) - outcome (takeover premiums) path of the constrained model is 
not significant. Moreover, the findings suggest that the independent-outcome 
path of the unconstrained model with the mediator is not significant. Specifically, 
it is found that there is a significant relationship between the proportion of non-
executives (sta ned) and board effectiveness (sta cscore) in third-party LBOs, 
while all other links are insignificant. Hence, it is expected that there is no 
mediation effect. Moreover, the bootstrapping tests suggest that the 
standardise indirect effects of board effectiveness (sta cscore) on takeover 
premiums (prem) are not significant, which indicate that there is not a significant 
mediation effect (Panel D, Table 4.46 in Appendix). Therefore, Hypotheses 
4.10a, 4.11a and 4.12a are rejected. Board structures do not have mediating 
effects in the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in third-party LBOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
303 
Table 4.19 Summary table of the structural equation modelling (SEM) 
approach for mediation analysis: mediating effects of board structures on 
the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in 
third-party LBO deals (BE→ BS→ premiums)  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 97.916 61 1.605 0.090 0.767 0.873 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS  
sta bsize <--- sta cscore -0.127 0.117 -1.083 0.279 
sta ned <--- sta cscore 0.277 0.133 2.080 0.038 
dual <--- sta cscore 0.027 0.049 0.558 0.577 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize -0.020 0.065 -0.308 0.758 
prem <--- sta ned -0.058 0.057 -1.028 0.304 
prem <--- dual -0.031 0.157 -0.200 0.841 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta cscore 0.064 0.069 0.925 0.355 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 -0.001 0.104 -0.006 0.995 
dual <--- sg -0.029 0.047 -0.620 0.535 
dual <--- size 0.006 0.026 0.237 0.812 
dual <--- roa -0.084 0.250 -0.335 0.737 
dual <--- bown 0.020 0.291 0.068 0.946 
dual <--- ceoch 0.087 0.143 0.613 0.540 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.380 0.392 0.969 0.332 
sta ned <--- big4 0.124 0.285 0.434 0.664 
sta ned <--- sg 0.064 0.129 0.497 0.619 
sta ned <--- size 0.085 0.070 1.220 0.223 
sta ned <--- roa -1.097 0.685 -1.601 0.109 
sta ned <--- bown -0.941 0.797 -1.181 0.238 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.238 0.332 0.716 0.474 
sta bsize <--- big4 -0.530 0.242 -2.191 0.028 
sta bsize <--- sg -0.021 0.109 -0.192 0.848 
sta bsize <--- size 0.301 0.061 4.911 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa -0.429 0.636 -0.675 0.500 
sta bsize <--- bown 1.211 0.685 1.769 0.077 
prem <--- size -0.028 0.045 -0.622 0.534 
prem <--- roa -1.218 0.443 -2.751 0.006 
prem <--- level -0.358 0.200 -1.796 0.072 
prem <--- lnnas 0.136 0.046 2.936 0.003 
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prem <--- pe 0.000 0.001 0.180 0.857 
prem <--- fcf 0.891 0.599 1.487 0.137 
prem <--- bown 0.157 0.407 0.385 0.700 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Cscore →sta bsize →prem 0.077 0.446 0.072 0.476 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →sta ned →prem 0.077 0.446 0.101 0.329 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →dual →prem 0.077 0.446 0.078 0.441 
No 
mediation 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s 
CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. 
Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year 
Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: 
free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit 
belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.20 reports the results of mediating effects of board effectiveness in the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in MBOs (for 
more detail, see Table 4.47 in the Appendix). The unconstrained model for the 
mediating effects of the C-score (board effectiveness) shows a good fit to the 
data (χ2=131.759, df=74, χ2/df=1.781, RMSEA=0.087, CFI=0.8, GFI=0.862) in 
MBOs.  
 
Table 4.20, Panel C, suggests that the independent (board structures) - 
outcome (takeover premiums) path of the constrained model is not significant. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that the independent-outcome path of the 
unconstrained model with the mediator, is not significant. Specifically, there is 
a significantly positive relationship between CEO duality (dual) and board 
effectiveness (sta cscore) in MBOs (p=0.099). Moreover, the results suggest 
that the proportion of non-executives (sta ned) is significantly positively 
correlated to takeover premiums (prem) in MBOs (p=0.053). However, all other 
links are insignificant. Hence, it is expected that there is no mediation effect. 
Moreover, the bootstrapping tests suggest that the standardise indirect effects 
of board structures (bsize, ned & dual) on takeover premiums (prem) are not 
significant, which indicate that there is not a significant mediation effect (Panel 
D, Table 4.47 in Appendix). Thus, consistent with the findings in the multiple 
regression approach, Hypotheses 4.7b, 4.8b and 4.9b are rejected. The results 
suggest that board effectiveness does not have mediating effects in the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in MBOs. 
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Table 4.20 Summary table of the structural equation modelling (SEM) 
approach for mediation analysis: mediating effects of board effectiveness 
on the relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in 
MBO deals (BS→ BE→ premiums)  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 131.759 74 1.781 0.087 0.800 0.862 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- Sta bsize -0.007 0.022 -0.300 0.764 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- Sta ned -0.040 0.022 -1.820 0.069 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- dual 0.005 0.053 0.099 0.921 
BE →Prem prem <--- 
Sta 
cscore 
0.267 0.116 2.295 0.022 
BS →Prem 
prem <--- Sta bsize 0.014 0.029 0.488 0.625 
prem <--- Sta ned 0.002 0.029 0.053 0.958 
prem <--- dual 0.069 0.067 1.025 0.306 
Control 
variables 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- sg -0.023 0.010 -2.299 0.022 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- ceoch 0.093 0.078 1.192 0.233 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- big4 0.193 0.046 4.212 0.000 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- roa -0.844 0.162 -5.220 0.000 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- size 0.000 0.019 -0.025 0.980 
Sta 
cscore 
<--- bown -0.101 0.110 -0.916 0.360 
prem <--- size -0.030 0.030 -1.008 0.314 
prem <--- roa -0.167 0.280 -0.596 0.551 
prem <--- level 0.585 0.210 2.783 0.005 
prem <--- lnnas 0.052 0.025 2.066 0.039 
prem <--- pe -0.001 0.002 -0.670 0.503 
prem <--- fcf -0.234 0.246 -0.949 0.343 
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prem <--- bown 0.095 0.151 0.631 0.528 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without 
Mediator 
Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta bsize →sta cscore →prem 0.029 0.763 0.046 0.625 No mediation 
Sta ned →sta cscore →prem -0.028 0.773 0.005 0.958 No mediation 
Dual →sta cscore →prem 0.097 0.325 0.100 0.306 No mediation 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s 
CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. 
Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year 
Y−1. Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: 
free cash flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit 
belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.21 reports the SEM approach for mediation analysis of the effects of 
board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness (sta cscore) 
and takeover premiums in MBOs (for more detail, see Table 4.48 in the 
Appendix). The unconstrained model for the mediating effects of board 
structures shows a good fit to the data (χ2=106.928, df=62, χ2/df=1.725, 
RMSEA=0.083, CFI=0.844, GFI=0.884).  
 
Table 4.21, Panel C, reports that the independent (board effectiveness) - 
outcome (takeover premiums) path of the constrained model is statistically 
significant (p value=0.017). Moreover, the findings suggest that the 
independent-outcome path of the unconstrained model with the mediator is 
statistically significant (p value=0.02). Specifically, it is found that there is a 
significantly positive relationship between board effectiveness (sta cscore) and 
CEO duality (dual) (p=0.081) and between board effectiveness (sta cscore) and 
takeover premiums (prem) (p=0.022) in MBOs. Hence, it is expected that there 
is partial mediation effect. However, the bootstrapping tests suggest that the 
standardise indirect effects of board effectiveness (sta cscore) on takeover 
premiums (prem) are not significant, which indicate that there is not a significant 
mediation effect (Panel D, Table 4.48 in Appendix). Therefore, consistent with 
the findings in the multiple regression approach, the results suggest that board 
structures do not have significant mediating effects in the relationship between 
board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs. 
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Table 4.21 Summary table of the structural equation modelling (SEM) 
approach for mediation analysis: mediating effects of board structures on 
the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in 
MBO deals (BE→ BS→ premiums)  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 106.928 62 1.725 0.083 0.844 0.884 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS 
sta bsize <--- sta cscore -0.430 0.285 -1.509 0.131 
sta ned <--- sta cscore -0.393 0.293 -1.343 0.179 
dual <--- sta cscore 0.230 0.132 1.745 0.081 
BS →Prem 
prem <--- bsize 0.014 0.031 0.454 0.650 
prem <--- ned 0.002 0.029 0.053 0.958 
prem <--- dual 0.069 0.065 1.048 0.295 
BE →Prem prem <--- sta cscore 0.267 0.117 2.288 0.022 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 0.060 0.090 0.672 0.502 
dual <--- sg 0.043 0.019 2.315 0.021 
dual <--- size -0.067 0.038 -1.768 0.077 
dual <--- roa 0.092 0.341 0.268 0.788 
dual <--- bown 0.037 0.211 0.178 0.859 
dual <--- ceoch -0.299 0.153 -1.952 0.051 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.685 0.341 2.010 0.044 
sta ned <--- big4 0.079 0.200 0.393 0.694 
sta ned <--- sg -0.018 0.042 -0.436 0.663 
sta ned <--- size 0.154 0.084 1.821 0.069 
sta ned <--- roa -1.011 0.759 -1.332 0.183 
sta ned <--- bown -0.842 0.468 -1.799 0.072 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.136 0.332 0.408 0.683 
sta bsize <--- big4 0.010 0.195 0.054 0.957 
sta bsize <--- sg 0.050 0.041 1.221 0.222 
sta bsize <--- size 0.361 0.082 4.389 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa -0.492 0.739 -0.666 0.506 
sta bsize <--- bown 0.423 0.455 0.929 0.353 
prem <--- size -0.030 0.032 -0.942 0.346 
prem <--- roa -0.167 0.281 -0.594 0.553 
prem <--- level 0.585 0.194 3.021 0.003 
prem <--- lnnas 0.052 0.025 2.064 0.039 
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prem <--- pe -0.001 0.002 -0.670 0.503 
prem <--- fcf -0.234 0.240 -0.973 0.330 
prem <--- bown 0.095 0.149 0.640 0.522 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Cscore →sta bsize →prem 0.277 0.017 0.284 0.020 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →sta ned →prem 0.277 0.017 0.278 0.022 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →dual →prem 0.277 0.017 0.276 0.023 
No 
mediation 
 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y−1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts’s (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y−1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm’s 
CEO and chairman in year Y−1 is the same person, otherwise 0. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y−1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y−1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y−1. 
Size: ln (total assets) in year Y−1. Roa: return on assets in year Y−1. Bown: board ownership in year Y−1. 
Lnnas: ln (non-audit fees) in year Y−1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y−1. Fcf: free cash 
flow in year Y−1. Pe: price earnings ratio in year Y−1. Big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to 
big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. Ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 
in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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4.3.6 Sensitivity analysis 
To check the robustness of the presented findings, a number of additional 
sensitivity analyses based on the sample of third-party LBOs and MBOs are 
performed. First, in order to ensure that the degree of accounting conservatism 
is a reasonable measure of board effectiveness, this research analyses the 
impact of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums by 
using alternative proxies for board effectiveness, which include board tenure 
and the proportion of financial expertise on the board.  
 
As discussed earlier, Vandenberg et al. (1999), Forbes and Milliken (1999), 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) and Payne et al. (2009) and Kirkpatrick et al. 
(2015) suggest that the key attributes of board effectiveness encapsulate 
directors’ knowledge, experience, expertise, engagement, integrity and social 
skills. Board tenure refers to the length of time served by directors, where long 
tenures may indicate that directors have cumulative knowledge, information 
and experience of the firm (Finkelstein, 1992; Alderfer, 1986; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995). Having directors with longer tenures may also imply that they are 
more competent to maintain their job (Peasnell et al., 2005). However, the 
opposite view suggests that long-serving directors may lose independence, 
which may rob the board of critical expertise. Hence, board tenure is used as 
an alternative proxy for board effectiveness in the analysis.   
 
Moreover, directors’ financial expertise tends to indicate that directors have 
more knowledge and information to monitor and constrain managers’ 
irregularities in financial reporting (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). However, 
the high proportion of financial expertise on boards tend to provide high quality 
financial reports. As this may make the acquirers bid more effectively, high 
proportion of financial expertise tend to lead to lower takeover premiums 
(McNichols and Stubben, 2014). Therefore, the proportion of financial expertise 
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on boards is also used to proxy board effectiveness in robustness tests. 
 
Tables 4.49 to 4.64 in the Appendix assess the moderation and mediation 
analysis of the impact of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover 
premiums with alternative proxies for board effectiveness in third-party LBOs 
and MBOs. The results are consistent with the findings in Tables 4.5 to 4.12, 
which indicate accounting conservatism is a reasonable measure for board 
effectiveness. Specifically, in the models, the C-score is replaced by board 
tenure and the proportion of financial expertise to measure the levels of board 
effectiveness. This does not change the directions or significance of the results.  
 
Table 4.54 in the Appendix reports that the coefficient for the interaction term of 
CEO duality and board tenure (dual*sta btenure) is significantly negative at the 
0.1 level in MBOs. In the model, the C-score is replaced by board tenure as a 
measure of the levels of board effectiveness. The direction and significance of 
the interaction effects of CEO duality and board effectiveness stay the same, 
which may indicate that the result is robust. Moreover, the directions of the 
coefficients for board size and board tenure (sta bsize*sta btenure), the 
proportion of non-executives and board tenure (sta ned*sta btenure), board size 
and the proportion of financial expertise (sta bsize*sta fe), the proportion of non-
executives and the proportion of financial expertise (sta ned*sta fe), and CEO 
duality and the proportion of financial expertise (dual*sta fe) stay the same in 
MBOs (see Tables 4.53 to 4.56). 
 
However, in Table 4.50, the research finds that the directions and significances 
of the interaction term for CEO duality and board tenure (dual*sta btenure) in 
third-party LBOs are different from the results that use the C-score to measure 
board effectiveness in Table 4.6. This may be because, in third-party LBO 
transactions, the board of directors are likely to have long-term job security 
issues (Hafzalla, 2009; Weir and Wright, 2006). This may affect the directors’ 
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tenure. Therefore, the boards are likely to require higher premiums to impede 
third-party LBOs, especially when the boards have duality.  
 
Moreover, in Table 4.52, the directions and significances of the interaction terms 
for board structures and the proportion of financial expertise (sta bsize*sta fe, 
sta ned*sta fe and dual*sta fe) in third-party LBOs are different form the results 
that use the C-score to measure board effectiveness in Table 4.6. This may be 
because the high proportion of financial expertise indicates a high capability of 
directors to fulfil their function of monitoring and control, which results in high-
quality financial reports (Payne et al., 2009; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). 
However, acquirers may pay lower premiums to the targets with higher-quality 
accounting information, as they can bid closer to the target’s reservation price 
(McNichols and Stubben, 2014). Therefore, third-party LBO firms tend to 
achieve lower premiums when the board has a large proportion of financial 
expertise. 
 
Second, one could argue that the hypotheses of this study may suffer from 
endogeneity, as the board structures may influence board effectiveness, and, 
in turn, can also be influenced by board effectiveness. This research addresses 
endogeneity by using 2SLS regressions. In the models, the lagged value of 
board structures, accounting conservatism (C-score), board tenure, and the 
proportion of financial expertise are used as instrumental variables in analysis. 
Tables 4.34 to 4.40 and Tables 4.65 to 4.80 in the Appendix report the results 
of the 2SLS approach for moderation and mediation analysis in MBOs and 
third-party LBOs. The results suggest that, in most cases, there is no 
endogeneity problem. The direction or significance of the results in 2SLS and 
OLS are the same when the model does not pass the Hausman test. 
 
Third, this research analyses the impact of board structures and board 
effectiveness with alternative proxies on takeover premiums by using both the 
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multiple regression approach and SEM. Due to the limitations of the multiple 
regression approach, this research presents the analyses with alternative 
proxies for board effectiveness in third-party LBOs and in MBOs using the SEM 
approach. Tables 4.81 to 4.104 in the Appendix suggest that the results using 
alternative measures are consistent. 
 
In particular, Table 4.89 in the Appendix reports that the relationship between 
board effectiveness (measured as board tenure) and takeover premiums is 
different across the groups measuring the proportion of non-executives in 
MBOs, which is consistent with the finding in Table 4.14. Table 4.90 in the 
Appendix also reports that, in MBOs, boards with high and medium proportions 
of non-executives are likely to achieve significantly higher premiums than 
boards with a lower proportion of non-executives when board effectiveness is 
at high levels.  
 
In addition, Tables 4.91 and 4.92 in the Appendix reports that the link between 
board effectiveness (measured as the level of financial expertise) and takeover 
premiums is different across the board size groups in MBOs, which is consistent 
with the findings in Tables 4.8 and 4.14. Also, Tables 4.93 and 4.94 in the 
Appendix suggest that, in MBOs, the link between CEO duality and takeover 
premiums can vary across levels of board effectiveness (btenure), which is 
consistent with the finding in Table 4.15. Furthermore, the results in Tables 4.97 
to 4.104 suggest that there is no mediating effect of board structures and board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums in MBOs and third-party LBOs, which is 
consistent with the findings in the main results.  
 
Therefore, board tenure and the proportion of financial expertise as alternative 
measures for board effectiveness do not alter the results. However, the 
research finds that the results in the multiple regression approach and SEM are 
not always consistent. This may be because the sample size of the research is 
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small, which may affect the results (Frazier et al., 2004; Fitzsimons, 2008). 
Moreover, artificially converting continuous variables into categorical variables 
in multi-group analysis may lead to information loss and spurious results that 
reduce ability to detect moderating effects (MacCallum et al., 2002; Irwin and 
McClelland, 2001). 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
The buyout transactions are likely to affect managers’ interests, which provide 
a unique opportunity in examining the conflicts of interests between managers 
and shareholders. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) find that board 
structures do not have significant effects on performance outcomes (in this 
study it is the takeover premiums). The inclusive findings may indicate that 
research fails to model the impact of boards on shareholder wealth protection 
correctly.  
 
It is recognised that the overall impact of boards is not only determined by its 
structures but also by its effectiveness. Board structures are the makeup of the 
board, which can affect the ability of directors to corporate and collaborate with 
each other. However, board effectiveness usually concerns with the outcomes 
of the tasks that occurs when the directors have fulfilled their responsibilities. It 
encapsulates the knowledge, experience, expertise and ability of the board of 
directors in performing their roles (Cornforth, 2001; Payne et al., 2009; Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Kirkpatrick et al., 2015; Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2007; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Conflating the two can be misleading (Bedard et al., 
2004; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Kang et al., 2007).  
 
Therefore, this research examines the impact of board structures and board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs by taking 
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into account the interrelationship between board structure and board 
effectiveness. It is expected that board structures may affect the ability of the 
board of directors by defining the conditions within which the directors can 
effectively bring their skills, expertise, experience and knowledge together 
(Klein, 2002b; Pacini et al., 2008). Moreover, board effectiveness is expected 
to affect the CEO and board’s bargaining position and power in the negotiations 
over the composition of the board (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
Hence, this research tests whether board structures − including board size, the 
proportion of non-executives and CEO duality − and board effectiveness have 
a moderating or a mediating relationship that affects takeover premiums in 
third-party LBOs and MBOs. 
 
Overall, this study has implication for the measurement of board effectiveness. 
In this study, board effectiveness is measured through the level of accounting 
conservatism (the C-score). Lim (2011) suggests that effective boards are likely 
to demand the managers to adopt conservative accounting to protect the long-
term interests of shareholders. Moreover, the second empirical study (Chapter 
3) suggests that boards are able to adjust the approach of accounting 
conservatism for the interests of shareholders. In particular, more conservative 
accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness in third-party 
LBOs, but a low level of board effectiveness in MBOs. It is also suggested that 
the levels of accounting conservatism reflect the extent to which the board has 
ability, knowledge, expertise and experience to carry out their duties that are 
attributed to the effectiveness of the board. By using the alternative measure of 
board effectiveness in the analysis, the research finds that the results are 
consistent throughout the models. This may indicate that levels of accounting 
conservatism are a reasonable measure of board effectiveness. 
 
Moreover, this research has implication to understand the effects of the board, 
especially the interrelationship between board structures and board 
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effectiveness and their influence on shareholder wealth. The multiple 
regression approach and SEM are used in analysing the moderating or 
mediating effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover 
premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs. Overall, this research provides 
evidence for the existence of moderating effects of board structures on the 
relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs. In 
particular, by using the multiple regression approach and SEM, it is found that, 
in MBOs, the magnitude of board effectiveness on takeover premiums is 
negatively influenced by, or moderated by board size. This implies that the link 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs is significantly 
different across board sizes. The finding illustrates that a small board could 
improve communication and coordination among members and reduce the 
free-rider problems that are a factor when protecting shareholder wealth (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Lehn et al., 2009; Harris and 
Raviv, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, using multi-group analysis, this research finds that the proportion 
of non-executive directors has moderating effects on the relationship between 
board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs. The magnitudes of board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums are positively affected by, or moderated by, 
the proportion of non-executives on the board. This suggests that a high 
proportion of non-executives on the board can benefit the board’s monitoring 
by increasing the directors’ independence and objectivity in decision-making, 
which contributes to shareholder wealth protection (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Cotter et al., 1997). 
However, this result is not consistent with the findings in multiple regression 
analysis. This may be because, in multi-group analysis, the continuous 
variables ‘proportion of non-executives’ and ‘board effectiveness’ (C-score) are 
artificially converted into categorical variables that can lead to information loss 
and spurious interaction effects (MacCallum et al., 2002; Irwin and McClelland, 
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2001).Moreover, the sample size of the research is small, which may affect the 
results in SEM analysis (Frazier et al., 2004; Fitzsimons, 2008).  
 
Also, using the multiple regression approach and SEM, this research finds that 
board effectiveness has moderating effects in the relationship between CEO 
duality and takeover premiums in MBOs. This indicates that, in MBOs, the link 
between CEO duality and takeover premiums varies across the levels of board 
effectiveness. In MBO firms, takeover premiums tend to deteriorate with CEO 
duality when firms have more effective boards. However, when the CEO and 
the chairman are the same person, the takeover premiums for MBO firms with 
less effective boards are, surprisingly, higher than firms with more effective 
boards. This may indicate that duality could provide managers with more control 
power over the board and a strong desire to accomplish MBOs quickly, which 
might incentivise them to increase their offer price (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1998). However, this research finds that board structures (board 
effectiveness) do not have mediation effects in relationship between board 
effectiveness (board structures) and takeover premiums in third-party LBOs 
and MBOs. 
 
In addition, this research has implication for using different approach includes 
multiple regression analysis and SEM to analyse the moderating and mediating 
effects. Specifically, multiple regression analysis is a widely used tool to predict 
variance based on a continuous dependent variable and continuous, 
dichotomous or dummy independent variables (Ro, 2012). It allows the analysis 
to control for factors that may simultaneously affect the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2015). Moreover, multiple regression analysis can work in small 
data sets (Kuiper, 2008; Freund et al., 2006). However, this approach has some 
limitations that may affect the results of the analysis. First, in the multiple 
regression approach, the creation of interaction terms may result in compound 
measurement errors that dramatically reduce the reliability of the interaction 
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terms. In turn, the low reliability of the interaction terms may reduce the power 
of the test that lead the results to be misspecified (Aguinis et al., 2001; Jaccard 
and Wan, 1996; Frazier et al., 2004; Holmbeck, 1997). Second, in the 
regression model, there is no distinction between a moderator variable (Mo) 
and an independent variable (X). Hence, the results might be misinterpreted.  
 
SEM has some advantages over the multiple regression approach in the 
analysis. First, SEM can be used to test the complex relationships between one 
or more independent and outcome variables (Hox and Bechger, 1998). Second, 
in SEM, the correlated errors of measurement are added to a measurement 
model that can improve the overall fit of a model and minimise the problem of 
underestimation (Holmbeck, 1997; Hoyle and Smith, 1994). However, this 
approach may also have some limitations. First, the multiple-group approach is 
a valuable SEM strategy to test moderation effects, which has limitations when 
both the independent (X) and the moderator (Mo) variables are continuous  
(Tomarken and Waller, 2005; Ro, 2012). Although the researcher can convert 
the continuous moderator (Mo) into a categorical variable and then use the 
multi-group approach, this artificial grouping may result in loss of information 
and reduction in power to detect interaction effects (Frazier et al., 2004; 
Fitzsimons, 2008). In addition, artificially dichotomising two continuous 
variables may make the predictors have opposite effects and lead to spurious 
interaction effects (MacCallum et al., 2002; Irwin and McClelland, 2001). 
Moreover, SEM is generally based on large sample sizes (Kline, 2015; 
Tomarken and Waller, 2005). Jackson (2003) suggests that the sample size-to-
parameters ratio should be not less than 10:1. Kline (2015) suggests that the 
‘typical’ sample size for SEM is about 200. Small samples may result in loss of 
information and reduction of power of the results. Considering the advantages 
and disadvantages of these approaches, this study suggests that the 
moderating effects of continuous variables are more reliable in multiple 
regression analysis. However, the moderating effects of categorical variables 
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tend to be more reliable in SEM. Moreover, the mediation results in SEM 
analysis are more reliable. 
 
However, this research has some limitations. First, the sample size of this study 
is relatively small. SEM requires a minimum sample size of 200. Failure to meet 
this requirement may mean that the SEM approach is untenable and result in 
misinterpretation. This is because SEM is based on maximum likelihood 
analysis, which does not perform well with small samples (Kline, 2015). A small 
sample size may cause a Type I error. Due to this limitation, this study uses 
both multiple regression and SEM approaches in its analysis. The future 
research could examine the research questions using SEM with a large sample 
size. Second, this study uses AMOS in performing SEM. However, AMOS does 
not provide a test for endogeneity. Therefore, this study only checks 
endogeneity in the multiple regression approach. The future research could use 
alternative software to run SEM tests. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This thesis examined the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
opportunistic behaviours by management prior to LBOs in the UK. As previously 
discussed, leveraged buyouts are a distinct and increasingly important type of 
M&A in global finance. The UK is, after the US, the world’s second largest LBO 
market. LBOs can be subdivided into two types of transactions: third-party 
LBOs and MBOs. A third-party LBO is led by outside investors, while an MBO 
is led by the target firm’s management (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 
2006). In companies which might become subject to a third-party LBO, 
managers are likely to have long-term job security issues that may motivate 
them to engage in opportunistic behaviours to manipulate earnings upwards to 
impede the takeover (Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006; Amess and 
Wright, 2012). However, this may conflict with the interests of shareholders, as 
the overstatement will eventually be reversed, which is not in the long-term 
interests of shareholders (Hafzalla, 2009; He et al., 2010). 
 
In MBOs, the direct involvement of management may also generate a conflict 
of interest between the target firm’s managers and shareholders. In such 
transactions, managers are on both sides of these transactions. Managers are 
not only acting on behalf of shareholders to seek the highest possible purchase 
price, but also acting as buyers who are motivated to maximise their own 
interests by reducing their purchase price (Lowenstein, 1985; Hafzalla, 2009; 
Weir et al., 2005b; Weir and Wright, 2006). Therefore, third-party LBOs and 
MBOs can provide managers with different incentives that motivate them to 
behave opportunistically. 
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Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to prevent expropriation by 
managers to ensure that the interests of shareholders are protected (Ahmed 
and Duellman, 2007; Lara et al., 2009). Good corporate governance 
mechanisms can mitigate the conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders, either by effectively motivating managers or better controlling and 
monitoring their behaviour. Weak corporate governance mechanisms, on the 
other hand, may enable greater managerial discretion, which is associated with 
more opportunistic behaviour by managers (Lara et al., 2007; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Therefore, this thesis explored how corporate governance 
mechanisms may affect such opportunistic behaviours by managers in third-
party LBO and MBO settings in the UK. 
 
In order to meet these aims, this thesis comprised three empirical studies, 
which were structured to compare third-party LBOs with MBOs in the UK market. 
In general, buyouts are likely to affect managerial interests that provide a 
unique opportunity to examine the conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders. The first empirical study (Chapter 2) investigated the influence of 
managerial interests on takeover resistance and bid premiums in third-party 
LBOs and MBOs. The results suggest that these two types of buyouts can 
generate clear conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders that 
may motivate managers to engage in different activities to protect their own 
interests. However, how could managers maximise their interests prior to MBOs 
and third-party LBOs? Moreover, to what extent does the corporate governance 
mechanism works on protecting the interests of shareholders before the 
buyouts become an interesting question.  
 
Accounting conservatism usually indicates that managers have adopted 
prudent attitudes in earnings recognition, where bad news will be recognised 
as losses in a timelier manner than good news to be recognised as gains (Basu, 
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1997). Conservative accounting is proposed to reduce the overvaluation of 
firms. However, it may indeed reduce the firm’s current value (Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Basu, 1997; Chan et al., 2009; Chen and Zhang, 2007). 
Managers are likely to engage in different levels of accounting conservatism in 
order to manipulate the earnings and protect their self-interests (Beekes et al., 
2004; Begley et al., 2003). Hence, the second empirical study (Chapter 3) 
examined the existence of accounting conservatism and the relationship 
between corporate governance and accounting conservatism prior to third-
party LBOs and MBOs.  
 
Moreover, the investigation of the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in the first empirical study suggested that these variables 
were not significantly correlated in third-party LBOs and MBOs. The previous 
studies (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995; Klein, 1998; Bøhren 
and Strøm, 2010; Belkhir, 2009; Pacini et al., 2008; Bliss, 2011; Elsayed, 2007) 
also found an inclusive relationship between board structures and performance 
outcomes. It is recognised that the overall impact of the board is determined by 
its structures as well as its effectiveness. Conflating board structures and board 
effectiveness can lead to misleading results. 
 
Lim (2011) suggests that effective boards are likely to require the managers to 
adopt conservative accounting for the long-term interests of shareholders. 
Moreover, the second empirical study (Chapter 3) suggests that boards are able 
to adjust the approach of accounting conservatism prior to buyouts in order to 
protect shareholder interests. In particular, it is found that effective boards are 
likely to push managers to engage in less conservative accounting prior to 
MBOs, but more conservative accounting prior to third-party LBOs. Hence, the 
levels of accounting conservatism are used to measure board effectiveness. 
The third empirical study (Chapter 4) examined the impact of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs, 
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by taking into account the potential of moderating or mediating effects of board 
structures and board effectiveness. 
 
5.2  Results and Findings 
The first empirical study (Chapter 2) focused on examining the effects of 
managerial incentive schemes, including managerial ownership and share 
options on takeover resistance and bid premiums in third-party LBOs and 
MBOs. The findings suggested that higher managerial ownership can lead to a 
greater likelihood of takeover resistance in third-party LBOs. This may be 
because high share ownership could provide managers with greater power and 
influence with the board, which may enable them to protect their own interests 
rather than those of shareholders (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). This implies 
that managers with high levels of share ownership are able to resist third-party 
LBO offers to protect their long-term job security. Regarding MBOs, this 
research found that there was no significant relationship between managerial 
ownership and takeover resistance. This may be because, managers’ 
involvement in MBOs could provide them with stronger incentives that affect 
their decision-making, independent of their prior shares in the firm. 
 
Moreover, as expected, the findings suggested that managerial share options 
were negatively related to takeover resistance in third-party LBOs, while this 
relationship was positive in MBOs. This suggests that managers with higher 
share options are less likely to resist third-party LBO offers, as these share 
options can be exercised immediately after takeover so that more returns may 
accrue for them (Moeller, 2005). While share options are also exercisable after 
MBO transactions, managers are less likely to exercise their share options via 
a cash pay-off, instead increasing their ownership of the firm (Veenman et al., 
2011; Sanders, 2001). Moreover, if boards are aware of managers’ incentives 
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from share options, which would be immediately exercisable after the takeover 
offer, they might be more cautious about MBO offers and tend to resist 
takeovers. 
 
Furthermore, the research found that managerial ownership was positively 
related to takeover premiums in third-party LBOs, but was not significantly 
correlated in MBOs. This may imply that high ownership has provided 
managers with incentives to demand high premiums. They might get the 
bidders to stop or they may at least get a higher premium on their shares (Song 
and Walkling, 1993). 
 
In addition, the findings suggested that managerial share options were 
negatively related to takeover premiums in both third-party LBOs and MBOs. In 
third-party LBOs, managers have incentives to exercise their share options 
after a takeover. Higher managerial share options may reduce managers’ 
incentives to drive up the takeover premiums, where higher premiums may be 
associated with a high risk of takeover failure. Moreover, it is surprising that 
share ownership does not affect takeover premiums in MBOs, but share options 
negatively affect them. In MBOs, share options do not have cash incentives. 
Managers may try to make their options exercisable and therefore increase 
their shares in the firm after a takeover. Hence, in order to reduce their possible 
purchase price of MBOs, managers are less likely to offer high premiums when 
they held higher share options (Moeller, 2005; Bauguess et al., 2009). This may 
also be a reason to explain why higher share options were positively associated 
with board resistance in MBOs. 
 
To summarise, the results suggested that the effects of managerial incentive 
schemes on takeover resistance and bid premiums were different in third-party 
LBOs and MBOs. This may be because these two types of buyouts have shown 
that managers with different incentives may affect their behaviours. In MBOs, 
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managers’ direct involvement may motivate them to depress their purchase 
price, while in third-party LBOs managers may have incentives to protect their 
long-term job security to impede a takeover (Hafzalla, 2009; Watts, 2003b). 
 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that the different pay-off structures of share 
ownership versus share options may provide different incentives to managers 
and thus lead to different managerial behaviours in decision-making (Vallascas 
and Hagendorff, 2013; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Burns and Kedia, 2006). 
 
The second empirical study (Chapter 3) investigated the degree of accounting 
conservatism and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms (board 
characteristics and ownership characteristics) on accounting conservatism 
preceding third-party LBOs and MBOs. The research found that managers 
tended to engage in more conservative accounting one year prior to an MBO 
than in a third-party LBO. This may be because managers’ direct involvement 
in MBOs may generate incentives for them to reduce the perception of the firm’s 
value and depress the purchase price (Hafzalla, 2009; Elitzur et al., 1998). 
Conservative accounting may possibly reduce the perceived value of the firm 
by delaying the recognition of good news as gains but recognise bad news as 
losses in a timely manner (Hafzalla, 2009; Beekes et al., 2004; Perry and 
Williams, 1994). However, managers may have incentives to prevent third-party 
LBOs to protect their long-term job security. Hence, prior to third-party LBOs, 
managers are likely to engage in less conservative accounting than prior to 
MBOs in order to increase the firm’s perceived value and thereby impede 
potential third-party bids. The findings of this research indicate that managers’ 
behaviours towards accounting conservatism are different in third-party LBOs 
and MBOs. 
 
Moreover, the research found that the accounting conservatism shifted from 
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more to less conservative preceding third-party LBOs, from year Y−2 (two years 
before the announcement of a buyout) to year Y−1 (one year before the 
announcement of a buyout) and from year Y−3 (three years before the 
announcement of a buyout) to year Y−1 (see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3). This is 
because third-party LBOs may provide managers with incentives to protect their 
long-term job security, which motivates them to engage in less conservative 
accounting disclosure to avoid the firm being undervalued and become the 
target of a third-party LBO. However, artificial overstatements resulting from 
less conservative accounting will be offset by an eventual reversed and thus 
negative impact on future earnings (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
Continuously aggressive accounting disclosure may result in poor quality 
reporting, which is bad for managers’ reputations (Francis et al., 2008). 
 
Furthermore, as expected, the findings suggested that the degree of accounting 
conservatism shifted from less to more conservative preceding MBOs, from 
year Y−2 to year Y−1. This may indicate that there is a mean-reversion of 
managerial behaviours towards accounting conservatism. Before managers 
initiate an MBO, they may have incentives to manipulate earnings upwards to 
obtain greater earning-based pay, which may lead them to apply less 
conservative accounting. However, the direct involvement of managers in 
MBOs tends to provide them with incentives to reduce the firm’s value and thus 
depress the purchase price. 
 
In addition, the research found that corporate governance mechanisms had 
different impacts on accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs and 
MBOs. First, CEO duality tended to result in less conservative accounting 
before third-party LBOs, while there was no significant relationship prior to 
MBOs. Duality gives the CEO a concentrated power and position, which may 
enable the CEO to behave opportunistically (Cornett et al., 2008; Desai et al., 
2003). Such a CEO might be motivated to protect their long-term job security 
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and power within the firm prior to a third-party LBO. 
 
Second, the proportion of non-executives on the board led to more conservative 
accounting prior to third-party LBOs, but they were not significantly related for 
MBOs. A high proportion of non-executive directors can increase the 
independence of the board, which benefits the board’s control over 
management (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Lara et al., 2007). Boards with a higher 
proportion of non-executives are likely to reduce managers’ opportunistic 
behaviours and apply more conservative accounting prior to a third-party LBO. 
 
Third, surprisingly, audit committee independence was related to less 
conservative accounting both before MBOs and third-party LBOs. While, in the 
case of MBOs this works to shareholders’ advantage, in the third-party LBO 
case it does not. The independent audit committee works to circumvent those 
managers in the target firm who deliberately cut its perceived value via more 
conservative accounting disclosure (Klein, 2002b; Klein, 2002a). Prior to MBOs, 
non-executives may be aware of potential conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. More independent audit committees are likely to 
support less conservative accounting disclosure to avoid managers artificially 
depressing the firm’s value. However, prior to third-party LBOs, the research 
found that independent audit committees supported less conservative 
accounting. This may be because third-party LBOs are more difficult to predict. 
The non-executives may not aware of the conflicts of interests. Hence, audit 
committee independence may not effectively protect shareholder interests prior 
to third-party LBOs. 
 
Fourth, as expected, institutional shareholding may lead to more conservative 
accounting prior to third-party LBOs and MBOs. This may be because 
concentrated institutional shareholdings may provide institutional investors with 
longer investment horizons that motivate them to push the board to apply a 
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conservative accounting disclosure (Brickley et al., 1988; Ramalingegowda and 
Yu, 2012). As higher ownership may make institutional investors assume the 
results of overstated earnings, such investors are likely to push the board to 
adopt more conservative accounting disclosure to protect their long-term 
interests. Moreover, the board of directors will be worried that aggressive 
accounting may be detected by institutional investors, which may increase their 
perception of investment risk. 
 
Fifth, this research found that there was a ‘U-shaped’ relationship between 
managerial ownership and accounting conservatism prior to third-party LBOs. 
This may be because managerial ownership has alighment and entrenchment 
effects. According to incentive alignment effects, interest-aligned managers 
have a disincentive to act opportunistically and work to protect the interests of 
shareholders (Shuto and Takada, 2010; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
Hence, managers with higher ownership are less likely to apply more 
conservative accounting prior to third-party LBOs, because it can deliberately 
cut the firm’s perceived value, which works against shareholder wealth 
maximisation (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Basu, 1997). However, at certain 
levels, managerial ownership may generate entrenchment effects that motivate 
them to engage in more conservative accounting. This is because the prediction 
of third-party LBOs is difficult. Overstatements via less conservative reporting 
will be offset by an eventual decline in the firm’s value when these 
overstatements are reversed; a larger managerial ownership may make 
managers assume the results of this (Shuto and Takada, 2010; Lafond and 
Roychowdhury, 2008; Morck et al., 1988a). 
 
To summarise, the results suggested that corporate governance mechanisms 
were more effective in protecting shareholder interests prior to third-party LBOs 
than prior to MBOs. In the MBO case, before directors are aware of the 
impending offer, more conservative accounting is likely to be seen positively. 
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The third-party LBO case is similar to the normal case where managers try to 
avoid undervaluation to deter takeover bids or to increase their pay (Weir et al., 
2005a; Weir et al., 2005b; Hafzalla, 2009). Prior to third-party LBOs, good 
corporate governance can constrain managers to engage in less conservative 
accounting. However, prior to MBOs, governance mechanisms are less 
effective, which may not have significant effects on the degree of accounting 
conservatism. As conservative accounting can indeed protect the long-term 
interests of shareholders, some boards of directors may not be familiar with 
certain of the firm’s operations, which then makes it difficult to challenge the 
decisions of management. 
 
The inconclusive relationship between board structures and takeover premiums 
in the first empirical study (Chapter 2) may indicate that the research failed to 
model the impact of boards on performance outcomes. As the overall impact of 
a board is determined by its structures and effectiveness, the third empirical 
study (Chapter 4) focused on the impact of board structures and board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBOs and MBOs. The 
findings suggested that board size had moderating effects on the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs. This 
relationship was more positive when board size was smaller. This indicates that 
the link between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBOs may vary 
depending on the size of the board, where a small board achieves higher 
takeover premiums relative to a large board when there is a high level of 
effectiveness. The finding suggests that a small board could improve board 
communication and coordination and reduces the free-rider problems that may 
facilitate shareholder wealth protection (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996; Lehn et al., 2009; Harris and Raviv, 2008). 
 
The research also found that board effectiveness moderated the relationship 
between CEO duality and takeover premiums in MBOs. This relationship was 
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more negative when there was a higher level of board effectiveness. This might 
suggest that a board with high levels of effectiveness can achieve high 
premiums when the firm has a separate CEO and chairman relative to a board 
with low effectiveness, and achieve lower premiums when the CEO and the 
chairman are the same person. This may be because the board can effectively 
monitor a CEO with a separate position from the chairman than a CEO who 
holds both positions (Arthur, 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
 
5.3  Implications 
Overall, the findings in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have implications for regulators, 
policy makers and accounting standard setters for the development of 
accounting information disclosure and corporate governance systems. 
 
First, this research may have implications for the board of directors and 
investors in understanding the managerial incentives and opportunistic 
behaviours preceding the LBO setting. 
 
The findings suggested that managers engaged in more conservative 
accounting disclosure prior to MBOs than prior to third-party LBOs. Managers 
may use more conservative accounting to reduce the perceived value of the 
firm before an MBO, thereby depressing the possible purchase price. Managers 
can also use less conservative (i.e. more aggressive) accounting disclosure to 
increase the firm’s perceived value and reduce the probability that the firm is 
undervalued in an attempt to impede a third-party LBO. Therefore, the findings 
reveal that more conservative accounting prior to MBOs is purposed to 
manipulate earnings and defraud the current shareholders. The board and 
shareholders should enhance monitoring of accounting information disclosure 
prior to an MBO. 
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Moreover, accounting conservatism shifted from less to more conservative prior 
to MBOs, but from more to less conservative prior to third-party LBOs. This 
implies that buyouts do indeed provide incentives to managers that affect their 
behaviour. As managers are likely to have a conflict of interests with 
shareholders, the board and shareholders should enhance monitoring and 
control over management. 
 
Second, this research has implications for the board of directors and 
shareholders in the understanding of the effects of managerial incentives, 
including managerial ownership and share options in shareholder wealth 
protection. 
 
Specifically, the research found that managerial ownership was positively 
associated with takeover resistance and bid premiums in third-party LBOs, but 
did not have a significant relationship in MBOs. This implies that high 
managerial ownership could lead to managers’ opportunistic behaviour during 
a third-party LBOs. The board and shareholders should be aware that in 
companies with high levels of managerial ownership, managers may pursue 
their own interests instead of those of shareholders when facing a third-party 
LBO. Moreover, managerial share options were positively related to takeover 
resistance in MBOs, but were negatively related in third-party LBOs. There was 
a negative relationship between share options and takeover premiums in MBOs 
and third-party LBOs. This implies that managerial option schemes may fail to 
motivate managers to protect shareholder interests when facing a takeover. 
The board and shareholders should pay attention to the presence of significant 
share options of managers before a takeover, which may lead to their 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
In addition, managerial ownership had a non-linear relationship with accounting 
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conservatism prior to third-party LBOs. This has implications for corporate 
governance regulation, suggesting that managerial ownership should be limited. 
Extremely high managerial ownership can only generate entrenchment effects 
that are harmful to the interests of shareholders. The board and shareholders 
should be aware of managers with extremely levels of high ownership prior to 
third-party LBOs. 
 
Third, this research may have implications for the board of directors, 
shareholders and regulators in understanding the corporate governance 
mechanisms regarding the improvement of the board’s monitoring and control 
over management. 
 
The research found that audit committee independence was negatively related 
to accounting conservatism prior to MBOs. This implies that the audit committee 
is effective in monitoring and controlling accounting reporting prior to MBOs, 
which works to protect the interests of current shareholders. The improvement 
of audit committee independence and effectiveness contributes to the 
protection of current shareholder wealth. Moreover, the research found that the 
proportion of non-executives was not significantly related to accounting 
conservatism prior to MBOs. This reveals that a high proportion of non-
executive directors is unable to reduce opportunistic behaviour of managers 
prior to MBOs. Firms should therefore enhance the independence and the 
effectiveness of the non-executives on the board prior to an MBO. 
 
Moreover, CEO duality was negatively related to accounting conservatism prior 
to third-party LBOs. This implies that separating the position of CEO and 
chairman may help to mitigate managers’ opportunistic behaviours prior to 
third-party LBOs, as their control and power might then be limited. However, 
the proportion of non-executives and institutional shareholdings are positively 
correlated to accounting conservatism preceding third-party LBOs. This implies 
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that non-executives and institutional shareholders have played very important 
roles in monitoring managers’ opportunistic behaviours preceding third-party 
LBOs. 
 
Fourth, this research may have implications for understanding the 
interrelationship between board structures and board effectiveness and their 
effects on shareholder wealth protection. 
 
Specifically, the research found that there were moderating effects of the board 
size on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in MBOs. It also found that board effectiveness had moderating effects on the 
relationship between CEO duality and takeover premiums in MBOs. This 
implies that there is an interrelationship between board structures and board 
effectiveness. Board structures should be distinguished from board 
effectiveness in analysis. Research should consider the compounded impact of 
board structures and board effectiveness rather than focusing on their direct 
relationship to performance outcomes. 
 
5.4  Limitations and Suggestions 
This thesis has some limitations. First, due to the limitation of data available, 
the sample of this research includes both third-party LBO and MBO 
transactions, but did not match their firm size or industry when comparing 
managerial behaviours in different settings. This is because MBOs and third-
party LBOs have small sample size, which are 124 and 88 in the study. The 
matching exercise can dramatically reduce the sample size of the study, which 
may reduce the reliability of the study and can lead to a misinterpretation (Kline, 
2015). In particular, the matching exercise can artificially reduce the sample 
size that can lead to the loss of information and reduction of statistical power, 
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which is the Type II error (Frazier et al., 2004; Fitzsimons, 2008; Kline, 2015; 
Freiman et al., 1978). Moreover, this may also lead to the Type I error, which 
can cause opposite effect of the results (Irwin and McClelland, 2001; 
MacCallum et al., 2002; Roussos and Stout, 1996; Kline, 2015). Therefore, 
instead of matching the size of the sample, this study uses firm size as a control 
variable in the study. 
 
Second, the sample of this thesis mainly focuses on the successful third-party 
LBOs and MBOs in the market; however, there are more unsuccessful buyout 
transactions in the market that are not observed. Managers’ behaviours and the 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms may be different in successful 
and unsuccessful buyouts. Future research could extend the study to the 
unsuccessful buyout setting and investigate to what extent the findings of this 
research can be applied in unsuccessful third-party LBO and MBO settings. 
 
Third, the sample period of this thesis covers a significant leveraged buyout 
wave from 1997 to 2011. However, corporate governance information is limited 
in scope before 2006. Prior to 2006, the proportion of independent non-
executives is not reported. Therefore, this study only includes non-executive 
directors in its analysis. However, the non-executive directors may not be 
completely independent in the monitoring and controlling of managerial 
behaviours that might affect the results of the analysis. Future research could 
add to studies by examining the effects of corporate governance in buyout 
transactions after 2006, in an attempt to reduce the effects of this. Moreover, 
by adding the impact of corporate governance prior to leveraged buyouts, it 
might be possible to focus on the US market, which might provide a larger 
sample and fuller data. 
 
Fourth, this study has used the initial mood of the boards (hostile takeovers) to 
measure takeover resistance, which takes the value of 0 if the bid is friendly 
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and 1 otherwise. However, this measure has some limitations. First, the target 
resistance indicates a dissatisfaction with target management and board, which 
is raising from the actions include any verbal statement indicating the offer is 
not supported or inadequate, definitive actions such as legal maneuvering or 
any restructuring, and initiating or actively participating in the cancellation of a 
proposed acquisition (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993; Bradley et al., 1983; 
Dimopoulos and Sacchetto, 2014; Bates and Becher, 2015; Carline et al., 2016). 
However, due to the sample of this study focuses on going private companies 
starting from 1997, in which the deal information is limited, this research only 
measure resistance via the initial mood of the boards. Moreover, the hostile 
takeovers in third-party LBOs and MBOs have relatively small size, which tends 
to affect the validity, power and robustness of the results. Previous studies (e.g. 
Nayak, 2010; Button et al., 2013) suggest that a smaller sample may provide 
insufficient power in detecting a real effect and the study may turn out to be 
falsely negative and lead to a type II error. Therefore, the future study could run 
the analysis with an alternative measure of takeover resistance and focuses on 
large sample size. 
 
Fifth, this research only focuses on corporate governance mechanisms, 
including CEO duality, the proportion of non-executives on the board, audit 
committee independence, managerial ownership, non-executive shareholding 
and institutional shareholding. Any future research could explore other 
governance factors that may affect accounting conservatism. More research 
could focus on the impact of other board characteristics, such as board 
qualifications and expertise on accounting conservatism prior to buyouts. 
 
Sixth, in Chapter 4, the research uses structural equation modelling (SEM) to 
analyse moderating and mediating effects of board structures and board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums prior to buyouts. However, the sample size 
for MBOs and third-party LBOs is relatively small in the analysis. A small sample 
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when using SEM may result in misinterpretations that affect the reliability of the 
results (Kline, 2015). Therefore, it is suggested that future studies test the 
moderating and mediating effects of board structures and board effectiveness 
using a larger sample. Moreover, future research could investigate the 
moderating and mediating effects of board structures and board effectiveness 
in a setting other than leveraged buyouts, which might provide sufficient data 
for analysis. 
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Appendix 
Tables 
Table 2.8 Sample of MBO and third-party LBO tender offers 
Panel A: Sample for Determinants of 
Takeover Resistance 
Panel B: Sample for Determinants of 
Takeover Premiums 
 MBO Third-party LBO  MBO Third-party LBO 
Fiscal Year N N Fiscal Year N N 
1997 4 2 1997 4 2 
1998 12 3 1998 10 3 
1999 22 12 1999 20 11 
2000 17 8 2000 15 8 
2001 12 0 2001 12 0 
2002 7 2 2002 6 2 
2003 6 4 2003 6 4 
2004 2 2 2004 2 2 
2005 1 5 2005 0 4 
2006 1 13 2006 1 12 
2007 4 7 2007 4 7 
2008 2 3 2008 2 3 
2009 1 2 2009 1 2 
2010 0 0 2010 0 0 
2011 1 2 2011 1 2 
Total 92 65 Total 84 62 
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Table 2.9 The Pearson correlations matrix for determinants of takeover resistance 
Panel A: MBOs 
 resist prem exeown exeownv  ceoown ceoownv  exeso pe fcf roa size other-own  level ceoch 
resist 1.000              
prem 0.068 1.000             
exeown -0.034 -0.064 1.000            
exeownv  0.067 0.058 0.451*** 1.000           
ceoown -0.101 -0.097 0.752*** 0.271*** 1.000          
ceoownv -0.042 0.042 0.258** 0.833*** 0.403*** 1.000         
exeso 0.007 -0.257** -0.112 0.046 -0.100 0.084 1.000        
pe -0.012 0.340*** -0.046 -0.034 0.012 -0.001 -0.047 1.000       
fcf 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.028 0.105 0.083 -0.111 0.088 1.000      
roa 0.005 -0.135 0.181* 0.056 0.215** 0.051 -0.026 0.012 0.206** 1.000     
size 0.032 -0.167 -0.211** 0.150 -0.170 0.125 0.175* 0.010 -0.154 0.317*** 1.000    
other-own  -0.010 -0.024 0.321*** 0.195* -0.101 -0.081 -0.276*** -0.029 0.083 0.073 -0.067 1.000   
level -0.017 -0.069 -0.087 0.042 -0.096 -0.016 0.161 -0.038 -0.193* -0.121 -0.087 -0.026 1.000  
ceoch 0.199* -0.078 -0.180* -0.093 -0.148 -0.063 -0.104 -0.061 -0.047 -0.066 -0.022 0.058 0.010 1.000 
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Panel B: Third-party LBOs 
 resist prem exeown exeownv  ceoown ceoownv  exeso pe fcf roa size other-own  level ceoch 
resist 1.000              
prem -0.074 1.000             
exeown -0.040 0.028 1.000            
exeownv 0.390*** -0.013 0.119 1.000           
ceoown -0.078 -0.040 0.807*** -0.026 1.000          
ceoownv -0.022 -0.033 0.170 0.051 0.262** 1.000         
exeso 0.073 -0.040 -0.028 0.076 -0.074 -0.328*** 1.000        
pe 0.034 -0.326*** -0.169 0.010 -0.081 0.011 -0.118 1.000       
fcf -0.058 -0.091 0.119 0.027 0.166 -0.146 0.135 -0.025 1.000      
roa -0.051 -0.462*** 0.275** 0.052 0.270** 0.027 -0.063 -0.023 0.420*** 1.000     
size 0.419*** -0.207* -0.313** 0.310** -0.301** 0.082 0.189 -0.068 0.037 0.168 1.000    
other-own  -0.092 -0.075 0.502*** 0.117 0.147 -0.042 0.020 -0.168 -0.055 0.067 -0.278** 1.000   
level -0.086 -0.206* -0.277** -0.076 -0.188 0.154 -0.224* 0.272** -0.355*** -0.285** 0.208* -0.107 1.000  
ceoch 0.266** 0.046 0.025 -0.045 -0.121 -0.086 0.163 -0.074 -0.097 -0.022 0.065 0.181 -0.040 1.000 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover 
premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is percentage of 
ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price 
earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. 
fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is the 
natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the 
dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. 
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Table 2.10 The Pearson correlations matrix for determinants of takeover premiums 
Panel A: MBOs  
 prem  exeown exeownv ceoown ceoownv  exeso pe fcf roa size other-own level ned multi insti  lnnas 
prem  1.000                
exeown -0.015 1.000               
exeownv 0.057 0.478*** 1.000              
ceoown -0.041 0.736*** 0.301*** 1.000             
ceoownv  0.042 0.270** 0.834*** 0.437*** 1.000            
exeso -0.333*** -0.016 0.059 0.049 0.105 1.000           
pe 0.329*** -0.040 -0.021 0.018 0.010 -0.163 1.000          
fcf 0.022 0.051 0.026 0.151 0.086 -0.149 0.052 1.000         
roa -0.108 0.123 0.066 0.141 0.059 0.033 -0.039 0.230** 1.000        
size -0.168 -0.192* 0.172 -0.162 0.145 0.161 -0.013 -0.147 0.314*** 1.000       
other-own -0.034 0.336*** 0.187* -0.086 -0.086 -0.310*** 0.016 0.064 0.106 -0.036 1.000      
level -0.092 -0.072 0.045 -0.051 -0.012 0.124 -0.108 -0.232** -0.102 -0.082 -0.047 1.000     
ned 0.044 -0.515*** -0.186* -0.327*** -0.087 -0.188* 0.247** 0.036 0.102 0.175 0.013 0.139 1.000    
multi 0.175 -0.160 -0.117 -0.155 -0.073 0.015 0.188* -0.017 0.144 0.122 -0.134 -0.042 0.142 1.000   
insti  -0.073 -0.538*** -0.204* -0.394*** -0.113 0.189* -0.124 -0.098 -0.158 0.121 -0.415*** 0.223** 0.184* 0.078 1.000  
lnnas 0.216** -0.230** -0.017 -0.137 0.052 0.048 0.088 -0.187* -0.054 0.501*** -0.318*** -0.169 0.095 0.155 0.052 1.000 
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Panel B: Third-party LBOs  
 prem  exeown exeownv ceoown ceoownv  exeso pe fcf roa size other-own level ned multi insti  lnnas 
prem  1.000                
exeown 0.017 1.000               
exeownv -0.016 0.117 1.000              
ceoown -0.048 0.806*** -0.029 1.000             
ceoownv  -0.039 0.165 0.049 0.258** 1.000            
exeso -0.039 -0.016 0.081 -0.065 -0.326*** 1.000           
pe -0.331*** -0.171 0.009 -0.083 0.010 -0.119 1.000          
fcf -0.092 0.122 0.028 0.170 -0.147 0.132 -0.022 1.000         
roa -0.475*** 0.277** 0.052 0.274** 0.026 -0.064 -0.018 0.409*** 1.000        
size -0.200 -0.303** 0.319** -0.293** 0.093 0.169 -0.067 0.035 0.179 1.000       
other-own -0.087 0.495*** 0.114 0.138 -0.051 0.035 -0.171 -0.053 0.065 -0.264** 1.000      
level -0.211* -0.298** -0.081 -0.204 0.151 -0.194 0.277** -0.355*** -0.291** 0.245* -0.126 1.000     
ned 0.070 -0.424*** -0.015 -0.231* -0.074 -0.080 -0.006 -0.052 -0.305** 0.187 -0.142 0.264** 1.000    
multi 0.229* -0.270** 0.145 -0.265** -0.169 0.256** -0.069 -0.073 -0.152 0.385*** -0.118 0.064 0.128 1.000   
insti  0.089 -0.290** -0.089 -0.241* -0.107 -0.162 0.303** 0.003 -0.151 -0.076 -0.250* 0.222* 0.080 0.078 1.000 
lnnas 0.094 -0.237* 0.221* -0.270** 0.132 0.050 -0.106 -0.037 0.068 0.232* -0.065 0.252** -0.050 0.096 0.007 1.000 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover 
premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is percentage of 
ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price 
earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. 
fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is the 
natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the 
dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. ned is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. insti is the total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common outstanding shares, where the shareholding is in excess 
of 3%. lnnas is the natural logarithm of the non-audit fees. multi is the dummy variable that code as 1 if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise 
0. 
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Table 2.11 The endogenous test of the relationship between managerial 
ownership and takeover premiums: using 2SLS 
 Dependent Variable=PREM 
 LBO MBO Third-party LBO 
 Model37 Model38 Model39 Model40 Model41 Model42 
exeown 2.330 0.904 6.633 -1.425 0.546 0.262 
 (1.315) (0.680) (0.372) (-0.680) (0.406) (0.190) 
exeso  -0.029***  -0.034**  -0.024 
  (-3.020)  (-1.990)  (-1.560) 
pe -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.004* -0.004** 
 (-0.422) (-0.980) (-0.170) (1.460) (-1.886) (-1.980) 
fcf 0.832 0.520 1.865 -1.339 0.421 0.628 
 (0.895) (0.680) (0.386) (-0.150) (0.510) (0.740) 
roa -2.628* -1.903 -4.527 0.368 -3.589*** -3.731*** 
 (-1.674) (-1.510) (-0.381) (0.200) (-3.282) (-3.430) 
size -0.029 -0.062 0.138 -0.178 -0.012 -0.010 
 (-0.448) (-1.180) (0.173) (-1.360) (-0.278) (-0.220) 
other-own -0.396 -0.222 -1.369 0.509 -0.840 -0.668 
 (-0.587) (-0.390) (-0.279) (0.670) (-1.089) (-0.850) 
level -0.901** -0.803** -1.135 0.543 -1.312*** -1.362*** 
 (-2.245) (-2.430) (-0.302) (0.920) (-3.333) (-3.420) 
ned 1.501* 0.895 5.079 -0.694 0.034 -0.179 
 (1.816) (1.390) (0.392) (-0.430) (0.049) (-0.025) 
multi 0.262** 0.286*** 0.419 0.056 0.152 0.184 
 (2.240) (2.880) (0.461) (0.320) (1.206) (1.510) 
insti 0.353 0.090 0.816 -0.034 0.477 0.336 
 (0.862) (0.270) (0.383) (-0.090) (1.332) (0.880) 
lnnas 0.111** 0.084** 0.149 0.096* 0.090** 0.085 
 (2.265) (2.160) (0.849) (1.820) (2.059) (1.940)) 
       
Constant -1.063 0.587 -6.533 3.218 -0.076 0.383 
 (-0.627) (0.480) (-0.303) (1.150) (-0.071) (0.330) 
       
Wald Chi2 26.400*** 46.150*** 3.3440 44.210*** 60.110*** 61.040*** 
Prob>Chi2 0.006 0.000 0.985 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-square 0.000 0.312 0.000 0.397 0.581 0.579 
Hausman 
chi2 
7.860 10.160 12.800 20.950 8.060 7.990 
Hausman 
Prob>chi2 
0.726 0.602 0.235 0.051 0.624 0.715 
Durbin 
(Score) chi2 
2.279 0.547 1.524 1.799 1.102 1.509 
Durbin 
(Score) 
Prob>chi2 
0.320 0.761 0.467 0.407 0.576 0.470 
Wu-
Hausman 
chi2 
1.010 0.235 0.577 0.663 0.412 0.553 
Wu-
Hausman 
0.368 0.791 0.566 0.521 0.666 0.580 
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Prob>chi2 
Basmann 
chi2 
1.115 0.802 1.481 1.030 3.234 2.158 
Basmann 
Prob>chi2 
0.291 0.338 0.224 0.310 0.072 0.142 
Observations 105 104 53 52 52 52 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. instrumental variables: ceo tenure is measured 
as the number of years as ceo of the firm; the risk of volatility is measured as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily share returns.; lagged roa is measured as 2 year lagged value of return on asset. prem 
is the takeover premium of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original 
announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. pe is the price earnings ratio that 
calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit 
industry classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from 
operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on 
assets. size is the natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target 
board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ned is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. multi is the dummy variable that code as 1 if there is more than one 
simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise 0. insti is the total common shares held by institutional 
investors divided by total common outstanding shares, where the shareholding is in excess of 3%. lnnas 
is the natural logarithm of the non-audit fee. 
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Table 2.12 The relationship between managerial ownership and takeover resistance in MBOs: using alternative measures 
of managerial ownership 
 Dependent Variable=resist 
 Model43 Model44 Model45 Model46 Model47 Model48 Model49 Model50 Model51 Model52 Model53 Model54 
ceoown -85.078  -85.078      -96.119 -96.119*     
 (-1.333) (-1.274)     (-1.533) (-1.647)     
exeownv   0.118  0.118      0.069 0.069   
   -0.727  -0.730      (0.425) (0.427)   
ceoownv     -9.101  -9.101      -9.341 -9.341 
     (-0.995) (-1.011)     (-1.010) (-1.088) 
exeso       0.221* 0.221 0.165* 0.165 0.193* 0.193 
       (1.761) (1.448) (1.798) (1.501) (1.927) (1.597) 
pe -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005* -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.380) (-0.436) (-0.808) (-0.987) (-0.612) (-0.710) (-0.241) (-0.266) (-1.436) (-1.922) (-1.120) (-1.356) 
fcf 5.326  5.326  5.039  5.039  5.512  5.512  7.190** 7.190** 6.758 6.758 7.550* 7.550* 
 -1.472  -1.327  -0.957  -0.861  -1.405  -1.277  (2.019) (2.080) (1.290) (1.262) (1.908) (1.934) 
roa 1.043  1.043  -1.237  -1.237  0.023  0.023  0.358 0.358 -2.252 -2.252 -0.921 -0.921 
 -0.184  -0.183  (-0.184) (-0.180) -0.004  -0.004  (0.073) (0.076) (-0.366) (-0.375) (-0.180) (-0.189) 
size 0.179  0.179  0.371  0.371  0.348  0.348  0.367 0.367 0.493 0.493 0.526 0.526* 
 -0.446  -0.440  -0.909  -0.944  -0.881  -0.875  (0.976) (1.075) (1.380) (1.483) (1.527) (1.659) 
other-own -1.444  -1.444  -0.973  -0.973  -1.415  -1.415  0.432 0.432 0.758 0.758 0.478 0.478 
 (-0.475) (-0.499) (-0.270) (-0.281) (-0.460) (-0.482) (0.143) (0.150) (0.234) (0.243) (0.151) (0.156) 
level 0.271  0.271  -0.100  -0.100  0.129  0.129  1.229 1.229 -0.052 -0.052 0.472 0.472 
 -0.030  -0.030  (-0.011) (-0.011) -0.014  -0.014  (0.130) (0.129) (-0.006) (-0.006) (0.053) (0.052) 
prem 1.537  1.537* 1.725* 1.725** 1.765* 1.765** 3.165** 3.165** 2.787** 2.787*** 3.140** 3.140** 
 -1.330  -1.934  -1.757  -2.442  -1.654  -2.205  (2.479) (2.569) (2.428) (2.853) (2.415) (2.575) 
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ceoch 1.826  1.826  2.667** 2.667** 2.089  2.089  2.504 2.504 3.046** 3.046** 2.666 2.666 
 -1.287  -1.416  -1.985  -2.107  -1.348  -1.453  (1.580) (1.478) (2.125) (2.028) (1.628) (1.547) 
Industry Cluster  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Constant -6.931  -6.931  -11.213  -11.213  -10.171  -10.171  -14.001* -14.001** -15.924** -15.924** -16.530*** -16.530*** 
 (-0.953) (-0.936) (-1.507) (-1.548) (-1.413) (-1.400) (-1.869) (-2.087) (-2.351) (-2.482) (-2.594) (-2.815) 
             
Wald Chi2 25.020*** 43.190*** 30.760*** 64.870*** 27.950*** 42.800*** 15.220 20.380** 24.220*** 41.110*** 17.080* 29.030*** 
Prob>Chi2 0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.124 0.023 0.007 0.000 0.073 0.001 
Pseudo R Square 0.210  0.210  0.146  0.146  0.179  0.179  0.238 0.238 0.163 0.163 0.201 0.201 
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the 
takeover premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is 
percentage of ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share 
price times the number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe 
is the price earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-
code) sorting. fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. 
size is the natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. 
ceoch is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
347 
Table 2.13 The relationship between managerial ownership and takeover resistance in third-party LBOs: using alternative 
measures of managerial ownership 
 Dependent Variable=resist 
 Model55 Model56 Model57 Model58 Model59 Model60 Model61 Model62 Model63 Model64 Model65 Model66 
ceoown 11.644** 11.644**     5.975 5.975     
 -2.170  -2.190      (0.260) (0.240)     
exeownv   0.292  0.292      0.058* 0.058*   
   -0.955  -0.899      (1.901) (1.815)   
ceoownv     0.223  0.223      -0.766* -0.766 
     -0.696  -0.654      (-1.674) (-1.486) 
exeso       -0.436* -0.436 -0.434*** -0.434** -0.610** -0.610* 
       (-1.669) (-1.540) (-2.603) (-2.421) (-1.986) (-1.809) 
pe 0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.011  0.011  -0.057* -0.057* -0.059** -0.059** -0.075* -0.075 
 -0.320  -0.327  -0.468  -0.477  -0.516  -0.534  (-1.744) (-1.755) (-2.149) (-2.223) (-1.797) (-1.642) 
fcf -3.487  -3.487  -4.349  -4.349  -5.287  -5.287  -1.301 -1.301 -2.075 -2.075 -6.199 -6.199 
 (-0.545) (-0.606) (-0.649) (-0.671) (-0.701) (-0.757) (-0.128) (-0.127) (-0.337) (-0.355) (-0.792) (-0.857) 
roa -15.239  -15.239  -12.902  -12.902  -12.686  -12.686  -29.480* -29.480 -27.698 -27.698 -31.760 -31.760 
 (-1.363) (-1.365) (-1.214) (-1.210) (-1.129) (-1.120) (-1.650) (-1.625) (-1.632) (-1.594) (-1.476) (-1.426) 
size 1.330*** 1.330*** 0.997** 0.997** 1.180** 1.180** 2.001** 2.001** 1.798** 1.798** 2.326** 2.326* 
 -2.858  -2.906  -2.301  -2.301  -2.560  -2.569  (2.305) (2.216) (2.262) (2.135) (2.013) (1.870) 
other-own 0.711  0.711  -2.888  -2.888  1.368  1.368  3.492 3.492 0.495 0.495 2.955 2.955 
 -0.206  -0.203  (-0.744) (-0.701) -0.422  -0.423  (0.682) (0.614) (0.117) (0.099) (0.575) (0.499) 
level -7.030  -7.030  -6.229  -6.229  -7.065  -7.065  -11.749* -11.749* -10.853** -10.853** -13.309** -13.309** 
 (-1.617) (-1.544) (-1.495) (-1.404) (-1.616) (-1.545) (-1.930) (-1.949) (-2.151) (-2.133) (-2.011) (-2.072) 
prem -2.081  -2.081  -2.035  -2.035  -1.936  -1.936  -4.196 -4.196 -4.011 -4.011 -4.676 -4.676 
 (-0.951) (-0.979) (-1.040) (-1.057) (-0.935) (-0.958) (-1.367) (-1.392) (-1.492) (-1.515) (-1.340) (-1.390) 
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ceoch 2.967* 2.967* 2.581* 2.581* 2.537  2.537  4.335** 4.335** 4.129* 4.129* 4.578* 4.578 
 -1.659  -1.686  -1.776  -1.819  -1.575  -1.608  (2.018) (2.058) (1.932) (1.922) (1.678) (1.619) 
Industry Cluster  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Constant 
-
26.312*** 
-
26.312*** 
-
19.715*** 
-
19.715*** 
-
23.258*** 
-
23.258*** 
-
32.491*** 
-32.491** -28.665** -28.665** -36.309** -36.309* 
 (-3.168) (-3.217) (-2.602) (-2.595) (-2.836) (-2.827) (-2.603) (-2.508) (-2.274) (-2.139) (-2.055) (-1.893) 
             
Wald Chi2 19.440** 52.030*** 16.910** 35.320*** 17.780** 31.170*** 24.930*** 27.030*** 28.210*** 27.370*** 26.070*** 34.630*** 
Prob>Chi2 0.022  0.000  0.050  0.000  0.038  0.000  0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 
Pseudo R Square 0.527  0.527  0.530  0.530  0.507  0.507  0.606 0.606 0.614 0.614 0.626 0.626 
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the 
takeover premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is 
percentage of ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share 
price times the number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe 
is the price earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-
code) sorting. fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. 
size is the natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. 
ceoch is the dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. 
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Table 2.14 The relationship between managerial ownership and takeover premiums in MBOs: using alternative measures of 
managerial ownership 
 Dependent Variable=prem 
 Model67 Model68 Model69 Model70 Model71 Model72 Model73 Model74 Model75 Model76 Model77 Model78 
ceoown -0.111 -0.111     -0.123 -0.123     
 (-0.307) (-0.346)     (-0.356) (-0.399)     
exeownv   0.034*** 0.034***     0.038*** 0.038***   
   (2.809) (3.401)     (2.902) (3.212)   
ceoownv     0.025*** 0.025***     0.028*** 0.028*** 
     (2.821) (4.234)     (3.320) (4.316) 
exeso       -0.027* -0.027 -0.027* -0.027 -0.027* -0.027 
       (-1.824) (-1.563) (-1.864) (-1.594) (-1.853) (-1.579) 
pe 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.320) (1.192) (1.250) (1.128) (1.250) (1.129) (1.466) (1.311) (1.368) (1.219) (1.371) (1.223) 
fcf 0.087 0.087 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.024 -0.005 -0.005 -0.083 -0.083 -0.080 -0.080 
 (0.266) (0.266) (0.065) (0.065) (0.074) (0.074) (-0.015) (-0.014) (-0.286) (-0.256) (-0.270) (-0.243) 
roa 0.059 0.059 0.063 0.063 0.054 0.054 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.017 
 (0.143) (0.160) (0.154) (0.184) (0.134) (0.160) (0.047) (0.052) (0.047) (0.054) (0.040) (0.046) 
size -0.111** -0.111** -0.125** -0.125*** -0.118** -0.118*** -0.095** -0.095** -0.111** -0.111** -0.104** -0.104** 
 (-2.327) (-2.591) (-2.541) (-2.976) (-2.444) (-2.817) (-2.135) (-2.302) (-2.375) (-2.604) (-2.268) (-2.508) 
other-own 0.169 0.169 0.166 0.166 0.239 0.239 -0.032 -0.032 -0.043 -0.043 0.043 0.043 
 (0.719) (1.119) (0.819) (1.052) (1.080) (1.424) (-0.113) (-0.145) (-0.168) (-0.201) (0.161) (0.198) 
level -0.027 -0.027 -0.093 -0.093 -0.052 -0.052 -0.006 -0.006 -0.080 -0.080 -0.033 -0.033 
 (-0.090) (-0.076) (-0.317) (-0.265) (-0.175) (-0.148) (-0.020) (-0.018) (-0.268) (-0.244) (-0.106) (-0.097) 
ned -0.077 -0.077 0.043 0.043 -0.025 -0.025 -0.210 -0.210 -0.081 -0.081 -0.157 -0.157 
 (-0.237) (-0.277) (0.126) (0.158) (-0.077) (-0.101) (-0.580) (-0.579) (-0.219) (-0.232) (-0.444) (-0.477) 
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multi 0.127 0.127 0.147 0.147* 0.143 0.143 0.124 0.124 0.147* 0.147* 0.142 0.142* 
 (1.304) (1.591) (1.507) (1.727) (1.457) (1.669) (1.432) (1.605) (1.714) (1.798) (1.650) (1.734) 
insti 0.016 0.016 0.096 0.096 0.083 0.083 0.026 0.026 0.116 0.116 0.103 0.103 
 (0.077) (0.087) (0.504) (0.530) (0.432) (0.452) (0.117) (0.130) (0.574) (0.634) (0.490) (0.532) 
lnnas 0.120** 0.120** 0.125** 0.125** 0.125** 0.125** 0.109** 0.109** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.114** 
 (2.527) (2.620) (2.621) (2.735) (2.581) (2.642) (2.618) (2.557) (2.797) (2.746) (2.717) (2.617) 
Industry Cluster  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Constant 1.056* 1.056* 1.151** 1.151** 1.072* 1.072** 1.287* 1.287* 1.402** 1.402** 1.312* 1.312* 
 (1.732) (1.827) (2.001) (2.211) (1.887) (2.108) (1.848) (1.797) (2.055) (2.084) (1.977) (2.026) 
             
F-test 1.400 3.310*** 2.070** 5.860*** 2.030** 5.330*** 1.560 2.320** 2.080** 3.280*** 2.270** 4.110*** 
Prob>f 0.190 0.004 0.034 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.126 0.030 0.029 0.004 0.017 0.001 
R-squared 0.254 0.254 0.273 0.273 0.261 0.261 0.326 0.326 0.350 0.350 0.336 0.336 
Root MSE 0.336 0.336 0.332 0.332 0.334 0.334 0.326 0.326 0.320 0.320 0.323 0.323 
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 82 82 82 82 82 82 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover 
premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is percentage of 
ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price 
earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. 
fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is the 
natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the 
dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. ned is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. insti is the total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common outstanding shares, where the shareholding is in excess 
of 3%. lnnas is the natural logarithm of the non-audit fees. multi is the dummy variable that code as 1 if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise 
0. 
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Table 2.15 The relationship between managerial ownership and takeover premiums in third-LBOs: using alternative 
measures of managerial ownership 
 Dependent Variable=prem 
 Model79 Model80 Model81 Model82 Model83 Model84 Model85 Model86 Model87 Model88 Model89 Model90 
ceoown 0.763* 0.763*     0.757 0.757*     
 (1.759) (1.906)     (1.665) (1.706)     
exeownv   0.000 0.000     -0.001 -0.001   
   (0.008) (0.008)     (-0.341) (-0.321)   
ceoownv     0.056 0.056*     -0.006 -0.006 
     (1.671) (1.747)     (-0.135) (-0.152) 
exeso       -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026** -0.026** 
       (-2.774) (-2.989) (-2.798) (-2.849) (-2.612) (-2.678) 
pe -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-3.868) (-3.756) (-4.005) (-3.828) (-4.305) (-4.179) (-4.007) (-4.164) (-4.142) (-4.207) (-4.599) (-4.681) 
fcf -0.003 -0.003 0.075 0.075 0.126 0.126 0.218 0.218 0.295 0.295 0.292 0.292 
 (-0.006) (-0.007) (0.127) (0.142) (0.213) (0.229) (0.383) (0.417) (0.484) (0.526) (0.480) (0.520) 
roa -2.614*** -2.614*** -2.439*** -2.439*** -2.442*** -2.442*** -2.909*** -2.909*** -2.751*** -2.751*** -2.740*** -2.740*** 
 (-5.022) (-5.816) (-4.462) (-4.983) (-4.710) (-5.371) (-5.783) (-6.348) (-4.934) (-5.226) (-5.093) (-5.350) 
size -0.043 -0.043 -0.055 -0.055 -0.057 -0.057 -0.029 -0.029 -0.039 -0.039 -0.041 -0.041 
 (-1.158) (-1.090) (-1.388) (-1.254) (-1.635) (-1.543) (-0.763) (-0.753) (-0.933) (-0.882) (-1.069) (-1.041) 
other-own -0.630 -0.630 -0.667 -0.667 -0.643 -0.643 -0.553 -0.553 -0.567 -0.567 -0.591 -0.591 
 (-1.131) (-1.101) (-1.162) (-1.133) (-1.173) (-1.138) (-1.022) (-1.020) (-1.012) (-1.016) (-1.120) (-1.124) 
level -0.979*** -0.979*** -0.916*** -0.916*** -0.936*** -0.936*** -1.119*** -1.119*** -1.074*** -1.074*** -1.057*** -1.057*** 
 (-3.132) (-3.310) (-2.765) (-2.859) (-2.998) (-3.218) (-3.645) (-4.030) (-3.234) (-3.436) (-3.440) (-3.769) 
ned 0.049 0.049 -0.018 -0.018 0.009 0.009 -0.075 -0.075 -0.143 -0.143 -0.145 -0.145 
 (0.092) (0.099) (-0.032) (-0.034) (0.016) (0.017) (-0.135) (-0.137) (-0.249) (-0.251) (-0.250) (-0.254) 
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multi 0.201** 0.201** 0.193* 0.193** 0.208** 0.208** 0.244** 0.244** 0.236** 0.236** 0.235** 0.235** 
 (2.078) (2.288) (1.950) (2.135) (2.068) (2.240) (2.436) (2.607) (2.306) (2.457) (2.289) (2.438) 
insti 0.416 0.416 0.328 0.328 0.350 0.350 0.327 0.327 0.238 0.238 0.236 0.236 
 (1.182) (1.334) (0.928) (1.062) (0.985) (1.105) (0.945) (0.963) (0.686) (0.721) (0.686) (0.719) 
lnnas 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.063** 0.063** 0.061** 0.061** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.069** 0.069** 0.067** 0.067** 
 (2.873) (2.870) (2.171) (2.118) (2.275) (2.227) (3.253) (2.930) (2.452) (2.295) (2.550) (2.375) 
Industry Cluster  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Constant 0.547 0.547 0.976 0.976 1.003* 1.003 0.659 0.659 1.030 1.030 1.081* 1.081* 
 (0.859) (0.819) (1.345) (1.227) (1.695) (1.599) (1.118) (1.093) (1.484) (1.425) (1.860) (1.844) 
             
F-test 15.460*** 35.400*** 12.690*** 15.380*** 13.030*** 18.300*** 20.460*** 29.680*** 17.070*** 20.820*** 17.210*** 21.090*** 
Prob>f 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.537 0.537 0.525 0.525 0.529 0.529 0.575 0.575 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.564 
Root MSE 0.386 0.386 0.391 0.391 0.389 0.389 0.374 0.374 0.378 0.378 0.379 0.379 
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Robust pval in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. resist is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the bid is classified as friendly and 1 otherwise. prem is the takeover 
premiums of offer price to target closing share price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. exeown is percentage of executive shareholding. ceoown is percentage of 
ceo shareholding. exeownv is the year-end share price times the number of executive shares held and is in millions of pounds. ceoownv is the year-end share price times the 
number of ceo shares held and is in millions of pounds. exeso is the logarithm of the valuation of executive share options with black-scholes’ (1973) model. pe is the price 
earnings ratio that calculate by adjust the target pe ratio by subtracting the industry median pe, along with using the 2-digit industry classification benchmark (icb-code) sorting. 
fcf is the free cash flow. it defined as the funds from operation minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets. roa is firm’s return on assets. size is the 
natural logarithm of market value. other-own is the common shares held by the target board directors other than the ceo. level is total debt divided by total assets. ceoch is the 
dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the new ceo has been appointed at the financial year prior to the takeover announcement and otherwise 0. ned is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. insti is the total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common outstanding shares, where the shareholding is in excess 
of 3%. lnnas is the natural logarithm of the non-audit fees. multi is the dummy variable that code as 1 if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target and otherwise 
0. 
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Table 3.6 Distribution of firms for MBOs and third-party LBOs from 1997 
to 2011 
Year MBOs 
third-
party 
LBOs 
LBOs 
Observations 
Deal Value (GBP mil) 
Mean Total 
1997 6 2 8 57.328 458.62 
1998 15 8 23 71.123 1635.84 
1999 27 16 43 112.903 4854.84 
2000 25 8 33 143.423 4732.95 
2001 20 0 20 90.828 1816.55 
2002 16 3 19 78.381 1489.23 
2003 14 8 22 172.993 3805.84 
2004 4 5 9 301.496 2713.46 
2005 4 11 15 341.236 4436.07 
2006 1 16 17 1267.119 21541.03 
2007 6 10 16 1246.142 18692.13 
2008 2 3 5 406.502 2032.51 
2009 2 0 2 178.08 178.08 
2010 0 4 4 950.728 3802.91 
2011 3 6 9 90.791 817.12 
Total 145 100 245 302.934 73007.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
354 
Table 3.7 Descriptive statistics on conservatism proxies, board 
characteristics and control variables for MBO deals 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics on conservatism proxies for the Basu (1997), Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), and Khan and Watts (2009) at year Y-1, Y-2, and Y-3 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
         
epsp1 118 0.027 0.071 0.213 -1.215 -0.035 0.117 0.726 
dr1 118 0.593 1.000 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
r1 118 -0.064 -0.093 0.416 -0.884 -0.339 0.135 1.480 
drr1 118 -0.190 -0.093 0.233 -0.884 -0.339 0.000 0.000 
accrb1 110 -0.057 -0.062 0.090 -0.269 -0.113 -0.007 0.272 
dcfo1 118 0.110 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
cfo1 118 0.096 0.099 0.129 -0.556 0.042 0.164 0.426 
dcfocfo1 118 -0.015 0.000 0.069 -0.556 0.000 0.000 0.000 
cscore1 118 0.254 0.276 0.236 -2.149 0.230 0.339 0.408 
gscore1 118 0.130 0.125 0.126 -0.183 0.036 0.224 0.481 
size1 117 17.865 17.802 1.401 13.234 17.079 18.709 22.338 
level1 117 0.170 0.144 0.152 0.000 0.037 0.256 0.740 
mtb1 117 2.262 1.225 5.988 -1.676 0.798 2.116 63.599 
epsp2 113 -0.024 0.078 0.745 -7.495 0.038 0.113 0.417 
dr2 113 0.558 1.000 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
r2 113 0.045 -0.037 0.724 -0.937 -0.285 0.169 5.954 
drr2 113 -0.162 -0.037 0.217 -0.937 -0.285 0.000 0.000 
accrb2 108 -0.023 -0.036 0.117 -0.316 -0.084 0.015 0.528 
dcfo2 113 0.133 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
cfo2 113 0.095 0.095 0.193 -1.528 0.054 0.160 0.519 
dcfocfo2 113 -0.023 0.000 0.147 -1.528 0.000 0.000 0.000 
cscore2 113 -0.302 -0.308 0.821 -2.278 -0.892 0.355 1.810 
gscore2 113 0.543 0.400 0.733 -2.733 0.056 0.913 3.007 
size2 113 17.853 17.770 1.395 14.041 17.058 18.599 22.422 
level2 113 0.168 0.131 0.149 0.000 0.057 0.247 0.723 
mtb2 113 2.340 1.345 14.501 -67.773 0.888 2.830 127.841 
epsp3 110 0.043 0.077 0.323 -3.172 0.049 0.112 0.346 
dr3 110 0.445 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
r3 110 0.058 0.032 0.416 -0.951 -0.156 0.261 1.331 
drr3 110 -0.126 0.000 0.207 -0.951 -0.156 0.000 0.000 
accrb3 96 -0.027 -0.035 0.109 -0.330 -0.072 0.011 0.453 
dcfo3 110 0.109 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
cfo3 110 0.117 0.112 0.115 -0.276 0.063 0.173 0.419 
dcfocfo3 110 -0.009 0.000 0.038 -0.276 0.000 0.000 0.000 
cscore3 110 0.365 0.293 0.470 -0.577 0.066 0.548 2.731 
gscore3 110 0.034 0.035 0.072 -0.580 0.008 0.059 0.247 
size3 110 17.755 17.701 1.475 11.533 16.961 18.524 22.396 
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level3 110 0.176 0.148 0.164 0.000 0.039 0.251 1.029 
mtb3 110 5.988 1.546 32.547 -15.527 0.938 2.981 334.615 
         
Panel B. Descriptive statistics on board characteristics and control variables 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
         
dual1 117 0.282 0.000 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ned1 117 0.444 0.429 0.145 0.000 0.375 0.500 0.750 
auditn1 117 0.718 1.000 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ceoown1 117 0.123 0.035 0.173 0.000 0.003 0.198 0.771 
exeown1 117 0.157 0.066 0.195 0.000 0.006 0.241 0.771 
nedown1 117 0.055 0.003 0.129 0.000 0.001 0.041 0.664 
insti1 117 0.354 0.321 0.215 0.000 0.202 0.501 0.890 
size1 117 17.865 17.802 1.401 13.234 17.079 18.709 22.338 
level1 117 0.170 0.144 0.152 0.000 0.037 0.256 0.740 
mtb1 117 2.262 1.225 5.988 -1.676 0.798 2.116 63.599 
pe1 117 -3.829 -5.280 16.688 -58.720 -12.790 2.720 84.570 
boar1 117 1.768 1.792 0.254 1.099 1.609 1.946 2.398 
bsize1 117 6.051 6.000 1.542 3.000 5.000 7.000 11.000 
epsp#: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, 
y-3). r#: share returns from 9 months before year # end to three months after the year # end, # (#=1,2,3 
denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr#: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r#) is negative, 0 otherwise 
at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). drr#: share return (r#) * negative returns (dr#) at year # 
(#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). accrb#: (δinventory+δdebtors+δother current assets-δcreditors-
δother current liabilities-depreciation)/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-
1, y-2, y-3). cfo#: cash flow from operation/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the 
year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfo#: dummy variable equal to 1 if cfo is negative, 0 otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 
denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfocfo#: cash flow from operation * negative cash flow from operation at 
year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). cscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics 
include firm size, market to book value and leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote 
the year y-1, y-2, y-3). gscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market 
to book value and leverage, in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
size#: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). level#: total 
debts divided by total assets at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). mtb#: market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dual1: dummy 
variable coded 1 if the ceo is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of 
non-executive directors divided by the total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit 
committee independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the members in audit committee are non-
executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: ceo share ownership as a percentage of the total number 
of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1: executive share ownership as a percentage of the total 
number of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total common shares held by non-executive 
directors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: total common shares held by 
institutional investors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. boar1: natural logarithm 
of the number of board directors at year y-1. bsize1: number of board directors on the board at year y-1. 
pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1. 
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Table 3.8 Descriptive statistics on conservatism proxies, board 
characteristics and control variables for third-party LBO deals 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics on conservatism proxies for the Basu (1997), Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), and Khan and Watts (2009) at year Y-1, Y-2, and Y-3 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
         
epsp1 81 -0.034 0.051 0.316 -1.770 -0.004 0.091 0.367 
dr1 81 0.556 1.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
r1 81 -0.043 -0.096 0.413 -0.874 -0.354 0.234 1.131 
drr1 81 -0.193 -0.096 0.235 -0.874 -0.354 0.000 0.000 
accrb1 75 -0.047 -0.041 0.063 -0.191 -0.079 -0.017 0.128 
dcfo1 81 0.160 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
cfo1 81 0.074 0.073 0.101 -0.262 0.041 0.108 0.430 
dcfocfo1 81 -0.012 0.000 0.041 -0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 
cscore1 80 -6.548 -6.571 0.750 -8.583 -6.934 -6.225 -3.428 
gscore1 80 0.074 0.057 0.238 -0.489 -0.058 0.209 1.109 
size1 80 18.413 18.465 1.779 9.952 17.506 19.390 21.676 
level1 80 0.252 0.230 0.211 0.000 0.090 0.372 1.130 
mtb1 80 0.826 1.655 10.698 -92.143 0.850 2.409 12.333 
epsp2 70 0.026 0.069 0.222 -1.324 0.027 0.096 0.543 
dr2 70 0.414 0.000 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
r2 70 0.193 0.062 0.628 -0.733 -0.109 0.269 2.987 
drr2 70 -0.095 0.000 0.168 -0.733 -0.109 0.000 0.000 
accrb2 67 -0.030 -0.033 0.100 -0.230 -0.070 -0.001 0.343 
dcfo2 70 0.100 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
cfo2 70 0.090 0.087 0.110 -0.396 0.045 0.148 0.428 
dcfocfo2 70 -0.012 0.000 0.052 -0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 
cscore2 70 0.654 0.752 0.841 -3.391 0.276 1.241 2.009 
gscore2 70 0.013 0.009 0.212 -0.977 -0.117 0.160 0.429 
size2 70 18.551 18.475 1.547 14.621 17.426 19.474 21.777 
level2 70 0.249 0.238 0.187 0.000 0.118 0.351 1.047 
mtb2 70 2.430 1.769 2.482 -2.581 1.230 3.023 13.274 
epsp3 68 0.029 0.056 0.117 -0.416 0.017 0.085 0.236 
dr3 68 0.441 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
r3 68 0.036 0.031 0.642 -0.841 -0.284 0.153 4.000 
drr3 68 -0.159 0.000 0.253 -0.841 -0.284 0.000 0.000 
accrb3 65 -0.052 -0.054 0.135 -0.490 -0.096 -0.016 0.533 
dcfo3 68 0.132 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
cfo3 68 0.090 0.078 0.140 -0.423 0.047 0.138 0.582 
dcfocfo3 68 -0.020 0.000 0.067 -0.423 0.000 0.000 0.000 
cscore3 68 0.310 0.297 0.296 -1.350 0.206 0.439 0.885 
gscore3 68 -0.029 -0.012 0.192 -0.502 -0.175 0.079 0.555 
size3 68 18.459 18.339 1.623 14.279 17.564 19.344 21.872 
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level3 68 0.205 0.195 0.152 0.000 0.062 0.290 0.726 
mtb3 68 2.032 1.894 2.100 -10.219 1.288 3.000 5.961 
         
Panel B. Descriptive statistics on board characteristics and control variables 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
         
dual1 80 0.113 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ned1 80 0.532 0.556 0.118 0.222 0.444 0.625 0.750 
auditn1 80 0.900 1.000 0.302 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ceoown1^2 80 0.016 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.419 
exeown1^2 80 0.021 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.530 
nedown1 80 0.036 0.002 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.362 
insti1 80 0.369 0.370 0.186 0.000 0.289 0.496 0.905 
size1 80 18.413 18.465 1.779 9.952 17.506 19.390 21.676 
level1 80 0.252 0.230 0.211 0.000 0.090 0.372 1.130 
mtb1 80 0.826 1.655 10.698 -92.143 0.850 2.409 12.333 
pe1 80 0.700 -3.185 69.025 -242.180 -11.710 4.110 510.100 
boar1 80 1.881 1.946 0.242 1.386 1.609 2.079 2.303 
bsize1 80 6.750 7.000 1.587 4.000 5.000 8.000 10.000 
epsp#: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, 
y-3). r#: share returns from 9 months before year # end to three months after the year # end, # (#=1,2,3 
denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr#: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r#) is negative, 0 otherwise 
at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). drr#: share return (r#) * negative returns (dr#) at year # 
(#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). accrb#: (δinventory+δdebtors+δother current assets-δcreditors-
δother current liabilities-depreciation)/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-
1, y-2, y-3). cfo#: cash flow from operation/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the 
year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfo#: dummy variable equal to 1 if cfo is negative, 0 otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 
denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfocfo#: cash flow from operation * negative cash flow from operation at 
year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). cscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics 
include firm size, market to book value and leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote 
the year y-1, y-2, y-3). gscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market 
to book value and leverage, in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
size#: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). level#: total 
debts divided by total assets at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). mtb#: market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dual1: dummy 
variable coded 1 if the ceo is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of 
non-executive directors divided by the total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit 
committee independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the members in audit committee are non-
executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share ownership as a percentage 
of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the executive share 
ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total common 
shares held by non-executive directors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: 
total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common shares outstanding at year 
y-1. boar1: natural logarithm of the number of board directors at year y-1. bsize1: number of board 
directors on the board at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1. 
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Table 3.9 Pearson Correlations between conservatism proxies, board characteristics and control variables for MBO deals 
Panel A. Correlation between conservatism proxies at year Y-1, Y-2, and Y-3 
 epsp1 dr1 r1 drr1 accrb1 dcfo1 cfo1 dcfocfo1 cscore1 gscore1 
epsp1 1.000          
dr1 -0.252*** 1.000         
r1 0.386*** -0.746*** 1.000        
drr1 0.429*** -0.678*** 0.808*** 1.000       
accrb1 0.116 -0.148 0.132 0.174* 1.000      
dcfo1 -0.110 -0.039 -0.133 -0.206** 0.316*** 1.000     
cfo1 0.201** 0.079 0.087 0.158* -0.250*** -0.638*** 1.000    
dcfocfo1 -0.006 0.058 0.062 0.158* -0.059 -0.631*** 0.722*** 1.000   
cscore1 -0.022 -0.121 0.085 0.112 0.088 0.038 -0.245*** -0.021 1.000  
gscore1 -0.042 0.058 -0.006 0.079 -0.019 0.022 -0.022 0.003 -0.229** 1.000 
size1 0.142 -0.145 0.112 0.281*** -0.083 -0.157* 0.233** 0.261*** -0.045 0.571*** 
level1 -0.155* 0.173* -0.093 -0.076 0.035 0.069 -0.087 0.073 -0.157* 0.869*** 
mtb1 0.060 0.083 -0.065 -0.087 -0.100 -0.067 0.321*** 0.052 -0.978*** 0.071 
epsp2 0.363*** -0.097 0.157* 0.220** -0.034 -0.370*** 0.220** 0.155 0.003 -0.065 
dr2 -0.167* -0.049 0.010 0.030 0.061 -0.036 -0.188** 0.036 0.164* 0.062 
r2 0.130 0.020 -0.011 -0.056 -0.136 0.145 -0.033 -0.373*** -0.044 -0.112 
drr2 0.288*** -0.021 0.031 0.081 -0.038 -0.161* 0.258*** 0.187** -0.080 -0.142 
accrb2 0.181* -0.006 -0.020 0.022 0.173* 0.206** -0.164* -0.191** -0.065 0.048 
dcfo2 -0.208** 0.059 -0.097 -0.184* 0.230** 0.521*** -0.472*** -0.448*** 0.014 0.164* 
cfo2 0.130 -0.022 0.120 0.234** -0.108 -0.392*** 0.670*** 0.636*** -0.237** 0.111 
dcfocfo2 0.034 -0.070 0.165* 0.291*** 0.009 -0.342*** 0.408*** 0.695*** -0.035 0.196** 
cscore2 -0.035 0.066 -0.052 -0.195** 0.032 0.029 -0.077 -0.171* -0.094 -0.836*** 
gscore2 -0.052 0.011 0.043 0.090 0.051 0.076 -0.119 0.022 0.312*** 0.592*** 
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Panel A. continued 
 epsp1 dr1 r1 drr1 accrb1 dcfo1 cfo1 dcfocfo1 cscore1 gscore1 
size2 0.098 -0.119 0.048 0.212** -0.083 -0.129 0.225** 0.238** -0.026 0.529*** 
level2 -0.032 0.036 0.005 0.041 0.007 0.089 -0.087 -0.001 -0.068 0.750*** 
mtb2 0.048 0.044 -0.082 -0.117 -0.102 0.007 0.087 -0.051 -0.787*** 0.140 
epsp3 0.062 -0.092 -0.009 -0.044 -0.016 0.007 0.081 0.074 0.158* -0.194** 
dr3 -0.122 -0.093 0.072 0.036 -0.065 -0.029 -0.110 -0.154 0.097 -0.087 
r3 0.175* -0.003 0.010 0.040 0.044 -0.096 0.212** 0.186* -0.086 -0.004 
drr3 0.256*** 0.019 -0.031 0.012 0.028 -0.132 0.187* 0.231** 0.026 -0.008 
accrb3 -0.100 0.042 -0.173* -0.188* 0.133 0.267*** -0.465*** -0.437*** -0.024 0.065 
dcfo3 -0.180* 0.060 -0.109 -0.109 0.093 0.295*** -0.394*** -0.473*** 0.027 -0.057 
cfo3 0.162* 0.070 0.012 0.022 -0.225** -0.399*** 0.667*** 0.414*** -0.176* -0.010 
dcfocfo3 0.020 0.032 0.057 0.060 -0.183* -0.443*** 0.443*** 0.641*** -0.006 0.020 
cscore3 -0.101 0.124 -0.076 -0.095 -0.022 0.093 -0.199** -0.159* -0.235** 0.401*** 
gscore3 0.117 -0.042 0.067 0.127 0.057 0.049 0.042 -0.021 -0.253*** 0.392*** 
size3 0.068 -0.142 0.096 0.276*** -0.052 -0.149 0.242** 0.334*** -0.030 0.510*** 
level3 -0.082 0.073 -0.042 0.014 -0.048 0.033 -0.109 -0.025 -0.256*** 0.636*** 
mtb3 -0.183* 0.087 -0.099 -0.127 -0.096 -0.042 -0.106 0.023 0.131 -0.036 
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Panel A. continued 
 size1 level1 mtb1 epsp2 dr2 r2 drr2 accrb2 dcfo2 cfo2 
size1 1.000          
level1 0.098 1.000         
mtb1 0.067 -0.049 1.000        
epsp2 0.127 -0.156* 0.034 1.000       
dr2 0.020 0.080 -0.181* 0.017 1.000      
r2 0.094 -0.199** 0.089 0.067 -0.521*** 1.000     
drr2 0.129 -0.260*** 0.139 0.080 -0.666*** 0.514*** 1.000    
accrb2 -0.064 0.085 0.046 0.065 -0.119 0.041 0.120 1.000   
dcfo2 -0.158* 0.299*** -0.082 -0.328*** 0.086 0.032 -0.288*** 0.388*** 1.000  
cfo2 0.313*** -0.076 0.268*** 0.269*** -0.130 0.156* 0.361*** -0.470*** -0.544*** 1.000 
dcfocfo2 0.332*** 0.036 0.041 0.230** -0.093 0.130 0.342*** -0.591*** -0.400*** 0.858*** 
cscore2 -0.697*** -0.615*** 0.192** 0.021 -0.109 0.080 0.104 -0.044 -0.080 -0.116 
gscore2 0.022 0.746*** -0.467*** -0.122 0.106 -0.155 -0.213** 0.119 0.230** -0.099 
size2 0.976*** 0.058 0.054 0.102 0.062 0.036 0.078 -0.080 -0.140 0.260*** 
level2 0.076 0.869*** -0.108 -0.132 0.072 -0.132 -0.224** 0.146 0.259*** -0.064 
mtb2 0.082 0.044 0.787*** 0.009 -0.090 0.081 0.033 0.023 -0.002 0.086 
epsp3 0.144 -0.319*** 0.068 0.105 -0.033 0.086 0.257*** -0.072 -0.244** 0.157 
dr3 0.043 -0.129 -0.011 -0.151 -0.006 0.116 0.037 -0.105 -0.036 -0.099 
r3 0.000 -0.008 0.099 0.260*** 0.052 -0.116 0.047 0.109 -0.108 0.175* 
drr3 0.053 -0.041 0.008 0.401*** 0.040 -0.088 0.123 0.001 -0.221** 0.258*** 
accrb3 -0.053 0.104 -0.055 -0.007 -0.007 0.243** 0.004 0.429*** 0.422*** -0.353*** 
dcfo3 -0.254*** 0.083 -0.123 -0.077 0.020 0.108 -0.277*** 0.161 0.371*** -0.347*** 
cfo3 0.196** -0.136 0.313*** 0.132 0.067 -0.207** 0.092 -0.226** -0.452*** 0.424*** 
dcfocfo3 0.153 -0.068 0.075 -0.001 0.113 -0.496*** -0.009 -0.174* -0.340*** 0.107 
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Panel A. continued 
 size1 level1 mtb1 epsp2 dr2 r2 drr2 accrb2 dcfo2 cfo2 
cscore3 -0.307*** 0.668*** -0.249*** -0.091 -0.030 0.005 -0.199** 0.069 0.228** -0.155 
gscore3 0.105 0.409*** 0.007 -0.045 -0.062 0.029 -0.088 0.119 0.141 -0.050 
size3 0.940*** 0.060 0.122 0.099 0.082 0.030 0.110 -0.118 -0.129 0.370*** 
level3 0.074 0.726*** -0.213** -0.053 0.006 0.017 -0.163* 0.025 0.183* -0.005 
mtb3 -0.035 -0.018 -0.135 0.024 0.078 -0.021 0.005 -0.126 -0.055 0.071 
           
           
Panel A. continued 
 dcfocfo2 cscore2 gscore2 size2 level2 mtb2 epsp3 dr3 r3 drr3 
dcfocfo2 1.000          
cscore2 -0.208** 1.000         
gscore2 0.028 -0.703*** 1.000        
size2 0.277*** -0.714*** 0.024 1.000       
level2 0.025 -0.722*** 0.881*** 0.074 1.000      
mtb2 -0.016 0.148 -0.472*** 0.074 0.001 1.000     
epsp3 0.127 0.164* -0.353*** 0.118 -0.354*** 0.027 1.000    
dr3 -0.071 -0.042 -0.027 0.094 -0.042 -0.049 -0.179* 1.000   
r3 0.145 0.105 -0.114 -0.047 -0.088 0.097 0.318*** -0.740*** 1.000  
drr3 0.214** 0.064 -0.102 0.006 -0.093 0.040 0.476*** -0.684*** 0.771*** 1.000 
accrb3 -0.329*** 0.040 0.033 -0.099 0.050 0.084 0.093 -0.073 0.139 0.076 
dcfo3 -0.283*** 0.083 0.105 -0.235** 0.126 0.064 -0.331*** 0.156 -0.274*** -0.440*** 
cfo3 0.156 -0.050 -0.085 0.186* -0.150 -0.209** 0.142 -0.196** 0.301*** 0.330*** 
dcfocfo3 0.019 -0.055 -0.080 0.174* -0.111 -0.097 0.053 -0.134 0.153 0.187* 
cscore3 -0.098 -0.296*** 0.741*** -0.329*** 0.766*** 0.020 -0.515*** -0.034 -0.061 -0.143 
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Panel A. continued 
 dcfocfo2 cscore2 gscore2 size2 level2 mtb2 epsp3 dr3 r3 drr3 
gscore3 0.035 -0.326*** 0.317*** 0.089 0.456*** 0.421*** -0.261*** 0.093 -0.070 -0.124 
size3 0.417*** -0.717*** 0.051 0.963*** 0.090 0.101 0.125 0.088 -0.058 0.006 
level3 0.074 -0.616*** 0.804*** 0.061 0.843*** 0.053 -0.487*** -0.001 -0.088 -0.146 
mtb3 0.024 -0.036 0.135 -0.025 0.001 -0.448*** 0.004 -0.104 0.024 0.052 
           
           
Panel A. continued 
 accrb3 dcfo3 cfo3 dcfocfo3 cscore3 gscore3 size3 level3 mtb3  
accrb3 1.000          
dcfo3 0.287*** 1.000         
cfo3 -0.570*** -0.603*** 1.000        
dcfocfo3 -0.439*** -0.657*** 0.584*** 1.000       
cscore3 0.080 0.312*** -0.233** -0.210** 1.000      
gscore3 -0.040 0.107 -0.105 -0.094 0.449*** 1.000     
size3 -0.097 -0.256*** 0.146 0.148 -0.321*** 0.108 1.000    
level3 0.050 0.219** -0.183* -0.157 0.916*** 0.495*** 0.085 1.000   
mtb3 0.071 0.002 0.014 0.016 0.038 -0.840*** -0.030 0.053 1.000  
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Panel B. Correlations between conservatism proxies, board characteristics, and control variables at year Y-1 
 epsp1 dr1 r1 drr1 accrb1 dcfo1 cfo1 dcfocfo1 cscore1 gscore1 dual1 ned1 
epsp1 1.000            
dr1 -0.252*** 1.000           
r1 0.386*** -0.746*** 1.000          
drr1 0.429*** -0.678*** 0.808*** 1.000         
accrb1 0.116 -0.148 0.132 0.174* 1.000        
dcfo1 -0.110 -0.039 -0.133 -0.206** 0.316*** 1.000       
cfo1 0.201** 0.079 0.087 0.158* -0.250*** -0.638*** 1.000      
dcfocfo1 -0.006 0.058 0.062 0.158* -0.059 -0.631*** 0.722*** 1.000     
cscore1 -0.022 -0.121 0.085 0.112 0.088 0.038 -0.245*** -0.021 1.000    
gscore1 -0.042 0.058 -0.006 0.079 -0.019 0.022 -0.022 0.003 -0.229** 1.000   
dual1 0.135 -0.029 0.041 -0.002 -0.048 0.039 0.020 -0.117 0.097 -0.358*** 1.000  
ned1 -0.120 -0.023 -0.112 -0.047 -0.110 0.107 -0.102 -0.158* -0.063 0.197** -0.244*** 1.000 
auditn1 -0.079 0.068 -0.084 -0.110 -0.073 -0.039 0.034 0.087 -0.072 0.230** -0.282*** 0.134 
ceoown1 0.133 0.016 0.158* 0.036 0.196** 0.040 0.008 -0.085 0.007 -0.272*** 0.187** -0.386*** 
exeown1 0.145 0.031 0.166* 0.044 0.169* -0.004 -0.005 -0.042 0.039 -0.314*** 0.181* -0.514*** 
nedown1 0.083 -0.155* 0.041 0.131 -0.041 -0.029 0.138 0.018 0.031 -0.043 -0.044 0.276*** 
insti1 -0.216** 0.066 -0.177* -0.191** -0.061 0.145 -0.111 -0.056 -0.035 0.231** -0.172* 0.288*** 
size1 0.142 -0.145 0.112 0.281*** -0.083 -0.157* 0.233** 0.261*** -0.045 0.571*** -0.192** 0.101 
level1 -0.155* 0.173* -0.093 -0.076 0.035 0.069 -0.087 0.073 -0.157* 0.869*** -0.317*** 0.176* 
mtb1 0.060 0.083 -0.065 -0.087 -0.100 -0.067 0.321*** 0.052 -0.978*** 0.071 -0.039 0.031 
pe1 0.221** -0.086 0.036 0.188** 0.099 -0.058 0.130 0.078 -0.019 -0.080 0.060 -0.040 
boar1 0.041 -0.031 0.011 0.053 0.156 0.076 0.026 0.092 -0.070 0.332*** -0.318*** -0.016 
bsize1 0.059 -0.063 0.033 0.075 0.135 0.080 0.007 0.070 -0.047 0.304*** -0.293*** -0.016 
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Panel B. continued 
 auditn1 ceoown1 exeown1 nedown1 insti1 size1 level1 mtb1 pe1 boar1 bsize1 
auditn1 1.000            
ceoown1 -0.303*** 1.000           
exeown1 -0.306*** 0.926*** 1.000          
nedown1 -0.079  -0.119  -0.111  1.000         
insti1 0.139  -0.448*** -0.532*** -0.215** 1.000        
size1 0.265*** -0.375*** -0.393*** -0.074  0.163* 1.000       
level1 0.117  -0.110  -0.147  -0.006  0.184** 0.098  1.000      
mtb1 0.059  0.001  -0.025  -0.034  0.003  0.067  -0.049  1.000     
pe1 -0.233** 0.034  0.112  0.102  -0.154* -0.001  -0.101  0.041  1.000    
boar1 0.377*** -0.120  -0.096  -0.031  0.060  0.349*** 0.193** 0.045  -0.038  1.000   
bsize1 0.343*** -0.129  -0.101  -0.017  0.042  0.355*** 0.157* 0.029  -0.061  0.985*** 1.000  
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp#: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). r#: share 
returns from 9 months before year # end to three months after the year # end, # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr#: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r#) is negative, 
0 otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). drr#: share return (r#) * negative returns (dr#) at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). accrb#: 
(δinventory+δdebtors+δother current assets-δcreditors-δother current liabilities-depreciation)/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). cfo#: 
cash flow from operation/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfo#: dummy variable equal to 1 if cfo is negative, 0 otherwise at year # 
(#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfocfo#: cash flow from operation * negative cash flow from operation at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). cscore#: is linear 
functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). gscore#: 
is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage, in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
size#: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). level#: total debts divided by total assets at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, 
y-3). mtb#: market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dual1: dummy variable coded 1 if the ceo is also the 
chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit committee 
independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the members in audit committee are non-executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: ceo share ownership as a percentage of 
the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. 
exeown1: executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the executive share ownership as a 
percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total common shares held by non-executive directors divided by total common shares outstanding at 
year y-1. insti1: total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. boar1: natural logarithm of the number of board 
directors at year y-1. bsize1: number of board directors on the board at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1. 
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Table 3.10 Pearson Correlations between conservatism proxies, board characteristics and control variables for third-party 
LBOs 
Panel A. Correlation between conservatism proxies at year Y-1, Y-2, and Y-3 
 epsp1 dr1 r1 drr1 accrb1 dcfo1 cfo1 dcfocfo1 cscore1 gscore1 
epsp1 1.000          
dr1 -0.094 1.000         
r1 0.255** -0.829*** 1.000        
drr1 0.279** -0.738*** 0.871*** 1.000       
accrb1 0.274** -0.166 0.124 0.189 1.000      
dcfo1 -0.194* 0.053 -0.090 -0.097 0.145 1.000     
cfo1 0.243** -0.030 0.126 0.140 -0.278** -0.641*** 1.000    
dcfocfo1 0.161 -0.076 0.158 0.209* -0.118 -0.652*** 0.654*** 1.000   
cscore1 -0.050 0.039 -0.106 -0.138 0.048 0.259** -0.168 -0.380*** 1.000  
gscore1 -0.187* 0.138 -0.225** -0.308*** 0.063 0.182 0.017 -0.295*** 0.595*** 1.000 
size1 0.171 -0.111 0.204* 0.271** -0.057 -0.275** 0.106 0.390*** -0.877*** -0.903*** 
level1 -0.056 -0.058 0.056 0.116 -0.048 0.209* -0.327*** -0.094 0.192* -0.579*** 
mtb1 0.453*** -0.160 0.237** 0.275** 0.135 -0.266** 0.166 0.095 0.298*** -0.236** 
epsp2 0.483*** 0.171 -0.046 -0.051 0.184 -0.293** 0.270** 0.286** -0.401*** -0.128 
dr2 -0.254** 0.131 -0.251** -0.361*** -0.175 -0.044 -0.109 -0.040 -0.106 0.000 
r2 0.195 -0.292** 0.332*** 0.305** 0.190 -0.026 0.149 0.029 0.171 0.119 
drr2 0.366*** 0.004 0.077 0.160 0.209* 0.085 0.032 -0.040 -0.034 -0.140 
accrb2 -0.034 0.079 -0.063 0.028 0.114 0.425*** -0.367*** -0.280** 0.172 -0.049 
dcfo2 -0.270** 0.019 -0.065 -0.075 0.042 0.772*** -0.584*** -0.684*** 0.261** 0.240** 
cfo2 0.287** -0.086 0.119 0.060 -0.092 -0.545*** 0.838*** 0.633*** -0.142 0.020 
dcfocfo2 0.124 -0.045 0.081 0.104 -0.043 -0.528*** 0.568*** 0.868*** -0.318*** -0.269** 
cscore2 0.240** 0.052 -0.019 -0.051 0.138 -0.074 0.255** 0.074 -0.282** 0.386*** 
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gscore2 0.325*** -0.009 0.065 0.060 0.120 -0.012 0.119 0.061 -0.564*** -0.125 
Panel A. continued 
 epsp1 dr1 r1 drr1 accrb1 dcfo1 cfo1 dcfocfo1 cscore1 gscore1 
size2 0.143 -0.089 0.151 0.162 -0.104 -0.158 -0.067 0.193 -0.840*** -0.838*** 
level2 -0.121 -0.076 0.057 0.110 -0.080 0.190 -0.321*** -0.142 0.180 -0.573*** 
mtb2 0.207* 0.014 -0.013 0.010 0.199 0.287** -0.027 -0.216* 0.191 0.193 
epsp3 0.396*** 0.068 0.043 0.096 0.027 -0.064 0.145 0.153 -0.295** -0.179 
dr3 -0.271** -0.198 0.141 0.082 -0.075 -0.034 -0.064 -0.078 0.093 0.246** 
r3 0.208* 0.080 -0.003 0.104 0.122 -0.049 0.058 0.086 -0.128 -0.134 
drr3 0.295** 0.123 -0.075 0.014 -0.049 -0.154 0.202* 0.276** -0.396*** -0.378*** 
accrb3 0.124 0.166 -0.257** -0.204 0.108 0.004 -0.087 0.034 -0.279** -0.147 
dcfo3 -0.201* -0.078 -0.027 -0.059 0.066 0.450*** -0.457*** -0.494*** 0.391*** 0.132 
cfo3 0.428*** 0.075 0.030 0.016 -0.009 -0.233* 0.521*** 0.389*** -0.200 0.032 
dcfocfo3 0.438*** -0.016 0.186 0.260** -0.041 -0.320*** 0.413*** 0.538*** -0.360*** -0.129 
cscore3 0.150 -0.041 -0.087 -0.145 0.194 -0.298** 0.296** 0.027 -0.258** 0.008 
gscore3 -0.206* 0.024 -0.037 -0.037 0.011 0.199 -0.093 -0.159 0.813*** 0.439*** 
size3 0.142 -0.094 0.181 0.202* -0.104 -0.112 -0.122 0.132 -0.829*** -0.818*** 
level3 -0.057 -0.130 0.197 0.207* -0.072 0.035 -0.237* -0.045 -0.074 -0.586*** 
mtb3 0.139 -0.055 -0.071 -0.130 0.195 -0.296** 0.278** 0.015 -0.235* -0.033 
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Panel A. continued 
 size1 level1 mtb1 epsp2 dr2 r2 drr2 accrb2 dcfo2 cfo2 
size1 1.000          
level1 0.204* 1.000         
mtb1 0.044 0.121 1.000        
epsp2 0.326*** -0.306** 0.084 1.000       
dr2 0.042 0.002 -0.186 -0.108 1.000      
r2 -0.156 -0.045 0.116 0.068 -0.570*** 1.000     
drr2 0.115 0.067 0.127 0.293** -0.678*** 0.531*** 1.000    
accrb2 -0.077 0.241* 0.004 -0.343*** 0.002 -0.081 0.035 1.000   
dcfo2 -0.338*** 0.188 -0.364*** -0.426*** 0.106 -0.043 -0.006 0.402*** 1.000  
cfo2 0.093 -0.266** 0.147 0.321*** -0.229* 0.293** 0.144 -0.423*** -0.634*** 1.000 
dcfocfo2 0.347*** 0.002 0.018 0.268** -0.108 0.060 0.034 -0.199 -0.684*** 0.686*** 
cscore2 -0.040 -0.829*** 0.056 0.472*** -0.043 0.037 0.098 -0.100 -0.088 0.221* 
gscore2 0.424*** -0.489*** 0.096 0.505*** -0.038 -0.059 0.173 0.010 -0.071 0.169 
size2 0.985*** 0.185 0.026 0.294** 0.071 -0.188 0.055 -0.115 -0.355*** 0.057 
level2 0.215* 0.929*** 0.000 -0.406*** 0.008 -0.071 0.001 0.252** 0.221* -0.241** 
mtb2 -0.212* -0.114 0.105 0.081 -0.115 0.047 0.182 0.319*** 0.422*** -0.015 
epsp3 0.279** -0.075 -0.003 0.263** -0.024 -0.348*** -0.010 0.087 -0.254** 0.126 
dr3 -0.215* -0.122 -0.162 -0.166 0.099 0.196 -0.086 0.067 0.141 -0.100 
r3 0.164 -0.014 0.087 0.153 -0.156 -0.089 0.115 0.073 -0.152 0.023 
drr3 0.463*** 0.023 0.085 0.264** 0.047 -0.475*** -0.019 -0.102 -0.323*** 0.217* 
accrb3 0.254** -0.102 0.010 0.257** 0.113 -0.392*** -0.104 0.189 -0.194 -0.065 
dcfo3 -0.307** 0.218* 0.033 -0.365*** 0.026 0.161 0.005 0.029 0.643*** -0.486*** 
cfo3 0.114 -0.309** 0.092 0.358*** -0.082 -0.058 0.012 -0.117 -0.461*** 0.592*** 
dcfocfo3 0.288** -0.201 -0.014 0.390*** -0.089 -0.078 -0.047 -0.128 -0.461*** 0.445*** 
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Panel A. continued 
 size1 level1 mtb1 epsp2 dr2 r2 drr2 accrb2 dcfo2 cfo2 
cscore3 0.158 -0.315*** 0.053 0.244** 0.113 0.067 -0.054 -0.175 -0.314*** 0.406*** 
gscore3 -0.746*** 0.319*** -0.060 -0.331*** -0.127 0.099 -0.025 0.112 0.366*** -0.187 
size3 0.965*** 0.181 0.017 0.279** 0.102 -0.188 0.032 -0.076 -0.297** -0.025 
level3 0.370*** 0.715*** -0.052 -0.009 -0.004 -0.111 -0.014 -0.005 0.010 -0.192 
mtb3 0.166 -0.232* 0.046 0.236* 0.110 0.063 -0.059 -0.177 -0.307** 0.393*** 
           
           
Panel A. continued 
 dcfocfo2 cscore2 gscore2 size2 level2 mtb2 epsp3 dr3 r3 drr3 
dcfocfo2 1.000          
cscore2 -0.015 1.000         
gscore2 0.097 0.831*** 1.000        
size2 0.309*** -0.059 0.379*** 1.000       
level2 0.027 -0.889*** -0.525*** 0.188 1.000      
mtb2 -0.147 0.485*** 0.577*** -0.309*** -0.108 1.000     
epsp3 0.236* 0.114 0.244** 0.253** -0.026 0.068 1.000    
dr3 -0.130 -0.031 -0.188 -0.178 -0.097 -0.179 -0.355*** 1.000   
r3 0.171 0.155 0.238* 0.114 -0.058 0.186 0.331*** -0.551*** 1.000  
drr3 0.364*** 0.089 0.311*** 0.429*** 0.033 0.024 0.572*** -0.711*** 0.587*** 1.000 
accrb3 0.015 0.159 0.263** 0.273** -0.099 0.006 0.376*** -0.255** 0.106 0.332*** 
dcfo3 -0.570*** -0.151 -0.202* -0.298** 0.164 0.178 -0.404*** 0.177 -0.232* -0.459*** 
cfo3 0.434*** 0.306** 0.298** 0.081 -0.263** 0.126 0.533*** -0.281** 0.272** 0.413*** 
dcfocfo3 0.534*** 0.170 0.258** 0.260** -0.119 -0.006 0.543*** -0.204* 0.223* 0.458*** 
cscore3 0.142 0.314*** 0.322*** 0.140 -0.273** 0.087 0.148 -0.240** 0.182 0.262** 
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Panel A. continued 
 dcfocfo2 cscore2 gscore2 size2 level2 mtb2 epsp3 dr3 r3 drr3 
gscore3 -0.211* -0.441*** -0.672*** -0.760*** 0.339*** 0.135 -0.257** 0.158 -0.169 -0.391*** 
size3 0.260** -0.039 0.409*** 0.980*** 0.182 -0.311*** 0.262** -0.146 0.108 0.401*** 
level3 0.123 -0.690*** -0.347*** 0.364*** 0.767*** -0.243** 0.051 -0.068 -0.036 0.095 
mtb3 0.150 0.229* 0.262** 0.146 -0.182 0.072 0.147 -0.249** 0.177 0.263** 
           
           
Panel A. continued 
 accrb3 dcfo3 cfo3 dcfocfo3 cscore3 gscore3 size3 level3 mtb3  
accrb3 1.000          
dcfo3 -0.062 1.000         
cfo3 0.032 -0.669*** 1.000        
dcfocfo3 0.082 -0.757*** 0.710*** 1.000       
cscore3 0.269** -0.187 0.296** 0.095 1.000      
gscore3 -0.333*** 0.312*** -0.223* -0.261** -0.482*** 1.000     
size3 0.237* -0.289** 0.053 0.281** 0.112 -0.759*** 1.000    
level3 -0.074 -0.017 -0.172 0.053 -0.227* 0.269** 0.386*** 1.000   
mtb3 0.254** -0.180 0.278** 0.091 0.992*** -0.421*** 0.119 -0.113 1.000  
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Panel B. Correlations between conservatism proxies, board characteristics, and control variables at year Y-1 
 epsp1 dr1 r1 drr1 accrb1 dcfo1 cfo1 dcfocfo1 cscore1 gscore1 dual1 ned1 
epsp1 1.000            
dr1 -0.094 1.000           
r1 0.255** -0.829*** 1.000          
drr1 0.279** -0.738*** 0.871*** 1.000         
accrb1 0.274** -0.166 0.124 0.189 1.000        
dcfo1 -0.194* 0.053 -0.090 -0.097 0.145 1.000       
cfo1 0.243** -0.030 0.126 0.140 -0.278** -0.641*** 1.000      
dcfocfo1 0.161 -0.076 0.158 0.209* -0.118 -0.652*** 0.654*** 1.000     
cscore1 -0.050 0.039 -0.106 -0.138 0.048 0.259** -0.168 -0.380*** 1.000    
gscore1 -0.187* 0.138 -0.225** -0.308*** 0.063 0.182 0.017 -0.295*** 0.595*** 1.000   
dual1 -0.191* 0.004 0.000 0.146 0.081 0.058 0.031 0.009 0.067 -0.051 1.000  
ned1 -0.126 -0.133 0.120 -0.005 -0.038 0.150 -0.254** -0.172 0.131 -0.046 -0.046 1.000 
auditn1 -0.017 -0.050 0.106 0.120 0.272** 0.034 -0.223** -0.095 -0.164 -0.308*** -0.013 0.248** 
ceoown1^2 0.056 0.046 -0.043 0.026 -0.083 -0.056 0.472*** 0.038 0.125 0.178 0.085 -0.205* 
exeown1^2 0.066 0.076 -0.051 0.021 -0.146 -0.054 0.484*** 0.042 0.135 0.196* 0.055 -0.262** 
nedown1 0.061 -0.022 -0.108 -0.125 0.220* -0.001 0.013 -0.018 0.180 0.249** -0.085 0.214* 
insti1 -0.049 0.063 -0.010 -0.010 -0.099 0.157 -0.208* -0.045 0.289*** -0.020 0.071 0.088 
size1 0.171 -0.111 0.204* 0.271** -0.057 -0.275** 0.106 0.390*** -0.877*** -0.903*** -0.010 -0.062 
level1 -0.056 -0.058 0.056 0.116 -0.048 0.209* -0.327*** -0.094 0.192* -0.579*** 0.134 0.283** 
mtb1 0.453*** -0.160 0.237** 0.275** 0.135 -0.266** 0.166 0.095 0.298*** -0.236** 0.036 -0.096 
pe1 0.048 -0.047 -0.016 0.055 0.185 -0.039 -0.053 0.015 0.068 0.014 -0.015 -0.109 
boar1 0.113 0.085 0.000 -0.005 0.050 0.358*** -0.270** -0.258** -0.307*** -0.319*** -0.040 -0.061 
bsize1 0.098 0.096 -0.017 -0.018 0.062 0.371*** -0.280** -0.267** -0.329*** -0.328*** -0.044 -0.090 
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Panel B. continued 
 auditn1 ceoown1^2 exeown1^2 nedown1 insti1 size1 level1 mtb1 pe1 boar1 bsize1 
auditn1 1.000            
ceoown1^2 -0.105  1.000           
exeown1^2 -0.161  0.984*** 1.000          
nedown1 -0.057  -0.027  -0.035  1.000         
insti1 -0.054  -0.173  -0.176  -0.241** 1.000        
size1 0.254** -0.163  -0.178  -0.249** -0.141  1.000       
level1 0.278** -0.134  -0.149  -0.074  0.266** 0.204* 1.000      
mtb1 -0.059  0.051  0.054  -0.111  0.201* 0.044  0.121  1.000     
pe1 -0.052  -0.032  -0.028  -0.012  0.049  -0.045  0.047  0.027  1.000    
boar1 0.131  -0.158  -0.126  -0.114  -0.155  0.342*** 0.134  -0.084  -0.036  1.000   
bsize1 0.106  -0.160  -0.127  -0.118  -0.158  0.360*** 0.118  -0.082  -0.025  0.992*** 1.000  
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp#: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). r#: share 
returns from 9 months before year # end to three months after the year # end, # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr#: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r#) is negative, 
0 otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). drr#: share return (r#) * negative returns (dr#) at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). accrb#: 
(δinventory+δdebtors+δother current assets-δcreditors-δother current liabilities-depreciation)/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). cfo#: 
cash flow from operation/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfo#: dummy variable equal to 1 if cfo is negative, 0 otherwise at year # 
(#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfocfo#: cash flow from operation * negative cash flow from operation at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). cscore#: is linear 
functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). gscore#: 
is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage, in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
size#: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). level#: total debts divided by total assets at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, 
y-3). mtb#: market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dual1: dummy variable coded 1 if the ceo is also the 
chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit committee 
independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the members in audit committee are non-executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share ownership 
as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding 
shares at year y-1. nedown1: total common shares held by non-executive directors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: total common shares held by 
institutional investors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. boar1: natural logarithm of the number of board directors at year y-1. bsize1: number of board 
directors on the board at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1.
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Table 3.11 Results from cross-sectional regressions of beginning of 
period price deflated earnings on contemporaneous annual returns based 
on Basu (1997) model 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α2𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + α3𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ε                                    
  MBOs   third-party LBOs 
  Y-1 Y-2 Y-3   Y-1 Y-2 Y-3 
  Model1 Model2 Model3   Model4 Model5 Model6 
Variables 
Expected 
sign 
epsp1 epsp2 epsp3  
Expected 
sign 
epsp1 epsp2 epsp3 
          
dr1  0.061     0.128*   
  (0.199)     (0.097)   
r1 - 0.100    + 0.118   
  (0.244)     (0.201)   
drr1 + 0.336**    - 0.363*   
  (0.039)     (0.060)   
dr2   0.222     0.060  
   (0.271)     (0.285)  
r2 -/+  0.072   -/+  -0.029  
   (0.347)     (0.606)  
drr2 +/-  0.491   +/-  0.565**  
   (0.150)     (0.037)  
dr3    0.017     -0.002 
    (0.602)     (0.955) 
r3 +   0.017  -   -0.014 
    (0.308)     (0.740) 
drr3 -   0.243  +   0.231** 
    (0.194)     (0.023) 
Constant  0.061* -0.072 0.089***   -0.024 0.060*** 0.069*** 
  (0.066) (0.695) (0.000)   (0.737) (0.005) (0.000) 
Observations  118 113 110   81 70 68 
R-squared  0.197 0.019 0.04   0.118 0.105 0.133 
F-test  4.865*** 1.375 1.459   3.448** 1.69 3.286** 
Prob>F  0.0032 0.254 0.23   0.0207 0.178 0.0263 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp#: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning 
of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). r#: share returns from 9 months before year # end to three months 
after the year # end, # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr#: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r#) is 
negative, 0 otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). drr#: share return (r#) * negative returns (dr#) 
at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
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Table 3.12 Results from cross-sectional regressions of beginning of 
period price deflated earnings on contemporaneous annual returns by 
controlling firm size, leverage and market to book value, based on Khan 
& Watts (2009) model to calculate C-score and G-score 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
= α0 + α1𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ (𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡) + (𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜇4𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇5𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇6𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀                                               
 Y-1   Y-2   Y-3 
 MBOs 
third-
party 
LBOs 
 
 
MBOs 
third-
party 
LBOs 
 
 
MBOs 
third-party 
LBOs 
 Model7 Model10  
 
Model8 Model11  
 
Model9 Model12 
Variables epsp1 epsp1  Variables epsp2 epsp2  Variables epsp3 epsp3 
           
dr1 -0.311 1.638**  dr2 0.138 -0.856  dr3 0.091 0.869* 
 (0.476) (0.045)   (0.877) (0.273)   (0.756) (0.054) 
r1 -0.764 2.199**  r2 -0.077 -1.796**  r3 -0.027 1.970 
 (0.643) (0.037)   (0.959) (0.013)   (0.910) (0.283) 
rsize1 0.043 -0.109*  rsize2 -0.003 0.098**  rsize3 0.002 -0.115 
 (0.637) (0.053)   (0.974) (0.012)   (0.886) (0.291) 
rmtb1 0.002 -0.003  rmtb2 -0.024 0.063*  rmtb3 -0.002** -0.022 
 (0.979) (0.861)   (0.299) (0.054)   (0.037) (0.583) 
rlevel1 0.680 -0.445  rlevel2 4.351 -0.658*  rlevel3 0.236 0.778* 
 (0.303) (0.542)   (0.354) (0.051)   (0.173) (0.053) 
drr1 0.272 0.584  drr2 7.433*** -1.284  drr3 2.168*** -0.079 
 (0.882) (0.701)   (0.004) (0.773)   (0.005) (0.970) 
drrsize1 0.007 -0.041  drrsize2 -0.400*** 0.137  drrsize3 -0.128*** 0.009 
 (0.946) (0.628)   (0.008) (0.568)   (0.006) (0.944) 
drrmtb1 -0.039 0.021  drrmtb2 0.011 0.158  drrmtb3 -0.000 0.137** 
 (0.568) (0.565)   (0.809) (0.365)   (0.980) (0.020) 
drrlevel1 -0.328 1.251  drrlevel2 -3.717 -3.986*  drrlevel3 2.717*** -0.266 
 (0.768) (0.180)   (0.432) (0.094)   (0.000) (0.699) 
size1 0.003 0.056  size2 -0.030 0.007  size3 0.002 0.038** 
 (0.846) (0.143)   (0.459) (0.626)   (0.628) (0.042) 
mtb1 0.011 0.002  mtb2 0.010 -0.018*  mtb3 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.492) (0.898)   (0.303) (0.075)   (0.160) (0.799) 
level1 -0.130 0.066  level2 -2.550 -0.190  level3 -0.125 -0.396** 
 (0.398) (0.849)   (0.346) (0.289)   (0.120) (0.015) 
drsize1 0.026 -0.086**  drsize2 -0.015 0.055  drsize3 -0.008 -0.059** 
 (0.300) (0.046)   (0.755) (0.182)   (0.624) (0.025) 
drmtb1 -0.026 0.023  drmtb2 -0.010 0.035**  drmtb3 0.003 0.074** 
 (0.202) (0.377)   (0.362) (0.023)   (0.729) (0.014) 
drlevel1 -0.264 -0.122  drlevel2 2.787 -0.888  drlevel3 0.497*** 0.531* 
 (0.380) (0.738)   (0.306) (0.217)   (0.003) (0.057) 
           
Constant 0.000 -1.036  Constant 0.707 0.030  Constant 0.068 -0.537 
 (0.999) (0.156)   (0.334) (0.912)   (0.457) (0.121) 
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Observations 118 81  Observations 113 70  Observations 110 68 
R-squared 0.248 0.986  R-squared 0.113 0.663  R-squared 0.839 0.491 
F-test 2.239*** 301.4***  F-test 2.763*** 2.78***  F-test 32.62*** 5.278*** 
Prob>F 0.009 0.000  Prob>F 0.001 0.003  Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp#: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning of 
year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). r#: share returns from 9 months before year # end to three months after the 
year # end, # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr#: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r#) is negative, 0 otherwise 
at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). drr#: share return (r#) * negative returns (dr#) at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the 
year y-1, y-2, y-3). size#: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). level#: total 
debts divided by total assets at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). mtb#: market value of equity divided by the 
book value of equity at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
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Table 3.13 Descriptive statistics of C-score and G-score 
Panel A. MBOs 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
gscore1 119 0.131 0.126 0.126 -0.183 0.036 0.225 0.481 
gscore2 118 0.544 0.395 0.745 -2.733 0.032 0.916 3.007 
gscore3 113 0.035 0.035 0.072 -0.580 0.008 0.061 0.247 
cscore1 119 0.254 0.275 0.235 -2.149 0.230 0.339 0.408 
cscore2 118 -0.271 -0.303 0.878 -2.278 -0.913 0.368 2.643 
cscore3 113 0.371 0.274 0.477 -0.577 0.066 0.548 2.731 
         
Panel B. third-party LBOs 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
gscore1 87 0.055 0.055 0.241 -0.489 -0.082 0.179 1.109 
gscore2 83 0.003 0.002 0.223 -0.977 -0.128 0.170 0.429 
gscore3 74 -0.016 -0.006 0.224 -0.502 -0.173 0.081 0.948 
cscore1 87 -6.558 -6.605 0.782 -8.583 -6.960 -6.242 -3.428 
cscore2 83 0.657 0.757 0.845 -3.391 0.276 1.263 2.009 
cscore3 74 0.328 0.297 0.377 -1.350 0.199 0.432 2.353 
cscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market to book value and 
leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). gscore#: is linear 
functions of firm specific characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage, in khan and 
watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
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Table 3.14 Correlations between C-score and G-score at year Y-1, Y-2, and 
Y-3 , based on Khan & Watts (2009) model 
Panel A. MBOs 
 gscore1 gscore2 gscore3 cscore1 cscore2 cscore3 
gscore1 1.000      
gscore2 0.622*** 1.000     
gscore3 0.392*** 0.234** 1.000    
cscore1 -0.229** 0.285*** -0.201** 1.000   
cscore2 -0.840*** -0.700*** -0.287*** -0.065 1.000  
cscore3 0.383*** 0.670*** 0.456*** -0.051 -0.281*** 1.000 
       
Panel B. third-party LBOs 
 gscore1 gscore2 gscore3 cscore1 cscore2 cscore3 
gscore1 1.000      
gscore2 -0.218** 1.000     
gscore3 0.442*** -0.687*** 1.000    
cscore1 0.491*** -0.605*** 0.831*** 1.000   
cscore2 0.311*** 0.821*** -0.501*** -0.278** 1.000  
cscore3 -0.026 0.420*** -0.377*** -0.197* 0.354*** 1.000 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. cscore#: is linear functions of firm specific 
characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year # 
(#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). gscore#: is linear functions of firm specific characteristics include 
firm size, market to book value and leverage, in khan and watts (2009), at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year 
y-1, y-2, y-3). 
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Table 3.15 Relation between asymmetric timeliness (accounting 
conservatism) and board characteristics at year Y-1. Dependent variable: 
EPS before extraordinary item divided by the price at the beginning of 
year Basu (1997) model 
  MBOs   third-party LBOs 
  Model13 Model14   Model15 Model16 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
epsp1 epsp1  
Expected 
Sign 
epsp1 epsp1 
        
dr1  -1.525 -1.474   -2.093 -1.785 
  (0.150) (0.188)   (0.184) (0.259) 
r1  -4.832** -4.320*   -6.288** -4.381** 
  (0.030) (0.059)   (0.043) (0.033) 
drr1  0.269 -1.010   8.559** 6.606** 
  (0.956) (0.847)   (0.032) (0.043) 
dual1  0.034 0.031   -2.664*** -2.607*** 
  (0.775) (0.784)   (0.000) (0.000) 
drdual1  -0.008 -0.013   2.712*** 2.656*** 
  (0.961) (0.930)   (0.000) (0.000) 
rdual1 - -0.258 -0.238  + 8.457*** 7.995*** 
  (0.359) (0.298)   (0.000) (0.000) 
drrdual1 + 0.237 0.217  - -8.709*** -8.245*** 
  (0.607) (0.610)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ned1  -0.262 -0.244   -1.116 -0.967 
  (0.657) (0.651)   (0.182) (0.151) 
drned1  0.753 0.716   2.305** 2.160** 
  (0.264) (0.256)   (0.050) (0.043) 
rned1 + 1.324 1.230  - 1.412 1.082 
  (0.295) (0.329)   (0.462) (0.365) 
drrned1 - 0.773 0.944  + 2.599 2.915* 
  (0.671) (0.619)   (0.258) (0.095) 
auditn1  -0.053 -0.052   -1.458*** -1.298*** 
  (0.628) (0.639)   (0.000) (0.000) 
drauditn1  -0.086 -0.091   0.979** 0.855** 
  (0.553) (0.538)   (0.025) (0.042) 
rauditn1 + 0.607 0.575  - 3.919*** 3.435*** 
  (0.105) (0.116)   (0.001) (0.002) 
drrauditn1 - -0.893* -0.851*  + -5.175*** -4.640*** 
  (0.053) (0.062)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ceoown1  0.264      
  (0.552)      
drceoown1  -0.320      
  (0.515)      
rceoown1 - -0.282      
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  (0.692)      
drrceoown1 + 0.194      
  (0.873)      
exeown1   0.336     
   (0.381)     
drexeown1   -0.360     
   (0.423)     
rexeown1 -  -0.506     
   (0.441)     
drrexeown1 +  0.801     
   (0.523)     
ceoown1^2      8.494***  
      (0.000)  
drceoown1^2      -8.127***  
      (0.001)  
rceoown1^2     - -48.755***  
      (0.003)  
drrceoown1^2     + 48.111***  
      (0.003)  
exeown1^2       9.534*** 
       (0.000) 
drexeown1^2       -9.264*** 
       (0.000) 
rexeown1^2     -  -55.310*** 
       (0.000) 
drrexeown1^2     +  54.634*** 
       (0.000) 
nedown1  0.317 0.321   -3.246*** -4.441*** 
  (0.236) (0.235)   (0.009) (0.001) 
drnedown1  0.293 0.326   1.330 2.505* 
  (0.545) (0.506)   (0.327) (0.070) 
rnedown1 + 2.798 2.429  - 19.387*** 25.693*** 
  (0.213) (0.252)   (0.005) (0.000) 
drrnedown1 - -0.458 0.199  + -28.091*** -34.476*** 
  (0.876) (0.945)   (0.000) (0.000) 
insti1  0.551*** 0.560***   1.337** 1.194** 
  (0.007) (0.008)   (0.041) (0.011) 
drinsti1  -0.649** -0.661**   -0.716 -0.574 
  (0.049) (0.048)   (0.440) (0.479) 
rinsti1 - -2.448*** -2.471***  - -4.338* -4.117** 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.090) (0.019) 
drrinsti1 + 2.339** 2.466**  + 4.776* 4.553** 
  (0.024) (0.020)   (0.093) (0.034) 
level1  -0.150 -0.139   0.917*** 0.803*** 
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  (0.613) (0.638)   (0.001) (0.000) 
drlevel1  -0.250 -0.266   -1.069** -0.945** 
  (0.542) (0.517)   (0.021) (0.028) 
rlevel1  -0.231 -0.151   -2.924*** -2.061*** 
  (0.795) (0.853)   (0.001) (0.000) 
drrlevel1  -0.014 -0.105   4.235*** 3.435*** 
  (0.991) (0.934)   (0.006) (0.009) 
mtb1  -0.052 -0.054   0.016 0.011 
  (0.130) (0.108)   (0.354) (0.357) 
drmtb1  0.023 0.025   0.024 0.030 
  (0.537) (0.496)   (0.600) (0.511) 
rmtb1  0.372** 0.372**   -0.025 -0.025 
  (0.031) (0.030)   (0.649) (0.331) 
drrmtb1  -0.436** -0.437**   0.064 0.064 
  (0.014) (0.013)   (0.458) (0.365) 
size1  -0.036 -0.029   -0.008 0.003 
  (0.326) (0.461)   (0.819) (0.905) 
drsize1  0.119** 0.116**   -0.002 -0.013 
  (0.029) (0.044)   (0.959) (0.759) 
rsize1  0.340** 0.317**   0.002 -0.075 
  (0.014) (0.015)   (0.990) (0.336) 
drrsize1  -0.111 -0.057   -0.125 -0.050 
  (0.664) (0.828)   (0.413) (0.628) 
pe1  0.001 0.001   -0.001** -0.001*** 
  (0.808) (0.770)   (0.014) (0.002) 
drpe1  -0.004 -0.005   0.004 0.003 
  (0.343) (0.312)   (0.209) (0.243) 
rpe1  0.014** 0.013**   0.001 -0.000 
  (0.021) (0.027)   (0.709) (0.844) 
drrpe1  -0.031** -0.030**   0.006 0.007 
  (0.028) (0.021)   (0.346) (0.229) 
boar1  0.345*** 0.337**   -0.258 -0.267 
  (0.008) (0.010)   (0.525) (0.419) 
drboar1  -0.306 -0.280   0.162 0.169 
  (0.266) (0.313)   (0.780) (0.749) 
rboar1  -0.969* -0.966**   1.890 1.867* 
  (0.072) (0.050)   (0.209) (0.057) 
drrboar1  1.066 1.111   -2.362 -2.323* 
  (0.193) (0.151)   (0.170) (0.071) 
Constant  0.075 -0.056   2.144** 1.799** 
  (0.907) (0.935)   (0.015) (0.027) 
        
Observations  117 117   80 80 
R-squared  0.51 0.513   0.919 0.922 
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F-test  7.096*** 7.252***   4653*** 4842*** 
Prob>F  0 0   0 0 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp1: eps before extraordinary item/price at the 
beginning of year y-1. r1: share returns from 9 months before year 1 end to three months after the year 1 end, 1 
(1=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr1: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r1) is negative, 0 otherwise at 
year y-1. drr1: share return (r1) * negative returns (dr1) at year y-1. size1: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at 
year y-1. level1: total debts divided by total assets at year y-1. mtb1: market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity at year y-1. dual1: dummy variable coded 1 if the ceo is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise 
at year y-1. ned1: number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of board directors at year y-1. 
auditn1: audit committee independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the members in audit committee are non-
executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: ceo share ownership as a percentage of the total number of 
outstanding shares at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share ownership as a percentage of the total 
number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1: executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number 
of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the executive share ownership as a percentage of the 
total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total common shares held by non-executive directors 
divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: total common shares held by institutional investors 
divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. boar1: natural logarithm of the number of board directors 
at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1.  
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Table 3.16 Results from cross-sectional regressions of accruals on cash 
from operations based on Ball & Shivakumar (2005) model 
  MBOs   third-party LBOs 
  Y-1 Y-2 Y-3   Y-1 Y-2 Y-3 
  Model17 Model18 Model19   Model20 Model21 Model22 
Variables 
Expected 
sign 
accrb1 accrb2 accrb3  
Expected 
sign 
accrb1 accrb2 accrb3 
          
dcfo1  0.133     -0.006   
  (0.162)     (0.856)   
cfo1 - -0.212**    + -0.280***   
  (0.036)     (0.004)   
dcfocfo1 + 0.809*    - 0.219   
  (0.067)     (0.311)   
dcfo2   0.079     0.093  
   (0.391)     (0.171)  
cfo2 -/+  -0.334**   -/+  -0.364**  
   (0.011)     (0.023)  
dcfocfo2 +/-  0.401***   +/-  0.424***  
   (0.003)     (0.010)  
dcfo3    -0.069**     0.001 
    (0.036)     (0.995) 
cfo3 +   -0.447***  -   -0.066 
    (0.000)     (0.823) 
dcfocfo3 -   -0.822**  +   0.392 
    (0.016)     (0.658) 
Constant  -0.041*** 0.003 0.022   -0.025** -0.003 -0.030 
  (0.001) (0.837) (0.226)   (0.049) (0.829) (0.443) 
          
Observations  110 113 99   78 78 72 
R-squared  0.063 0.083 0.348   0.103 0.118 0.008 
F-test  2.383* 3.299** 13.49***   4.594*** 3.309** 0.104 
Prob>F  0.0735 0.0232 2.09E-07   0.00528 0.0247 0.958 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. accrb#: (δinventory + δdebtors + δother current assets – 
δcreditors - δother current liabilities - depreciation) / total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, 
y-2, y-3). cfo#: cash flow from operation/total assets at the beginning of year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
dcfo#: dummy variable equal to 1 if cfo is negative, 0 otherwise at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dcfocfo#: 
cash flow from operation * negative cash flow from operation at year # (#=1,2,3 denote the year y-1, y-2, y-3). 
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Table 3.17 Information disclosure descriptive statistics on MBO deals and 
third-party LBO deals at year Y-1, Y-2, and Y-3, based on Banker et al. 
(2012) modified C-score model 
Panel A: C-Score (Bad news) compare MBOs with third-party LBOs 
 MBOs  third-party LBOs  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
Y-1 118 0.392   81 -1.592   1.437  (0.152)  
Y-3 110 0.060   68 0.359   -2.781***  (0.006)  
         
Panel B: C-Score (Bad news) compare year Y-1 with Y-2 
 Y-1  Y-2  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
MBOs 118 0.392   113 0.519   -0.746  (0.457)  
         
Panel C: C-Score (Bad news) compare year Y-1 with Y-3 
 Y-1  Y-3  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
MBOs 118 0.392   110 0.060   2.589***  (0.010)  
third-party LBOs 81 -1.592   68 0.359   -1.075  (0.284)  
         
Panel D: C-Score (Bad news) compare year Y-2 with Y-3 
 Y-2  Y-3  Significance tests 
 Observations Mean  Observations Mean  t p > |t| 
         
MBOs 113 0.519   110 0.060   3.218**  (0.002)  
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. cscore: is a linear function of firm specific characteristics 
includes firm size, market to book value and leverage in Khan and Watts (2009). 
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Table 3.18 Relation between asymmetric timeliness (accounting 
conservatism) and board characteristics at year Y-1. Dependent variable: 
C-score (bad news) based on Khan & Watts (2009) model 
 MBOs  third-party LBOs 
  Model23 Model24   Model25 Model26 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
cscore1 cscore1  
Expected 
Sign 
cscore1 cscore1 
dual1 + 0.035 0.034  - 0.101 0.109 
  (0.277) (0.276)   (0.619) (0.594) 
ned1 - -0.115 -0.104  + 0.845 0.929 
  (0.190) (0.225)   (0.218) (0.174) 
auditn1 - -0.026 -0.020  + -0.209 -0.185 
  (0.549) (0.620)   (0.347) (0.387) 
ceoown1 + -0.072      
  (0.284)      
exeown1 +  -0.012     
   (0.828)     
ceoown1^2     + 2.191*  
      (0.086)  
exeown1^2     +  2.107* 
       (0.093) 
nedown1 - 0.080 0.094  + 2.243 2.257 
  (0.424) (0.379)   (0.245) (0.242) 
insti1 + -0.017 0.002  + 1.260** 1.282** 
  (0.703) (0.965)   (0.025) (0.022) 
pe1  -0.001 -0.001   0.001 0.001 
  (0.525) (0.554)   (0.536) (0.529) 
boar1  -0.036 -0.035   -0.762** -0.763*** 
  (0.473) (0.485)   (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant  0.386*** 0.361***   -5.966*** -6.047*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Observations  118 118   85 85 
R-squared  0.019 0.018   0.246 0.253 
F-test  1.062 0.887   4.007*** 4.08*** 
Prob>F  0.395 0.53   0.000522 0.000441 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. cscore1: is a linear function of firm specific 
characteristics includes firm size, market to book value and leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year y-1. size1: 
natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year y-1. level1: total debts divided by total assets at year y-1. mtb1: market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year y-1. dual1: dummy variable coded 1 if the ceo is also the 
chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of non-executive directors divided by the total number 
of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit committee independence, dummy variable equals to 1 if all the 
members in audit committee are non-executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: ceo share ownership as a 
percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share ownership 
as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1: executive share ownership as a 
percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the executive share 
ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total common shares 
held by non-executive directors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: total common shares 
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held by institutional investors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. boar1: natural logarithm of 
the number of board directors at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1. 
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Table 3.19 Sensitivity analysis by changing the form to measure board 
size. Relation between asymmetric timeliness (accounting conservatism) 
and board characteristics at year Y-1, based on Basu (1997) model. 
Dependent variable: EPS before extraordinary item divided by the price at 
the beginning of year 
 MBOs  third-party LBOs 
  Model27 Model28   Model29 Model30 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
epsp1 epsp1  
Expected 
Sign 
epsp1 epsp1 
        
dr1  -1.849* -1.783*   -1.872 -1.572 
  (0.070) (0.098)   (0.122) (0.195) 
r1  -5.893*** -5.432**   -4.639 -2.794 
  (0.007) (0.016)   (0.242) (0.283) 
drr1  1.322 0.131   6.509 4.627 
  (0.786) (0.980)   (0.138) (0.152) 
dual1  0.034 0.030   -2.585*** -2.538*** 
  (0.775) (0.791)   (0.000) (0.000) 
drdual1  -0.002 -0.006   2.636*** 2.590*** 
  (0.990) (0.966)   (0.000) (0.000) 
rdual1 - -0.282 -0.250  + 8.215*** 7.805*** 
  (0.283) (0.243)   (0.000) (0.000) 
drrdual1 + 0.266 0.235  - -8.452*** -8.041*** 
  (0.554) (0.575)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ned1  -0.294 -0.281   -0.805 -0.679 
  (0.626) (0.611)   (0.392) (0.310) 
drned1  0.798 0.761   2.006 1.882* 
  (0.244) (0.236)   (0.104) (0.071) 
rned1 + 1.533 1.464  - 1.006 0.691 
  (0.232) (0.250)   (0.648) (0.599) 
drrned1 - 0.573 0.712  + 3.072 3.371* 
  (0.755) (0.710)   (0.221) (0.060) 
auditn1  -0.044 -0.044   -1.479*** -1.323*** 
  (0.689) (0.697)   (0.000) (0.000) 
drauditn1  -0.104 -0.108   0.987** 0.867** 
  (0.462) (0.451)   (0.025) (0.044) 
rauditn1 + 0.575 0.545  - 4.106*** 3.622*** 
  (0.123) (0.133)   (0.001) (0.002) 
drrauditn1 - -0.885* -0.844*  + -5.392*** -4.855*** 
  (0.050) (0.058)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ceoown1  0.257      
  (0.565)      
drceoown1  -0.319      
  (0.520)      
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rceoown1 - -0.213      
  (0.767)      
drrceoown1 + 0.116      
  (0.924)      
exeown1   0.323     
   (0.404)     
drexeown1   -0.356     
   (0.430)     
rexeown1 -  -0.425     
   (0.522)     
drrexeown1 +  0.706     
   (0.577)     
ceoown1^2      8.212***  
      (0.001)  
drceoown1^2      -7.854***  
      (0.002)  
rceoown1^2     - -45.294***  
      (0.007)  
drrceoown1^2     + 44.598***  
      (0.008)  
exeown1^2       9.232*** 
       (0.000) 
drexeown12       -8.967*** 
       (0.000) 
rexeown12     -  -51.925*** 
       (0.000) 
drrexeown1^2     +  51.201*** 
       (0.001) 
nedown1  0.323 0.327   -2.958** -4.092*** 
  (0.235) (0.234)   (0.016) (0.001) 
drnedown1  0.270 0.303   1.042 2.154 
  (0.572) (0.532)   (0.433) (0.108) 
rnedown1 + 2.799 2.442  - 17.829** 23.823*** 
  (0.186) (0.228)   (0.011) (0.000) 
drrnedown1 - -0.489 0.159  + -26.601*** -32.678*** 
  (0.863) (0.955)   (0.000) (0.000) 
insti1  0.576*** 0.580***   1.127 1.014** 
  (0.004) (0.005)   (0.103) (0.029) 
drinsti1  -0.683** -0.693**   -0.510 -0.398 
  (0.035) (0.034)   (0.585) (0.613) 
rinsti1 - -2.487*** -2.486***  - -3.648 -3.527* 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.181) (0.059) 
drrinsti1 + 2.375** 2.476**  + 4.070 3.950* 
  (0.020) (0.018)   (0.171) (0.075) 
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level1  -0.140 -0.130   0.835*** 0.731*** 
  (0.639) (0.664)   (0.004) (0.001) 
drlevel1  -0.258 -0.273   -0.976** -0.861** 
  (0.537) (0.515)   (0.037) (0.043) 
rlevel1  -0.335 -0.248   -2.826*** -2.023*** 
  (0.696) (0.751)   (0.003) (0.001) 
drrlevel1  0.098 0.003   4.187*** 3.447*** 
  (0.940) (0.998)   (0.007) (0.010) 
mtb1  -0.053 -0.055*   0.013 0.009 
  (0.113) (0.089)   (0.449) (0.485) 
drmtb1  0.023 0.025   0.027 0.032 
  (0.533) (0.491)   (0.554) (0.476) 
rmtb1  0.384** 0.384**   -0.020 -0.022 
  (0.020) (0.016)   (0.733) (0.532) 
drrmtb1  -0.451*** -0.451***   0.059 0.061 
  (0.008) (0.006)   (0.498) (0.406) 
size1  -0.040 -0.033   -0.014 -0.004 
  (0.283) (0.409)   (0.669) (0.888) 
drsize1  0.123** 0.120**   0.006 -0.004 
  (0.025) (0.038)   (0.897) (0.919) 
rsize1  0.358*** 0.336***   0.013 -0.061 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.930) (0.547) 
drrsize1  -0.128 -0.074   -0.135 -0.062 
  (0.614) (0.777)   (0.423) (0.611) 
pe1  0.001 0.001   -0.001* -0.001** 
  (0.781) (0.747)   (0.055) (0.022) 
drpe1  -0.005 -0.005   0.004 0.003 
  (0.309) (0.284)   (0.218) (0.250) 
rpe1  0.014** 0.013**   0.001 -0.000 
  (0.018) (0.027)   (0.762) (0.880) 
drrpe1  -0.030** -0.030**   0.006 0.007 
  (0.027) (0.021)   (0.330) (0.219) 
bsize1  0.058*** 0.056***   -0.017 -0.020 
  (0.006) (0.008)   (0.784) (0.699) 
drbsize1  -0.045 -0.041   -0.001 0.001 
  (0.280) (0.335)   (0.991) (0.987) 
rbsize1  -0.172** -0.169**   0.222 0.224 
  (0.035) (0.024)   (0.355) (0.174) 
drrbsize1  0.199 0.203*   -0.300 -0.299 
  (0.110) (0.085)   (0.265) (0.143) 
Constant  0.400 0.270   1.836** 1.494** 
  (0.536) (0.695)   (0.015) (0.032) 
        
Observations  117 117   80 80 
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R-squared  0.512 0.515   0.918 0.921 
F-test  6.675*** 6.744***   4258*** 7101*** 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epsp1: eps before extraordinary item/price at the beginning 
of year y-1. r1: share returns from 9 months before year 1 end to three months after the year 1 end, 1 (1=1,2,3 denote 
the year y-1, y-2, y-3). dr1: dummy variable coded 1 if share return (r1) is negative, 0 otherwise at year y-1. drr1: share 
return (r1) * negative returns (dr1) at year y-1. size1: natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year y-1. level1: total debts 
divided by total assets at year y-1. mtb1: market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year y-1. dual1: 
dummy variable coded 1 if the ceo is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of non-
executive directors divided by the total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit committee independence, 
dummy variable equals to 1 if all the members in audit committee are non-executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: 
ceo share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of 
the ceo share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1: executive 
share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the 
executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total 
common shares held by non-executive directors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: total 
common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. bsize1: number 
of board directors on the board at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1. 
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Table 3.20 Sensitivity analysis by changing the form to measure board 
size. Relation between asymmetric timeliness (accounting conservatism) 
and board characteristics at year Y-1, based on Basu (1997) model. 
Dependent variable: C-score (bad news) 
 MBOs  third-party LBOs 
  Model31 Model32   Model33 Model34 
VARIABLES 
Expected 
Sign 
cscore1 cscore1  
Expected 
Sign 
cscore1 cscore1 
        
dual1 + 0.038 0.038  - 0.097 0.104 
  (0.239) (0.238)   (0.637) (0.613) 
ned1 - -0.110 -0.098  + 0.801 0.884 
  (0.205) (0.244)   (0.243) (0.196) 
auditn1 - -0.030 -0.024  + -0.213 -0.190 
  (0.493) (0.555)   (0.334) (0.372) 
ceoown1 + -0.072      
  (0.276)      
exeown1 +  -0.012     
   (0.829)     
ceoown1^2     + 2.118*  
      (0.093)  
exeown1^2     +  2.050* 
       (0.099) 
nedown1 - 0.080 0.093  + 2.211 2.226 
  (0.426) (0.380)   (0.250) (0.247) 
insti1 + -0.018 0.001  + 1.249** 1.271** 
  (0.687) (0.985)   (0.025) (0.022) 
pe1  -0.001 -0.001   0.001 0.001 
  (0.504) (0.533)   (0.536) (0.529) 
bsize1  -0.002 -0.002   -0.124*** -0.124*** 
  (0.785) (0.816)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant  0.337*** 0.312***   -6.525*** -6.608*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Observations  118 118   85 85 
R-squared  0.019 0.017   0.254 0.261 
F-test  0.866 0.688   4.234*** 4.314*** 
Prob>F  0.548 0.701   0.000308 0.000256 
Robust pval in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. cscore1: is linear functions of firm specific 
characteristics include firm size, market to book value and leverage in khan and watts (2009), at year y-1. size1: 
natural logarithm of firms' total sales at year y-1. level1: total debts divided by total assets at year y-1. mtb1: 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year y-1. dual1: dummy variable coded 1 if the ceo 
is also the chairman of the board, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ned1: number of non-executive directors divided by the 
total number of board directors at year y-1. auditn1: audit committee independence, dummy variable equals to 1 
if all the members in audit committee are non-executives, 0 otherwise at year y-1. ceoown1: ceo share ownership 
as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. ceoown1^2: the square of the ceo share 
ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1: executive share 
ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. exeown1^2: the square of the 
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executive share ownership as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares at year y-1. nedown1: total 
common shares held by non-executive directors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. insti1: 
total common shares held by institutional investors divided by total common shares outstanding at year y-1. bsize1: 
number of board directors on the board at year y-1. pe1: the industry-adjusted price earnings ratio at year y-1.  
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Table 4.22 Descriptive statistics on takeover premiums, board structures, 
board effectiveness and control variables for third-party LBOs 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
prem 76 0.358 0.300 0.468 -0.994 0.134 0.474 2.286 
bsize 76 6.763 7.000 1.574 4.000 5.500 8.000 10.000 
ned 76 0.536 0.563 0.118 0.222 0.444 0.625 0.750 
dual 76 0.105 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
cscore 76 -6.532 -6.597 0.766 -8.583 -6.900 -6.245 -3.427 
sta bsize *sta cscore 76 -0.189 -0.050 0.527 -2.168 -0.372 0.098 1.100 
sta ned *sta cscore 76 0.069 0.030 0.616 -1.954 -0.174 0.230 2.724 
dual *sta cscore 76 0.006 0.000 0.237 -0.451 0.000 0.000 1.915 
size total assets (£000) 
76 
546,444.90
0 
104,704.50
0 
1,532,222 6,776 42,148.500 
445,33
0 
11,700,000 
size ln(total assets) 76 18.663 18.464 1.666 15.729 17.557 19.914 23.186 
roa 76 0.018 0.051 0.147 -0.564 0.007 0.089 0.315 
bown 76 0.102 0.029 0.143 0.000 0.003 0.146 0.746 
lnnas non-audit fees 
(£000) 
76 324.263 107 607.481 5 55 326 4,300 
lnnas ln(non-audit fees) 76 4.895 4.671 1.329 1.609 4.005 5.787 8.366 
level 76 0.589 0.552 0.242 0.060 0.471 0.663 1.774 
fcf 76 -0.011 0.009 0.110 -0.417 -0.048 0.049 0.201 
pea 76 1.407 -3.025 70.768 -242.180 -10.365 4.700 510.100 
big4 76 0.868 1.000 0.340 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ceoch 76 0.066 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
sg 76 0.237 0.085 0.757 -0.895 -0.008 0.222 5.169 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting 
conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) 
model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year 
Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: 
the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year 
Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO duality and 
standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size (£000): Firm size is measured using the total assets of firms. Size: ln total assets in 
year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas (£000): 
The audit independence is measured using the non-audit fees of firms. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-
audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: is calculated by the funds from operation 
minus capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: 
dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change 
equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.23 Descriptive statistics on takeover premiums, board structures, 
board effectiveness and control variables for MBOs 
variables N mean p50 sd min p25 p75 max 
prem 106 0.415 0.397 0.314 -0.600 0.237 0.574 1.716 
bsize 106 6.142 6.000 1.576 3.000 5.000 7.000 11.000 
ned 106 0.445 0.429 0.148 0.000 0.375 0.500 0.750 
dual 106 0.283 0.000 0.453 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
cscore 106 0.256 0.288 0.247 -2.149 0.244 0.339 0.408 
sta bsize *sta cscore 106 -0.044 -0.007 0.437 -2.641 -0.207 0.062 1.743 
sta ned *sta cscore 106 -0.071 -0.008 0.481 -3.952 -0.138 0.108 0.886 
dual *sta cscore 106 0.061 0.000 0.175 -0.391 0.000 0.000 0.507 
size total assets (£000) 106 133,181.600 54,727.500 363,045 1,370 27,809 117,899 3,376,400 
size ln(total assets) 106 17.812 17.818 1.262 14.130 17.141 18.585 21.940 
roa 106 0.048 0.062 0.141 -0.597 0.014 0.112 0.539 
bown 106 0.200 0.110 0.213 0.000 0.014 0.336 0.733 
lnnas non-audit fees (£000) 106 131.008 65.500 196.270 2.000 25.000 160.213 1,322 
lnnas ln(non-audit fees) 106 4.071 4.182 1.382 0.693 3.219 5.077 7.187 
level 106 0.504 0.492 0.185 0.095 0.387 0.637 1.122 
fcf 106 -0.008 0.015 0.137 -0.980 -0.045 0.044 0.369 
pea 106 -3.314 -4.425 16.923 -58.720 -12.470 3.120 84.570 
big4 106 0.698 1.000 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ceoch 106 0.085 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
sg 105 0.394 0.039 2.292 -0.554 -0.052 0.159 21.687 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting 
conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. 
Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the 
standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. 
sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO duality and 
standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size (£000): Firm size is measured using the total assets of firms. Size: ln total assets in year 
Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas (£000): The 
audit independence is measured using the non-audit fees of firms. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit 
fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: is calculated by the funds from operation minus 
capital expenditure and cash dividend deflated by total assets in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy 
variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals 
to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.24 Pearson Correlations among board structures, board effectiveness and control variables for third-party 
LBO deals 
  prem bsize ned dual cscore sta bsize sta ned sta cscore 
sta bsize 
*sta cscore 
sta ned *sta 
cscore 
prem 1          
bsize -0.079 1         
ned -0.085 -0.054 1        
dual -0.006 -0.003 -0.014 1       
cscore 0.005 -0.284** 0.111 0.05 1      
sta bsize -0.079 1.000*** -0.054 -0.003 -0.284** 1     
sta ned -0.085 -0.054 1.000*** -0.014 0.111 -0.054 1    
sta cscore 0.005 -0.284** 0.111 0.05 1.000*** -0.284** 0.111 1   
sta bsize *sta cscore -0.046 -0.212* 0.075 0.104 0.248** -0.212* 0.075 0.248** 1  
sta ned *sta cscore 0.083 0.038 0.048 0.205* 0.482*** 0.038 0.048 0.482*** -0.068 1 
dual *sta cscore -0.098 -0.015 0.215* 0.076 0.326*** -0.015 0.215* 0.326*** 0.099 0.460*** 
size -0.069 0.444*** 0.091 -0.017 -0.552*** 0.444*** 0.091 -0.552*** -0.325*** -0.123 
roa -0.239** 0.017 -0.217* -0.069 -0.104 0.017 -0.217* -0.104 0.008 -0.056 
bown -0.029 -0.088 -0.219* -0.005 0.206* -0.088 -0.219* 0.206* 0.175 0.079 
lnnas 0.199* 0.339*** -0.004 -0.009 -0.457*** 0.339*** -0.004 -0.457*** -0.113 -0.102 
level -0.137 0.153 0.147 0.076 -0.085 0.153 0.147 -0.085 -0.292** 0.038 
fcf -0.045 -0.310*** -0.09 -0.01 -0.184 -0.310*** -0.09 -0.184 -0.118 -0.121 
pea 0.021 -0.017 -0.111 -0.011 0.07 -0.017 -0.111 0.07 0.002 0.113 
big4 -0.045 -0.059 0.055 0.007 -0.122 -0.059 0.055 -0.122 -0.122 -0.105 
ceoch -0.027 0.108 0.136 0.082 -0.073 0.108 0.136 -0.073 -0.108 0.096 
sg -0.094 0.022 0.005 -0.086 -0.036 0.022 0.005 -0.036 0.092 -0.033 
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Continued            
 
dual *sta 
cscore 
size roa bown lnnas level fcf pea big4 ceoch sg 
dual *sta cscore 1           
size -0.162 1          
roa -0.081 0.158 1         
bown 0.162 -0.476*** 0.194* 1        
lnnas -0.14 0.621*** -0.031 -0.373*** 1       
level 0.350*** 0.243** -0.131 -0.15 0.19 1      
fcf -0.11 0.01 0.588*** 0.082 -0.115 -0.047 1     
pea -0.051 -0.018 0.024 -0.036 -0.063 -0.048 0.035 1    
big4 0.027 0.267** 0.125 -0.061 0.201* 0.122 0.067 -0.011 1   
ceoch 0.424*** -0.005 -0.239** -0.037 0.059 0.276** -0.244** 0.328*** 0.103 1  
sg 0 0.043 0.17 0.023 0.152 0.031 0.086 -0.055 -0.067 -0.099 1 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the 
announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-
executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised 
cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board 
size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit 
fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.25 Pearson Correlations among board structures, board effectiveness and control variables for MBO deals 
  prem bsize ned dual cscore sta bsize sta ned sta cscore 
sta bsize 
*sta 
cscore 
sta ned 
*sta 
cscore 
prem 1          
bsize 0.062 1         
ned -0.004 -0.025 1        
dual 0.061 -0.310*** -0.249** 1       
cscore 0.061 -0.043 -0.067 0.114 1      
sta bsize 0.062 1.000*** -0.025 -0.310*** -0.043 1     
sta ned -0.004 -0.025 1.000*** -0.249** -0.067 -0.025 1    
sta cscore 0.061 -0.043 -0.067 0.114 1.000*** -0.043 -0.067 1   
sta bsize *sta cscore 0.107 0.462*** -0.015 -0.137 -0.014 0.462*** -0.015 -0.014 1  
sta ned *sta cscore 0.047 -0.006 0.254*** 0.022 0.751*** -0.006 0.254*** 0.751*** -0.123 1 
dual *sta cscore 0.076 -0.240** -0.089 0.560*** 0.178* -0.240** -0.089 0.178* -0.166* -0.039 
size -0.041 0.406*** 0.225** -0.183* 0.047 0.406*** 0.225** 0.047 0.210** 0.027 
roa -0.246** 0.102 -0.07 -0.092 -0.207** 0.102 -0.07 -0.207** -0.015 -0.213** 
bown -0.079 -0.082 -0.286*** 0.109 0.054 -0.082 -0.286*** 0.054 -0.031 -0.054 
lnnas 0.152 0.363*** 0.136 -0.177* -0.016 0.363*** 0.136 -0.016 0.173* 0.002 
level 0.189* 0.176* 0.104 -0.224** -0.377*** 0.176* 0.104 -0.377*** 0.037 -0.146 
fcf -0.229** -0.05 -0.212** -0.064 -0.011 -0.05 -0.212** -0.011 -0.042 -0.158 
pea -0.117 -0.084 -0.008 0.05 -0.025 -0.084 -0.008 -0.025 0.009 -0.143 
big4 0.081 0.099 0.115 0.003 -0.034 0.099 0.115 -0.034 0.239** -0.099 
ceoch 0.051 0.059 0.213** -0.116 0.059 0.059 0.213** 0.059 0.067 0.13 
sg 0.014 0.129 0.026 0.176* 0.062 0.129 0.026 0.062 0.205** 0.115 
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Continued            
  
dual *sta 
cscore 
size roa bown lnnas level fcf pea big4 ceoch sg 
dual *sta cscore 1           
size -0.132 1          
roa -0.277*** 0.359*** 1         
bown 0.049 -0.352*** 0.056 1        
lnnas -0.250*** 0.568*** 0.152 -0.419*** 1       
level -0.428*** 0.099 -0.044 -0.267*** 0.161* 1      
fcf -0.152 0.062 0.543*** 0.079 0.006 -0.124 1     
pea -0.038 -0.052 0.170* 0.187* -0.041 -0.154 0.108 1    
big4 -0.014 0.296*** 0.145 -0.226** 0.352*** 0.213** 0.009 0.169* 1   
ceoch -0.013 0.001 -0.239** -0.09 0.14 0.019 -0.12 -0.179* 0.053 1  
sg 0.166* -0.006 -0.251*** 0.035 0.123 -0.175* -0.086 -0.036 -0.011 0.252*** 1 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the 
announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-
executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised 
cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board 
size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit 
fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.26 VIF table for Table 4.5 the regression approach for moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model 
(third-party LBOs) 
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
in third-party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) 
 lo1 lo2 lo3 lo4 lo5 lo6 lo7 lo8 lo9 lo10 lo11 lo12 lo13 lo14 lo15 lo16 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Sta cscore         1.65 1.69 1.71 1.65 1.74 1.69 1.71 1.75 
Sta bsize  1.53   1.54 1.53  1.54  1.57   1.57 1.57  1.57 
Sta ned   1.14  1.15  1.14 1.15   1.18  1.18  1.18 1.19 
dual    1.01  1.01 1.01 1.01    1.01  1.01 1.02 1.02 
size 2.14 2.42 2.15 2.14 2.46 2.42 2.15 2.46 2.57 2.76 2.63 2.57 2.84 2.76 2.63 2.84 
roa 1.83 1.87 1.88 1.83 1.92 1.88 1.89 1.93 1.88 1.94 1.95 1.89 2.01 1.95 1.96 2.02 
bown 1.46 1.5 1.5 1.46 1.53 1.5 1.5 1.53 1.48 1.51 1.51 1.48 1.54 1.51 1.51 1.54 
lnnas 1.7 1.71 1.74 1.7 1.74 1.71 1.74 1.74 1.78 1.79 1.8 1.78 1.8 1.79 1.8 1.8 
level 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 
fcf 1.58 1.85 1.59 1.59 1.85 1.85 1.59 1.85 1.73 2.07 1.74 1.73 2.07 2.07 1.75 2.08 
pea 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.04 
                 
Mean VIF 1.55 1.63 1.52 1.48 1.59 1.56 1.46 1.54 1.65 1.72 1.63 1.58 1.69 1.65 1.57 1.63 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the 
announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-
executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised 
cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board 
size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees 
in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.27 VIF table for Table 4.6 the regression approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (third-party LBOs) 
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative 
accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 lo17 lo18 lo19 lo20 lo21 lo22 lo23 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
sta cscore 1.7 2.24 1.78 2.36 1.83 2.24 2.37 
sta bsize 1.61   1.63 1.61  1.63 
sta ned  1.18  1.22  1.24 1.26 
dual   1.02  1.04 1.06 1.11 
sta bsize *sta cscore 1.29   1.37 1.34  1.91 
sta ned *sta cscore  1.39  1.46  1.73 1.49 
dual *sta cscore   1.38  1.41 1.71 1.79 
size 2.86 2.7 2.57 3 2.86 2.73 3.01 
roa 1.98 1.96 1.89 2.08 2 1.98 2.1 
bown 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.55 1.54 1.56 1.58 
lnnas 1.83 1.81 1.78 1.88 1.83 1.81 1.89 
level 1.18 1.12 1.34 1.2 1.44 1.37 1.53 
fcf 2.15 1.74 1.74 2.18 2.17 1.76 2.19 
pea 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.05 1.06 
        
Mean VIF 1.71 1.67 1.6 1.75 1.68 1.69 1.78 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated 
via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the 
proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and 
chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta 
bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta 
cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year 
Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by 
total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
399 
Figure 4.11 Board size and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals – takeover premiums across board 
size 
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
 
High C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High Bsize: is the 67th to the maximum of board size. 
Medium Bsize: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of board size. 
Low Bsize: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of board size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
400 
Figure 4.12 Board size and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals – takeover premiums across the levels 
of board effectiveness  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
 
 
High C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High Bsize: is the 67th to the maximum of board size. 
Medium Bsize: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of board size. 
Low Bsize: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of board size. 
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Figure 4.13 NED and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals – takeover premiums across NED  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
 
 
High C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High NED: is the 67th to the maximum of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Medium NED: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Low NED: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
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Figure 4.14 NED and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals – takeover premiums across the levels 
of board effectiveness  
 (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
 
 
High C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High NED: is the 67th to the maximum of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Medium NED: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Low NED: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
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Figure 4.15 CEO duality and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals – takeover premiums across CEO 
duality  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
 
 
High C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
Not Duality: represents the seperate position of CEO and chairman. 
CEO Duality: represents that firm’s CEO and chairman is the same person. 
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Figure 4.16 CEO duality and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals – takeover premiums across the levels 
of board effectiveness  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness). 
 
 
High C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in third-party LBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
Not Duality: represents the seperate position of CEO and chairman. 
CEO Duality: represents that firm’s CEO and chairman is the same person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
405 
Table 4.28 VIF table for Table 4.7 the regression approach for moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (MBOs) 
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
in MBO deals (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 mo1 mo2 mo3 mo4 mo5 mo6 mo7 mo8 mo9 mo10 mo11 mo12 mo13 mo14 mo15 mo16 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Sta cscore         1.31 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.32 
Sta bsize  1.31   1.33 1.38  1.44  1.31   1.33 1.38  1.44 
Sta ned   1.17  1.2  1.25 1.3   1.18  1.2  1.25 1.31 
dual    1.1  1.16 1.16 1.26    1.1  1.16 1.16 1.26 
size 1.79 1.93 1.84 1.8 2.01 1.93 1.84 2.01 1.86 2.01 1.92 1.87 2.1 2.01 1.92 2.1 
roa 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 
bown 1.38 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.47 1.42 1.45 1.48 1.38 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.48 1.43 1.45 1.48 
lnnas 1.62 1.69 1.62 1.63 1.69 1.69 1.64 1.69 1.62 1.69 1.62 1.63 1.69 1.69 1.64 1.69 
level 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.16 1.13 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.31 1.33 1.31 1.35 1.33 1.36 1.35 1.36 
fcf 1.48 1.48 1.52 1.48 1.53 1.49 1.54 1.56 1.5 1.5 1.54 1.51 1.55 1.51 1.56 1.58 
pea 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
                 
Mean VIF 1.46 1.48 1.45 1.42 1.47 1.46 1.43 1.48 1.5 1.51 1.49 1.46 1.5 1.49 1.47 1.51 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the 
announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-
executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised 
cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board 
size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees 
in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.29 VIF table for Table 4.8 the regression approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (MBOs) 
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in MBO 
deals (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a 
high level of board effectiveness) 
 mo17 mo18 mo19 mo20 mo21 mo22 mo23 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
sta cscore 1.32 3.74 1.33 3.86 1.34 3.89 4.09 
sta bsize 1.58   1.65 1.66  1.79 
sta ned  1.51  1.56  1.63 1.74 
dual   1.55  1.61 1.68 1.82 
sta bsize *sta cscore 1.3   1.36 1.33  1.44 
sta ned *sta cscore  3.37  3.56  3.74 4.11 
dual *sta cscore   2.07  2.12 2.3 2.43 
size 2.02 1.99 1.94 2.19 2.1 2.03 2.23 
roa 1.97 2 2.11 2.02 2.15 2.12 2.16 
bown 1.42 1.44 1.4 1.48 1.44 1.47 1.5 
lnnas 1.69 1.62 1.72 1.69 1.78 1.73 1.79 
level 1.33 1.36 1.66 1.38 1.69 1.67 1.7 
fcf 1.5 1.58 1.51 1.59 1.52 1.61 1.62 
pea 1.09 1.14 1.09 1.14 1.1 1.16 1.16 
        
Mean VIF 1.52 1.98 1.64 1.96 1.65 2.09 2.11 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated 
via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the 
proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and 
chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta 
bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta 
cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year 
Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by 
total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Figure 4.17 NED and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in MBO deals – takeover premiums across NED  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
 
 
High C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High NED: is the 67th to the maximum of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Medium NED: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Low NED: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
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Figure 4.18 NED and board effectiveness interaction for takeover 
premiums in MBO deals – takeover premiums across the levels of board 
effectiveness  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
 
 
High C-score: represents a low level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Low C-score: represents a high level of board effectiveness in MBOs. 
Bsize: the total number of board of directors. 
High NED: is the 67th to the maximum of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Medium NED: is the 34th to 66th percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
Low NED: is the minimum to 33rd percentiles of the proportion of non-executives on board. 
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Table 4.30 VIF table for Table 4.9 the regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
LE1-LE7 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), LE9-LE14 test the effects of board 
structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), LE15-LE21 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, 
BE→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 le1 le2 le3 le4 le5 le6 le7 le8 le9 le10 le11 le12 le13 le14 le15 le16 le17 le18 le19 Le20 Le21 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Sta bsize 1.53   1.54 1.53  1.54 1.38   1.4 1.38  1.4 1.57   1.57 1.57  1.57 
Sta ned  1.14  1.15  1.14 1.15  1.1  1.11  1.1 1.12  1.18  1.18  1.18 1.19 
dual   1.01  1.01 1.01 1.01   1.01  1.01 1.02 1.02   1.01  1.01 1.02 1.02 
Sta cscore               1.69 1.71 1.65 1.74 1.69 1.71 1.75 
size 2.42 2.15 2.14 2.46 2.42 2.15 2.46 2.02 1.5 1.5 2.03 2.02 1.5 2.03 2.76 2.63 2.57 2.84 2.76 2.63 2.84 
roa 1.87 1.88 1.83 1.92 1.88 1.89 1.93 1.25 1.28 1.24 1.29 1.25 1.28 1.29 1.94 1.95 1.89 2.01 1.95 1.96 2.02 
bown 1.5 1.5 1.46 1.53 1.5 1.5 1.53 1.49 1.47 1.43 1.52 1.49 1.47 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.48 1.54 1.51 1.51 1.54 
lnnas 1.71 1.74 1.7 1.74 1.71 1.74 1.74        1.79 1.8 1.78 1.8 1.79 1.8 1.8 
level 1.11 1.12 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.13        1.12 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 
fcf 1.85 1.59 1.59 1.85 1.85 1.59 1.85        2.07 1.74 1.73 2.07 2.07 1.75 2.08 
pea 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.03        1.02 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.04 
big4        1.18 1.12 1.12 1.18 1.18 1.12 1.18        
ceoch        1.11 1.09 1.09 1.12 1.11 1.1 1.12        
sg        1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05        
                      
Mean VIF 1.63 1.52 1.48 1.59 1.56 1.46 1.54 1.35 1.23 1.21 1.34 1.31 1.2 1.3 1.72 1.63 1.58 1.69 1.65 1.57 1.63 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards 
in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: 
the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in 
year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: 
dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth 
in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.31 VIF table for Table 4.10 the regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the 
relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
LE22 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), LE23-LE25 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), LE26-LE32 tests the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 le22 le23 le24 le25 le26 le27 le28 le29 le30 le31 le32 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Sta cscore 1.65 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.69 1.71 1.65 1.74 1.69 1.71 1.75 
Sta bsize     1.57   1.57 1.57  1.57 
Sta ned      1.18  1.18  1.18 1.19 
dual       1.01  1.01 1.02 1.02 
size 2.57 2.02 2.02 2.02 2.76 2.63 2.57 2.84 2.76 2.63 2.84 
roa 1.88 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.94 1.95 1.89 2.01 1.95 1.96 2.02 
bown 1.48 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.51 1.51 1.48 1.54 1.51 1.51 1.54 
lnnas 1.78    1.79 1.8 1.78 1.8 1.79 1.8 1.8 
level 1.12    1.12 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 
fcf 1.73    2.07 1.74 1.73 2.07 2.07 1.75 2.08 
pea 1.02    1.02 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.04 
big4  1.12 1.12 1.12        
ceoch  1.1 1.1 1.1        
sg  1.04 1.04 1.04        
            
Mean VIF 1.65 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.72 1.63 1.58 1.69 1.65 1.57 1.63 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards 
in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta 
bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year 
Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: 
sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.32 VIF test for Table 4.11 the regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the 
relationship between board structure and takeover premiums in MBO deals 
ME1-ME7 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ME9-ME14 test the effects of board 
structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ME15-ME21 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
(BS, BE→ premiums) (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 me1 me2 me3 me4 me5 me6 me7 me8 me9 me10 me11 me12 me13 me14 me15 me16 me17 me18 me19 me20 me21 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Sta bsize 1.31   1.33 1.38  1.44 1.23   1.26 1.35  1.42 1.31   1.33 1.38  1.44 
Sta ned  1.17  1.2  1.25 1.3  1.17  1.2  1.22 1.27  1.18  1.2  1.25 1.31 
dual   1.1  1.16 1.16 1.26   1.11  1.22 1.16 1.3   1.1  1.16 1.16 1.26 
Sta 
cscore 
              1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.32 
size 1.93 1.84 1.8 2.01 1.93 1.84 2.01 1.75 1.54 1.54 1.83 1.75 1.57 1.83 2.01 1.92 1.87 2.1 2.01 1.92 2.1 
roa 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.39 1.4 1.39 1.41 1.39 1.41 1.41 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 
bown 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.47 1.42 1.45 1.48 1.26 1.29 1.25 1.29 1.26 1.29 1.29 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.48 1.43 1.45 1.48 
lnnas 1.69 1.62 1.63 1.69 1.69 1.64 1.69        1.69 1.62 1.63 1.69 1.69 1.64 1.69 
level 1.13 1.11 1.16 1.13 1.17 1.16 1.17        1.33 1.31 1.35 1.33 1.36 1.35 1.36 
fcf 1.48 1.52 1.48 1.53 1.49 1.54 1.56        1.5 1.54 1.51 1.55 1.51 1.56 1.58 
pea 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09        1.09 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
big4        1.13 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.14 1.14 1.14        
ceoch        1.12 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.18        
sg        1.15 1.14 1.19 1.15 1.23 1.19 1.23        
                      
Mean 
VIF 
1.48 1.45 1.42 1.47 1.46 1.43 1.48 1.29 1.26 1.25 1.3 1.31 1.27 1.34 1.51 1.49 1.46 1.5 1.49 1.47 1.51 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards 
in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: 
the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in 
year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: 
dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth 
in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.33 VIF table for Table 4.12 the regression approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structure on the 
relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBO deals 
ME22 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ME23-ME25 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ME26-ME32 tests the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 me22 me23 me24 me25 me26 me27 me28 me29 me30 me31 me32 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Sta cscore 1.31 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.32 
Sta bsize     1.31   1.33 1.38  1.44 
Sta ned      1.18  1.2  1.25 1.31 
dual       1.1  1.16 1.16 1.26 
Size 1.86 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.01 1.92 1.87 2.1 2.01 1.92 2.1 
roa 1.95 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 
bown 1.38 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.48 1.43 1.45 1.48 
lnnas 1.62    1.69 1.62 1.63 1.69 1.69 1.64 1.69 
level 1.31    1.33 1.31 1.35 1.33 1.36 1.35 1.36 
fcf 1.5    1.5 1.54 1.51 1.55 1.51 1.56 1.58 
pea 1.08    1.09 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
big4  1.16 1.16 1.16        
ceoch  1.12 1.12 1.12        
sg  1.14 1.14 1.14        
            
Mean VIF 1.5 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.51 1.49 1.46 1.5 1.49 1.47 1.51 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards 
in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: 
the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in 
year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: 
dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth 
in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.34 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation analysis: 
Step 1 the constrained model (third-party LBOs) 
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
 endolo1 endolo2 endolo3 endolo4 endolo5 endolo6 endolo7 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta cscore -0.114 -0.080 -0.135 -0.069 -0.115 -0.050 -0.040 
 (-0.525) (-0.382) (-0.738) (-0.282) (-0.526) (-0.211) (-0.150) 
Sta bsize 0.017   0.008 0.017  0.008 
 (0.209)   (0.098) (0.209)  (0.098) 
Sta ned  -0.102  -0.103  -0.112 -0.113 
  (-1.191)  (-1.191)  (-1.304) (-1.301) 
dual   -0.001  0.005 -0.076 -0.074 
   (-0.002)  (0.021) (-0.281) (-0.274) 
size -0.093 -0.073 -0.094 -0.072 -0.094 -0.064 -0.064 
 (-1.563) (-1.102) (-1.511) (-1.076) (-1.508) (-0.886) (-0.873) 
roa -1.029 -1.184 -0.994 -1.202 -1.027 -1.235 -1.252 
 (-1.040) (-1.161) (-0.989) (-1.156) (-1.005) (-1.194) (-1.188) 
bown 0.203 0.111 0.213 0.105 0.202 0.107 0.101 
 (0.478) (0.263) (0.526) (0.238) (0.475) (0.251) (0.228) 
lnnas 0.166*** 0.151*** 0.165*** 0.151*** 0.166*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 
 (3.603) (3.450) (3.605) (3.455) (3.621) (3.351) (3.357) 
level -0.442** -0.408** -0.439** -0.409** -0.443** -0.395* -0.397* 
 (-2.212) (-1.975) (-2.101) (-1.971) (-2.119) (-1.763) (-1.760) 
fcf 0.533 0.592 0.423 0.644 0.528 0.676 0.726 
 (0.416) (0.492) (0.363) (0.469) (0.401) (0.532) (0.507) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.571) (0.323) (0.592) (0.301) (0.573) (0.251) (0.233) 
Constant 1.539 1.227 1.554 1.216 1.547 1.088 1.081 
 (1.405) (1.025) (1.368) (1.007) (1.367) (0.824) (0.815) 
        
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.192 0.192 0.188 0.193 0.192 0.194 0.194 
Chi2-test 22.69 24.38 22.41 24.78 22.90 27.36 27.53 
Prob>chi2 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.004 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 1.962 6.154 0.912 6.120 2.149 6.185 6.297 
Hausman Prob>Chi2 0.375 0.046 0.634 0.106 0.542 0.103 0.178 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta cscore2 9.972*** 10.861*** 10.588*** 7.887*** 7.742*** 8.482*** 6.572*** 
Sta Bsize2 62.911***   45.728*** 48.323***  41.294*** 
Sta Ned2  136.722***  100.522***  106.632*** 87.745*** 
Dual2   12.179***  8.935*** 12.961*** 9.612*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting 
conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) 
model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in 
year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta 
cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised 
ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned 
*sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Sta cscore2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year 
before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, 
the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised board size and 
standardised cscore in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised ned and standardised 
Appendix 
414 
cscore in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in year Y-2. 
Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit 
fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings 
ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.35 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation analysis: 
Step 2 the unconstrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 endolo8 endolo9 endolo10 endolo11 endolo12 endolo13 endolo14 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta cscore -0.108 -3.973 -0.178 -0.821 -0.075 0.293 1.018 
 (-0.353) (-0.209) (-0.622) (-0.098) (-0.095) (0.069) (0.220) 
Sta bsize 0.010   1.287 -0.021  0.456 
 (0.024)   (0.253) (-0.064)  (0.326) 
Sta ned  0.790  -0.954  -0.570 -0.390 
  (0.181)  (-0.247)  (-0.172) (-0.342) 
dual   0.031  0.046 3.255 1.623 
   (0.117)  (0.128) (0.172) (0.320) 
Sta bsize*sta cscore -0.054   10.207 -0.287  -0.474 
 (-0.019)   (0.240) (-0.106)  (-0.072) 
Sta ned*sta cscore  5.644  0.000  -8.643 -4.270 
  (0.204)  (0.000)  (-0.170) (-0.328) 
Dual*sta cscore   0.083  -0.056 10.263 4.600 
   (0.189)  (-0.050) (0.175) (0.363) 
size -0.096 -0.807 -0.103 0.517 -0.104 -0.191 -0.076 
 (-0.700) (-0.222) (-1.356) (0.184) (-1.128) (-0.226) (-0.194) 
roa -0.992 1.942 -0.963 -9.682 -0.823 -0.748 -1.891 
 (-0.480) (0.125) (-0.945) (-0.268) (-0.420) (-0.100) (-0.310) 
bown 0.197 -1.787 0.189 0.462 0.181 0.928 0.220 
 (0.402) (-0.191) (0.436) (0.097) (0.365) (0.141) (0.105) 
lnnas 0.165* -0.053 0.166*** 0.269 0.158* 0.714 0.435 
 (1.810) (-0.051) (3.754) (0.372) (1.801) (0.222) (0.546) 
level -0.454 -1.242 -0.480** 2.161 -0.487* -4.496 -2.405 
 (-0.730) (-0.266) (-2.031) (0.193) (-1.661) (-0.192) (-0.410) 
fcf 0.482 -2.394 0.344 11.335 0.253 -5.559 0.766 
 (0.150) (-0.153) (0.289) (0.248) (0.110) (-0.160) (0.113) 
pea 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.004 
 (0.483) (-0.178) (0.633) (0.031) (0.294) (0.167) (0.305) 
        
Constant 1.584 15.872 1.733 -9.934 1.753 2.961 1.101 
 (0.572) (0.220) (1.181) (-0.186) (0.981) (0.208) (0.155) 
        
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.194 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.00 
Chi2-test 23.050** 0.950 26.910*** 0.430 26.080*** 0.700 2.959 
Prob>chi2 0.011 0.999 0.003 1.000 0.010 1.000 0.999 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 2.091 9.173 1.141 9.395 2.696 9.202 9.418 
Hausman Prob>Chi2 0.554 0.027 0.767 0.094 0.747 0.101 0.224 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta cscore2 7.535*** 7.448*** 6.169*** 6.105*** 5.147*** 5.014*** 5.303*** 
Sta bsize2 58.199***   41.794*** 35.506***  29.783*** 
Sta bsize2* sta 
cscore2 
0.699   0.777 0.689  0.703 
Sta ned2  90.073***  59.106***  75.782*** 64.148*** 
Sta ned2* sta 
cscore2 
 0.722  1.313  0.464 1.110 
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Dual2   21.109***  16.321*** 15.762*** 13.232*** 
Dual2* sta 
cscore2 
  6.010***  4.265*** 3.943*** 3.720*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via 
Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of 
non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same 
person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board 
size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board 
size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised 
cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Sta cscore2: 
lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged 
variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta 
bsize2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-2. 
sta ned2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-2. 
Duality2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in year Y-2. Size: ln 
total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit 
fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-
earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.36 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation analysis: 
Step 1 the constrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in MBO deals (In the MBO 
context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) 
 endomo1 endomo2 endomo3 endomo4 endomo5 endomo6 endomo7 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta cscore 0.016 0.012 0.020 0.014 0.021 0.020 0.026 
 (0.232) (0.183) (0.308) (0.200) (0.302) (0.292) (0.350) 
Sta bsize -0.004   0.015 0.003  0.036 
 (-0.076)   (0.251) (0.045)  (0.533) 
Sta ned  0.065  0.066  0.080 0.086 
  (1.368)  (1.340)  (1.518) (1.489) 
dual   0.045  0.047 0.089 0.112 
   (0.585)  (0.524) (0.967) (0.996) 
size -0.029 -0.041 -0.029 -0.046 -0.030 -0.042 -0.053 
 (-0.817) (-1.236) (-1.084) (-1.050) (-0.837) (-1.239) (-1.163) 
roa -0.323 -0.315 -0.308 -0.308 -0.306 -0.288 -0.264 
 (-0.970) (-0.959) (-0.947) (-0.902) (-0.887) (-0.844) (-0.728) 
bown 0.070 0.133 0.068 0.121 0.066 0.151 0.125 
 (0.521) (0.943) (0.512) (0.871) (0.482) (1.060) (0.882) 
lnnas 0.056* 0.061** 0.057* 0.058* 0.056* 0.065** 0.060* 
 (1.654) (2.031) (1.876) (1.725) (1.673) (2.169) (1.784) 
level 0.276 0.250 0.308 0.242 0.307 0.311 0.307 
 (1.165) (1.010) (1.180) (1.024) (1.194) (1.154) (1.167) 
fcf -0.280* -0.195 -0.272* -0.189 -0.271* -0.161 -0.137 
 (-1.815) (-1.291) (-1.749) (-1.224) (-1.772) (-1.032) (-0.816) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.683) (-0.956) (-0.697) (-0.886) (-0.661) (-0.993) (-0.898) 
Constant 0.562 0.753 0.534 0.850 0.548 0.686 0.904 
 (0.919) (1.458) (1.288) (1.142) (0.926) (1.352) (1.224) 
        
Observations 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.145 0.094 0.154 0.095 0.154 0.099 0.098 
chi2-test 29.41 38.76 29.31 38.93 31.13 44.21 45.35 
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 0.947 6.388 0. 2906 7.280 0.311 6.858 7.747 
Hausman Prob>Chi2 0.109 0.410 0.865 0.064 0.958 0.077 0.101 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta Cscore2 1.073 1.077 1.077 0.711 0.711 0.715 0.530 
Sta Bsize2 33.268*** 52.771*** 112.619*** 23.622*** 23.619***  18.434*** 
Sta Ned2    34.783***  34.836*** 25.572*** 
Dual2     80.117*** 70.441*** 57.263*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via 
Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of 
non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same 
person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board 
size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board 
size and standardised cscore in year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised 
cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Sta cscore2: 
lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged 
variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta 
bsize2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-2. 
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sta ned2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-2. 
Duality2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in year Y-2. Size: ln 
total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit 
fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-
earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.37 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation analysis: 
Step 2 the unconstrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in MBO 
deals (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a 
high level of board effectiveness) 
 endomo8 endomo9 endomo10 endomo11 endomo12 endomo13 endomo14 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta cscore 0.027 0.007 0.002 0.555 0.008 0.182 0.982 
 (0.359) (0.019) (0.021) (0.168) (0.066) (0.400) (0.215) 
Sta bsize -0.046   -0.079 -0.009  -0.096 
 (-0.726)   (-0.203) (-0.079)  (-0.107) 
Sta ned  0.063  0.303  0.184 0.510 
  (0.352)  (0.206)  (0.833) (0.276) 
dual   0.189  0.170 0.302 0.131 
   (0.816)  (0.432) (1.240) (0.083) 
Sta bsize*sta cscore 0.205   0.779 0.061  1.230 
 (0.796)   (0.211) (0.099)  (0.192) 
Sta ned*sta cscore  0.015  -1.457  -0.566 -2.590 
  (0.014)  (-0.161)  (-0.398) (-0.215) 
Dual*sta cscore   -0.676  -0.578 -1.014 0.021 
   (-0.776)  (-0.331) (-1.017) (0.003) 
size -0.036 -0.040 -0.010 -0.164 -0.016 -0.043 -0.259 
 (-0.941) (-0.781) (-0.271) (-0.234) (-0.191) (-0.728) (-0.231) 
roa -0.218 -0.319 -0.566 0.525 -0.495 -0.516 1.154 
 (-0.541) (-0.906) (-1.068) (0.115) (-0.436) (-1.113) (0.127) 
bown 0.063 0.133 0.016 0.063 0.019 0.096 0.029 
 (0.432) (0.942) (0.102) (0.191) (0.114) (0.509) (0.066) 
lnnas 0.057* 0.061** 0.039 0.060 0.041 0.043 0.063 
 (1.652) (1.996) (1.236) (1.162) (0.933) (1.291) (0.303) 
level 0.322 0.246 0.050 0.685 0.101 0.033 1.081 
 (1.174) (0.754) (0.114) (0.272) (0.112) (0.077) (0.180) 
fcf -0.309* -0.190 -0.271 -0.775 -0.279 -0.338 -1.150 
 (-1.742) (-0.549) (-1.551) (-0.226) (-1.491) (-0.700) (-0.233) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.012 
 (-0.803) (-0.300) (-0.932) (-0.190) (-0.910) (-0.609) (-0.233) 
Constant 0.674 0.744 0.416 2.580 0.482 0.895 3.902 
 (1.028) (1.076) (0.867) (0.251) (0.505) (1.001) (0.259) 
        
Observations 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.128 0.092 0.023 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.000 
Chi2-test 28.420*** 40.350*** 25.890*** 7.960 28.340*** 37.670*** 4.236 
Prob>chi2 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.789 0.005 0.000 0.994 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 0.576 6.818 3.375 7.756 5.691 12.726 11.932 
Hausman Prob>Chi2 0.902 0.078 0.337 0.170 0.338 0.026 0.103 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta cscore2 0.786 0.733 0.837 0.480 0.501 0.500 0.282 
Sta bsize2 36.968***   31.822*** 24.755***  24.860*** 
Sta bsize2* sta 
cscore2 
3.434**   7.076 2.221*  4.172*** 
Sta ned2  36.304***  21.306***  22.166*** 15.326*** 
Sta ned2* sta cscore2 3.346**  2.386**  2.163* 1.791* 
Dual2   92.588***  56.390*** 62.019*** 46.291*** 
Dual2* sta cscore2   11.321***  7.731*** 7.126*** 5.780*** 
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Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting 
conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) 
model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in 
year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta cscore: interaction of standardised board size and standardised cscore in 
year Y-1. sta ned *sta cscore: interaction of standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-1. duality *sta cscore: 
interaction of CEO duality and standardised cscore in year Y-1. Sta cscore2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score 
in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. 
Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of 
standardised board size and standardised cscore in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of 
standardised ned and standardised cscore in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta cscore2: lagged variable, interaction of CEO duality 
and standardised cscore in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free 
cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.38 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
ENDOLE1-ENDOLE7 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ENDOLE9-ENDOLE14 test 
the effects of board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ENDOLE15-ENDOLE21 tests the effects of board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends 
to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step1: BS→ premiums Step2: BS→ BE Step3: BS, BE→ premiums 
 
endole1 endole2 endole3 endole4 endole5 endole6 endole7 endole8 endole9 endole10 endole11 endole12 
endole1
3 
endole14 
endole1
5 
endole16 endole17 
endole1
8 
endole19 
endole
20 
endole21 
Variable
s 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta cscore prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta 
bsize 
0.038   0.018 0.039  0.014 -0.062   -0.025 -0.074  -0.024 0.017   0.008 0.017  0.008 
 (0.589)   (0.279) (0.578)  (0.197) (-0.613)   (-0.253) (-0.733)  (-0.258) (0.209)   (0.098) (0.209)  (0.098) 
Sta ned  -0.118*  -0.116*  -0.122* -0.120*  0.188***  0.185***  0.189*** 0.186***  -0.102  -0.103  -0.112 -0.113 
  (-1.791)  (-1.708)  (-1.949) (-1.849)  (2.946)  (2.920)  (2.867) (2.850)  (-1.191)  (-1.191)  (-1.304) (-1.301) 
dual   -0.011  0.005 -0.086 -0.079   -0.123  -0.154 0.018 0.006   -0.001  0.005 -0.076 -0.074 
   (-0.047)  (0.021) (-0.339) (-0.304)   (-0.595)  (-0.769) (0.089) (0.031)   (-0.002)  (0.021) (-0.281) (-0.274) 
Sta 
cscore 
              -0.114 -0.080 -0.135 -0.069 -0.115 -0.050 -0.040 
               (-0.525) (-0.382) (-0.738) (-0.282) (-0.526) (-0.211) (-0.150) 
size 
-0.071 -0.052 -0.061 -0.056 -0.071 -0.051 -0.055 -0.250*** -0.269*** -0.272*** -0.260*** -0.245*** 
-
0.269*** 
-0.261*** -0.093 -0.073 -0.094 -0.072 -0.094 -0.064 -0.064 
 (-1.645) (-1.357) (-1.549) (-1.368) (-1.631) (-1.349) (-1.312) (-4.020) (-6.974) (-6.740) (-4.314) (-4.039) (-6.970) (-4.406) (-1.563) (-1.102) (-1.511) (-1.076) (-1.508) (-0.886) (-0.873) 
roa -1.141 -1.270 -1.103 -1.286 -1.141 -1.292 -1.302 -0.308 -0.007 -0.301 -0.020 -0.332 -0.004 -0.019 -1.029 -1.184 -0.994 -1.202 -1.027 -1.235 -1.252 
 (-1.256) (-1.312) (-1.229) (-1.319) (-1.244) (-1.342) (-1.345) (-0.336) (-0.008) (-0.317) (-0.023) (-0.362) (-0.004) (-0.021) (-1.040) (-1.161) (-0.989) (-1.156) (-1.005) (-1.194) (-1.188) 
bown 0.214 0.114 0.250 0.099 0.214 0.108 0.098 -0.133 -0.047 -0.184 -0.020 -0.093 -0.049 -0.021 0.203 0.111 0.213 0.105 0.202 0.107 0.101 
 (0.481) (0.264) (0.588) (0.226) (0.480) (0.250) (0.222) (-0.283) (-0.110) (-0.416) (-0.046) (-0.192) (-0.117) (-0.050) (0.478) (0.263) (0.526) (0.238) (0.475) (0.251) (0.228) 
lnnas 
0.170*** 
0.151**
* 
0.169*** 0.151*** 0.170*** 0.149*** 0.150***        
0.166**
* 
0.151*** 0.165*** 
0.151**
* 
0.166*** 
0.149**
* 
0.150*** 
 (3.721) (3.392) (3.676) (3.416) (3.700) (3.303) (3.324)        (3.603) (3.450) (3.605) (3.455) (3.621) (3.351) (3.357) 
level 
-0.442** 
-
0.400** 
-0.432** -0.405** -0.443** -0.389* -0.393*        -0.442** -0.408** -0.439** -0.409** -0.443** -0.395* -0.397* 
 (-2.319) (-2.018) (-2.227) (-2.000) (-2.229) (-1.833) (-1.795)        (-2.212) (-1.975) (-2.101) (-1.971) (-2.119) (-1.763) (-1.760) 
fcf 0.867 0.782 0.735 0.845 0.867 0.797 0.842        0.533 0.592 0.423 0.644 0.528 0.676 0.726 
 (0.900) (0.802) (0.781) (0.846) (0.900) (0.820) (0.851)        (0.416) (0.492) (0.363) (0.469) (0.401) (0.532) (0.507) 
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pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.485) (0.213) (0.481) (0.218) (0.486) (0.188) (0.194)        (0.571) (0.323) (0.592) (0.301) (0.573) (0.251) (0.233) 
Big4        -0.006 -0.019 0.017 -0.030 -0.019 -0.019 -0.030        
        (-0.031) (-0.107) (0.091) (-0.149) (-0.093) (-0.105) (-0.150)        
ceoch        -0.235 -0.264 -0.259 -0.254 -0.227 -0.264 -0.254        
        (-0.587) (-0.708) (-0.631) (-0.683) (-0.548) (-0.712) (-0.689)        
sg        0.012 -0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.007 -0.003 -0.003        
        (0.205) (-0.054) (0.161) (-0.055) (0.124) (-0.045) (-0.052)        
Constan
t 
1.109 0.841 0.917 0.935 1.110 0.847 0.916 4.617*** 4.977*** 5.029*** 4.819*** 4.560*** 4.975*** 4.821*** 1.539 1.227 1.554 1.216 1.547 1.088 1.081 
 (1.427) (1.277) (1.371) (1.252) (1.421) (1.288) (1.211) (4.179) (7.349) (6.942) (4.576) (4.188) (7.284) (4.653) (1.405) (1.025) (1.368) (1.007) (1.367) (0.824) (0.815) 
                      
Observa
tions 
73 73 73 73 73 73 73 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-
squared 
0.207 0.200 0.212 0.199 0.207 0.197 0.196 0.427 0.453 0.424 0.452 0.416 0.454 0.452 0.192 0.192 0.188 0.193 0.192 0.194 0.194 
Chi2-
test 
22.25 23.62 21.82 24.45 22.36 26.52 26.97 86.87 116.6 88.26 115.6 91.67 119.0 118.9 22.69 24.38 22.41 24.78 22.90 27.36 27.53 
Prob>ch
i2 
0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.003 0.004 
Endogenous test 
Hausma
n Chi2 
1.614 5.711 0.000 5.812 1.589 5.832 5.946 0.811 2.690 0.916 3.463 1.255 5.001 5.253 1.962 6.154 0.912 6.120 2.149 6.185 6.297 
Hausma
n 
Prob>C
hi2 
0.204 0.017 0.996 0.055 0.452 0.054 0.114 0.368 0.101 0.339 0.177 0.534 0.082 0.154 0.375 0.046 0.634 0.106 0.542 0.103 0.178 
Weak instrument test 
F
-
t
e
s
t 
Sta 
cscore
2 
              
9.972**
* 
10.861*** 10.588*** 
7.887**
* 
7.742*** 
8.482**
* 
6.572*** 
Sta 
bsize2 
120.365
*** 
  
67.209*
** 
68.244***  
53.016**
* 
167.451*
** 
  88.159*** 
84.440**
* 
 59.797*** 
62.911*
** 
  
45.728*
** 
48.323***  41.294*** 
Sta 
ned2 
 
272.20
9*** 
 
140.107
*** 
 
148.999*
** 
101.001*
** 
 353.011***  
181.479**
* 
 
215.826
*** 
143.856***  136.722***  
100.522
*** 
 
106.63
2*** 
87.745*** 
Dual2   
17.292**
* 
 8.810*** 
10.500**
* 
9.555***   18.617***  
10.165**
* 
9.172*** 7.222***   12.179***  8.935*** 
12.961*
** 
9.612*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
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calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Cscore2: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year 
Y-1. Sta cscore2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, 
the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total 
assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, 
CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.39 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the 
relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in MBO deals 
ENDOME1-ENDOME7 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ENDOME9-ENDOME14 
test the effects of board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ENDOME15-ENDOME21 tests the effects of board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a 
high level of board effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: BS→ premiums Step2: BS→ BE Step3: BE, BS→ premiums 
endom
e1 
endome2 endome3 
endome
4 
endome5 endome6 
endome
7 
endome8 
endome
9 
endome
10 
endome11 
endome
12 
endom
e13 
endome
14 
endome
15 
endome
16 
endome
17 
endome
18 
endome
19 
endome
20 
endome
21 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
Sta 
cscore 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta bsize -0.005   0.014 0.001  0.035 -0.018   -0.024 -0.006  -0.008 -0.004   0.015 0.003  0.036 
 (-
0.101) 
  (0.237) (0.019)  (0.512) (-0.349)   (-0.483) (-0.103)  (-0.147) (-0.076)   (0.251) (0.045)  (0.533) 
Sta ned  0.065  0.066  0.080 0.087  -0.015  -0.017  -0.004 -0.005  0.065  0.066  0.080 0.086 
 
 (1.367)  (1.341)  (1.499) (1.470)  (-0.390)  (-0.447)  
(-
0.097) 
(-0.129)  (1.368)  (1.340)  (1.518) (1.489) 
dual   0.048  0.048 0.092 0.114   0.077  0.074 0.075 0.070   0.045  0.047 0.089 0.112 
   (0.604)  (0.530) (0.964) (0.984)   (1.054)  (0.901) (0.975) (0.800)   (0.585)  (0.524) (0.967) (0.996) 
Sta cscore               0.016 0.012 0.020 0.014 0.021 0.020 0.026 
               (0.232) (0.183) (0.308) (0.200) (0.302) (0.292) (0.350) 
size -0.026 -0.039 -0.025 -0.043 -0.025 -0.038 -0.047 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.029 -0.041 -0.029 -0.046 -0.030 -0.042 -0.053 
 (-
0.779) 
(-1.287) (-0.974) (-1.108) (-0.783) (-1.257) (-1.194) (-0.063) (-0.214) (-0.089) (0.089) (-0.019) 
(-
0.071) 
(0.026) (-0.817) (-1.236) (-1.084) (-1.050) (-0.837) (-1.239) (-1.163) 
roa 
-0.366 -0.349 -0.365 -0.347 -0.365 -0.344 -0.337 -0.561*** -0.569*** -0.570** -0.579*** -0.571** 
-
0.573** 
-0.577** -0.323 -0.315 -0.308 -0.308 -0.306 -0.288 -0.264 
 (-
1.414) 
(-1.360) (-1.418) (-1.337) (-1.392) (-1.307) (-1.260) (-2.606) (-2.606) (-2.541) (-2.673) (-2.556) 
(-
2.539) 
(-2.573) (-0.970) (-0.959) (-0.947) (-0.902) (-0.887) (-0.844) (-0.728) 
bown 0.075 0.136 0.072 0.125 0.071 0.155 0.132 0.145 0.127 0.133 0.135 0.135 0.130 0.133 0.070 0.133 0.068 0.121 0.066 0.151 0.125 
 (0.578) (0.967) (0.561) (0.921) (0.550) (1.100) (0.964) (0.965) (0.846) (0.921) (0.882) (0.907) (0.874) (0.873) (0.521) (0.943) (0.512) (0.871) (0.482) (1.060) (0.882) 
lnnas 0.056* 0.061** 0.056* 0.059* 0.056* 0.064** 0.060*        0.056* 0.061** 0.057* 0.058* 0.056* 0.065** 0.060* 
 (1.656) (2.018) (1.862) (1.728) (1.676) (2.160) (1.788)        (1.654) (2.031) (1.876) (1.725) (1.673) (2.169) (1.784) 
level 0.242 0.222 0.263 0.212 0.263 0.267 0.251        0.276 0.250 0.308 0.242 0.307 0.311 0.307 
 (1.640) (1.361) (1.513) (1.378) (1.601) (1.452) (1.467)        (1.165) (1.010) (1.180) (1.024) (1.194) (1.154) (1.167) 
fcf -0.266 -0.183 -0.251 -0.176 -0.250 -0.140 -0.112        -0.280* -0.195 -0.272* -0.189 -0.271* -0.161 -0.137 
 (- (-1.069) (-1.529) (-0.994) (-1.534) (-0.767) (-0.558)        (-1.815) (-1.291) (-1.749) (-1.224) (-1.772) (-1.032) (-0.816) 
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1.633) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001        -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-
0.702) 
(-0.960) (-0.719) (-0.898) (-0.689) (-1.011) (-0.932)        (-0.683) (-0.956) (-0.697) (-0.886) (-0.661) (-0.993) (-0.898) 
Big4        0.090 0.089 0.085 0.087 0.085 0.085 0.085        
        (1.185) (1.122) (1.124) (1.130) (1.129) (1.091) (1.096)        
ceoch        0.075 0.082 0.092 0.086 0.092 0.094 0.095        
        (0.785) (0.821) (0.939) (0.885) (0.947) (0.942) (0.957)        
sg        -0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004        
 
       (-0.056) (-0.250) (-0.628) (-0.072) (-0.496) 
(-
0.629) 
(-0.473)        
Constant 0.521 0.727 0.487 0.814 0.492 0.640 0.835 0.072 0.160 0.067 -0.008 0.032 0.061 0.009 0.562 0.753 0.534 0.850 0.548 0.686 0.904 
 (0.892) (1.495) (1.184) (1.185) (0.884) (1.348) (1.240) (0.129) (0.304) (0.134) (-0.014) (0.059) (0.120) (0.017) (0.919) (1.458) (1.288) (1.142) (0.926) (1.352) (1.224) 
                      
Observation
s 
105 104 105 104 105 104 104 116 115 116 115 116 115 115 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.139 0.088 0.147 0.087 0.147 0.089 0.087 0.090 0.087 0.093 0.103 0.096 0.095 0.100 0.145 0.094 0.154 0.095 0.154 0.099 0.098 
Chi2-test 28.01 38.03 27.52 38.12 29.36 42.04 41.85 13.57 13.80 14.76 13.26 14.65 14.51 14.43 29.41 38.76 29.31 38.93 31.13 44.21 45.35 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.055 0.039 0.103 0.066 0.069 0.108 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Endogenous test 
Hausman 
Chi2 
0.076 4.547 0.271 5.222 0.324 5.361 6.077 1.247 1.495 0.242 2.859 1.551 1.936 3.416 0.947 6.388 0. 2906 7.280 0.311 6.858 7.747  
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.783 0.033 0.603 0.074 0.851 0.069 0.108 0.264 0.222 0.623 0.240 0.461 0.380 0.332 0.109 0.410 0.865 0.064 0.958 0.077 0.101  
Weak Instrument test 
F
-
t
e
s
t 
Sta 
cscore2 
              1.073 1.077 1.077 0.711 0.711 0.715 0.530  
Sta bsize2 
59.284
*** 
  
31.409**
* 
30.684**
* 
 
21.180*
** 
66.140**
* 
  37.136*** 
32.643*
** 
 
24.615*
** 
33.268**
* 
52.771**
* 
112.619*
** 
23.622**
* 
23.619**
* 
 
18.434**
* 
 
Sta ned2  
104.955**
* 
 
51.949**
* 
 
52.241**
* 
34.142*
** 
 
144.306*
** 
 56.541***  
57.262
*** 
37.533*
** 
   
34.783**
* 
 
34.836**
* 
25.572**
* 
 
Dual2   
152.326**
* 
 
75.314**
* 
89.309**
* 
62.316*
** 
  
208.286
*** 
 
104.033
*** 
112.70
2*** 
78.426*
** 
    
80.117**
* 
70.441**
* 
57.263**
* 
 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Cscore2: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 
when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned 
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in year Y-1. Sta cscore2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged 
variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: 
dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
427 
Table 4.40 The endogenous 2SLS test approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship 
between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBO deals 
ENDOME22 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ENDOME23-ENDOME24 test 
the effects of board effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ENDOME26-ENDOME32 tests the effects of board 
structures on takeover premiums (BE, BS→ premiums) (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a 
high level of board effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step3: BE, BS→ premiums 
endome22 endome23 endome24 endome26 endome27 endome28 endome29 endome30 endome31 endome32 
prem bsize ned prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
           
Sta cscore 0.016 -0.723 -0.380 0.016 0.012 0.020 0.014 0.021 0.020 0.026 
 (0.244) (-1.206) (-0.579) (0.232) (0.183) (0.308) (0.200) (0.302) (0.292) (0.350) 
Sta bsize    -0.004   0.015 0.003  0.036 
    (-0.076)   (0.251) (0.045)  (0.533) 
Sta ned     0.065  0.066  0.080 0.086 
     (1.368)  (1.340)  (1.518) (1.489) 
dual      0.045  0.047 0.089 0.112 
      (0.585)  (0.524) (0.967) (0.996) 
size -0.030 0.380*** 0.150 -0.029 -0.041 -0.029 -0.046 -0.030 -0.042 -0.053 
 (-1.105) (4.263) (1.567) (-0.817) (-1.236) (-1.084) (-1.050) (-0.837) (-1.239) (-1.163) 
roa -0.321 -0.736 -1.240 -0.323 -0.315 -0.308 -0.308 -0.306 -0.288 -0.264 
 (-1.007) (-1.022) (-1.419) (-0.970) (-0.959) (-0.947) (-0.902) (-0.887) (-0.844) (-0.728) 
bown 0.067 0.507 -0.778 0.070 0.133 0.068 0.121 0.066 0.151 0.125 
 (0.504) (1.035) (-1.413) (0.521) (0.943) (0.512) (0.871) (0.482) (1.060) (0.882) 
lnnas 0.055*   0.056* 0.061** 0.057* 0.058* 0.056* 0.065** 0.060* 
 (1.826)   (1.654) (2.031) (1.876) (1.725) (1.673) (2.169) (1.784) 
level 0.274   0.276 0.250 0.308 0.242 0.307 0.311 0.307 
 (1.115)   (1.165) (1.010) (1.180) (1.024) (1.194) (1.154) (1.167) 
fcf -0.279*   -0.280* -0.195 -0.272* -0.189 -0.271* -0.161 -0.137 
 (-1.779)   (-1.815) (-1.291) (-1.749) (-1.224) (-1.772) (-1.032) (-0.816) 
pea -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.704)   (-0.683) (-0.956) (-0.697) (-0.886) (-0.661) (-0.993) (-0.898) 
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Big4  0.009 0.031        
  (0.054) (0.144)        
ceoch  0.186 0.656**        
  (0.603) (2.079)        
sg  0.049 -0.023        
  (1.416) (-0.877)        
Constant 0.587 -6.775*** -2.460 0.562 0.753 0.534 0.850 0.548 0.686 0.904 
 (1.380) (-4.226) (-1.389) (0.919) (1.458) (1.288) (1.142) (0.926) (1.352) (1.224) 
           
Observations 105 116 116 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.146 0.218 0.159 0.145 0.094 0.154 0.095 0.154 0.099 0.098 
Chi2-test 27.82 43.25 22.22 29.41 38.76 29.31 38.93 31.13 44.21 45.35 
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Endogen
ous test 
 
             
Hausman Chi2 0.069 0.332 0.001 0.947 6.388 0. 2906 7.280 0.311 6.858 7.747 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.793 0.564 0.982 0.109 0.410 0.865 0.064 0.958 0.077 0.101 
Weak 
instrume
nt test 
              
F-test 
Sta 
cscore2 
2.166 22.058*** 22.058*** 1.073 1.077 1.077 0.711 0.711 0.715 0.530 
Sta 
bsize2 
   33.268***   23.622*** 23.619***  18.434*** 
Sta ned2     52.771***  34.783***  34.836*** 25.572*** 
Dual2      112.619***  80.117*** 70.441*** 57.263*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of 
takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. 
Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Cscore2: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in year Y-2 (two 
year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-
executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year 
Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta cscore2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the 
announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
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return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. 
Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 
0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.41 the multi-group test for moderating effects of board structures 
on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in third-party LBO deals 
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
Panel A: Group difference analysis of board size    
  
Bsize High  Bsize Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore -0.247 0.119 0.119 0.023 2.192** 
prem <--- size -0.126 0.053 -0.240 0.000 -1.489 
prem <--- roa 1.673 0.076 3.097 0.000 1.270 
prem <--- lnnas 0.078 0.261 0.337 0.000 3.285*** 
prem <--- bown -0.465 0.476 -1.637 0.000 -1.623 
prem <--- level 0.017 0.941 -0.142 0.294 -0.601 
prem <--- pea 0.006 0.209 0.000 0.739 -1.273 
prem <--- fcf -2.047 0.086 -1.360 0.019 0.518 
                
  
Bsize High  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore -0.247 0.119 0.202 0.390 1.585 
prem <--- size -0.126 0.053 0.103 0.319 1.875* 
prem <--- roa 1.673 0.076 -1.845 0.002 -3.164*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.078 0.261 0.082 0.339 0.038 
prem <--- bown -0.465 0.476 0.493 0.393 1.099 
prem <--- level 0.017 0.941 -1.309 0.060 -1.812* 
prem <--- pea 0.006 0.209 -0.001 0.755 -1.238 
prem <--- fcf -2.047 0.086 0.999 0.394 1.824* 
                
  
Bsize Medium  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.119 0.023 0.202 0.390 0.343 
prem <--- size -0.240 0.000 0.103 0.319 3.101*** 
prem <--- roa 3.097 0.000 -1.845 0.002 -5.86*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.337 0.000 0.082 0.339 -2.713*** 
prem <--- bown -1.637 0.000 0.493 0.393 3.258*** 
prem <--- level -0.142 0.294 -1.309 0.060 -1.646 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.739 -0.001 0.755 -0.279 
prem <--- fcf -1.360 0.019 0.999 0.394 1.806* 
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Panel B: Group difference analysis of NED         
  
Ned High  Ned Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.152 0.432 0.194 0.000 0.214 
prem <--- size 0.066 0.520 0.043 0.089 -0.213 
prem <--- roa -2.908 0.003 0.177 0.510 3.019*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.208 0.062 0.087 0.000 -1.076 
prem <--- bown 1.395 0.350 -0.613 0.000 -1.334 
prem <--- level -0.740 0.064 -0.605 0.000 0.326 
prem <--- pea 0.003 0.166 0.000 0.000 -1.589 
prem <--- fcf 1.685 0.159 0.366 0.077 -1.085 
                
  
Ned High  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.152 0.432 -0.091 0.590 -0.946 
prem <--- size 0.066 0.520 -0.125 0.010 -1.679* 
prem <--- roa -2.908 0.003 0.103 0.838 2.72*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.208 0.062 0.225 0.000 0.145 
prem <--- bown 1.395 0.350 0.230 0.547 -0.755 
prem <--- level -0.740 0.064 -0.495 0.120 0.479 
prem <--- pea 0.003 0.166 -0.002 0.272 -1.768* 
prem <--- fcf 1.685 0.159 0.137 0.859 -1.087 
                
  
Ned Medium  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.194 0.000 -0.091 0.590 -1.677* 
prem <--- size 0.043 0.089 -0.125 0.010 -3.068*** 
prem <--- roa 0.177 0.510 0.103 0.838 -0.130 
prem <--- lnnas 0.087 0.000 0.225 0.000 3*** 
prem <--- bown -0.613 0.000 0.230 0.547 1.992** 
prem <--- level -0.605 0.000 -0.495 0.120 0.323 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.272 -0.844 
prem <--- fcf 0.366 0.077 0.137 0.859 -0.287 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. 
The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles 
for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. The low 
and high levels for sta cscore is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to 
maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in 
year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.42 the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, more conservative accounting tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
  
Cscore High  Cscore Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta bsize 0.013 0.905 -0.021 0.637 -0.286 
prem <--- sta ned -0.015 0.855 -0.006 0.905 0.092 
prem <--- dual -0.424 0.141 0.056 0.631 1.543 
prem <--- size -0.081 0.200 -0.069 0.044 0.162 
prem <--- roa -2.236 0.000 0.804 0.062 4.064*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.115 0.108 0.099 0.020 -0.193 
prem <--- bown 0.417 0.382 0.042 0.918 -0.600 
prem <--- level -0.072 0.830 -0.413 0.011 -0.920 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.975 0.001 0.292 0.720 
prem <--- fcf 1.678 0.047 -2.123 0.002 -3.507*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. 
The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles 
for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. The low 
and high levels for sta cscore is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to 
maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in 
year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.43 the multi-group test for moderating effects of board structures 
on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums 
in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) - group differences 
Panel A: Group difference analysis of board size       
  
Bsize High  Bsize Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.213 0.133 0.001 0.959 -1.473 
prem <--- size -0.101 0.069 -0.058 0.200 0.595 
prem <--- roa 0.092 0.797 -0.488 0.438 -0.802 
prem <--- lnnas 0.010 0.850 0.107 0.000 1.628 
prem <--- bown -0.200 0.448 0.418 0.026 1.91* 
prem <--- level 0.456 0.113 0.185 0.332 -0.785 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.721 -0.002 0.201 -0.213 
prem <--- fcf -0.491 0.238 0.949 0.139 1.885* 
                
  
Bsize High  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.213 0.133 0.515 0.053 1.000 
prem <--- size -0.101 0.069 0.061 0.207 2.202** 
prem <--- roa 0.092 0.797 -0.169 0.779 -0.373 
prem <--- lnnas 0.010 0.850 0.012 0.799 0.028 
prem <--- bown -0.200 0.448 -0.022 0.926 0.503 
prem <--- level 0.456 0.113 1.014 0.006 1.189 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.721 0.000 0.968 0.292 
prem <--- fcf -0.491 0.238 -0.357 0.441 0.215 
                
  
Bsize Medium  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.001 0.959 0.515 0.053 1.922* 
prem <--- size -0.058 0.200 0.061 0.207 1.798* 
prem <--- roa -0.488 0.438 -0.169 0.779 0.367 
prem <--- lnnas 0.107 0.000 0.012 0.799 -1.743* 
prem <--- bown 0.418 0.026 -0.022 0.926 -1.458 
prem <--- level 0.185 0.332 1.014 0.006 1.986** 
prem <--- pea -0.002 0.201 0.000 0.968 0.621 
prem <--- fcf 0.949 0.139 -0.357 0.441 -1.652* 
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Panel B: Group difference analysis of NED       
  
Ned High  Ned Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- 
sta 
cscore 
0.486 0.077 0.056 0.102 -1.554 
prem <--- size 0.055 0.349 -0.128 0.005 -2.454** 
prem <--- roa -1.039 0.011 0.709 0.194 2.57** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.040 0.363 0.078 0.022 0.694 
prem <--- bown 0.229 0.351 -0.233 0.421 -1.217 
prem <--- level 1.161 0.008 0.354 0.168 -1.590 
prem <--- pea -0.005 0.272 0.006 0.137 1.822* 
prem <--- fcf 0.028 0.917 -1.228 0.086 -1.644 
                
  
Ned High  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- 
sta 
cscore 
0.486 0.077 0.436 0.012 -0.153 
prem <--- size 0.055 0.349 0.029 0.437 -0.380 
prem <--- roa -1.039 0.011 -0.472 0.334 0.893 
prem <--- lnnas 0.040 0.363 0.028 0.403 -0.201 
prem <--- bown 0.229 0.351 0.008 0.956 -0.774 
prem <--- level 1.161 0.008 0.918 0.000 -0.477 
prem <--- pea -0.005 0.272 -0.003 0.061 0.378 
prem <--- fcf 0.028 0.917 -0.079 0.863 -0.201 
                
  
Ned Medium  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- 
sta 
cscore 
0.056 0.102 0.436 0.012 2.142** 
prem <--- size -0.128 0.005 0.029 0.437 2.665*** 
prem <--- roa 0.709 0.194 -0.472 0.334 -1.613 
prem <--- lnnas 0.078 0.022 0.028 0.403 -1.026 
prem <--- bown -0.233 0.421 0.008 0.956 0.743 
prem <--- level 0.354 0.168 0.918 0.000 1.539 
prem <--- pea 0.006 0.137 -0.003 0.061 -2.065** 
prem <--- fcf -1.228 0.086 -0.079 0.863 1.354 
 
Panel C: Group difference analysis of CEO duality       
  
Dual  Not dual 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta cscore 0.354 0.168 0.033 0.323 1.242 
prem <--- size 0.014 0.768 -0.049 0.204 1.021 
prem <--- roa 0.213 0.701 -0.259 0.435 0.729 
prem <--- lnnas 0.023 0.645 0.073 0.014 -0.868 
prem <--- bown -0.160 0.448 0.194 0.301 -1.255 
prem <--- level 0.575 0.074 0.434 0.052 0.360 
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prem <--- pea -0.003 0.164 0.001 0.800 -1.041 
prem <--- fcf -0.705 0.067 -0.248 0.513 -0.847 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. 
The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles 
for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. The low 
and high levels for sta cscore is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to 
maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in 
year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
436 
Table 4.44 the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, less conservative accounting tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) - group differences 
  
Cscore High  Cscore Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- 
sta 
bsize 
0.003 0.937 0.003 0.921 0.010 
prem <--- sta ned -0.021 0.666 0.016 0.617 0.633 
prem <--- dual 0.145 0.095 -0.094 0.230 -2.043** 
prem <--- size -0.011 0.800 -0.089 0.004 -1.442 
prem <--- roa 0.371 0.421 -0.278 0.246 -1.249 
prem <--- lnnas 0.053 0.187 0.054 0.022 0.019 
prem <--- bown 0.125 0.625 0.078 0.559 -0.161 
prem <--- level 0.698 0.008 -0.010 0.961 -2.101** 
prem <--- pea -0.003 0.161 0.002 0.299 1.743* 
prem <--- fcf -0.777 0.070 -0.267 0.367 0.980 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. 
The low and high levels for sta cscore is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th 
to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets 
in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.45 SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation effects of 
board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in third-party deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative 
accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 114.469 74 1.547 0.085 0.744 0.852 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for mediation 
analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE  
sta cscore <--- sta bsize -0.001 0.075 -0.012 0.991 
sta cscore <--- sta ned 0.136 0.077 1.764 0.078 
sta cscore <--- dual 0.109 0.222 0.494 0.622 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta cscore 0.064 0.081 0.795 0.426 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize -0.020 0.053 -0.382 0.702 
prem <--- sta ned -0.058 0.056 -1.052 0.293 
prem <--- dual -0.031 0.156 -0.200 0.841 
Control 
variables 
sta cscore <--- sg -0.020 0.091 -0.222 0.824 
sta cscore <--- ceoch -0.358 0.275 -1.304 0.192 
sta cscore <--- big4 0.064 0.201 0.319 0.750 
sta cscore <--- roa 0.100 0.482 0.208 0.835 
sta cscore <--- size -0.270 0.048 -5.606 0.000 
sta cscore <--- bown -0.233 0.567 -0.412 0.680 
prem <--- size -0.028 0.046 -0.605 0.545 
prem <--- roa -1.218 0.424 -2.872 0.004 
prem <--- level -0.358 0.200 -1.794 0.073 
prem <--- lnnas 0.136 0.047 2.914 0.004 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.001 0.180 0.857 
prem <--- fcf 0.891 0.543 1.640 0.101 
prem <--- bown 0.157 0.403 0.389 0.697 
 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without 
Mediator 
Direct with 
Mediator Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Bsize →sta cscore →prem -0.052 0.609 -0.038 0.702 
No 
mediation 
Sta Ned →sta cscore →prem -0.096 0.353 -0.109 0.293 
No 
mediation 
Dual →sta cscore →prem -0.015 0.880 -0.020 0.841 
No 
mediation 
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Panel D: Bootstrapping tests     
Standardised Indirect 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned  
Sta cscore 0.000 0.000 0.000  
prem 0.000 (0.917) 0.004 (0.363) 0.016 (0.257)  
     
Standardised Direct 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta cscore 
Sta cscore -0.001 (0.979) 0.045 (0.536) 0.163 (0.014) 0.000 
prem -0.038 (0.660) -0.020 (0.713) -0.109 (0.445) 
0.100 
(0.475) 
     
Standardised Total Effects Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta cscore 
Sta cscore -0.001 (0.979) 0.045 (0.536) 0.163 (0.014) 0.000 
prem -0.038 (0.704) -0.016 (0.721) -0.093 (0.521) 
0.100 
(0.475) 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting 
conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts 
(2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives 
on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 
0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. 
Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year 
Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit 
belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 
0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.46 SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation effects of 
board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(BE→ BS→ premiums). (In the third-party LBO context, more conservative 
accounting tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 97.916 61 1.605 0.090 0.767 0.873 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS  
sta bsize <--- sta cscore -0.127 0.117 -1.083 0.279 
sta ned <--- sta cscore 0.277 0.133 2.080 0.038 
dual <--- sta cscore 0.027 0.049 0.558 0.577 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize -0.020 0.065 -0.308 0.758 
prem <--- sta ned -0.058 0.057 -1.028 0.304 
prem <--- dual -0.031 0.157 -0.200 0.841 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta cscore 0.064 0.069 0.925 0.355 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 -0.001 0.104 -0.006 0.995 
dual <--- sg -0.029 0.047 -0.620 0.535 
dual <--- size 0.006 0.026 0.237 0.812 
dual <--- roa -0.084 0.250 -0.335 0.737 
dual <--- bown 0.020 0.291 0.068 0.946 
dual <--- ceoch 0.087 0.143 0.613 0.540 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.380 0.392 0.969 0.332 
sta ned <--- big4 0.124 0.285 0.434 0.664 
sta ned <--- sg 0.064 0.129 0.497 0.619 
sta ned <--- size 0.085 0.070 1.220 0.223 
sta ned <--- roa -1.097 0.685 -1.601 0.109 
sta ned <--- bown -0.941 0.797 -1.181 0.238 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.238 0.332 0.716 0.474 
sta bsize <--- big4 -0.530 0.242 -2.191 0.028 
sta bsize <--- sg -0.021 0.109 -0.192 0.848 
sta bsize <--- size 0.301 0.061 4.911 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa -0.429 0.636 -0.675 0.500 
sta bsize <--- bown 1.211 0.685 1.769 0.077 
prem <--- size -0.028 0.045 -0.622 0.534 
prem <--- roa -1.218 0.443 -2.751 0.006 
prem <--- level -0.358 0.200 -1.796 0.072 
prem <--- lnnas 0.136 0.046 2.936 0.003 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.001 0.180 0.857 
prem <--- fcf 0.891 0.599 1.487 0.137 
prem <--- bown 0.157 0.407 0.385 0.700 
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Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Cscore →sta bsize →prem 0.077 0.446 0.072 0.476 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →sta ned →prem 0.077 0.446 0.101 0.329 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →dual →prem 0.077 0.446 0.078 0.441 
No 
mediation 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests 
  Sta Cscore →sta bsize →prem Sta Cscore →sta ned →prem Sta Cscore →dual →prem 
Standardised 
Indirect 
Effects 
  cscore   cscore   cscore 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.000 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.001 (0.754) prem -0.024 (0.317) prem -0.001 (0.760) 
              
Standardised 
Direct Effects 
  cscore   cscore   cscore 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.064 (0.644) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.223 (0.046) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.020 (0.851) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.072 (0.585) prem 0.101 (0.432) prem 0.078 (0.539) 
              
Standardised 
Total Effects 
  cscore   cscore   cscore 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.064 (0.644) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.223 (0.046) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.020 (0.851) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.073 (0.552) prem 0.077 (0.522) prem 0.077 (0.536) 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism 
in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total 
number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable 
equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-
1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by 
total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit 
belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: 
sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.47 SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation effects of 
board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 131.759 74 1.781 0.087 0.800 0.862 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE  
Sta cscore <--- Sta bsize -0.007 0.022 -0.300 0.764 
Sta cscore <--- Sta ned -0.040 0.022 -1.820 0.069 
Sta cscore <--- dual 0.005 0.053 0.099 0.921 
BE →Prem  prem <--- Sta cscore 0.267 0.116 2.295 0.022 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- Sta bsize 0.014 0.029 0.488 0.625 
prem <--- Sta ned 0.002 0.029 0.053 0.958 
prem <--- dual 0.069 0.067 1.025 0.306 
Control 
variables 
Sta cscore <--- sg -0.023 0.010 -2.299 0.022 
Sta cscore <--- ceoch 0.093 0.078 1.192 0.233 
Sta cscore <--- big4 0.193 0.046 4.212 0.000 
Sta cscore <--- roa -0.844 0.162 -5.220 0.000 
Sta cscore <--- size 0.000 0.019 -0.025 0.980 
Sta cscore <--- bown -0.101 0.110 -0.916 0.360 
prem <--- size -0.030 0.030 -1.008 0.314 
prem <--- roa -0.167 0.280 -0.596 0.551 
prem <--- level 0.585 0.210 2.783 0.005 
prem <--- lnnas 0.052 0.025 2.066 0.039 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.002 -0.670 0.503 
prem <--- fcf -0.234 0.246 -0.949 0.343 
prem <--- bown 0.095 0.151 0.631 0.528 
 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without 
Mediator 
Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta bsize →sta cscore →prem 0.029 0.763 0.046 0.625 No mediation 
Sta ned →sta cscore →prem -0.028 0.773 0.005 0.958 No mediation 
Dual →sta cscore →prem 0.097 0.325 0.100 0.306 No mediation 
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Panel D: Bootstrapping tests     
Standardised Indirect 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned  
Sta cscore 0 0 0  
prem -0.006 (0.697) 
0.002 
(0.878) 
-0.035 (0.042)  
     
Standardised Direct 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta cscore 
Sta cscore -0.019 (0.812) 
0.007 
(0.935) 
-0.117 (0.064) 0 
prem 0.046 (0.825) 0.1 (0.392) 0.005 (0.862) 
0.298 
(0.031) 
     
Standardised Total Effects Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta cscore 
Sta cscore -0.019 (0.812) 
0.007 
(0.935) 
-0.117 (0.064) 0 
prem 0.04 (0.790) 
0.102 
(0.400) 
-0.030 (0.833) 
0.298 
(0.031) 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of 
accounting conservatism in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is 
calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in 
year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. 
Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. 
Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash 
flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to 
big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 
in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.48 SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation effects of 
board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals 
(BE→ BS→ premiums). (In the MBO context, less conservative accounting 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 106.928 62 1.725 0.083 0.844 0.884 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS  
sta bsize <--- sta cscore -0.430 0.285 -1.509 0.131 
sta ned <--- sta cscore -0.393 0.293 -1.343 0.179 
dual <--- sta cscore 0.230 0.132 1.745 0.081 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- bsize 0.014 0.031 0.454 0.650 
prem <--- ned 0.002 0.029 0.053 0.958 
prem <--- dual 0.069 0.065 1.048 0.295 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta cscore 0.267 0.117 2.288 0.022 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 0.060 0.090 0.672 0.502 
dual <--- sg 0.043 0.019 2.315 0.021 
dual <--- size -0.067 0.038 -1.768 0.077 
dual <--- roa 0.092 0.341 0.268 0.788 
dual <--- bown 0.037 0.211 0.178 0.859 
dual <--- ceoch -0.299 0.153 -1.952 0.051 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.685 0.341 2.010 0.044 
sta ned <--- big4 0.079 0.200 0.393 0.694 
sta ned <--- sg -0.018 0.042 -0.436 0.663 
sta ned <--- size 0.154 0.084 1.821 0.069 
sta ned <--- roa -1.011 0.759 -1.332 0.183 
sta ned <--- bown -0.842 0.468 -1.799 0.072 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.136 0.332 0.408 0.683 
sta bsize <--- big4 0.010 0.195 0.054 0.957 
sta bsize <--- sg 0.050 0.041 1.221 0.222 
sta bsize <--- size 0.361 0.082 4.389 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa -0.492 0.739 -0.666 0.506 
sta bsize <--- bown 0.423 0.455 0.929 0.353 
prem <--- size -0.030 0.032 -0.942 0.346 
prem <--- roa -0.167 0.281 -0.594 0.553 
prem <--- level 0.585 0.194 3.021 0.003 
prem <--- lnnas 0.052 0.025 2.064 0.039 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.002 -0.670 0.503 
prem <--- fcf -0.234 0.240 -0.973 0.330 
prem <--- bown 0.095 0.149 0.640 0.522 
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Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Cscore →sta bsize →prem 0.277 0.017 0.284 0.020 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →sta ned →prem 0.277 0.017 0.278 0.022 
No 
mediation 
Sta Cscore →dual →prem 0.277 0.017 0.276 0.023 
No 
mediation 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests 
  Sta Cscore →sta bsize →prem Sta Cscore →sta ned →prem Sta Cscore →sta dual →prem 
Standardised 
Indirect 
Effects 
  sta cscore   sta cscore   sta cscore 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.000 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem -0.003 (0.664) prem 0.003 (0.694) prem 0.015 (0.249) 
              
Standardised 
Direct Effects 
  sta cscore   sta cscore   sta cscore 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.165 (0.097) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned -0.126 (0.157) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.137 (0.176) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.284 (0.024) prem 0.278 (0.028) prem 0.276 (0.024) 
              
Standardised 
Total Effects 
  sta cscore   sta cscore   sta cscore 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.165 (0.097) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned -0.126 (0.157) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.137 (0.176) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.281 (0.022) prem 0.281 (0.023) prem 0.290 (0.025) 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Cscore: denotes for the levels of accounting conservatism in 
year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers), which is calculated via Khan & Watts (2009) model. Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta cscore: the standardised cscore in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the 
standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in 
year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. 
Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or 
four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.49 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in 
third-party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, the longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 lo24 lo25 lo26 lo27 lo28 lo29 lo30 lo31 lo32 lo33 lo34 lo35 lo36 lo37 lo38 lo39 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                 
Sta btenure         0.043 0.043 0.042 0.048 0.042 0.048 0.047 0.047 
         (0.845) (0.832) (0.811) (0.915) (0.795) (0.899) (0.878) (0.859) 
Sta bsize  -0.022   -0.027 -0.022  -0.027  -0.001   -0.004 0.001  -0.002 
  (-0.376)   (-0.466) (-0.371)  (-0.461)  (-0.009)   (-0.054) (0.009)  (-0.036) 
Sta ned   -0.048  -0.050  -0.049 -0.051   -0.024  -0.025  -0.025 -0.025 
   (-0.745)  (-0.770)  (-0.755) (-0.780)   (-0.370)  (-0.370)  (-0.386) (-0.384) 
dual    -0.019  -0.018 -0.024 -0.024    -0.057  -0.058 -0.060 -0.060 
    (-0.138)  (-0.132) (-0.173) (-0.168)    (-0.422)  (-0.417) (-0.436) (-0.428) 
size -0.051 -0.046 -0.048 -0.051 -0.041 -0.046 -0.048 -0.041 -0.039 -0.039 -0.038 -0.040 -0.037 -0.040 -0.039 -0.038 
 (-1.214) (-0.984) (-1.160) (-1.207) (-0.917) (-0.978) (-1.152) (-0.911) (-0.877) (-0.757) (-0.866) (-0.876) (-0.738) (-0.762) (-0.865) (-0.741) 
roa -1.101 -1.077 -1.165 -1.105 -1.139 -1.081 -1.170 -1.143 -1.169 -1.169 -1.199 -1.180 -1.195 -1.181 -1.211 -1.208 
 (-1.189) (-1.176) (-1.225) (-1.184) (-1.208) (-1.171) (-1.224) (-1.208) (-1.218) (-1.222) (-1.233) (-1.229) (-1.233) (-1.234) (-1.250) (-1.250) 
bown 0.163 0.185 0.109 0.163 0.134 0.185 0.109 0.134 0.057 0.058 0.033 0.057 0.037 0.056 0.032 0.034 
 (0.362) (0.394) (0.236) (0.360) (0.280) (0.392) (0.234) (0.278) (0.122) (0.117) (0.068) (0.118) (0.072) (0.111) (0.064) (0.066) 
lnnas 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.117** 0.117** 0.114** 0.117** 0.115** 0.117** 0.115** 0.115** 
 (2.829) (2.820) (2.754) (2.806) (2.753) (2.795) (2.730) (2.727) (2.179) (2.156) (2.174) (2.162) (2.155) (2.137) (2.156) (2.134) 
level -0.371* -0.366* -0.355* -0.369* -0.348* -0.364* -0.352* -0.345* -0.491*** -0.491*** -0.479** -0.482** -0.478** -0.482** -0.469** -0.468** 
 (-1.972) (-1.928) (-1.789) (-1.917) (-1.732) (-1.874) (-1.735) (-1.680) (-2.799) (-2.797) (-2.537) (-2.649) (-2.529) (-2.647) (-2.412) (-2.406) 
fcf 0.812 0.735 0.828 0.815 0.734 0.738 0.831 0.737 0.375 0.373 0.394 0.377 0.383 0.379 0.397 0.389 
 (0.839) (0.790) (0.837) (0.836) (0.773) (0.788) (0.836) (0.772) (0.397) (0.406) (0.412) (0.400) (0.411) (0.412) (0.415) (0.417) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.387) (0.387) (0.300) (0.382) (0.298) (0.382) (0.294) (0.293) (0.288) (0.286) (0.248) (0.276) (0.246) (0.274) (0.236) (0.233) 
Constant 0.886 0.776 0.854 0.888 0.717 0.778 0.856 0.720 0.841 0.837 0.830 0.849 0.811 0.852 0.839 0.825 
 (1.234) (0.935) (1.197) (1.227) (0.886) (0.930) (1.191) (0.882) (1.134) (0.935) (1.123) (1.132) (0.916) (0.938) (1.120) (0.918) 
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Observation
s 
76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.188 0.189 0.196 0.188 0.197 0.189 0.196 0.198 0.228 0.228 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.232 0.232 
F-test 1.895 1.653 1.864 1.672 1.643 1.482 1.911 1.713 1.741 1.528 1.568 1.717 1.391 1.524 1.799 1.610 
Prob>F 0.084 0.127 0.081 0.121 0.121 0.173 0.065 0.097 0.107 0.159 0.145 0.104 0.207 0.153 0.080 0.120 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total 
number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 
0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta btenure: interaction of 
standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-1. duality *sta btenure: interaction of CEO duality 
and standardised btenure in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.50 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, the longer board tenure tends 
to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 lo40 lo41 lo42 lo43 lo44 lo45 lo46 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
sta tenure 0.055 0.020 0.025 0.032 0.030 -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.785) (0.353) (0.413) (0.469) (0.301) (-0.505) (-0.252) 
sta bsize -0.001   -0.001 -0.002  -0.002 
 (-0.012)   (-0.021) (-0.027)  (-0.029) 
sta ned  -0.024  -0.028  -0.016 -0.017 
  (-0.371)  (-0.405)  (-0.247) (-0.236) 
dual   -0.122  -0.121 -0.086 -0.086 
   (-0.847)  (-0.792) (-0.513) (-0.489) 
sta bsize *sta btenure -0.030   -0.035 -0.009  -0.002 
 (-0.426)   (-0.454) (-0.103)  (-0.021) 
sta ned *sta btenure  0.067  0.068  0.101 0.100 
  (0.765)  (0.795)  (1.206) (1.314) 
dual *sta btenure   0.140  0.132 0.188** 0.186 
   (1.561)  (0.899) (2.124) (1.305) 
size -0.036 -0.032 -0.042 -0.028 -0.040 -0.032 -0.031 
 (-0.700) (-0.719) (-0.911) (-0.556) (-0.765) (-0.696) (-0.596) 
roa -1.206 -1.300 -1.169 -1.347 -1.179 -1.327 -1.327 
 (-1.264) (-1.345) (-1.220) (-1.401) (-1.271) (-1.364) (-1.406) 
bown 0.057 0.098 0.098 0.095 0.097 0.194 0.194 
 (0.114) (0.197) (0.204) (0.184) (0.190) (0.391) (0.373) 
lnnas 0.110* 0.115** 0.114** 0.108* 0.112** 0.112** 0.112** 
 (1.986) (2.180) (2.100) (1.957) (2.030) (2.116) (2.072) 
level -0.489*** -0.466** -0.432** -0.461** -0.434** -0.397* -0.397* 
 (-2.765) (-2.440) (-2.212) (-2.386) (-2.156) (-1.893) (-1.860) 
fcf 0.375 0.511 0.335 0.514 0.333 0.508 0.502 
 (0.401) (0.540) (0.357) (0.553) (0.363) (0.536) (0.543) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.263) (0.271) (0.288) (0.238) (0.275) (0.309) (0.300) 
Constant 0.808 0.702 0.867 0.659 0.848 0.664 0.652 
 (0.904) (0.929) (1.145) (0.746) (0.929) (0.859) (0.714) 
        
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
F-test 1.360 1.470 3.390*** 1.220 2.820*** 2.150** 1.844* 
Prob>F 0.222 0.173 0.002 0.292 0.004 0.027 0.054 
R-squared 0.231 0.238 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.258 0.258 
△R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.026 0.026 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of 
directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of 
directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 
when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in 
year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta 
btenure: interaction of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: interaction 
of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-1. duality *sta btenure: interaction of CEO duality and 
standardised btenure in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: 
free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.51 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
in third-party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) 
 lo47 lo48 lo49 lo50 lo51 lo52 lo53 lo54 lo55 lo56 lo57 lo58 lo59 lo60 lo61 lo62 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                 
Sta fe         -0.071 -0.081 -0.066 -0.071 -0.076 -0.081 -0.066 -0.076 
         (-1.045) (-1.117) (-0.921) (-1.037) (-1.002) (-1.107) (-0.915) (-0.995) 
Sta bsize  -0.022   -0.027 -0.022  -0.027  -0.051   -0.053 -0.051  -0.053 
  (-0.376)   (-0.466) (-0.371)  (-0.461)  (-0.759)   (-0.786) (-0.753)  (-0.779) 
Sta ned   -0.048  -0.050  -0.049 -0.051   -0.036  -0.038  -0.036 -0.038 
   (-0.745)  (-0.770)  (-0.755) (-0.780)   (-0.537)  (-0.575)  (-0.546) (-0.584) 
dual    -0.019  -0.018 -0.024 -0.024    -0.025  -0.024 -0.028 -0.028 
    (-0.138)  (-0.132) (-0.173) (-0.168)    (-0.176)  (-0.173) (-0.200) (-0.197) 
size -0.051 -0.046 -0.048 -0.051 -0.041 -0.046 -0.048 -0.041 -0.048 -0.035 -0.045 -0.048 -0.032 -0.035 -0.045 -0.032 
 (-1.214) (-0.984) (-1.160) (-1.207) (-0.917) (-0.978) (-1.152) (-0.911) (-1.157) (-0.772) (-1.117) (-1.151) (-0.727) (-0.768) (-1.110) (-0.723) 
roa -1.101 -1.077 -1.165 -1.105 -1.139 -1.081 -1.170 -1.143 -1.150 -1.102 -1.194 -1.155 -1.146 -1.106 -1.200 -1.152 
 (-1.189) (-1.176) (-1.225) (-1.184) (-1.208) (-1.171) (-1.224) (-1.208) (-1.324) (-1.331) (-1.352) (-1.320) (-1.358) (-1.328) (-1.352) (-1.360) 
bown 0.163 0.185 0.109 0.163 0.134 0.185 0.109 0.134 0.232 0.293 0.187 0.233 0.248 0.294 0.188 0.249 
 (0.362) (0.394) (0.236) (0.360) (0.280) (0.392) (0.234) (0.278) (0.500) (0.610) (0.390) (0.497) (0.501) (0.606) (0.387) (0.497) 
lnnas 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 
 (2.829) (2.820) (2.754) (2.806) (2.753) (2.795) (2.730) (2.727) (2.746) (2.764) (2.692) (2.725) (2.709) (2.741) (2.669) (2.686) 
level -0.371* -0.366* -0.355* -0.369* -0.348* -0.364* -0.352* -0.345* -0.395* -0.386* -0.381* -0.392* -0.371* -0.384* -0.378* -0.369* 
 (-1.972) (-1.928) (-1.789) (-1.917) (-1.732) (-1.874) (-1.735) (-1.680) (-1.987) (-1.941) (-1.814) (-1.936) (-1.763) (-1.889) (-1.766) (-1.714) 
fcf 0.812 0.735 0.828 0.815 0.734 0.738 0.831 0.737 0.914 0.750 0.919 0.918 0.748 0.754 0.922 0.752 
 (0.839) (0.790) (0.837) (0.836) (0.773) (0.788) (0.836) (0.772) (0.937) (0.838) (0.924) (0.936) (0.820) (0.839) (0.923) (0.822) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.387) (0.387) (0.300) (0.382) (0.298) (0.382) (0.294) (0.293) (0.457) (0.469) (0.387) (0.450) (0.398) (0.462) (0.379) (0.391) 
Constant 0.886 0.776 0.854 0.888 0.717 0.778 0.856 0.720 0.828 0.565 0.808 0.830 0.533 0.567 0.811 0.536 
 (1.234) (0.935) (1.197) (1.227) (0.886) (0.930) (1.191) (0.882) (1.160) (0.688) (1.131) (1.155) (0.658) (0.686) (1.126) (0.657) 
                 
Observatio
ns 
76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.188 0.189 0.196 0.188 0.197 0.189 0.196 0.198 0.210 0.216 0.214 0.210 0.221 0.216 0.214 0.221 
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F-test 1.895 1.653 1.864 1.672 1.643 1.482 1.911 1.713 1.595 1.425 1.605 1.427 1.439 1.293 1.615 1.474 
Prob>F 0.084 0.127 0.081 0.121 0.121 0.173 0.066 0.097 0.143 0.196 0.132 0.195 0.184 0.253 0.122 0.164 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). 
Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is 
the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta 
fe: interaction of standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned *sta fe: interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-1. duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised fe in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total 
debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.52 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for moderation analysis: 
Step 2 the unconstrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of 
financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Lo63 Lo64 Lo65 Lo66 Lo67 Lo68 Lo69 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
sta fe -0.070 -0.066 -0.074 -0.062 -0.072 -0.076 -0.072 
 (-1.027) (-1.033) (-1.084) (-0.964) (-1.043) (-1.148) (-1.064) 
sta bsize -0.038   -0.006 -0.037  -0.001 
 (-0.620)   (-0.117) (-0.580)  (-0.021) 
sta ned  -0.016  -0.021  -0.005 -0.009 
  (-0.274)  (-0.351)  (-0.086) (-0.138) 
dual   -0.024  -0.008 -0.127 -0.120 
   (-0.173)  (-0.062) (-0.907) (-0.827) 
sta bsize *sta fe 0.042   0.021 0.042  0.015 
 (0.691)   (0.352) (0.691)  (0.233) 
sta ned *sta fe  -0.192***  -0.187***  -0.204*** -0.201*** 
  (-3.161)  (-2.824)  (-3.227) (-2.799) 
dual *sta fe   0.051  0.051 0.133 0.130 
   (0.204)  (0.210) (0.535) (0.502) 
size -0.038 -0.059* -0.047 -0.057 -0.038 -0.060* -0.059 
 (-0.825) (-1.831) (-1.141) (-1.508) (-0.814) (-1.888) (-1.570) 
roa -1.062 -0.551 -1.130 -0.542 -1.040 -0.456 -0.453 
 (-1.350) (-0.883) (-1.224) (-0.892) (-1.235) (-0.744) (-0.743) 
bown 0.305 0.194 0.250 0.209 0.321 0.255 0.261 
 (0.629) (0.453) (0.535) (0.462) (0.661) (0.593) (0.578) 
lnnas 0.137** 0.145*** 0.135*** 0.144*** 0.137** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
 (2.652) (2.878) (2.704) (2.798) (2.606) (2.871) (2.805) 
level -0.391* -0.279 -0.379* -0.280 -0.377* -0.229 -0.231 
 (-1.926) (-1.358) (-1.765) (-1.341) (-1.721) (-1.193) (-1.181) 
fcf 0.718 0.660 0.898 0.609 0.703 0.606 0.581 
 (0.820) (0.775) (0.888) (0.772) (0.775) (0.713) (0.736) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.476) (0.354) (0.459) (0.353) (0.479) (0.390) (0.384) 
Constant 0.633 0.944 0.810 0.905 0.621 0.917 0.907 
 (0.768) (1.634) (1.134) (1.269) (0.753) (1.621) (1.279) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
F-test 1.210 2.540** 1.400 2.040** 1.110 2.430** 2.009** 
Prob>F 0.300 0.012 0.202 0.035 0.370 0.012 0.032 
R-squared 0.223 0.343 0.211 0.345 0.223 0.353 0.353 
△R-squared 0.007 0.129 0.001 0.124 0.007 0.139 0.132 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the 
board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in 
year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO 
and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the 
standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta fe: interaction of 
standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned *sta fe: interaction of standardised ned and standardised 
fe in year Y-1. duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. 
Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total 
debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.53 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
in MBO deals (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 mo24 mo25 mo26 mo27 mo28 mo29 mo30 mo31 mo32 mo33 mo34 mo35 mo36 mo37 mo38 mo39 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                 
Sta btenure         -0.026 -0.027 -0.030 -0.033 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
         (-0.850) (-0.828) (-0.868) (-1.056) (-0.853) (-1.016) (-0.982) (-0.921) 
Sta bsize  0.002   -0.000 0.011  0.009  -0.009   -0.011 0.001  0.000 
  (0.050)   (-0.009) (0.227)  (0.184)  (-0.173)   (-0.230) (0.014)  (0.003) 
Sta ned   -0.018  -0.018  -0.011 -0.009   -0.015  -0.017  -0.002 -0.002 
   (-0.627)  (-0.638)  (-0.397) (-0.340)   (-0.392)  (-0.441)  (-0.067) (-0.063) 
dual    0.068  0.074 0.063 0.068    0.088  0.088 0.086 0.086 
    (1.032)  (0.944) (0.987) (0.876)    (1.165)  (1.000) (1.207) (0.968) 
size -0.026 -0.027 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.024 -0.020 -0.018 -0.016 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-0.956) (-0.791) (-0.869) (-0.873) (-0.693) (-0.780) (-0.820) (-0.713) (-0.630) (-0.463) (-0.506) (-0.390) (-0.315) (-0.337) (-0.367) (-0.299) 
roa -0.378 -0.377 -0.380 -0.376 -0.380 -0.374 -0.377 -0.376 -0.338 -0.336 -0.344 -0.324 -0.342 -0.324 -0.325 -0.325 
 (-1.424) (-1.397) (-1.425) (-1.387) (-1.395) (-1.354) (-1.389) (-1.350) (-1.043) (-1.054) (-1.053) (-0.963) (-1.053) (-0.975) (-0.968) (-0.966) 
bown 0.074 0.072 0.053 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.092 0.097 0.082 0.105 0.088 0.105 0.104 0.104 
 (0.547) (0.524) (0.374) (0.566) (0.371) (0.488) (0.450) (0.407) (0.630) (0.640) (0.538) (0.707) (0.560) (0.684) (0.668) (0.657) 
lnnas 0.053* 0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 0.058 0.059 0.057 0.058* 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
 (1.677) (1.534) (1.636) (1.737) (1.511) (1.558) (1.701) (1.543) (1.664) (1.573) (1.620) (1.680) (1.545) (1.546) (1.659) (1.536) 
level 0.247 0.245 0.248 0.282 0.249 0.277* 0.280 0.276* 0.212 0.216 0.219 0.250 0.226 0.250 0.251 0.251 
 (1.514) (1.603) (1.523) (1.626) (1.629) (1.689) (1.614) (1.679) (1.152) (1.210) (1.166) (1.300) (1.244) (1.327) (1.288) (1.325) 
fcf -0.255 -0.254 -0.281 -0.237 -0.281 -0.232 -0.255 -0.247 -0.041 -0.046 -0.035 -0.007 -0.042 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-1.483) (-1.506) (-1.434) (-1.375) (-1.469) (-1.367) (-1.305) (-1.303) (-0.148) (-0.168) (-0.127) (-0.025) (-0.150) (-0.023) (-0.024) (-0.023) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.671) (-0.645) (-0.598) (-0.667) (-0.583) (-0.624) (-0.619) (-0.592) (-0.774) (-0.764) (-0.727) (-0.810) (-0.724) (-0.783) (-0.801) (-0.782) 
Constant 0.541 0.554 0.496 0.447 0.494 0.503 0.427 0.477 0.394 0.348 0.323 0.209 0.251 0.213 0.201 0.202 
 (1.234) (0.937) (1.161) (1.055) (0.846) (0.889) (1.015) (0.829) (0.776) (0.522) (0.645) (0.403) (0.368) (0.335) (0.380) (0.297) 
                 
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
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R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.140 0.146 0.140 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.092 0.092 0.093 0.106 0.094 0.106 0.106 0.106 
F-test 3.492 3.107 3.003 3.256 2.724 2.962 2.834 2.641 1.052 0.958 0.936 1.026 0.869 0.957 0.941 0.913 
Prob>F 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.405 0.481 0.499 0.427 0.565 0.488 0.501 0.532 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: 
the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same 
person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta 
btenure: interaction of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-1. duality *sta 
btenure: interaction of CEO duality and standardised btenure in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-
audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.54 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in MBO 
deals (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level 
of board effectiveness) 
 mo40 mo41 mo42 mo43 mo44 mo45 mo46 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
sta btenure -0.030 -0.024 0.000 -0.030 0.021 -0.003 0.017 
 (-0.957) (-0.713) (0.008) (-0.817) (0.515) (-0.064) (0.375) 
sta bsize -0.003   -0.003 -0.016  -0.020 
 (-0.053)   (-0.060) (-0.312)  (-0.388) 
sta ned  -0.012  -0.020  0.002 -0.020 
  (-0.331)  (-0.547)  (0.062) (-0.606) 
dual   0.088  0.032 0.090 0.016 
   (1.180)  (0.426) (1.238) (0.227) 
sta bsize *sta btenure -0.061   -0.067 -0.084  -0.089 
 (-1.348)   (-1.440) (-1.561)  (-1.655) 
sta ned *sta btenure  0.044  0.053  0.023 0.006 
  (1.208)  (1.349)  (0.608) (0.169) 
dual *sta btenure   -0.101  -0.175* -0.083 -0.173* 
   (-1.336)  (-1.962) (-1.005) (-1.840) 
size -0.017 -0.014 -0.018 -0.008 -0.019 -0.016 -0.013 
 (-0.453) (-0.466) (-0.524) (-0.225) (-0.507) (-0.468) (-0.339) 
roa -0.363 -0.375 -0.310 -0.412 -0.340 -0.328 -0.355 
 (-1.202) (-1.147) (-0.900) (-1.357) (-1.036) (-0.938) (-1.087) 
bown 0.086 0.109 0.124 0.103 0.129 0.136 0.119 
 (0.559) (0.714) (0.830) (0.660) (0.844) (0.866) (0.752) 
lnnas 0.058 0.056 0.057* 0.056 0.059 0.057* 0.059 
 (1.562) (1.639) (1.706) (1.530) (1.651) (1.692) (1.615) 
level 0.276 0.206 0.230 0.280 0.286 0.228 0.295 
 (1.394) (1.107) (1.231) (1.410) (1.450) (1.201) (1.475) 
fcf 0.068 -0.107 -0.015 0.002 0.101 -0.051 0.097 
 (0.223) (-0.375) (-0.052) (0.006) (0.313) (-0.171) (0.291) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.466) (-0.554) (-0.788) (-0.169) (-0.326) (-0.692) (-0.224) 
Constant 0.301 0.315 0.321 0.169 0.325 0.296 0.226 
 (0.479) (0.628) (0.575) (0.270) (0.508) (0.521) (0.343) 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
F-test 1.330 0.880 1.010 1.130 0.980 0.850 0.900 
Prob>F 0.229 0.557 0.442 0.348 0.477 0.599 0.563 
R-squared 0.120 0.102 0.123 0.137 0.168 0.125 0.171 
△R-squared 0.028 0.009 0.017 0.043 0.062 0.019 0.065 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board 
of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board 
of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable 
equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the 
standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised 
ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta btenure: interaction of standardised board size and standardised btenure in 
year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-1. duality 
*sta btenure: interaction of CEO duality and standardised btenure in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. 
Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. 
Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio 
in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.55 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures and board effectiveness on takeover premiums 
in MBO deals (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) 
 mo47 mo48 mo49 mo50 mo51 mo52 mo53 mo54 mo55 mo56 mo57 mo58 mo59 mo60 mo61 mo62 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                 
Sta fe         -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
         (-0.604) (-0.595) (-0.590) (-0.460) (-0.579) (-0.456) (-0.464) (-0.459) 
Sta bsize  0.002   -0.000 0.011  0.009  0.003   0.000 0.011  0.009 
  (0.050)   (-0.009) (0.227)  (0.184)  (0.062)   (0.004) (0.226)  (0.182) 
Sta ned   -0.018  -0.018  -0.011 -0.009   -0.017  -0.017  -0.011 -0.009 
   (-0.627)  (-0.638)  (-0.397) (-0.340)   (-0.611)  (-0.620)  (-0.402) (-0.348) 
dual    0.068  0.074 0.063 0.068    0.065  0.070 0.059 0.064 
    (1.032)  (0.944) (0.987) (0.876)    (0.966)  (0.894) (0.920) (0.829) 
size -0.026 -0.027 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.026 -0.022 -0.025 
 (-0.956) (-0.791) (-0.869) (-0.873) (-0.693) (-0.780) (-0.820) (-0.713) (-0.964) (-0.797) (-0.880) (-0.882) (-0.701) (-0.784) (-0.829) (-0.717) 
roa -0.378 -0.377 -0.380 -0.376 -0.380 -0.374 -0.377 -0.376 -0.359 -0.359 -0.363 -0.362 -0.363 -0.360 -0.363 -0.362 
 (-1.424) (-1.397) (-1.425) (-1.387) (-1.395) (-1.354) (-1.389) (-1.350) (-1.295) (-1.266) (-1.296) (-1.283) (-1.266) (-1.253) (-1.283) (-1.248) 
bown 0.074 0.072 0.053 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.075 0.073 0.055 0.078 0.055 0.068 0.065 0.059 
 (0.547) (0.524) (0.374) (0.566) (0.371) (0.488) (0.450) (0.407) (0.547) (0.519) (0.380) (0.563) (0.373) (0.486) (0.449) (0.406) 
lnnas 0.053* 0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 0.053* 0.052 0.052* 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 
 (1.677) (1.534) (1.636) (1.737) (1.511) (1.558) (1.701) (1.543) (1.709) (1.557) (1.666) (1.759) (1.532) (1.574) (1.723) (1.559) 
level 0.247 0.245 0.248 0.282 0.249 0.277* 0.280 0.276* 0.249 0.247 0.251 0.282 0.251* 0.277* 0.280 0.276* 
 (1.514) (1.603) (1.523) (1.626) (1.629) (1.689) (1.614) (1.679) (1.552) (1.643) (1.561) (1.633) (1.667) (1.697) (1.621) (1.687) 
fcf -0.255 -0.254 -0.281 -0.237 -0.281 -0.232 -0.255 -0.247 -0.263 -0.262 -0.289 -0.244 -0.289 -0.239 -0.262 -0.255 
 (-1.483) (-1.506) (-1.434) (-1.375) (-1.469) (-1.367) (-1.305) (-1.303) (-1.514) (-1.539) (-1.454) (-1.391) (-1.493) (-1.387) (-1.317) (-1.322) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.671) (-0.645) (-0.598) (-0.667) (-0.583) (-0.624) (-0.619) (-0.592) (-0.612) (-0.586) (-0.545) (-0.618) (-0.529) (-0.579) (-0.572) (-0.547) 
Constant 0.541 0.554 0.496 0.447 0.494 0.503 0.427 0.477 0.542 0.558 0.497 0.452 0.498 0.509 0.432 0.481 
 (1.234) (0.937) (1.161) (1.055) (0.846) (0.889) (1.015) (0.829) (1.233) (0.936) (1.163) (1.060) (0.848) (0.890) (1.020) (0.830) 
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Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.140 0.146 0.140 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.140 0.140 0.142 0.148 0.142 0.148 0.149 0.149 
F-test 3.492 3.107 3.003 3.256 2.724 2.962 2.834 2.641 3.545 3.140 3.046 3.268 2.739 2.939 2.854 2.614 
Prob>F 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.006 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: 
the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same 
person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta fe: interaction 
of standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned *sta fe: interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-1. duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO duality and 
standardised fe in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided 
by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.56 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for moderation analysis: 
Step 2 the unconstrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in MBO 
deals (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Mo63 Mo64 Mo65 Mo66 Mo67 Mo68 Mo69 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
sta fe -0.016 -0.017 -0.006 -0.018 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 
 (-0.584) (-0.660) (-0.184) (-0.615) (-0.171) (-0.317) (-0.310) 
sta bsize 0.002   -0.001 0.009  0.006 
 (0.038)   (-0.028) (0.169)  (0.108) 
sta ned  -0.009  -0.009  -0.003 0.001 
  (-0.285)  (-0.261)  (-0.111) (0.021) 
dual   0.062  0.071 0.058 0.068 
   (0.899)  (0.939) (0.888) (0.926) 
sta bsize *sta fe -0.002   -0.002 -0.016  -0.015 
 (-0.048)   (-0.038) (-0.399)  (-0.349) 
sta ned *sta fe  0.024  0.024  0.023 0.022 
  (0.954)  (0.893)  (0.900) (0.849) 
dual *sta fe   -0.025  -0.038 -0.015 -0.027 
   (-0.548)  (-0.768) (-0.330) (-0.522) 
size -0.027 -0.029 -0.024 -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.030 
 (-0.772) (-1.070) (-0.908) (-0.848) (-0.794) (-1.011) (-0.876) 
roa -0.357 -0.352 -0.352 -0.350 -0.324 -0.348 -0.322 
 (-1.330) (-1.277) (-1.251) (-1.323) (-1.149) (-1.239) (-1.142) 
bown 0.073 0.054 0.080 0.055 0.067 0.065 0.060 
 (0.518) (0.375) (0.582) (0.371) (0.480) (0.452) (0.407) 
lnnas 0.052 0.053* 0.056* 0.054 0.054 0.056* 0.055 
 (1.552) (1.714) (1.811) (1.564) (1.604) (1.801) (1.612) 
level 0.247 0.233 0.290 0.233 0.286* 0.269 0.266 
 (1.600) (1.408) (1.659) (1.446) (1.703) (1.476) (1.506) 
fcf -0.264 -0.299 -0.244 -0.301 -0.253 -0.272 -0.275 
 (-1.556) (-1.508) (-1.401) (-1.599) (-1.461) (-1.369) (-1.436) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.561) (-0.453) (-0.551) (-0.426) (-0.521) (-0.445) (-0.446) 
Constant 0.556 0.596 0.454 0.591 0.514 0.525 0.574 
 (0.909) (1.358) (1.064) (0.995) (0.877) (1.184) (0.974) 
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
F-test 2.800*** 3.180*** 3.450*** 2.620*** 2.890*** 2.970*** 2.533*** 
Prob>F 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.004 
R-squared 0.140 0.147 0.149 0.147 0.151 0.154 0.155 
△R-squared 0 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.006 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts 
on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the 
board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy 
variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the 
standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned 
in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta fe: interaction of standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned 
*sta fe: interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-1. duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised fe in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. 
Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total 
assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.57 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for 
mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
LE33-LE39 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), LE40-LE46 test the effects of board 
structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), LE47-LE53 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, 
BE→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BS→ premiums Step 2: BS→ BE Step 3: BS, BE→ premiums 
 le33 le34 le35 le36 le37 le38 le39 le40 le41 le42 le43 le44 le45 le46 le47 le48 le49 le50 le51 le52 le53 
VARIABLES prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta bsize -0.022   -0.027 -0.022  -0.027 -0.111   -0.120 -0.114  -0.122 -0.001   -0.004 0.001  -0.002 
 (-0.376)   (-0.466) (-0.371)  (-0.461) (-
0.841) 
  (-
0.900) 
(-
0.896) 
 (-
0.943) 
(-0.009)   (-0.054) (0.009)  (-0.036) 
Sta ned  -0.048  -0.050  -0.049 -0.051  -0.049  -0.061  -0.042 -0.054  -0.024  -0.025  -0.025 -0.025 
  (-0.745)  (-0.770)  (-0.755) (-0.780)  (-
0.444) 
 (-
0.544) 
 (-
0.366) 
(-
0.462) 
 (-0.370)  (-0.370)  (-0.386) (-0.384) 
dual   -0.019  -0.018 -0.024 -0.024   0.677  0.680 0.673 0.675   -0.057  -0.058 -0.060 -0.060 
   (-0.138)  (-0.132) (-0.173) (-0.168)   (1.466)  (1.455) (1.461) (1.451)   (-0.422)  (-0.417) (-0.436) (-0.428) 
Sta btenure               0.043 0.042 0.048 0.042 0.048 0.047 0.047 
               (0.832) (0.811) (0.915) (0.795) (0.899) (0.878) (0.859) 
size -0.046 -0.048 -0.051 -0.041 -0.046 -0.048 -0.041 -0.031 -0.070 -0.067 -0.027 -0.026 -0.067 -0.023 -0.039 -0.038 -0.040 -0.037 -0.040 -0.039 -0.038 
 (-0.984) (-1.160) (-1.207) (-0.917) (-0.978) (-1.152) (-0.911) (-
0.367) 
(-
0.736) 
(-
0.735) 
(-
0.321) 
(-
0.322) 
(-
0.725) 
(-
0.278) 
(-0.757) (-0.866) (-0.876) (-0.738) (-0.762) (-0.865) (-0.741) 
roa -1.077 -1.165 -1.105 -1.139 -1.081 -1.170 -1.143 1.053 1.006 1.117* 0.992 1.116* 1.075 1.062 -1.169 -1.199 -1.180 -1.195 -1.181 -1.211 -1.208 
 (-1.176) (-1.225) (-1.184) (-1.208) (-1.171) (-1.224) (-1.208) (1.603) (1.582) (1.784) (1.517) (1.692) (1.661) (1.567) (-1.222) (-1.233) (-1.229) (-1.233) (-1.234) (-1.250) (-1.250) 
bown 0.185 0.109 0.163 0.134 0.185 0.109 0.134 0.279 0.084 0.147 0.233 0.300 0.107 0.259 0.058 0.033 0.057 0.037 0.056 0.032 0.034 
 (0.394) (0.236) (0.360) (0.280) (0.392) (0.234) (0.278) (0.350) (0.110) (0.195) (0.295) (0.385) (0.146) (0.339) (0.117) (0.068) (0.118) (0.072) (0.111) (0.064) (0.066) 
lnnas 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.129***        0.117** 0.114** 0.117** 0.115** 0.117** 0.115** 0.115** 
 (2.820) (2.754) (2.806) (2.753) (2.795) (2.730) (2.727)        (2.156) (2.174) (2.162) (2.155) (2.137) (2.156) (2.134) 
level -0.366* -0.355* -0.369* -0.348* -0.364* -0.352* -0.345*        -0.491*** -0.479** -0.482** -0.478** -0.482** -0.469** -0.468** 
 (-1.928) (-1.789) (-1.917) (-1.732) (-1.874) (-1.735) (-1.680)        (-2.797) (-2.537) (-2.649) (-2.529) (-2.647) (-2.412) (-2.406) 
fcf 0.735 0.828 0.815 0.734 0.738 0.831 0.737        0.373 0.394 0.377 0.383 0.379 0.397 0.389 
 (0.790) (0.837) (0.836) (0.773) (0.788) (0.836) (0.772)        (0.406) (0.412) (0.400) (0.411) (0.412) (0.415) (0.417) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.387) (0.300) (0.382) (0.298) (0.382) (0.294) (0.293)        (0.286) (0.248) (0.276) (0.246) (0.274) (0.236) (0.233) 
big4        -0.095 -0.030 -0.036 -0.091 -0.096 -0.031 -0.093        
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        (-
0.438) 
(-
0.142) 
(-
0.179) 
(-
0.422) 
(-
0.458) 
(-
0.152) 
(-
0.439) 
       
ceoch        -0.467 -0.509* -0.574 -0.442 -0.513 -0.560 -0.491        
        (-
1.474) 
(-
1.710) 
(-
1.659) 
(-
1.326) 
(-
1.400) 
(-
1.599) 
(-
1.313) 
       
sg        -
0.222** 
-
0.209** 
-
0.193** 
-
0.216** 
-
0.200** 
-
0.188** 
-
0.195** 
       
        (-
2.568) 
(-
2.329) 
(-
2.529) 
(-
2.346) 
(-
2.575) 
(-
2.282) 
(-
2.322) 
       
Constant 0.776 0.854 0.888 0.717 0.778 0.856 0.720 0.665 1.363 1.224 0.603 0.498 1.219 0.444 0.837 0.830 0.849 0.811 0.852 0.839 0.825 
 (0.935) (1.197) (1.227) (0.886) (0.930) (1.191) (0.882) (0.429) (0.784) (0.749) (0.383) (0.336) (0.738) (0.293) (0.935) (1.123) (1.132) (0.916) (0.938) (1.120) (0.918) 
                      
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.189 0.196 0.188 0.197 0.189 0.196 0.198 0.080 0.076 0.116 0.083 0.123 0.118 0.125 0.228 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.232 0.232 
F-test 1.653 1.864 1.672 1.643 1.482 1.911 1.713 2.408 2.582 2.612 2.107 2.124 2.216 1.811 1.528 1.568 1.717 1.391 1.524 1.799 1.610 
Prob>F 0.127 0.081 0.121 0.121 0.173 0.065 0.097 0.030 0.021 0.020 0.048 0.047 0.038 0.084 0.159 0.145 0.104 0.207 0.153 0.080 0.120 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average board tenure of the board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: 
the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-
1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: 
price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.58 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for 
mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
LE54 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), LE55-ME57 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), LE58-LE64 tests the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step 3: BE, BS→ premiums 
 le54 le55 le56 le57 le58 le59 le60 le61 le62 le63 le64 
Variables prem bsize ned dual prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
            
Sta btenure 0.043 -0.060 -0.038 0.068 0.043 0.042 0.048 0.042 0.048 0.047 0.047 
 (0.845) (-0.924) (-0.469) (1.541) (0.832) (0.811) (0.915) (0.795) (0.899) (0.878) (0.859) 
Sta bsize     -0.001   -0.004 0.001  -0.002 
     (-0.009)   (-0.054) (0.009)  (-0.036) 
Sta ned      -0.024  -0.025  -0.025 -0.025 
      (-0.370)  (-0.370)  (-0.386) (-0.384) 
dual       -0.057  -0.058 -0.060 -0.060 
       (-0.422)  (-0.417) (-0.436) (-0.428) 
size -0.039 0.351*** 0.006 -0.000 -0.039 -0.038 -0.040 -0.037 -0.040 -0.039 -0.038 
 (-0.877) (5.651) (0.074) (-0.015) (-0.757) (-0.866) (-0.876) (-0.738) (-0.762) (-0.865) (-0.741) 
roa -1.169 0.049 -0.958 -0.163 -1.169 -1.199 -1.180 -1.195 -1.181 -1.211 -1.208 
 (-1.218) (0.064) (-1.160) (-0.487) (-1.222) (-1.233) (-1.229) (-1.233) (-1.234) (-1.250) (-1.250) 
bown 0.057 1.349* -0.940 -0.033 0.058 0.033 0.057 0.037 0.056 0.032 0.034 
 (0.122) (1.775) (-0.981) (-0.127) (0.117) (0.068) (0.118) (0.072) (0.111) (0.064) (0.066) 
lnnas 0.117**    0.117** 0.114** 0.117** 0.115** 0.117** 0.115** 0.115** 
 (2.179)    (2.156) (2.174) (2.162) (2.155) (2.137) (2.156) (2.134) 
level -0.491***    -0.491*** -0.479** -0.482** -0.478** -0.482** -0.469** -0.468** 
 (-2.799)    (-2.797) (-2.537) (-2.649) (-2.529) (-2.647) (-2.412) (-2.406) 
fcf 0.375    0.373 0.394 0.377 0.383 0.379 0.397 0.389 
 (0.397)    (0.406) (0.412) (0.400) (0.411) (0.412) (0.415) (0.417) 
pea 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.288)    (0.286) (0.248) (0.276) (0.246) (0.274) (0.236) (0.233) 
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big4  -0.529 0.126 0.002        
  (-1.369) (0.361) (0.024)        
ceoch  0.499* 0.317 0.106        
  (1.820) (0.938) (0.519)        
sg  -0.079 0.099 -0.018        
  (-1.233) (1.108) (-0.683)        
Constant 0.841 -6.269*** -0.090 0.123 0.837 0.830 0.849 0.811 0.852 0.839 0.825 
 (1.134) (-5.569) (-0.055) (0.258) (0.935) (1.123) (1.132) (0.916) (0.938) (1.120) (0.918) 
            
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.228 0.338 0.083 0.060 0.228 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.232 0.232 
F-test 1.741 7.212 1.322 0.662 1.528 1.568 1.717 1.391 1.524 1.799 1.610 
Prob>F 0.107 0.000 0.255 0.703 0.159 0.145 0.104 0.207 0.153 0.080 0.120 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average board tenure of the board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta 
ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-
1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to 
big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.59 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for mediation 
analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals 
LE65-LE71 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), LE72-LE78 test the effects of board 
structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), LE79-LE85 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, 
BE→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of 
board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BS→ premiums Step 2: BS→ BE Step 3: BS, BE→ premiums 
 le65 le66 le67 le68 le69 le70 le71 le72 le73 le74 le75 le76 le77 le78 le79 le80 le81 le82 le83 le84 le85 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta bsize -0.022   -0.027 -0.022  -0.027 -
0.369** 
  -
0.353** 
-
0.369** 
 -
0.353** 
-0.051   -0.053 -0.051  -0.053 
 (-0.376)   (-0.466) (-0.371)  (-0.461) (-
2.151) 
  (-
2.055) 
(-
2.135) 
 (-
2.038) 
(-0.759)   (-0.786) (-0.753)  (-0.779) 
Sta ned  -0.048  -0.050  -0.049 -0.051  0.179  0.146  0.179 0.146  -0.036  -0.038  -0.036 -0.038 
  (-0.745)  (-0.770)  (-0.755) (-0.780)  (1.207)  (1.052)  (1.200) (1.043)  (-0.537)  (-0.575)  (-0.546) (-0.584) 
dual   -0.019  -0.018 -0.024 -0.024   -0.035  -0.040 -0.019 -0.027   -0.025  -0.024 -0.028 -0.028 
   (-0.138)  (-0.132) (-0.173) (-0.168)   (-
0.113) 
 (-
0.158) 
(-
0.055) 
(-
0.095) 
  (-0.176)  (-0.173) (-0.200) (-0.197) 
Sta fe               -0.081 -0.066 -0.071 -0.076 -0.081 -0.066 -0.076 
               (-1.117) (-0.921) (-1.037) (-1.002) (-1.107) (-0.915) (-0.995) 
size -0.046 -0.048 -0.051 -0.041 -0.046 -0.048 -0.041 0.153* 0.027 0.029 0.145* 0.153* 0.027 0.145* -0.035 -0.045 -0.048 -0.032 -0.035 -0.045 -0.032 
 (-0.984) (-1.160) (-1.207) (-0.917) (-0.978) (-1.152) (-0.911) (1.721) (0.328) (0.330) (1.687) (1.708) (0.326) (1.675) (-0.772) (-1.117) (-1.151) (-0.727) (-0.768) (-1.110) (-0.723) 
roa -1.077 -1.165 -1.105 -1.139 -1.081 -1.170 -1.143 -0.421 -0.077 -0.281 -0.251 -0.425 -0.079 -0.253 -1.102 -1.194 -1.155 -1.146 -1.106 -1.200 -1.152 
 (-1.176) (-1.225) (-1.184) (-1.208) (-1.171) (-1.224) (-1.208) (-
0.354) 
(-
0.066) 
(-
0.262) 
(-
0.201) 
(-
0.354) 
(-
0.068) 
(-
0.202) 
(-1.331) (-1.352) (-1.320) (-1.358) (-1.328) (-1.352) (-1.360) 
bown 0.185 0.109 0.163 0.134 0.185 0.109 0.134 1.328 1.031 0.845 1.459 1.329 1.031 1.459 0.293 0.187 0.233 0.248 0.294 0.188 0.249 
 (0.394) (0.236) (0.360) (0.280) (0.392) (0.234) (0.278) (1.412) (1.091) (0.819) (1.624) (1.404) (1.084) (1.613) (0.610) (0.390) (0.497) (0.501) (0.606) (0.387) (0.497) 
lnnas 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.129***        0.138*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 
 (2.820) (2.754) (2.806) (2.753) (2.795) (2.730) (2.727)        (2.764) (2.692) (2.725) (2.709) (2.741) (2.669) (2.686) 
level -0.366* -0.355* -0.369* -0.348* -0.364* -0.352* -0.345*        -0.386* -0.381* -0.392* -0.371* -0.384* -0.378* -0.369* 
 (-1.928) (-1.789) (-1.917) (-1.732) (-1.874) (-1.735) (-1.680)        (-1.941) (-1.814) (-1.936) (-1.763) (-1.889) (-1.766) (-1.714) 
fcf 0.735 0.828 0.815 0.734 0.738 0.831 0.737        0.750 0.919 0.918 0.748 0.754 0.922 0.752 
 (0.790) (0.837) (0.836) (0.773) (0.788) (0.836) (0.772)        (0.838) (0.924) (0.936) (0.820) (0.839) (0.923) (0.822) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.387) (0.300) (0.382) (0.298) (0.382) (0.294) (0.293)        (0.469) (0.387) (0.450) (0.398) (0.462) (0.379) (0.391) 
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big4        -0.130 0.056 0.083 -0.142 -0.130 0.056 -0.142        
        (-
0.319) 
(0.126) (0.176) (-
0.361) 
(-
0.316) 
(0.125) (-
0.358) 
       
ceoch        -0.298 -0.523 -0.465 -0.350 -0.295 -0.521 -0.348        
        (-
0.800) 
(-
1.289) 
(-
1.254) 
(-
0.880) 
(-
0.795) 
(-
1.288) 
(-
0.880) 
       
sg        0.161 0.150 0.160 0.152 0.159 0.149 0.151        
        (1.642) (1.235) (1.309) (1.500) (1.611) (1.220) (1.479)        
Constant 0.776 0.854 0.888 0.717 0.778 0.856 0.720 -2.799 -0.590 -0.623 -2.671 -2.794 -0.587 -2.668 0.565 0.808 0.830 0.533 0.567 0.811 0.536 
 (0.935) (1.197) (1.227) (0.886) (0.930) (1.191) (0.882) (-
1.585) 
(-
0.364) 
(-
0.355) 
(-
1.572) 
(-
1.570) 
(-
0.359) 
(-
1.557) 
(0.688) (1.131) (1.155) (0.658) (0.686) (1.126) (0.657) 
                      
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.189 0.196 0.188 0.197 0.189 0.196 0.198 0.122 0.063 0.040 0.137 0.122 0.063 0.138 0.216 0.214 0.210 0.221 0.216 0.214 0.221 
F-test 1.653 1.864 1.672 1.643 1.482 1.911 1.713 1.722 1.027 0.674 1.720 1.493 0.907 1.523 1.425 1.605 1.427 1.439 1.293 1.615 1.474 
Prob>F 0.127 0.081 0.121 0.121 0.173 0.065 0.097 0.118 0.421 0.694 0.110 0.176 0.516 0.158 0.196 0.132 0.195 0.184 0.253 0.122 0.164 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial experts on board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total 
number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-
earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: 
sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.60 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for mediation 
analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals 
LE86 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), LE87-LE89 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), LE90-LE96 tests the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of 
board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step 3: BS→ premiums 
 le86 le87 le88 le89 le90 le91 le92 le93 le94 le95 le96 
Variables prem bsize ned dual prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
            
Sta fe -0.071 -0.232** 0.136 -0.003 -0.081 -0.066 -0.071 -0.076 -0.081 -0.066 -0.076 
 (-1.045) (-2.167) (1.251) (-0.112) (-1.117) (-0.921) (-1.037) (-1.002) (-1.107) (-0.915) (-0.995) 
Sta bsize     -0.051   -0.053 -0.051  -0.053 
     (-0.759)   (-0.786) (-0.753)  (-0.779) 
Sta ned      -0.036  -0.038  -0.036 -0.038 
      (-0.537)  (-0.575)  (-0.546) (-0.584) 
dual       -0.025  -0.024 -0.028 -0.028 
       (-0.176)  (-0.173) (-0.200) (-0.197) 
size -0.048 0.341*** 0.009 -0.001 -0.035 -0.045 -0.048 -0.032 -0.035 -0.045 -0.032 
 (-1.157) (5.974) (0.121) (-0.039) (-0.772) (-1.117) (-1.151) (-0.727) (-0.768) (-1.110) (-0.723) 
roa -1.150 -0.451 -1.087 -0.087 -1.102 -1.194 -1.155 -1.146 -1.106 -1.200 -1.152 
 (-1.324) (-0.499) (-1.258) (-0.266) (-1.331) (-1.352) (-1.320) (-1.358) (-1.328) (-1.352) (-1.360) 
bown 0.232 1.506** -1.160 0.012 0.293 0.187 0.233 0.248 0.294 0.188 0.249 
 (0.500) (2.286) (-1.338) (0.049) (0.610) (0.390) (0.497) (0.501) (0.606) (0.387) (0.497) 
lnnas 0.135***    0.138*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 
 (2.746)    (2.764) (2.692) (2.725) (2.709) (2.741) (2.669) (2.686) 
level -0.395*    -0.386* -0.381* -0.392* -0.371* -0.384* -0.378* -0.369* 
 (-1.987)    (-1.941) (-1.814) (-1.936) (-1.763) (-1.889) (-1.766) (-1.714) 
fcf 0.914    0.750 0.919 0.918 0.748 0.754 0.922 0.752 
 (0.937)    (0.838) (0.924) (0.936) (0.820) (0.839) (0.923) (0.822) 
pea 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.457)    (0.469) (0.387) (0.450) (0.398) (0.462) (0.379) (0.391) 
big4  -0.557* 0.138 0.002        
  (-1.819) (0.494) (0.024)        
ceoch  0.352 0.371 0.079        
  (1.250) (1.022) (0.404)        
sg  0.037 0.039 -0.029        
  (0.458) (0.411) (-1.170)        
Constant 0.828 -6.025*** -0.128 0.123 0.565 0.808 0.830 0.533 0.567 0.811 0.536 
 (1.160) (-5.880) (-0.091) (0.267) (0.688) (1.131) (1.155) (0.658) (0.686) (1.126) (0.657) 
            
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.210 0.340 0.115 0.015 0.216 0.214 0.210 0.221 0.216 0.214 0.221 
F-test 1.595 8.759 1.578 0.491 1.425 1.605 1.427 1.439 1.293 1.615 1.474 
Prob>F 0.143 0.000 0.157 0.838 0.196 0.132 0.195 0.184 0.253 0.122 0.164 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial experts on board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). 
Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman 
is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: 
ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year 
Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy 
variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.61 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for 
mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals 
ME33-ME39 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ME40-ME46 test the effects of 
board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ME47-ME53 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover 
premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BS→ premiums Step 2: BS→ BE Step 3: BS, BE→ premiums 
 me33 me34 me35 me36 me37 me38 me39 me40 me41 me42 me43 me44 me45 me46 me47 me48 me49 me50 me51 me52 me53 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta bsize 0.002   -0.000 0.011  0.009 -0.083   -0.128 -0.040  -0.102 -0.009   -0.011 0.001  0.000 
 (0.050)  (-0.009) (0.227) (0.184) (-0.801)   (-1.359) (-0.388)  (-1.030) (-0.173)   (-0.230) (0.014)  (0.003) 
Sta ned  -0.018  -0.018  -0.011 -0.009  -0.239**  -0.263*** -0.204** -0.234**  -0.015  -0.017  -0.002 -0.002 
  (-
0.627) 
 (-0.638)  (-
0.397) 
(-
0.340) 
 (-2.504)  (-2.773)  (-2.047) (-2.238)  (-0.392)  (-0.441)  (-0.067) (-0.063) 
dual   0.068  0.074 0.063 0.068   0.364*  0.341 0.242 0.166   0.088  0.088 0.086 0.086 
   (1.032) (0.944) (0.987) (0.876)   (1.681)  (1.533) (1.026) (0.672)   (1.165)  (1.000) (1.207) (0.968) 
Sta btenure               -0.027 -0.030 -0.033 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
               (-0.828) (-0.868) (-1.056) (-0.853) (-1.016) (-0.982) (-0.921) 
size -0.027 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.024 0.017 0.048 0.027 0.099 0.038 0.065 0.100 -0.018 -0.016 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-
0.791) 
(-
0.869) 
(-
0.873) 
(-0.693) (-
0.780) 
(-
0.820) 
(-
0.713) 
(0.191) (0.558) (0.315) (1.137) (0.451) (0.759) (1.169) (-0.463) (-0.506) (-0.390) (-0.315) (-0.337) (-0.367) (-0.299) 
roa -0.377 -0.380 -0.376 -0.380 -0.374 -0.377 -0.376 1.285 1.193 1.237 1.259 1.260 1.198 1.250 -0.336 -0.344 -0.324 -0.342 -0.324 -0.325 -0.325 
 (-
1.397) 
(-
1.425) 
(-
1.387) 
(-1.395) (-
1.354) 
(-
1.389) 
(-
1.350) 
(1.279) (1.166) (1.313) (1.203) (1.305) (1.220) (1.222) (-1.054) (-1.053) (-0.963) (-1.053) (-0.975) (-0.968) (-0.966) 
bown 0.072 0.053 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.708 0.559 0.722* 0.553 0.723* 0.593 0.577 0.097 0.082 0.105 0.088 0.105 0.104 0.104 
 (0.524) (0.374) (0.566) (0.371) (0.488) (0.450) (0.407) (1.655) (1.511) (1.754) (1.474) (1.739) (1.573) (1.516) (0.640) (0.538) (0.707) (0.560) (0.684) (0.668) (0.657) 
lnnas 0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053        0.059 0.057 0.058* 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
 (1.534) (1.636) (1.737) (1.511) (1.558) (1.701) (1.543)        (1.573) (1.620) (1.680) (1.545) (1.546) (1.659) (1.536) 
level 0.245 0.248 0.282 0.249 0.277* 0.280 0.276*        0.216 0.219 0.250 0.226 0.250 0.251 0.251 
 (1.603) (1.523) (1.626) (1.629) (1.689) (1.614) (1.679)        (1.210) (1.166) (1.300) (1.244) (1.327) (1.288) (1.325) 
fcf -0.254 -0.281 -0.237 -0.281 -0.232 -0.255 -0.247        -0.046 -0.035 -0.007 -0.042 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-
1.506) 
(-
1.434) 
(-
1.375) 
(-1.469) (-
1.367) 
(-
1.305) 
(-
1.303) 
       (-0.168) (-0.127) (-0.025) (-0.150) (-0.023) (-0.024) (-0.023) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001        -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (- (- (- (-0.583) (- (- (-        (-0.764) (-0.727) (-0.810) (-0.724) (-0.783) (-0.801) (-0.782) 
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0.645) 0.598) 0.667) 0.624) 0.619) 0.592) 
big4        0.055 0.103 0.033 0.083 0.028 0.073 0.066        
        (0.317) (0.568) (0.192) (0.456) (0.162) (0.406) (0.366)        
ceoch        0.097 0.292 0.196 0.331 0.194 0.335 0.353        
        (0.342) (1.055) (0.641) (1.322) (0.653) (1.212) (1.383)        
sg        -0.059* -0.067** -0.081*** -0.059 -0.077** -0.078** -0.068*        
        (-1.868) (-2.155) (-2.648) (-1.663) (-2.291) (-2.304) (-1.726)        
Constant 0.554 0.496 0.447 0.494 0.503 0.427 0.477 -0.567 -1.133 -0.834 -2.031 -1.032 -1.496 -2.097 0.348 0.323 0.209 0.251 0.213 0.201 0.202 
 (0.937) (1.161) (1.055) (0.846) (0.889) (1.015) (0.829) (-0.351) (-0.716) (-0.537) (-1.284) (-0.664) (-0.952) (-1.344) (0.522) (0.645) (0.403) (0.368) (0.335) (0.380) (0.297) 
                      
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.137 0.140 0.146 0.140 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.113 0.158 0.135 0.174 0.137 0.170 0.179 0.092 0.093 0.106 0.094 0.106 0.106 0.106 
F-test 3.107 3.003 3.256 2.724 2.962 2.834 2.641 3.003 4.133 4.069 3.402 3.316 4.019 3.313 0.958 0.936 1.026 0.869 0.957 0.941 0.913 
Prob>F 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.481 0.499 0.427 0.565 0.488 0.501 0.532 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average board tenure of the board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). 
Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the 
same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln 
total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free 
cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change 
equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.62 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the regression approach for 
mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals 
ME54 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ME55-ME57 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ME58-ME64 tests the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: 
BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step 3: BS→ premiums 
 me54 me55 me56 me57 me58 me59 me60 me61 me62 me63 me64 
Variables prem bsize ned dual prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
            
Sta btenure -0.026 -0.093 -0.243** 0.090 -0.027 -0.030 -0.033 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
 (-0.850) (-0.786) (-2.302) (1.430) (-0.828) (-0.868) (-1.056) (-0.853) (-1.016) (-0.982) (-0.921) 
Sta bsize     -0.009   -0.011 0.001  0.000 
     (-0.173)   (-0.230) (0.014)  (0.003) 
Sta ned      -0.015  -0.017  -0.002 -0.002 
      (-0.392)  (-0.441)  (-0.067) (-0.063) 
dual       0.088  0.088 0.086 0.086 
       (1.165)  (1.000) (1.207) (0.968) 
size -0.020 0.346*** 0.248** -0.106** -0.018 -0.016 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-0.630) (3.439) (2.582) (-2.035) (-0.463) (-0.506) (-0.390) (-0.315) (-0.337) (-0.367) (-0.299) 
roa -0.338 0.673 0.108 -0.107 -0.336 -0.344 -0.324 -0.342 -0.324 -0.325 -0.325 
 (-1.043) (0.698) (0.118) (-0.247) (-1.054) (-1.053) (-0.963) (-1.053) (-0.975) (-0.968) (-0.966) 
bown 0.092 0.128 -0.429 -0.117 0.097 0.082 0.105 0.088 0.105 0.104 0.104 
 (0.630) (0.222) (-0.689) (-0.512) (0.640) (0.538) (0.707) (0.560) (0.684) (0.668) (0.657) 
lnnas 0.058    0.059 0.057 0.058* 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
 (1.664)    (1.573) (1.620) (1.680) (1.545) (1.546) (1.659) (1.536) 
level 0.212    0.216 0.219 0.250 0.226 0.250 0.251 0.251 
 (1.152)    (1.210) (1.166) (1.300) (1.244) (1.327) (1.288) (1.325) 
fcf -0.041    -0.046 -0.035 -0.007 -0.042 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.148)    (-0.168) (-0.127) (-0.025) (-0.150) (-0.023) (-0.024) (-0.023) 
pea -0.001    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
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 (-0.774)    (-0.764) (-0.727) (-0.810) (-0.724) (-0.783) (-0.801) (-0.782) 
big4  -0.178 0.152 0.099        
  (-0.818) (0.682) (0.986)        
ceoch  0.151 0.884*** -0.310***        
  (0.402) (2.808) (-4.190)        
sg  0.062 -0.027 0.050***        
  (1.534) (-0.965) (3.708)        
Constant 0.394 -6.164*** -4.531** 2.152** 0.348 0.323 0.209 0.251 0.213 0.201 0.202 
 (0.776) (-3.381) (-2.566) (2.315) (0.522) (0.645) (0.403) (0.368) (0.335) (0.380) (0.297) 
            
Observations 90 89 89 89 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.092 0.208 0.276 0.169 0.092 0.093 0.106 0.094 0.106 0.106 0.106 
F-test 1.052 3.915 4.506 5.984 0.958 0.936 1.026 0.869 0.957 0.941 0.913 
Prob>F 0.405 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.481 0.499 0.427 0.565 0.488 0.501 0.532 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average board tenure of the board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement 
of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: 
total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or 
four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.63 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for mediation 
analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover premiums in MBO 
deals 
ME65-ME71 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ME72-ME78 test the effects of 
board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ME79-ME85 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover 
premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BS→ premiums Step 2: BS→ BE Step 3: BS, BE→ premiums 
 me65 me66 me67 me68 me69 me70 me71 me72 me73 me74 me75 me76 me77 me78 me79 me80 me81 me82 me83 me84 me85 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
                      
Sta bsize 0.002   -0.000 0.011  0.009 0.023   0.029 -0.020  -0.018 0.003   0.000 0.011  0.009 
 (0.050)   (-0.009) (0.227)  (0.184) (0.252)   (0.314) (-0.211)  (-0.185) (0.062)   (0.004) (0.226)  (0.182) 
Sta ned  -0.018  -0.018  -0.011 -0.009  0.039  0.043  0.013 0.009  -0.017  -0.017  -0.011 -0.009 
  (-
0.627) 
 (-0.638)  (-
0.397) 
(-
0.340) 
 (0.352)  (0.384)  (0.111) (0.076)  (-0.611)  (-0.620)  (-0.402) (-0.348) 
dual   0.068  0.074 0.063 0.068   -0.302  -0.315 -0.297 -0.310   0.065  0.070 0.059 0.064 
   (1.032)  (0.944) (0.987) (0.876)   (-1.262)  (-1.219) (-1.223) (-1.167)   (0.966)  (0.894) (0.920) (0.829) 
Sta fe               -0.016 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
               (-0.595) (-0.590) (-0.460) (-0.579) (-0.456) (-0.464) (-0.459) 
size -0.027 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.022 -0.024 0.009 0.011 -0.004 -0.000 0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.027 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.026 -0.022 -0.025 
 (-
0.791) 
(-
0.869) 
(-
0.873) 
(-0.693) (-
0.780) 
(-
0.820) 
(-
0.713) 
(0.104) (0.134) (-0.053) (-0.002) (0.026) (-0.071) (0.006) (-0.797) (-0.880) (-0.882) (-0.701) (-0.784) (-0.829) (-0.717) 
roa -0.377 -0.380 -0.376 -0.380 -0.374 -0.377 -0.376 0.939 0.964 0.922 0.974 0.917 0.932 0.924 -0.359 -0.363 -0.362 -0.363 -0.360 -0.363 -0.362 
 (-
1.397) 
(-
1.425) 
(-
1.387) 
(-1.395) (-
1.354) 
(-
1.389) 
(-
1.350) 
(1.582) (1.544) (1.636) (1.543) (1.604) (1.574) (1.534) (-1.266) (-1.296) (-1.283) (-1.266) (-1.253) (-1.283) (-1.248) 
bown 0.072 0.053 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.047 0.090 0.075 0.083 0.084 0.086 0.091 0.073 0.055 0.078 0.055 0.068 0.065 0.059 
 (0.524) (0.374) (0.566) (0.371) (0.488) (0.450) (0.407) (0.083) (0.154) (0.136) (0.141) (0.147) (0.150) (0.154) (0.519) (0.380) (0.563) (0.373) (0.486) (0.449) (0.406) 
lnnas 0.053 0.052 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053        0.052 0.052* 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 
 (1.534) (1.636) (1.737) (1.511) (1.558) (1.701) (1.543)        (1.557) (1.666) (1.759) (1.532) (1.574) (1.723) (1.559) 
level 0.245 0.248 0.282 0.249 0.277* 0.280 0.276*        0.247 0.251 0.282 0.251* 0.277* 0.280 0.276* 
 (1.603) (1.523) (1.626) (1.629) (1.689) (1.614) (1.679)        (1.643) (1.561) (1.633) (1.667) (1.697) (1.621) (1.687) 
fcf -0.254 -0.281 -0.237 -0.281 -0.232 -0.255 -0.247        -0.262 -0.289 -0.244 -0.289 -0.239 -0.262 -0.255 
 (-
1.506) 
(-
1.434) 
(-
1.375) 
(-1.469) (-
1.367) 
(-
1.305) 
(-
1.303) 
       (-1.539) (-1.454) (-1.391) (-1.493) (-1.387) (-1.317) (-1.322) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001        -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (- (- (- (-0.583) (- (- (-        (-0.586) (-0.545) (-0.618) (-0.529) (-0.579) (-0.572) (-0.547) 
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0.645) 0.598) 0.667) 0.624) 0.619) 0.592) 
big4        -0.241 -0.244 -0.216 -0.243 -0.216 -0.217 -0.216        
        (-
0.919) 
(-
0.927) 
(-0.829) (-0.919) (-0.824) (-0.823) (-0.816)        
ceoch        -0.119 -0.142 -0.203 -0.148 -0.204 -0.210 -0.209        
        (-
0.427) 
(-
0.490) 
(-0.711) (-0.507) (-0.712) (-0.710) (-0.703)        
sg        0.020 0.022 0.035 0.021 0.036 0.035 0.036        
        (0.936) (1.000) (1.467) (0.923) (1.483) (1.449) (1.465)        
Constant 0.554 0.496 0.447 0.494 0.503 0.427 0.477 -0.104 -0.148 0.201 0.054 0.086 0.227 0.116 0.558 0.497 0.452 0.498 0.509 0.432 0.481 
 (0.937) (1.161) (1.055) (0.846) (0.889) (1.015) (0.829) (-
0.065) 
(-
0.096) 
(0.134) (0.032) (0.053) (0.148) (0.069) (0.936) (1.163) (1.060) (0.848) (0.890) (1.020) (0.830) 
                      
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.137 0.140 0.146 0.140 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.029 0.030 0.045 0.030 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.140 0.142 0.148 0.142 0.148 0.149 0.149 
F-test 3.107 3.003 3.256 2.724 2.962 2.834 2.641 0.641 0.618 0.885 0.535 0.780 0.778 0.707 3.140 3.046 3.268 2.739 2.939 2.854 2.614 
Prob>F 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.721 0.740 0.521 0.828 0.621 0.623 0.701 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.006 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial experts on board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total 
number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 
0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on 
assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings 
ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales 
growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.64 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the regression approach for mediation 
analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBO 
deals 
ME86 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ME87-ME89 test the effects of board 
effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ME90-ME96 tests the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BE, 
BS→ premiums) (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) 
 Step 1: BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step 3: BS→ premiums 
 me86 me87 me88 me89 me90 me91 me92 me93 me94 me95 me96 
Variables prem bsize ned dual prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
            
Sta fe -0.016 0.019 0.035 -0.055 -0.016 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-0.604) (0.250) (0.364) (-1.268) (-0.595) (-0.590) (-0.460) (-0.579) (-0.456) (-0.464) (-0.459) 
Sta bsize     0.003   0.000 0.011  0.009 
     (0.062)   (0.004) (0.226)  (0.182) 
Sta ned      -0.017  -0.017  -0.011 -0.009 
      (-0.611)  (-0.620)  (-0.402) (-0.348) 
dual       0.065  0.070 0.059 0.064 
       (0.966)  (0.894) (0.920) (0.829) 
size -0.026 0.370*** 0.162 -0.071 -0.027 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.026 -0.022 -0.025 
 (-0.964) (3.891) (1.484) (-1.463) (-0.797) (-0.880) (-0.882) (-0.701) (-0.784) (-0.829) (-0.717) 
roa -0.359 -0.272 -0.825 0.016 -0.359 -0.363 -0.362 -0.363 -0.360 -0.363 -0.362 
 (-1.295) (-0.370) (-0.769) (0.045) (-1.266) (-1.296) (-1.283) (-1.266) (-1.253) (-1.283) (-1.248) 
bown 0.075 0.368 -0.893 0.069 0.073 0.055 0.078 0.055 0.068 0.065 0.059 
 (0.547) (0.677) (-1.376) (0.308) (0.519) (0.380) (0.563) (0.373) (0.486) (0.449) (0.406) 
lnnas 0.053*    0.052 0.052* 0.055* 0.052 0.053 0.054* 0.053 
 (1.709)    (1.557) (1.666) (1.759) (1.532) (1.574) (1.723) (1.559) 
level 0.249    0.247 0.251 0.282 0.251* 0.277* 0.280 0.276* 
 (1.552)    (1.643) (1.561) (1.633) (1.667) (1.697) (1.621) (1.687) 
fcf -0.263    -0.262 -0.289 -0.244 -0.289 -0.239 -0.262 -0.255 
 (-1.514)    (-1.539) (-1.454) (-1.391) (-1.493) (-1.387) (-1.317) (-1.322) 
pea -0.001    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
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 (-0.612)    (-0.586) (-0.545) (-0.618) (-0.529) (-0.579) (-0.572) (-0.547) 
big4  -0.034 0.042 0.073        
  (-0.172) (0.181) (0.756)        
ceoch  0.115 0.668* -0.294***        
  (0.334) (1.973) (-4.799)        
sg  0.050 -0.018 0.044***        
  (1.459) (-0.650) (3.911)        
Constant 0.542 -6.608*** -2.742 1.495* 0.558 0.497 0.452 0.498 0.509 0.432 0.481 
 (1.233) (-3.886) (-1.352) (1.720) (0.936) (1.163) (1.060) (0.848) (0.890) (1.020) (0.830) 
            
Observations 106 105 105 105 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.140 0.190 0.147 0.117 0.140 0.142 0.148 0.142 0.148 0.149 0.149 
F-test 3.545 4.241 2.610 6.442 3.140 3.046 3.268 2.739 2.939 2.854 2.614 
Prob>F 0.001 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.006 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial experts on board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). 
Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and 
chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in 
year Y-1.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by 
total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year 
Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.65 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
(In the third-party LBO context, the longer board tenure tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) 
 endolo15 endolo16 endolo17 endolo18 endolo19 endolo20 endolo21 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta btenure 0.057 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.068 0.100 0.097 
 (0.789) (0.911) (0.854) (0.913) (0.834) (1.098) (1.053) 
Sta bsize 0.081   0.063 0.076  0.051 
 (1.083)   (0.829) (0.996)  (0.614) 
Sta ned  -0.088  -0.078  -0.097 -0.088 
  (-1.352)  (-1.179)  (-1.566) (-1.393) 
dual   -0.116  -0.089 -0.227 -0.199 
   (-0.453)  (-0.337) (-0.783) (-0.682) 
size -0.074 -0.044 -0.050 -0.064 -0.073 -0.045 -0.061 
 (-1.512) (-1.105) (-1.201) (-1.339) (-1.473) (-1.091) (-1.229) 
roa -1.263 -1.304 -1.204 -1.357 -1.277 -1.365 -1.399 
 (-1.329) (-1.324) (-1.333) (-1.351) (-1.355) (-1.422) (-1.426) 
bown 0.093 0.071 0.163 0.022 0.093 0.050 0.014 
 (0.198) (0.155) (0.364) (0.048) (0.197) (0.107) (0.029) 
lnnas 0.161*** 0.144*** 0.156*** 0.149*** 0.160*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 
 (3.138) (2.937) (2.995) (3.033) (3.097) (2.779) (2.896) 
level -0.575*** -0.511*** -0.539*** -0.526*** -0.556*** -0.456** -0.475** 
 (-3.329) (-2.698) (-2.777) (-2.852) (-2.932) (-1.973) (-2.105) 
fcf 0.503 0.304 0.248 0.499 0.489 0.311 0.467 
 (0.507) (0.313) (0.271) (0.490) (0.498) (0.329) (0.466) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.395) (0.184) (0.353) (0.217) (0.371) (0.111) (0.145) 
Constant 1.324 0.812 0.877 1.176 1.306 0.827 1.117 
 (1.545) (1.204) (1.273) (1.392) (1.505) (1.205) (1.276) 
        
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
R-squared 0.252 0.243 0.257 0.241 0.254 0.225 0.229 
Chi2-test 25.72 22.36 23.58 25.18 26.27 25.50 26.70 
Prob>chi2 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 2.593 5.768 0.173 5.838 2.568 6.380 6.320 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.273 0.056 0.917 0.120 0.463 0.095 0.177 
Weak instrument test 
F-
test 
Sta 
btenure2 
63.959*** 33.157*** 26.093*** 44.929*** 56.024*** 23.509*** 40.591*** 
Sta 
bsize2 
42.542***   29.616*** 32.507***  26.520*** 
Sta ned2  139.997***  108.529***  105.560*** 89.936*** 
Dual2   13.783***  8.950*** 12.634*** 9.887*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of 
directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in 
year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in 
year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize 
*sta btenure: interaction of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: 
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interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-1. duality *sta btenure: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-
2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta 
ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, interaction 
of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, 
interaction of CEO duality and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on 
assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.66 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, the longer board tenure tends 
to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 endolo22 endolo23 endolo24 endolo25 endolo26 endolo27 endolo28 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta btenure 0.085 0.071 0.049 0.107 0.101 0.105 0.183 
 (1.307) (0.807) (0.561) (1.274) (1.135) (0.664) (1.064) 
Sta bsize 0.089   0.080 0.079  0.078 
 (1.189)   (1.042) (0.992)  (0.875) 
Sta ned  -0.088  -0.078  -0.098 -0.091 
  (-1.361)  (-1.165)  (-1.517) (-1.363) 
dual   -0.257  -0.171 -0.344 -0.258 
   (-0.865)  (-0.545) (-0.964) (-0.771) 
Sta bsize*sta 
btenure 
-0.123**   -0.104 -0.127*  -0.129* 
 (-2.178)   (-1.491) (-1.836)  (-1.646) 
Sta ned*sta btenure  -0.009  -0.074  -0.064 -0.151 
  (-0.037)  (-0.285)  (-0.199) (-0.425) 
Dual*sta btenure   0.154  0.027 0.090 -0.080 
   (1.402)  (0.204) (0.440) (-0.338) 
Size -0.069 -0.045 -0.053 -0.071 -0.067 -0.054 -0.077 
 (-1.394) (-0.953) (-1.242) (-1.167) (-1.319) (-1.005) (-1.120) 
roa -1.404 -1.290 -1.201 -1.363 -1.429 -1.266 -1.348 
 (-1.335) (-1.254) (-1.356) (-1.207) (-1.384) (-1.244) (-1.199) 
bown 0.106 0.063 0.199 -0.042 0.116 0.010 -0.155 
 (0.226) (0.133) (0.445) (-0.084) (0.239) (0.019) (-0.260) 
lnnas 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.151*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.139** 
 (2.940) (2.933) (2.819) (2.836) (2.769) (2.602) (2.535) 
level -0.584*** -0.513*** -0.465** -0.553*** -0.538** -0.420* -0.532** 
 (-3.372) (-2.755) (-2.038) (-3.022) (-2.487) (-1.654) (-2.209) 
fcf 0.539 0.290 0.215 0.444 0.504 0.193 0.346 
 (0.511) (0.276) (0.241) (0.396) (0.496) (0.183) (0.314) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.346) (0.181) (0.356) (0.143) (0.309) (0.079) (-0.009) 
Constant 1.281 0.830 0.906 1.353 1.243 0.980 1.495 
 (1.520) (1.015) (1.307) (1.280) (1.437) (1.070) (1.226) 
        
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
R-squared 0.246 0.242 0.260 0.218 0.248 0.203 0.173 
Chi2-test 27.580*** 22.330** 35.730*** 26.550*** 42.340*** 28.890*** 35.95 
Prob>chi2 0.002 0. 014 0. 000 0. 009 0. 000 0. 004 0.001 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 3.434 6.541 0.790 7.412 3.652 0.151 8.642 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.330 0.088 0.852 0.192 0.601 0.066 0.279 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta btenure2 97.692*** 67.187*** 
185.781**
* 
64.048*** 91.715*** 
133.629**
* 
142.194**
* 
Sta bsize2 28.845***   17.453*** 21.031***  15.243*** 
Sta bsize2* 
sta btenure2 
12.003***   15.238*** 16.542***  17.303*** 
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Sta ned2  91.150***  71.375***  63.226*** 61.499*** 
Sta ned2* sta 
btenure2 
 2.214*  1.429  3.498*** 2.391** 
Dual2   22.82***  20.031*** 18.530*** 23.101*** 
Dual2* sta 
btenure2 
  
551.419**
* 
 
455.224**
* 
329.8*** 
366.749**
* 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of 
directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in 
year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in 
year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize 
*sta btenure: interaction of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-1. duality *sta btenure: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the standardised btenure in year Y-
2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta 
ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, interaction 
of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, 
interaction of CEO duality and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on 
assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.67 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
(In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 endolo29 endolo30 endolo31 endolo32 endolo33 endolo34 endolo35 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta fe -0.091 -0.071 -0.092 -0.074 -0.091 -0.070 -0.073 
 (-1.350) (-1.064) (-1.519) (-1.022) (-1.381) (-1.078) (-1.036) 
Sta bsize -0.001   -0.011 0.001  -0.013 
 (-0.010)   (-0.152) (0.011)  (-0.171) 
Sta ned  -0.103  -0.103  -0.105 -0.106 
  (-1.538)  (-1.543)  (-1.633) (-1.636) 
dual   0.038  0.038 -0.038 -0.043 
   (0.172)  (0.169) (-0.162) (-0.176) 
size -0.057 -0.050 -0.057 -0.047 -0.057 -0.050 -0.046 
 (-1.364) (-1.344) (-1.526) (-1.153) (-1.360) (-1.342) (-1.120) 
roa -1.169 -1.303 -1.164 -1.294 -1.165 -1.311 -1.302 
 (-1.454) (-1.472) (-1.422) (-1.477) (-1.430) (-1.480) (-1.490) 
bown 0.362 0.219 0.362 0.232 0.361 0.214 0.229 
 (0.784) (0.491) (0.822) (0.510) (0.783) (0.486) (0.508) 
lnnas 0.176*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 
 (3.922) (3.654) (3.904) (3.660) (3.906) (3.615) (3.615) 
level -0.481** -0.442** -0.486** -0.441** -0.486** -0.437** -0.434** 
 (-2.429) (-2.150) (-2.380) (-2.125) (-2.354) (-2.019) (-1.969) 
fcf 0.838 0.859 0.835 0.823 0.838 0.864 0.822 
 (0.930) (0.908) (0.913) (0.877) (0.925) (0.914) (0.879) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.603) (0.352) (0.614) (0.354) (0.613) (0.340) (0.339) 
Constant 0.840 0.794 0.839 0.734 0.843 0.798 0.728 
 (1.087) (1.201) (1.270) (0.982) (1.087) (1.211) (0.963) 
        
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.241 0.227 0.240 0.229 0.240 0.226 0.228 
Chi2-test 26.83 29.85 26.28 30.34 26.80 30.34 30.73 
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Endogenous test 
Hausman 
Chi2 
1.733 6.547 0.268 6.838 1.635 6.704 6.951 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.420 0.038 0.875 0.077 0.652 0.082 0.139 
Weak instrument test 
F-
test 
Sta fe2 348.5*** 331.672*** 315.625*** 276.888*** 239.324*** 236.835*** 213.625*** 
Sta 
bsize2 
59.666***   46.926*** 45.056***  41.786*** 
Sta 
ned2 
 142.050***  105.106***  102.623*** 84.145*** 
Dual2   9.368***  6.053*** 8.225*** 7.151*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on 
the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year 
Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO 
and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the 
standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta fe: interaction of 
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standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned *sta fe: interaction of standardised ned and 
standardised fe in year Y-1. duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta fe2: 
lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged 
variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta 
bsize2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-2. sta ned2 
*sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta fe2: lagged 
variable, interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on 
assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.68 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (third-party LBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in third-
party LBO deals (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of 
financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 endolo36 endolo37 endolo38 endolo39 endolo40 endolo41 endolo42 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta fe -0.071 -0.085 -0.089 -0.057 -0.069 -0.074 -0.047 
 (-1.085) (-1.337) (-1.517) (-0.876) (-1.086) (-1.215) (-0.739) 
Sta bsize 0.034   0.063 0.043  0.070 
 (0.470)   (0.909) (0.559)  (0.959) 
Sta ned  -0.071  -0.076  -0.090 -0.089 
  (-1.232)  (-1.268)  (-1.592) (-1.449) 
dual   0.076  0.104 0.015 0.055 
   (0.358)  (0.501) (0.068) (0.246) 
Sta bsize*sta fe 0.062   0.063 0.067  0.068 
 (0.931)   (0.960) (1.019)  (1.027) 
Sta ned*sta fe  -0.129**  -0.120*  -0.130** -0.118* 
  (-2.074)  (-1.873)  (-2.090) (-1.838) 
Dual*sta fe   -0.089  -0.049 -0.198 -0.155 
   (-0.259)  (-0.152) (-0.545) (-0.441) 
size -0.068 -0.061* -0.058 -0.078** -0.071 -0.061* -0.081** 
 (-1.548) (-1.909) (-1.553) (-2.005) (-1.622) (-1.910) (-2.084) 
roa -1.119 -0.860 -1.204 -0.867 -1.128 -0.979 -0.961 
 (-1.441) (-1.136) (-1.379) (-1.168) (-1.318) (-1.192) (-1.161) 
bown 0.373 0.270 0.335 0.242 0.356 0.179 0.170 
 (0.822) (0.673) (0.767) (0.590) (0.786) (0.465) (0.425) 
lnnas 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.185*** 0.170*** 0.178*** 
 (4.075) (4.088) (3.879) (4.175) (4.036) (3.911) (3.997) 
level -0.496** -0.398** -0.516** -0.418** -0.525** -0.448* -0.467* 
 (-2.519) (-2.134) (-2.089) (-2.227) (-2.134) (-1.838) (-1.913) 
fcf 0.832 0.685 0.869 0.780 0.859 0.771 0.861 
 (0.956) (0.797) (0.916) (0.946) (0.921) (0.859) (0.974) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.628) (0.392) (0.600) (0.434) (0.642) (0.251) (0.361) 
Constant 1.029 0.891 0.869 1.217* 1.082 0.958* 1.305* 
 (1.288) (1.550) (1.320) (1.693) (1.364) (1.696) (1.869) 
        
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.257 0.355 0.234 0.356 0.249 0.339 0.337 
Chi2-test 26.490*** 39.880*** 26.460*** 39.290*** 26.230*** 43.100*** 41.080*** 
Prob>chi2 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 3.122 9.272 1.342 10.644 2.751 9.522 11.757 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.373 0.026 0.719 0.059 0.738 0.090 0.109 
Weak instrument test 
F-
test 
Sta fe2 243.807*** 218.343*** 213.299*** 164.761*** 149.971*** 139.814*** 119.983*** 
Sta bsize2 41.098***   31.415*** 31.081*** 71.148*** 29.104*** 
Sta 
bsize2* sta 
fe2 
34.454***   21.121*** 21.457*** 54.296*** 15.730*** 
Sta ned2  92.781***  69.131***   60.656*** 
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Sta ned2* 
sta fe2 
 82.667***  63.861***   56.029*** 
Dual2   23.666***  17.192*** 15.296*** 13.987*** 
Dual2* sta 
fe2 
  142.888***  79.027*** 85.062*** 60.708*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the 
board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. 
Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and 
chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised 
board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta fe: interaction of standardised board 
size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned *sta fe: interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-1. 
duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta fe2: lagged variable, the standardised c-
score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year 
Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of 
standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised 
ned and standardised fe in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe 
in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. 
Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-
1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.69 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in MBO deals (In the MBO 
context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) 
 endomo15 endomo16 endomo17 endomo18 endomo19 endomo20 endomo21 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta btenure -0.048 -0.027 -0.047* -0.026 -0.049* -0.025 -0.020 
 (-1.583) (-0.839) (-1.727) (-0.683) (-1.675) (-0.824) (-0.540) 
Sta bsize -0.027   0.003 -0.019  0.030 
 (-0.438)   (0.046) (-0.298)  (0.371) 
Sta ned  0.084  0.085  0.112* 0.118 
  (1.439)  (1.351)  (1.697) (1.590) 
dual   0.093  0.084 0.136 0.152 
   (1.111)  (0.899) (1.331) (1.261) 
size -0.014 -0.044 -0.013 -0.045 -0.009 -0.040 -0.048 
 (-0.381) (-1.247) (-0.420) (-0.954) (-0.250) (-1.106) (-1.011) 
roa -0.288 -0.262 -0.288 -0.262 -0.284 -0.240 -0.244 
 (-0.942) (-0.846) (-0.906) (-0.873) (-0.910) (-0.747) (-0.779) 
bown 0.118 0.156 0.112 0.154 0.123 0.192 0.178 
 (0.810) (1.029) (0.792) (1.007) (0.846) (1.223) (1.132) 
lnnas 0.064* 0.064** 0.061* 0.063* 0.064* 0.066** 0.062* 
 (1.750) (1.982) (1.835) (1.745) (1.733) (2.063) (1.710) 
level 0.217 0.160 0.245 0.159 0.250 0.207 0.197 
 (1.268) (0.889) (1.309) (0.880) (1.365) (1.073) (1.032) 
fcf -0.054 -0.065 -0.003 -0.063 -0.018 -0.026 -0.003 
 (-0.195) (-0.263) (-0.011) (-0.245) (-0.064) (-0.096) (-0.011) 
pea -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.873) (-1.048) (-0.903) (-1.000) (-0.903) (-1.160) (-1.103) 
Constant 0.259 0.812 0.208 0.832 0.124 0.658 0.812 
 (0.392) (1.368) (0.407) (0.960) (0.199) (1.086) (0.968) 
        
Observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.091 0.018 0.108 0.017 0.104 0.013 0.010 
Chi2-test 12.44 15.75 11.45 16.48 13.72 16.27 16.38 
Prob>chi2 0.190 0.072 0.246 0.087 0.186 0.092 0.127 
Endogenous test 
Hausman 
Chi2 
2.428 4.355 0.722 5.576 2.046 4.683 5.808 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.297 0.113 0.697 0.134 0.563 0.197 0.214 
Weak instrument test 
F-
test 
Sta 
btenure2 
200.328*** 217.908*** 223.787*** 150.213*** 154.773*** 156.429*** 124.962*** 
Sta 
bsize2 
29.668***   22.573*** 19.812***  16.840*** 
Sta ned2  43.438***  29.250***  29.123*** 21.528*** 
Dual2   96.077***  152.807*** 112.783*** 118.300*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of 
directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year 
Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-
1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta 
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btenure: interaction of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-1. duality *sta btenure: interaction of CEO 
duality and standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 
(two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta 
ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, interaction of 
standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, interaction 
of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, interaction of 
CEO duality and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year 
Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total 
assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.70 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for 
moderation analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (MBOs) 
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in MBO 
deals (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of 
board effectiveness) 
 endomo22 endomo23 endomo24 endomo25 endomo26 endomo27 endomo28 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta btenure -0.048 -0.032 -0.020 -0.032 -0.017 0.022 0.023 
 (-1.612) (-1.014) (-0.616) (-0.855) (-0.494) (0.516) (0.632) 
Sta bsize -0.024   0.017 -0.034  0.020 
 (-0.352)   (0.224) (-0.495)  (0.263) 
Sta ned  0.087  0.082  0.122* 0.115* 
  (1.396)  (1.416)  (1.791) (1.768) 
dual   0.100  0.082 0.135 0.126 
   (1.170)  (0.878) (1.294) (1.101) 
Sta bsize*sta 
btenure 
-0.011   -0.027 -0.008  -0.029 
 (-0.207)   (-0.523) (-0.134)  (-0.496) 
Sta ned*sta 
btenure 
 -0.072  -0.058  -0.106 -0.091 
  (-1.138)  (-1.026)  (-1.406) (-1.403) 
Dual*sta btenure   -0.077  -0.101 -0.157 -0.157 
   (-1.091)  (-1.492) (-1.513) (-1.531) 
size -0.014 -0.048 -0.016 -0.049 -0.010 -0.056 -0.058 
 (-0.387) (-1.287) (-0.511) (-1.128) (-0.285) (-1.350) (-1.284) 
roa -0.294 -0.212 -0.279 -0.239 -0.274 -0.149 -0.180 
 (-1.006) (-0.657) (-0.871) (-0.836) (-0.890) (-0.431) (-0.568) 
bown 0.114 0.115 0.126 0.104 0.149 0.163 0.148 
 (0.777) (0.689) (0.888) (0.631) (0.990) (0.947) (0.878) 
lnnas 0.064* 0.065* 0.060* 0.063* 0.065* 0.067** 0.063* 
 (1.728) (1.947) (1.864) (1.658) (1.804) (2.048) (1.740) 
level 0.227 0.179 0.233 0.197 0.245 0.200 0.215 
 (1.274) (0.944) (1.279) (1.054) (1.344) (1.021) (1.138) 
fcf -0.033 0.049 -0.007 0.088 -0.024 0.126 0.168 
 (-0.102) (0.164) (-0.027) (0.280) (-0.072) (0.386) (0.512) 
pea -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.725) (-1.158) (-0.886) (-0.864) (-0.761) (-1.328) (-1.042) 
Constant 0.259 0.856 0.278 0.881 0.152 0.929 0.978 
 (0.398) (1.369) (0.521) (1.119) (0.234) (1.346) (1.233) 
        
Observations 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.101 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.000 
Chi2-test 14.840 15.400 11.880 15.590 14.650 13.600 13.370 
Prob>chi2 0.138 0.118 0.293 0.211 0.261 0.327 0.498 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 2.913 5.726 1.188 7.020 3.182 6.233 8.049 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.405 0.126 0.756 0.219 0.672 0.284 0.328 
Weak instrument test 
F-
test 
Sta btenure2 134.608*** 182.183*** 214.637*** 109.23*** 158.648*** 200.376*** 156.181*** 
Sta bsize2 64.732***   54.158*** 44.326***  49.833*** 
Sta bsize2* 
sta btenure2 
17.063   12.633*** 17.094***  12.698*** 
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Sta ned2  34.800***  24.944***  20.589*** 16.715*** 
Sta ned2* 
sta btenure2 
 21.539***  17.066***  19.315*** 14.755*** 
Dual2   92.694***  142.674*** 99.557*** 111.706*** 
Dual2* sta 
btenure2 
  146.717***  82.282*** 167.638*** 107.455*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in 
year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the 
proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the 
same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board 
size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta btenure: interaction of standardised board size and 
standardised btenure in year Y-1. sta ned *sta btenure: interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-
1. duality *sta btenure: interaction of CEO duality and standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the 
standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board 
size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, 
interaction of standardised board size and standardised btenure in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, 
interaction of standardised ned and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta btenure2: lagged variable, interaction of 
CEO duality and standardised btenure in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: 
free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.71 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 1 the constrained model (MBOs) 
(an assumption of no interaction effect) of the effects of board structures 
and board effectiveness on takeover premiums in MBO deals (In the MBO 
context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to indicate a 
high level of board effectiveness) 
 endomo29 endomo30 endomo31 endomo32 endomo33 endomo34 endomo35 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta fe -0.020 -0.023 -0.018 -0.023 -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 
 (-0.587) (-0.621) (-0.498) (-0.629) (-0.523) (-0.500) (-0.485) 
Sta bsize -0.005   0.014 0.000  0.033 
 (-0.108)   (0.239) (0.002)  (0.506) 
Sta ned  0.065  0.066  0.079 0.085 
  (1.363)  (1.339)  (1.502) (1.473) 
dual   0.042  0.042 0.085 0.107 
   (0.526)  (0.467) (0.890) (0.939) 
Size -0.026 -0.039 -0.026 -0.043 -0.026 -0.038 -0.047 
 (-0.792) (-1.287) (-0.991) (-1.118) (-0.795) (-1.258) (-1.200) 
roa -0.344 -0.324 -0.346 -0.322 -0.346 -0.324 -0.320 
 (-1.217) (-1.155) (-1.236) (-1.139) (-1.223) (-1.142) (-1.119) 
bown 0.077 0.139 0.074 0.128 0.074 0.157 0.134 
 (0.586) (0.958) (0.562) (0.920) (0.560) (1.089) (0.964) 
lnnas 0.056* 0.060** 0.056* 0.058* 0.056* 0.064** 0.059* 
 (1.682) (2.054) (1.890) (1.745) (1.696) (2.177) (1.799) 
level 0.247* 0.228 0.264 0.217 0.264 0.268 0.253 
 (1.705) (1.410) (1.533) (1.445) (1.628) (1.472) (1.495) 
fcf -0.275* -0.193 -0.261 -0.186 -0.260 -0.151 -0.123 
 (-1.682) (-1.120) (-1.550) (-1.055) (-1.577) (-0.817) (-0.615) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.618) (-0.851) (-0.641) (-0.795) (-0.618) (-0.910) (-0.848) 
Constant 0.520 0.726 0.494 0.811 0.495 0.646 0.831 
 (0.903) (1.481) (1.194) (1.192) (0.894) (1.340) (1.244) 
        
Observations 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.140 0.088 0.147 0.087 0.147 0.089 0.087 
Chi2-test 34.35 43.71 34.83 43.29 34.92 46.06 44.69 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 0.360 5.371 0.403 5.594 0.596 6.195 6.424 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.835 0.068 0.818 0.133 0.897 0.103 0.170 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta fe2 218.816*** 232.360*** 210.007*** 161.939*** 148.896*** 152.371*** 119.937*** 
Sta bsize2 29.126***   20.585*** 20.230***  15.677*** 
Sta ned2  66.431***  44.040***  43.384*** 32.236*** 
Dual2   98.779***  68.241*** 69.446*** 60.257*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in 
year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion 
of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta fe: interaction of standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned 
*sta fe: interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-1. duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO duality and 
standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta fe2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). 
Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year 
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Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-2. sta ned2 *sta 
fe2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-2. Duality2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, 
interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. 
Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. 
Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1.  
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Table 4.72 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach for moderation 
analysis: Step 2 the unconstrained model (MBOs)  
(an assumption of interaction effect) of the effects of board structures, 
board effectiveness and the interaction term takeover premiums in MBO 
deals (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 endomo36 endomo37 endomo38 endomo39 endomo40 endomo41 endomo42 
Variables prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
        
Sta fe -0.003 -0.031 -0.025 -0.009 -0.020 -0.046 -0.032 
 (-0.087) (-0.725) (-0.610) (-0.263) (-0.541) (-0.782) (-0.664) 
Sta bsize 0.041   0.057 0.047  0.068 
 (0.510)   (0.681) (0.581)  (0.798) 
Sta ned  0.076  0.053  0.091 0.053 
  (1.370)  (1.124)  (1.451) (0.965) 
dual   0.044  0.007 0.069 0.025 
   (0.537)  (0.081) (0.707) (0.226) 
Sta bsize*sta 
fe 
0.086   0.088 0.114  0.123 
 (0.969)   (0.978) (1.093)  (1.146) 
Sta ned*sta 
fe 
0.060  0.041  0.068 0.051 
  (0.951)  (0.781)  (0.921) (0.788) 
Dual*sta fe   0.025  0.082 0.061 0.105 
   (0.387)  (0.894) (0.599) (0.813) 
size -0.035 -0.050 -0.025 -0.055 -0.033 -0.050 -0.055 
 (-0.945) (-1.492) (-0.979) (-1.313) (-0.894) (-1.452) (-1.280) 
roa -0.452* -0.301 -0.355 -0.422 -0.518* -0.321 -0.505* 
 (-1.691) (-1.042) (-1.302) (-1.567) (-1.926) (-1.162) (-1.899) 
bown 0.076 0.131 0.072 0.102 0.075 0.141 0.097 
 (0.563) (0.934) (0.536) (0.742) (0.514) (0.985) (0.649) 
lnnas 0.055* 0.062** 0.055* 0.058* 0.052 0.062** 0.053* 
 (1.676) (2.174) (1.865) (1.764) (1.610) (2.133) (1.654) 
level 0.256* 0.191 0.255 0.207 0.237 0.195 0.183 
 (1.666) (1.269) (1.531) (1.297) (1.455) (1.206) (1.039) 
fcf -0.172 -0.223 -0.261 -0.130 -0.143 -0.192 -0.094 
 (-0.849) (-1.313) (-1.529) (-0.591) (-0.683) (-1.071) (-0.409) 
pea -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.182) (-0.526) (-0.680) (-0.120) (-0.223) (-0.656) (-0.136) 
Constant 0.680 0.945* 0.494 1.049 0.683 0.920 1.078 
 (1.056) (1.666) (1.185) (1.369) (1.047) (1.533) (1.354) 
        
Observations 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.101 0.087 0.143 0.059 0.066 0.076 0.013 
Chi2-test 44.240*** 41.300*** 34.200*** 50.950*** 44.660*** 39.570*** 49.640*** 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Endogenous test 
Hausman 
Chi2 
3.719 7.511 2.986 10.660 5.571 9.549 13.833 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.294 0.057 0.294 0.059 0.350 0.089 0.054 
Weak instrument test 
F-
test 
Sta fe2 151.791*** 154.693*** 161.414*** 94.527*** 109.604*** 106.141*** 77.815*** 
Sta 
bsize2 
22.871***   15.998*** 19.330***  15.673*** 
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Sta 
bsize2* 
sta fe2 
54.499***   43.862*** 56.109***  40.433 
Sta ned2  45.430***  29.746***  27.035*** 21.148*** 
Sta 
ned2* 
sta fe2 
 31.245***  31.551***  21.141*** 23.711*** 
Dual2   67.244***  54.688*** 47.195*** 61.249*** 
Dual2* 
sta fe2 
  56.360***  84.443*** 60.938*** 75.079*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts 
on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors 
in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when 
firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1.Sta 
bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. sta bsize *sta fe: 
interaction of standardised board size and standardised fe in year Y-1. sta ned *sta fe: interaction of standardised 
ned and standardised fe in year Y-1. duality *sta fe: interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe in year Y-1. 
Sta fe2: lagged variable, the standardised c-score in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: 
lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in 
year Y-2. sta bsize2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised board size and standardised fe in year 
Y-2. sta ned2 *sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of standardised ned and standardised fe in year Y-2. Duality2 
*sta fe2: lagged variable, interaction of CEO duality and standardised fe in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year 
y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. 
Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in 
year Y-1.  
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Table 4.73 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test 
approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
ENDOLE33-ENDOLE39 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ENDOLE40-ENDOLE46 
test the effects of board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ENDOLE47-ENDOLE53 tests the effects of board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate 
a high level of board effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: BS→ premiums Step2: BS→ BE Step3: BS, BE→ premiums 
Endole3
3 
Endole3
4 
Endole3
5 
Endole
36 
Endole
37 
Endole3
8 
Endole3
9 
Endole4
0 
Endole41 Endole4
2 
Endole43 Endole4
4 
Endole4
5 
Endole4
6 
Endole4
7 
Endole4
8 
Endole4
9 
Endole
50 
Endole5
1 
Endole
52 
Endole5
3 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta bsize 0.038   0.018 0.039  0.014 -0.033   -0.050 0.066  0.061 0.081   0.063 0.076  0.051 
 (0.589)   (0.279) (0.578)  (0.197) (-0.295)   (-0.422) (0.437)  (0.391) (1.083)   (0.829) (0.996)  (0.614) 
Sta ned  -0.118*  -0.116*  -0.122* -0.120*  -0.066  -0.072  -0.023 -0.015  -0.088  -0.078  -0.097 -0.088 
  (-1.791)  (-1.708) (-1.949) (-1.849)  (-0.677)  (-0.713)  (-0.222) (-0.142)  (-1.352)  (-1.179)  (-1.566) (-1.393) 
dual   -0.011  0.005 -0.086 -0.079   1.150*  1.171* 1.133* 1.159*   -0.116  -0.089 -0.227 -0.199 
   (-0.047)  (0.021) (-0.339) (-0.304)   (1.717)  (1.709) (1.684) (1.657)   (-0.453)  (-0.337) (-0.783) (-0.682) 
Sta btenure               0.057 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.068 0.100 0.097 
               (0.789) (0.911) (0.854) (0.913) (0.834) (1.098) (1.053) 
size -0.071 -0.052 -0.061 -0.056 -0.071 -0.051 -0.055 -0.039 -0.053 -0.049 -0.034 -0.074 -0.050 -0.072 -0.074 -0.044 -0.050 -0.064 -0.073 -0.045 -0.061 
 (-1.645) (-1.357) (-1.549) (-1.368) (-1.631) (-1.349) (-1.312) (-0.448) (-0.629) (-0.612) (-0.395) (-0.726) (-0.618) (-0.704) (-1.512) (-1.105) (-1.201) (-1.339) (-1.473) (-1.091) (-1.229) 
roa -1.141 -1.270 -1.103 -1.286 -1.141 -1.292 -1.302 1.379** 1.287** 1.534** 1.280** 1.536** 1.500** 1.514** -1.263 -1.304 -1.204 -1.357 -1.277 -1.365 -1.399 
 (-1.256) (-1.312) (-1.229) (-1.319) (-1.244) (-1.342) (-1.345) (2.340) (2.276) (2.458) (2.241) (2.517) (2.328) (2.376) (-1.329) (-1.324) (-1.333) (-1.351) (-1.355) (-1.422) (-1.426) 
bown 0.214 0.114 0.250 0.099 0.214 0.108 0.098 -0.222 -0.311 -0.430 -0.256 -0.511 -0.445 -0.516 0.093 0.071 0.163 0.022 0.093 0.050 0.014 
 (0.481) (0.264) (0.588) (0.226) (0.480) (0.250) (0.222) (-0.318) (-0.457) (-0.581) (-0.366) (-0.626) (-0.611) (-0.638) (0.198) (0.155) (0.364) (0.048) (0.197) (0.107) (0.029) 
lnnas 0.170*** 0.151*** 0.169*** 0.151**
* 
0.170**
* 
0.149*** 0.150***        0.161*** 0.144*** 0.156*** 0.149**
* 
0.160*** 0.143**
* 
0.147*** 
 (3.721) (3.392) (3.676) (3.416) (3.700) (3.303) (3.324)        (3.138) (2.937) (2.995) (3.033) (3.097) (2.779) (2.896) 
level -0.442** -0.400** -0.432** -
0.405** 
-
0.443** 
-0.389* -0.393*        -0.575*** -
0.511*** 
-0.539*** -
0.526**
* 
-0.556*** -0.456** -0.475** 
 (-2.319) (-2.018) (-2.227) (-2.000) (-2.229) (-1.833) (-1.795)        (-3.329) (-2.698) (-2.777) (-2.852) (-2.932) (-1.973) (-2.105) 
fcf 0.867 0.782 0.735 0.845 0.867 0.797 0.842        0.503 0.304 0.248 0.499 0.489 0.311 0.467 
 (0.900) (0.802) (0.781) (0.846) (0.900) (0.820) (0.851)        (0.507) (0.313) (0.271) (0.490) (0.498) (0.329) (0.466) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.485) (0.213) (0.481) (0.218) (0.486) (0.188) (0.194)        (0.395) (0.184) (0.353) (0.217) (0.371) (0.111) (0.145) 
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Big4        0.037 0.065 0.112 0.046 0.140 0.116 0.141        
        (0.184) (0.329) (0.498) (0.231) (0.566) (0.524) (0.574)        
ceoch        -0.466* -0.480** -0.496 -0.456* -0.529 -0.495* -0.526        
        (-1.946) (-2.127) (-1.635) (-1.894) (-1.609) (-1.658) (-1.607)        
sg        -0.272*** -0.261*** -
0.241*** 
-0.264*** -0.235*** -
0.239*** 
-
0.233*** 
       
        (-2.878) (-2.700) (-2.848) (-2.692) (-2.740) (-2.700) (-2.651)        
Constant 1.109 0.841 0.917 0.935 1.110 0.847 0.916 0.828 1.069 0.827 0.736 1.267 0.836 1.243        
 (1.427) (1.277) (1.371) (1.252) (1.421) (1.288) (1.211) (0.521) (0.710) (0.595) (0.465) (0.714) (0.602) (0.691) 1.324 0.812 0.877 1.176 1.306 0.827 1.117 
               (1.545) (1.204) (1.273) (1.392) (1.505) (1.205) (1.276) 
Observation
s 
73 73 73 73 73 73 73 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
R-squared 0.207 0.200 0.212 0.199 0.207 0.197 0.196 0.084 0.084 0.073 0.085 0.066 0.075 0.069 0.252 0.243 0.257 0.241 0.254 0.225 0.229 
Chi2-test 22.25*** 23.620**
* 
21.820**
* 
24.450*
** 
22.360*
** 
26.520**
* 
26.970**
* 
19.71*** 20.810*** 18.140*
* 
19.820** 19.280** 18.160*
* 
19.210*
* 
25.72 22.36 23.58 25.18 26.27 25.50 26.70 
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.003 0. 006 0. 004 0.011 0. 011 0. 013 0. 020 0. 024 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Endogenous test 
Hausman 
Chi2 
1.614 5.711 0.000 5.812 1.589 5.832 5.946 0.001 0.219 2.850 0.224 3.019 3.060 3.432 2.593 5.768 0.173 5.838 2.568 6.380 6.320 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.204 0.017 0.996 0.055 0.452 0.054 0.114 0.974 0.640 0.091 0.894 0.221 0.217 0.330 0.273 0.056 0.917 0.120 0.463 0.095 0.177 
Weak instrument test 
F-
tes
t 
Sta 
btenure2 
              
63.959**
* 
33.157*
** 
26.093**
* 
44.929*
** 
56.024**
* 
23.509*
** 
40.591**
* 
Sta 
bsize2 
120.364
*** 
  
67.209*
** 
68.243*
** 
 
53.016**
* 
125.156*
** 
  64.801*** 
62.421**
* 
 
43.385*
** 
42.542**
* 
  
29.616*
** 
32.507**
* 
 
26.520**
* 
Sta ned2  
272.208
*** 
 
140.10
7*** 
 
148.999
*** 
101.001
*** 
 328.747*** 169.472*** 
201.105
*** 
134.466
*** 
 
139.997
*** 
 
108.529
*** 
 
105.560
*** 
89.936**
* 
Dual2   
17.292**
* 
 
8.810**
* 
10.500**
* 
9.555***   
18.401*
** 
 
10.081**
* 
9.065*** 7.219***   
13.783**
* 
 8.950*** 
12.634*
** 
9.887*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total 
number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 
in year Y-1. Btenure2: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the 
proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in 
year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the standardised btenure in year Y-2 (two year before the 
announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets 
in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year 
Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1.Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.74 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test 
approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals 
ENDOLE54 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ENDOLE55-ENDOME56 test 
the effects of board effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ENDOLE58-ENDOLE64 tests the effects of board 
structures on takeover premiums (BE, BS→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a 
high level of board effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: 
BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step3: BE, BS→ premiums 
Endole54 Endole55 Endole56 Endole58 Endole59 Endole60 Endole61 Endole62 Endole63 Endole64 
prem bsize ned prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta btenure 0.054 -0.080 0.140 0.057 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.068 0.100 0.097 
 (0.755) (-0.640) (0.827) (0.789) (0.911) (0.854) (0.913) (0.834) (1.098) (1.053) 
Sta bsize    0.081   0.063 0.076  0.051 
    (1.083)   (0.829) (0.996)  (0.614) 
Sta ned     -0.088  -0.078  -0.097 -0.088 
     (-1.352)  (-1.179)  (-1.566) (-1.393) 
dual      -0.116  -0.089 -0.227 -0.199 
      (-0.453)  (-0.337) (-0.783) (-0.682) 
size -0.050 0.368*** -0.010 -0.074 -0.044 -0.050 -0.064 -0.073 -0.045 -0.061 
 (-1.197) (6.401) (-0.126) (-1.512) (-1.105) (-1.201) (-1.339) (-1.473) (-1.091) (-1.229) 
roa -1.180 0.120 -1.570* -1.263 -1.304 -1.204 -1.357 -1.277 -1.365 -1.399 
 (-1.290) (0.156) (-1.904) (-1.329) (-1.324) (-1.333) (-1.351) (-1.355) (-1.422) (-1.426) 
bown 0.168 1.168* -0.709 0.093 0.071 0.163 0.022 0.093 0.050 0.014 
 (0.380) (1.720) (-0.818) (0.198) (0.155) (0.364) (0.048) (0.197) (0.107) (0.029) 
lnnas 0.156***   0.161*** 0.144*** 0.156*** 0.149*** 0.160*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 
 (3.050)   (3.138) (2.937) (2.995) (3.033) (3.097) (2.779) (2.896) 
level -0.564***   -0.575*** -0.511*** -0.539*** -0.526*** -0.556*** -0.456** -0.475** 
 (-3.211)   (-3.329) (-2.698) (-2.777) (-2.852) (-2.932) (-1.973) (-2.105) 
fcf 0.247   0.503 0.304 0.248 0.499 0.489 0.311 0.467 
 (0.266)   (0.507) (0.313) (0.271) (0.490) (0.498) (0.329) (0.466) 
pea 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.382)   (0.395) (0.184) (0.353) (0.217) (0.371) (0.111) (0.145) 
Big4  -0.400 0.210        
  (-1.267) (0.695)        
ceoch  0.446* 0.105        
  (1.706) (0.335)        
sg  -0.114 0.169**        
  (-1.518) (1.987)        
Constant 0.867 -6.665*** 0.089        
 (1.264) (-6.511) (0.061) 1.324 0.812 0.877 1.176 1.306 0.827 1.117 
    (1.545) (1.204) (1.273) (1.392) (1.505) (1.205) (1.276) 
Observations 68 76 76 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
R-squared 0.259 0.385 0.045 0.252 0.243 0.257 0.241 0.254 0.225 0.229 
Chi2-test 22.080*** 64.350*** 11.470 25.72 22.36 23.58 25.18 26.27 25.50 26.70 
Prob>chi2 0.005 0. 000 0. 119 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 0.026 0.341 1.577 2.593 5.768 0.173 5.838 2.568 6.380 6.320 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.873 0.559 0.209 0.273 0.056 0.917 0.120 0.463 0.095 0.177 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta 
btenure2 
24.704*** 28.291*** 28.291*** 63.959*** 33.157*** 26.093*** 44.929*** 56.024*** 23.509*** 40.591*** 
Sta bsize2    42.542***   29.616*** 32.507***  26.520*** 
Sta ned2     139.997***  108.529***  105.560*** 89.936*** 
Dual2      13.783***  8.950*** 12.634*** 9.887*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of 
takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Btenure2: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement of takeovers). 
Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO 
and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the standardised btenure in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the 
standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year 
Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: 
sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.75 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach 
for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals 
ENDOLE65-ENDOLE71 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ENDOLE72-ENDOLE78 
test the effects of board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ENDOLE79-ENDOLE85 tests the effects of board 
effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts 
on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: BS→ premiums Step2: BS→ BE Step3: BS, BE→ premiums 
Endole65 Endole66 Endole6
7 
Endole6
8 
Endole69 Endole
70 
Endole
71 
Endole
72 
Endole
73 
Endole
74 
Endole7
5 
Endole7
6 
Endole
77 
Endole7
8 
Endole79 Endole80 Endole8
1 
Endole8
2 
Endole83 Endole8
4 
Endole8
5 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta bsize 0.038   0.018 0.039  0.014 -
0.372** 
  -0.350** -0.373**  -0.342* -0.001   -0.011 0.001  -0.013 
 (0.589)   (0.279) (0.578)  (0.197) (-
2.266) 
  (-2.092) (-2.193)  (-1.934) (-0.010)   (-0.152) (0.011)  (-0.171) 
Sta ned  -0.118*  -0.116*  -0.122* -0.120*  0.149  0.113  0.159 0.117  -0.103  -0.103  -0.105 -0.106 
  (-1.791)  (-1.708)  (-1.949) (-
1.849) 
 (1.013)  (0.834)  (1.082) (0.847)  (-1.538)  (-1.543)  (-1.633) (-1.636) 
dual   -0.011  0.005 -0.086 -0.079   0.147  -0.008 0.266 0.093   0.038  0.038 -0.038 -0.043 
   (-0.047)  (0.021) (-0.339) (-
0.304) 
  (0.341)  (-0.020) (0.605) (0.226)   (0.172)  (0.169) (-0.162) (-0.176) 
Sta fe               -0.091 -0.071 -0.092 -0.074 -0.091 -0.070 -0.073 
               (-1.350) (-1.064) (-1.519) (-1.022) (-1.381) (-1.078) (-1.036) 
size -0.071 -0.052 -0.061 -0.056 -0.071 -0.051 -0.055 0.189** 0.058 0.056 0.182** 0.189** 0.058 0.180* -0.057 -0.050 -0.057 -0.047 -0.057 -0.050 -0.046 
 (-1.645) (-1.357) (-1.549) (-1.368) (-1.631) (-1.349) (-
1.312) 
(2.099) (0.785) (0.706) (2.031) (2.082) (0.779) (1.946) (-1.364) (-1.344) (-1.526) (-1.153) (-1.360) (-1.342) (-1.120) 
roa -1.141 -1.270 -1.103 -1.286 -1.141 -1.292 -1.302 -0.870 -0.512 -0.713 -0.696 -0.872 -0.464 -0.675 -1.169 -1.303 -1.164 -1.294 -1.165 -1.311 -1.302 
 (-1.256) (-1.312) (-1.229) (-1.319) (-1.244) (-1.342) (-
1.345) 
(-
0.777) 
(-
0.455) 
(-
0.726) 
(-0.581) (-0.774) (-
0.426) 
(-0.563) (-1.454) (-1.472) (-1.422) (-1.477) (-1.430) (-1.480) (-1.490) 
bown 0.214 0.114 0.250 0.099 0.214 0.108 0.098 1.575* 1.267 1.118 1.643* 1.577* 1.231 1.622* 0.362 0.219 0.362 0.232 0.361 0.214 0.229 
 (0.481) (0.264) (0.588) (0.226) (0.480) (0.250) (0.222) (1.750) (1.446) (1.175) (1.926) (1.769) (1.390) (1.896) (0.784) (0.491) (0.822) (0.510) (0.783) (0.486) (0.508) 
lnnas 0.170*** 0.151*** 0.169*** 0.151*** 0.170*** 0.149**
* 
0.150**
* 
       0.176*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 
 (3.721) (3.392) (3.676) (3.416) (3.700) (3.303) (3.324)        (3.922) (3.654) (3.904) (3.660) (3.906) (3.615) (3.615) 
level -0.442** -0.400** -0.432** -0.405** -0.443** -0.389* -0.393*        -0.481** -0.442** -0.486** -0.441** -0.486** -0.437** -0.434** 
 (-2.319) (-2.018) (-2.227) (-2.000) (-2.229) (-1.833) (-
1.795) 
       (-2.429) (-2.150) (-2.380) (-2.125) (-2.354) (-2.019) (-1.969) 
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fcf 0.867 0.782 0.735 0.845 0.867 0.797 0.842        0.838 0.859 0.835 0.823 0.838 0.864 0.822 
 (0.900) (0.802) (0.781) (0.846) (0.900) (0.820) (0.851)        (0.930) (0.908) (0.913) (0.877) (0.925) (0.914) (0.879) 
pea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.485) (0.213) (0.481) (0.218) (0.486) (0.188) (0.194)        (0.603) (0.352) (0.614) (0.354) (0.613) (0.340) (0.339) 
Big4        0.090 0.228 0.266 0.076 0.089 0.237 0.082        
        (0.265) (0.629) (0.707) (0.229) (0.262) (0.655) (0.249)        
ceoch        -0.324 -0.483 -0.484 -0.335 -0.323 -0.488 -0.340        
        (-
0.935) 
(-
1.491) 
(-
1.526) 
(-0.958) (-0.939) (-
1.443) 
(-0.967)        
sg        0.180** 0.173 0.189* 0.171* 0.180** 0.179 0.173*        
        (2.115) (1.580) (1.730) (1.932) (2.077) (1.631) (1.928)        
Constant 1.109 0.841 0.917 0.935 1.110 0.847 0.916 -
3.767** 
-1.421 -1.411 -3.644** -3.770** -1.456 -3.605** 0.840 0.794 0.839 0.734 0.843 0.798 0.728 
 (1.427) (1.277) (1.371) (1.252) (1.421) (1.288) (1.211) (-
2.154) 
(-
0.977) 
(-
0.906) 
(-2.099) (-2.151) (-
0.995) 
(-2.045) (1.087) (1.201) (1.270) (0.982) (1.087) (1.211) (0.963) 
                      
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.207 0.200 0.212 0.199 0.207 0.197 0.196 0.140 0.087 0.064 0.151 0.140 0.078 0.149 0.241 0.227 0.240 0.229 0.240 0.226 0.228 
Chi2-test 22.25*** 23.620*** 21.820**
* 
24.450**
* 
22.360*** 26.520*
** 
26.970*
** 
16.720
** 
11.080 7.690 20.120*
** 
16.730*
* 
11.550 20.340** 26.83 29.85 26.28 30.34 26.80 30.34 30.73 
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.019 0.135 0.361 0.001 0.033 0.172 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 1.614 5.711 0.000 5.812 1.589 5.832 5.946 0.067 0.037 0.721 0.0448 0.329 2.128 1.122 1.733 6.547 0.268 6.838 1.635 6.704 6.951 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.204 0.017 0.996 0.055 0.452 0.054 0.114 0.796 0.847 0.396 0.978 0.848 0.345 0.772 0.420 0.038 0.875 0.077 0.652 0.082 0.139 
Weak instrument test 
F-
test 
Sta fe2               348.5*** 
331.672*
** 
315.625*
** 
276.888*
** 
239.324*
** 
236.835
*** 
213.625
*** 
Sta bsize2 
120.364*
** 
  
67.209**
* 
68.243*** 
53.016*
** 
167.45
1*** 
  
88.158*
** 
84.440*
** 
 
59.797**
* 
59.666***  
46.926**
* 
45.056*** 
41.786**
* 
Sta ned2  
272.208*
** 
 
140.107
*** 
 
148.99
9*** 
101.00
1*** 
 
353.01
1*** 
 
181.470
*** 
 
215.82
7*** 
143.856*
** 
 
142.050*
** 
 
105.106*
** 
 
102.623
*** 
84.145**
* 
Dual2   
17.292**
* 
 8.810*** 
10.500*
** 
9.555**
* 
  
18.617
*** 
 
10.165*
** 
9.172**
* 
7.223***   9.368***  6.053*** 8.225*** 7.151*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the 
board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives 
on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised 
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board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta fe2: lagged variable, the standardise fe at yeat Y-2. Sta bsize: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned: 
lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total 
debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. 
ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.76 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach 
for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals 
ENDOLE86 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ENDOLE87-ENDOLE88 test 
the effects of board effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ENDOLE90-ENDOLE96 tests the effects of board 
structures on takeover premiums (BE, BS→ premiums) (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts 
on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step1: 
BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step3: BE, BS→ premiums 
 Endole86 Endole87 Endole88 Endole90 Endole91 Endole92 Endole93 Endole94 Endole95 Endole96 
Variables prem bsize ned prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta fe -0.091 -0.275** 0.199* -0.091 -0.071 -0.092 -0.074 -0.091 -0.070 -0.073 
 (-1.476) (-2.430) (1.697) (-1.350) (-1.064) (-1.519) (-1.022) (-1.381) (-1.078) (-1.036) 
Sta bsize    -0.001   -0.011 0.001  -0.013 
    (-0.010)   (-0.152) (0.011)  (-0.171) 
Sta ned     -0.103  -0.103  -0.105 -0.106 
     (-1.538)  (-1.543)  (-1.633) (-1.636) 
dual      0.038  0.038 -0.038 -0.043 
      (0.172)  (0.169) (-0.162) (-0.176) 
size -0.057 0.372*** -0.025 -0.057 -0.050 -0.057 -0.047 -0.057 -0.050 -0.046 
 (-1.530) (6.906) (-0.375) (-1.364) (-1.344) (-1.526) (-1.153) (-1.360) (-1.342) (-1.120) 
roa -1.170 -0.574 -1.331* -1.169 -1.303 -1.164 -1.294 -1.165 -1.311 -1.302 
 (-1.449) (-0.638) (-1.645) (-1.454) (-1.472) (-1.422) (-1.477) (-1.430) (-1.480) (-1.490) 
bown 0.361 1.475** -1.067 0.362 0.219 0.362 0.232 0.361 0.214 0.229 
 (0.817) (2.282) (-1.372) (0.784) (0.491) (0.822) (0.510) (0.783) (0.486) (0.508) 
lnnas 0.176***   0.176*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 
 (3.920)   (3.922) (3.654) (3.904) (3.660) (3.906) (3.615) (3.615) 
level -0.481**   -0.481** -0.442** -0.486** -0.441** -0.486** -0.437** -0.434** 
 (-2.445)   (-2.429) (-2.150) (-2.380) (-2.125) (-2.354) (-2.019) (-1.969) 
fcf 0.840   0.838 0.859 0.835 0.823 0.838 0.864 0.822 
 (0.924)   (0.930) (0.908) (0.913) (0.877) (0.925) (0.914) (0.879) 
pea 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.604)   (0.603) (0.352) (0.614) (0.354) (0.613) (0.340) (0.339) 
Big4  -0.386 0.167        
  (-1.370) (0.646)        
ceoch  0.290 0.109        
  (0.980) (0.356)        
sg  0.037 0.047        
  (0.445) (0.537)        
Constant 0.844 -6.760*** 0.469 0.840 0.794 0.839 0.734 0.843 0.798 0.728 
 (1.278) (-6.844) (0.373) (1.087) (1.201) (1.270) (0.982) (1.087) (1.211) (0.963) 
           
Observations 73 81 81 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
R-squared 0.241 0.374 0.100 0.241 0.227 0.240 0.229 0.240 0.226 0.228 
Chi2-test 26.300*** 73.690*** 10.99 26.83 29.85 26.28 30.34 26.80 30.34 30.73 
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.000 0.139 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 0.171 1.561 1.524 1.733 6.547 0.268 6.838 1.635 6.704 6.951 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.679 0.211 0.217 0.420 0.038 0.875 0.077 0.652 0.082 0.139 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta fe2 594.640*** 523.016*** 523.016*** 348.5*** 331.672*** 315.625*** 276.888*** 239.324*** 236.835*** 213.625*** 
Sta 
bsize2 
   59.666***   46.926*** 45.056***  41.786*** 
Sta 
ned2 
    142.050***  105.106***  102.623*** 84.145*** 
Dual2      9.368***  6.053*** 8.225*** 7.151*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: 
the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman 
is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Bsize2: the total number of the 
board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta fe2: lagged 
variable, the standardise fe at yeat Y-2. Sta bsize: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln 
total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in 
year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: 
dummy ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.77 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test 
approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals 
ENDOME32-ENDOME38 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ENDOME39-
ENDOME45 test the effects of board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ENDOME46-ENDOME52 tests the effects 
of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a 
high level of board effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: BS→ premiums Step2: BS→ BE Step3: BS, BE→ premiums 
Endome
33 
Endome
34 
Endome
35 
Endome
36 
Endom
e37 
Endome3
8 
Endome
39 
Endome
40 
Endome
41 
Endome
42 
Endome
43 
Endome
44 
Endome
45 
Endome
46 
Endome
47 
Endome
48 
Endome
49 
Endome
50 
Endome
51 
Endome
52 
Endome
53 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
Sta 
btenure 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta bsize -0.005   0.014 0.001  0.035 -0.147   -0.210 -0.102  -0.161 -0.027   0.003 -0.019  0.030 
 (-0.101)   (0.237) (0.019)  (0.512) (-0.810)   (-1.234) (-0.598)  (-0.948) (-0.438)   (0.046) (-0.298)  (0.371) 
Sta ned  0.065  0.066  0.080 0.087  -0.156  -0.172  -0.102 -0.128  0.084  0.085  0.112* 0.118 
  (1.367)  (1.341)  (1.499) (1.470)  (-1.165)  (-1.305)  (-0.635) (-0.776)  (1.439)  (1.351)  (1.697) (1.590) 
dual   0.048  0.048 0.092 0.114   0.338  0.295 0.299 0.221   0.093  0.084 0.136 0.152 
   (0.604)  (0.530) (0.964) (0.984)   (1.299)  (1.192) (0.999) (0.732)   (1.111)  (0.899) (1.331) (1.261) 
Sta btenure               -0.048 -0.027 -0.047* -0.026 -0.049* -0.025 -0.020 
               (-1.583) (-0.839) (-1.727) (-0.683) (-1.675) (-0.824) (-0.540) 
Size -0.026 -0.039 -0.025 -0.043 -0.025 -0.038 -0.047 -0.007 -0.025 -0.023 0.054 0.009 -0.005 0.050 -0.014 -0.044 -0.013 -0.045 -0.009 -0.040 -0.048 
 (-0.779) (-1.287) (-0.974) (-1.108) (-0.783) (-1.257) (-1.194) (-0.063) (-0.250) (-0.265) (0.465) (0.095) (-0.052) (0.458) (-0.381) (-1.247) (-0.420) (-0.954) (-0.250) (-1.106) (-1.011) 
roa -0.366 -0.349 -0.365 -0.347 -0.365 -0.344 -0.337 1.773* 1.627 1.627* 1.711 1.682* 1.583 1.659 -0.288 -0.262 -0.288 -0.262 -0.284 -0.240 -0.244 
 (-1.414) (-1.360) (-1.418) (-1.337) (-1.392) (-1.307) (-1.260) (1.709) (1.536) (1.670) (1.598) (1.690) (1.586) (1.621) (-0.942) (-0.846) (-0.906) (-0.873) (-0.910) (-0.747) (-0.779) 
bown 0.075 0.136 0.072 0.125 0.071 0.155 0.132 1.049** 0.946** 1.054** 0.968** 1.065** 0.997** 1.001** 0.118 0.156 0.112 0.154 0.123 0.192 0.178 
 (0.578) (0.967) (0.561) (0.921) (0.550) (1.100) (0.964) (2.312) (2.097) (2.391) (2.114) (2.384) (2.113) (2.117) (0.810) (1.029) (0.792) (1.007) (0.846) (1.223) (1.132) 
lnnas 0.056* 0.061** 0.056* 0.059* 0.056* 0.064** 0.060*        0.064* 0.064** 0.061* 0.063* 0.064* 0.066** 0.062* 
 (1.656) (2.018) (1.862) (1.728) (1.676) (2.160) (1.788)        (1.750) (1.982) (1.835) (1.745) (1.733) (2.063) (1.710) 
level 0.242 0.222 0.263 0.212 0.263 0.267 0.251        0.217 0.160 0.245 0.159 0.250 0.207 0.197 
 (1.640) (1.361) (1.513) (1.378) (1.601) (1.452) (1.467)        (1.268) (0.889) (1.309) (0.880) (1.365) (1.073) (1.032) 
fcf -0.266 -0.183 -0.251 -0.176 -0.250 -0.140 -0.112        -0.054 -0.065 -0.003 -0.063 -0.018 -0.026 -0.003 
 (-1.633) (-1.069) (-1.529) (-0.994) (-1.534) (-0.767) (-0.558)        (-0.195) (-0.263) (-0.011) (-0.245) (-0.064) (-0.096) (-0.011) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001        -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.702) (-0.960) (-0.719) (-0.898) (-0.689) (-1.011) (-0.932)        (-0.873) (-1.048) (-0.903) (-1.000) (-0.903) (-1.160) (-1.103) 
Big4        0.016 0.053 0.013 0.014 -0.003 0.022 0.000        
        (0.081) (0.267) (0.066) (0.071) (-0.014) (0.109) (0.002)        
ceoch        0.143 0.245 0.210 0.291 0.215 0.282 0.308        
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        (0.524) (0.887) (0.672) (1.248) (0.735) (1.002) (1.252)        
Sg        -0.052 -0.065** -0.078** -0.051 -0.070* -0.079** -0.065        
        (-1.533) (-1.963) (-2.334) (-1.396) (-1.928) (-2.257) (-1.635)        
Constant 0.521 0.727 0.487 0.814 0.492 0.640 0.835 -0.190 0.149 0.026 -1.251 -0.535 -0.282 -1.242 0.259 0.812 0.208 0.832 0.124 0.658 0.812 
 (0.892) (1.495) (1.184) (1.185) (0.884) (1.348) (1.240) (-0.101) (0.081) (0.017) (-0.599) (-0.308) (-0.169) (-0.632) (0.392) (1.368) (0.407) (0.960) (0.199) (1.086) (0.968) 
                      
Observation
s 
105 104 105 104 105 104 104 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.139 0.088 0.147 0.087 0.147 0.089 0.087 0.152 0.159 0.172 0.176 0.177 0.182 0.190 0.091 0.018 0.108 0.017 0.104 0.013 0.010 
Chi2-test 28.010**
* 
38.030**
* 
27.520**
* 
38.120*
** 
29.36**
* 
42.040*** 41.850*** 20.420**
* 
30.390**
* 
24.460**
* 
28.930**
* 
22.490**
* 
32.070**
* 
30.450**
* 
12.44 15.75 11.45 16.48 13.72 16.27 16.38 
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.000 0. 001 0. 000 0. 001 0. 000 0. 000 0. 005 0. 000 0. 001 0. 000 0. 004 0. 000 0. 000 0.190 0.072 0.246 0.087 0.186 0.092 0.127 
Endogenous test 
Hausman 
Chi2 
0.076 4.547 0.271 5.222 0.324 5.361 6.077 0.0136 0.0163 2.013 0.300 1.899 1.919 1.771 2.428 4.355 0.722 5.576 2.046 4.683 5.808 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.783 0.033 0.603 0.074 0.851 0.069 0.108 0.907 0.898 0.156 0.861 0.387 0.383 0.621 0.297 0.113 0.697 0.134 0.563 0.197 0.214 
Weak instrument test 
F
-
t
e
s
t 
Sta 
btenure2 
              
200.328*
** 
217.908
*** 
223.787
*** 
150.213
*** 
154.773
*** 
156.429
*** 
124.962
*** 
Sta bsize2 
59.284**
* 
  
31.409*
** 
30.684*
** 
 21.181*** 
45.679**
* 
  
23.847**
* 
22.659**
* 
 16.118*** 
29.668**
* 
  
22.573**
* 
19.812**
* 
 
16.840**
* 
Sta ned2  
104.955
*** 
 
51.949*
** 
 52.241*** 34.142*** 
84.224**
* 
 
41.626**
* 
 
42.145**
* 
27.563**
* 
 
43.438**
* 
 
29.250**
* 
 
29.123**
* 
21.528**
* 
Dual2   
152.326
*** 
 
75.314*
** 
89.309*** 62.316***  
167.231
*** 
 
99.651**
* 
143.903
*** 
110.035*
** 
  
96.077**
* 
 
152.807
*** 
112.783
*** 
118.300
*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total 
number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 
in year Y-1. Btenure2: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the 
proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in 
year Y-1.Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the standardised btenure in year Y-2 (two year before the 
announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets 
in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year 
Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.78 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (Btenure) - the endogenous 2SLS test 
approach for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals 
ENDOME54 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ENDOME55-ENDOME56 test 
the effects of board effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ME58-ME64 tests the effects of board structures on 
takeover premiums (BE, BS→ premiums) (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step3: BE, BS→ premiums 
Endome54 Endome55 Endome56 Endome58 Endome59 Endome60 Endome61 Endome62 Endome63 Endome64 
prem bsize ned prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta btenure -0.044 -0.089 -0.134 -0.048 -0.027 -0.047* -0.026 -0.049* -0.025 -0.020 
 (-1.600) (-1.109) (-1.201) (-1.583) (-0.839) (-1.727) (-0.683) (-1.675) (-0.824) (-0.540) 
Sta bsize    -0.027   0.003 -0.019  0.030 
    (-0.438)   (0.046) (-0.298)  (0.371) 
Sta ned     0.084  0.085  0.112* 0.118 
     (1.439)  (1.351)  (1.697) (1.590) 
dual      0.093  0.084 0.136 0.152 
      (1.111)  (0.899) (1.331) (1.261) 
size -0.021 0.354*** 0.211** -0.014 -0.044 -0.013 -0.045 -0.009 -0.040 -0.048 
 (-0.690) (3.811) (2.364) (-0.381) (-1.247) (-0.420) (-0.954) (-0.250) (-1.106) (-1.011) 
roa -0.295 0.593 -0.295 -0.288 -0.262 -0.288 -0.262 -0.284 -0.240 -0.244 
 (-0.950) (0.685) (-0.344) (-0.942) (-0.846) (-0.906) (-0.873) (-0.910) (-0.747) (-0.779) 
bown 0.100 0.234 -0.388 0.118 0.156 0.112 0.154 0.123 0.192 0.178 
 (0.721) (0.467) (-0.710) (0.810) (1.029) (0.792) (1.007) (0.846) (1.223) (1.132) 
lnnas 0.060*   0.064* 0.064** 0.061* 0.063* 0.064* 0.066** 0.062* 
 (1.810)   (1.750) (1.982) (1.835) (1.745) (1.733) (2.063) (1.710) 
level 0.203   0.217 0.160 0.245 0.159 0.250 0.207 0.197 
 (1.156)   (1.268) (0.889) (1.309) (0.880) (1.365) (1.073) (1.032) 
fcf -0.037   -0.054 -0.065 -0.003 -0.063 -0.018 -0.026 -0.003 
 (-0.139)   (-0.195) (-0.263) (-0.011) (-0.245) (-0.064) (-0.096) (-0.011) 
pea -0.001   -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.859)   (-0.873) (-1.048) (-0.903) (-1.000) (-0.903) (-1.160) (-1.103) 
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Big4  -0.186 0.065        
  (-1.016) (0.331)        
ceoch  0.171 0.823***        
  (0.491) (2.867)        
sg  0.061 -0.028        
  (1.642) (-1.051)        
Constant 0.404 -6.320*** -3.733** 0.259 0.812 0.208 0.832 0.124 0.658 0.812 
 (0.827) (-3.782) (-2.280) (0.392) (1.368) (0.407) (0.960) (0.199) (1.086) (0.968) 
           
Observations 89 99 99 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.093 0.232 0.207 0.091 0.018 0.108 0.017 0.104 0.013 0.010 
Chi2-test 10.42 38.820*** 24.800*** 12.44 15.75 11.45 16.48 13.72 16.27 16.38 
Prob>chi2 0.237 0.000 0.001 0.190 0.072 0.246 0.087 0.186 0.092 0.127 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 1.216 0.785 0.048 2.428 4.355 0.722 5.576 2.046 4.683 5.808 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.270 0.376 0.827 0.297 0.113 0.697 0.134 0.563 0.197 0.214 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta 
btenure 
397.107*** 686.659*** 686.659*** 200.328*** 217.908*** 223.787*** 150.213*** 154.773*** 156.429*** 124.962*** 
Sta bsize    29.668***   22.573*** 19.812***  16.840*** 
Sta ned     43.438***  29.250***  29.123*** 21.528*** 
dual      96.077***  152.807*** 112.783*** 118.300*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: 
the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same 
person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Btenure2: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize2: the total number of the board of 
directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year 
Y-2. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta btenure2: lagged variable, the 
standardised btenure in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Sta bsize2: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned2: lagged variable, the standardised ned 
in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets 
in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy 
variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.79 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach 
for mediation analysis of the effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals 
ENDOME65-ENDOME71 test the effects of board structures on takeover premiums (BS→ premiums), ENDOME72-
ENDOME78 test the effects of board structures on board effectiveness (BS→ BE), ENDOME79-ENDOME85 tests the effects 
of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BS, BE→ premiums) (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts 
on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Variables 
Step1: BS→ premiums Step2: BS→  BE Step3: BS, BE→ premiums 
Endome6
5 
Endome
66 
Endome
67 
Endome
68 
Endome
69 
Endom
e70 
Endom
e71 
Endome
72 
Endome
73 
Endome
74 
Endome
75 
Endome
76 
Endome
77 
Endome
78 
Endome
79 
Endome
80 
Endome
81 
Endome
82 
Endome
83 
Endome
84 
Endome
85 
prem prem prem prem prem prem prem Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe Sta fe prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta bsize -0.005   0.014 0.001  0.035 -0.027   -0.021 -0.096  -0.128 -0.005   0.014 0.000  0.033 
 (-0.101)   (0.237) (0.019)  (0.512) (-0.233)   (-0.177) (-0.786)  (-1.055) (-0.108)   (0.239) (0.002)  (0.506) 
Sta ned  0.065  0.066  0.080 0.087  0.019  0.018  -0.041 -0.062  0.065  0.066  0.079 0.085 
  (1.367)  (1.341)  (1.499) (1.470)  (0.144)  (0.131)  (-0.309) (-0.457)  (1.363)  (1.339)  (1.502) (1.473) 
dual   0.048  0.048 0.092 0.114   -0.370  -0.420 -0.415* -0.490*   0.042  0.042 0.085 0.107 
   (0.604)  (0.530) (0.964) (0.984)   (-1.527)  (-1.576) (-1.713) (-1.826)   (0.526)  (0.467) (0.890) (0.939) 
Sta fe               -0.020 -0.023 -0.018 -0.023 -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 
               (-0.587) (-0.621) (-0.498) (-0.629) (-0.523) (-0.500) (-0.485) 
size -0.026 -0.039 -0.025 -0.043 -0.025 -0.038 -0.047 0.012 0.000 -0.029 0.008 0.004 -0.025 0.022 -0.026 -0.039 -0.026 -0.043 -0.026 -0.038 -0.047 
 (-0.779) (-1.287) (-0.974) (-1.108) (-0.783) (-1.257) (-1.194) (0.137) (0.003) (-0.395) (0.089) (0.049) (-0.329) (0.238) (-0.792) (-1.287) (-0.991) (-1.118) (-0.795) (-1.258) (-1.200) 
roa -0.366 -0.349 -0.365 -0.347 -0.365 -0.344 -0.337 0.775 0.816 0.859* 0.807 0.837 0.840 0.792 -0.344 -0.324 -0.346 -0.322 -0.346 -0.324 -0.320 
 (-1.414) (-1.360) (-1.418) (-1.337) (-1.392) (-1.307) (-1.260) (1.425) (1.389) (1.708) (1.357) (1.644) (1.561) (1.447) (-1.217) (-1.155) (-1.236) (-1.139) (-1.223) (-1.142) (-1.119) 
bown 0.075 0.136 0.072 0.125 0.071 0.155 0.132 -0.039 -0.012 -0.027 -0.005 0.016 -0.031 0.010 0.077 0.139 0.074 0.128 0.074 0.157 0.134 
 (0.578) (0.967) (0.561) (0.921) (0.550) (1.100) (0.964) (-0.081) (-0.025) (-0.056) (-0.010) (0.032) (-0.063) (0.020) (0.586) (0.958) (0.562) (0.920) (0.560) (1.089) (0.964) 
lnnas 0.056* 0.061** 0.056* 0.059* 0.056* 0.064** 0.060*        0.056* 0.060** 0.056* 0.058* 0.056* 0.064** 0.059* 
 (1.656) (2.018) (1.862) (1.728) (1.676) (2.160) (1.788)        (1.682) (2.054) (1.890) (1.745) (1.696) (2.177) (1.799) 
level 0.242 0.222 0.263 0.212 0.263 0.267 0.251        0.247* 0.228 0.264 0.217 0.264 0.268 0.253 
 (1.640) (1.361) (1.513) (1.378) (1.601) (1.452) (1.467)        (1.705) (1.410) (1.533) (1.445) (1.628) (1.472) (1.495) 
fcf -0.266 -0.183 -0.251 -0.176 -0.250 -0.140 -0.112        -0.275* -0.193 -0.261 -0.186 -0.260 -0.151 -0.123 
 (-1.633) (-1.069) (-1.529) (-0.994) (-1.534) (-0.767) (-0.558)        (-1.682) (-1.120) (-1.550) (-1.055) (-1.577) (-0.817) (-0.615) 
pea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001        -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.702) (-0.960) (-0.719) (-0.898) (-0.689) (-1.011) (-0.932)        (-0.618) (-0.851) (-0.641) (-0.795) (-0.618) (-0.910) (-0.848) 
Big4        -0.249 -0.280 -0.222 -0.281 -0.224 -0.259 -0.263        
        (-1.101) (-1.249) (-0.995) (-1.251) (-1.006) (-1.168) (-1.189)        
ceoch        -0.169 -0.188 -0.267 -0.184 -0.267 -0.258 -0.247        
        (-0.648) (-0.675) (-1.022) (-0.653) (-1.012) (-0.919) (-0.862)        
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sg        0.019 0.018 0.035* 0.019 0.042* 0.035* 0.045**        
        (0.970) (0.876) (1.652) (0.944) (1.838) (1.748) (2.122)        
Constant 0.521 0.727 0.487 0.814 0.492 0.640 0.835 -0.088 0.153 0.722 0.005 0.139 0.700 -0.112 0.520 0.726 0.494 0.811 0.495 0.646 0.831 
 (0.892) (1.495) (1.184) (1.185) (0.884) (1.348) (1.240) (-0.054) (0.110) (0.538) (0.003) (0.087) (0.512) (-0.067) (0.903) (1.481) (1.194) (1.192) (0.894) (1.340) (1.244) 
                      
Observati
ons 
105 104 105 104 105 104 104 116 115 116 115 116 115 115 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.139 0.088 0.147 0.087 0.147 0.089 0.087 0.025 0.030 0.049 0.030 0.050 0.057 0.058 0.140 0.088 0.147 0.087 0.147 0.089 0.087 
Chi2-test 28.010*** 38.030**
* 
27.520**
* 
38.120**
* 
29.36*** 42.040*
** 
41.850*
** 
4.500 5.340 7.090 5.360 7.130 11.390 12.300 34.35 43.71 34.83 43.29 34.92 46.06 44.69 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0. 001 0. 000 0. 001 0. 000 0. 000 0.721 0.619 0.420 0.719 0.523 0.181 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Endogenous test 
Hausman 
Chi2 
0.076 4.547 0.271 5.222 0.324 5.361 6.077 0.032 0.028 0.036 0.046 0.144 0.0679 0.392 0.360 5.371 0.403 5.594 0.596 6.195 6.424 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi
2 
0.783 0.033 0.603 0.074 0.851 0.069 0.108 0.859 0.868 0.850 0.977 0.930 0.967 0.942 0.835 0.068 0.818 0.133 0.897 0.103 0.170 
Weak instrument test 
F
-
t
e
s
t 
Sta fe2               
218.816
*** 
232.360
*** 
210.007
*** 
161.939
*** 
148.896
*** 
152.371
*** 
119.937*
** 
Sta 
bsize2 
59.284***  
31.409**
* 
30.684*
** 
 
21.181*
** 
66.140**
* 
  
37.136**
* 
32.643**
* 
 
24.615**
* 
29.126**
* 
  
20.585**
* 
20.230**
* 
 
15.677**
* 
Sta 
ned2 
 
104.955*
** 
 
51.949**
* 
 
52.241*
** 
34.142*
** 
 
114.306*
** 
 
56.542**
* 
 
57.262**
* 
37.533**
* 
 
66.431**
* 
 
44.040**
* 
 
43.384**
* 
32.236**
* 
Dual2   
152.326*
** 
 
75.314*
** 
89.309*
** 
62.316*
** 
  
208.286
*** 
 
104.033
*** 
112.702*
** 
78.426**
* 
  
98.779**
* 
 
68.241**
* 
69.446**
* 
60.257**
* 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: the total number of the 
board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Bsize2: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives 
on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised 
board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta fe2: lagged variable, the standardise fe at yeat Y-2. Sta bsize: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned: 
lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total 
debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. 
ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.80 Sensitive analysis: use alternative measure for board effectiveness (FE) - the endogenous 2SLS test approach 
for mediation analysis of the effects of board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals 
ENDOME86 tests the effects of board effectiveness on takeover premiums (BE→ premiums), ENDOME87-ENDOME88 test 
the effects of board effectiveness on board structures (BE→ BS), ENDOME90-ENDOME96 tests the effects of board 
structures on takeover premiums (BE, BS→ premiums) (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 Step1: 
BE→ 
premiums 
Step2: BE→ BS Step3: BE, BS→ premiums 
Endome86 Endome87 Endome88 Endome90 Endome91 Endome92 Endome93 Endome94 Endome95 Endome96 
Variables prem bsize ned prem prem prem prem prem prem prem 
Sta fe -0.020 -0.044 0.114 -0.020 -0.023 -0.018 -0.023 -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 
 (-0.575) (-0.535) (1.270) (-0.587) (-0.621) (-0.498) (-0.629) (-0.523) (-0.500) (-0.485) 
Sta bsize    -0.005   0.014 0.000  0.033 
    (-0.108)   (0.239) (0.002)  (0.506) 
Sta ned     0.065  0.066  0.079 0.085 
     (1.363)  (1.339)  (1.502) (1.473) 
dual      0.042  0.042 0.085 0.107 
      (0.526)  (0.467) (0.890) (0.939) 
size -0.027 0.387*** 0.153 -0.026 -0.039 -0.026 -0.043 -0.026 -0.038 -0.047 
 (-1.040) (4.433) (1.552) (-0.792) (-1.287) (-0.991) (-1.118) (-0.795) (-1.258) (-1.200) 
roa -0.344 -0.301 -1.118 -0.344 -0.324 -0.346 -0.322 -0.346 -0.324 -0.320 
 (-1.232) (-0.460) (-1.206) (-1.217) (-1.155) (-1.236) (-1.139) (-1.223) (-1.142) (-1.119) 
bown 0.072 0.405 -0.825 0.077 0.139 0.074 0.128 0.074 0.157 0.134 
 (0.547) (0.852) (-1.454) (0.586) (0.958) (0.562) (0.920) (0.560) (1.089) (0.964) 
lnnas 0.055*   0.056* 0.060** 0.056* 0.058* 0.056* 0.064** 0.059* 
 (1.849)   (1.682) (2.054) (1.890) (1.745) (1.696) (2.177) (1.799) 
level 0.243   0.247* 0.228 0.264 0.217 0.264 0.268 0.253 
 (1.559)   (1.705) (1.410) (1.533) (1.445) (1.628) (1.472) (1.495) 
fcf -0.273   -0.275* -0.193 -0.261 -0.186 -0.260 -0.151 -0.123 
 (-1.635)   (-1.682) (-1.120) (-1.550) (-1.055) (-1.577) (-0.817) (-0.615) 
pea -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
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 (-0.633)   (-0.618) (-0.851) (-0.641) (-0.795) (-0.618) (-0.910) (-0.848) 
Big4  -0.068 0.024        
  (-0.401) (0.121)        
ceoch  0.126 0.649**        
  (0.389) (2.099)        
sg  0.051 -0.025        
  (1.584) (-0.914)        
Constant 0.553 -6.913*** -2.546 0.520 0.726 0.494 0.811 0.495 0.646 0.831 
 (1.316) (-4.422) (-1.390) (0.903) (1.481) (1.194) (1.192) (0.894) (1.340) (1.244) 
           
Observations 105 116 116 105 104 105 104 105 104 104 
R-squared 0.140 0.209 0.142 0.140 0.088 0.147 0.087 0.147 0.089 0.087 
Chi2-test 34.260*** 36.090*** 22.560*** 34.35 43.71 34.83 43.29 34.92 46.06 44.69 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Endogenous test 
Hausman Chi2 1.297 0.766 6.000*** 0.360 5.371 0.403 5.594 0.596 6.195 6.424 
Hausman 
Prob>Chi2 
0.719 0.382 0.014 0.835 0.068 0.818 0.133 0.897 0.103 0.170 
Weak instrument test 
F-test 
Sta fe2 416.714*** 449.056*** 449.056*** 218.816*** 232.360*** 210.007*** 161.939*** 148.896*** 152.371*** 119.937*** 
Sta 
bsize2 
   29.126***   20.585*** 20.230***  15.677*** 
Sta 
ned2 
    66.431***  44.040***  43.384*** 32.236*** 
Dual2      98.779***  68.241*** 69.446*** 60.257*** 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement). Bsize: 
the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman 
is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-2 (two year before the announcement). Bsize2: the total number of the 
board of directors in year Y-2. Ned2: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-2. Dual2: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-2. Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Sta fe2: lagged 
variable, the standardise fe at yeat Y-2. Sta bsize: lagged variable, the standardised board size in year Y-2. Sta ned: lagged variable, the standardised ned in year Y-2. Size: ln 
total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in 
year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: 
dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.81 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) - measurement invariance test 
Groups Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI △Chi-square Invariance 
Board 
size 
groups 
Unconstrained 74.062 63 1.176 0.051 0.921 0.828 
Δχ2(2)= 3.687, p=0.158 Yes 
Fully constrained 77.749 65 1.196 0.054 0.909 0.821 
          
NED 
groups 
Unconstrained 83.413 60 1.390 0.076 0.838 0.813 
Δχ2(2)= 4.766, p=0.092 No 
Fully constrained 88.179 62 1.422 0.079 0.819 0.804 
Board size group: The standardised board size is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 
66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. Ned group: The standardised proportion of non-executives on 
board is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th 
to maximum for high levels. 
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Table 4.82 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
Panel A: Group difference analysis of board size    
  
Bsize High  Bsize Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure -0.019 0.630 0.003 0.968 0.278 
prem <--- size -0.145 0.004 -0.293 0.000 -2.236** 
prem <--- roa 1.120 0.055 2.930 0.000 1.868* 
prem <--- lnnas 0.139 0.011 0.340 0.000 2.638*** 
prem <--- bown -1.650 0.005 -1.694 0.000 -0.059 
prem <--- level -0.465 0.012 -0.044 0.765 1.774* 
prem <--- pea 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.864 -2.335** 
prem <--- fcf -3.347 0.000 -1.700 0.003 1.643 
                
  
Bsize High  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure -0.019 0.630 0.204 0.041 2.073** 
prem <--- size -0.145 0.004 0.081 0.399 2.082** 
prem <--- roa 1.120 0.055 -2.060 0.000 -3.871*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.139 0.011 0.015 0.855 -1.249 
prem <--- bown -1.650 0.005 0.484 0.402 2.581*** 
prem <--- level -0.465 0.012 -0.408 0.499 0.091 
prem <--- pea 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.939 -1.902* 
prem <--- fcf -3.347 0.000 0.774 0.515 2.857*** 
                
  
Bsize Medium  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure 0.003 0.968 0.204 0.041 1.659* 
prem <--- size -0.293 0.000 0.081 0.399 3.533*** 
prem <--- roa 2.930 0.000 -2.060 0.000 -5.165*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.340 0.000 0.015 0.855 -3.301*** 
prem <--- bown -1.694 0.000 0.484 0.402 2.957*** 
prem <--- level -0.044 0.765 -0.408 0.499 -0.585 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.864 0.000 0.939 -0.057 
prem <--- fcf -1.700 0.003 0.774 0.515 1.873* 
 
Panel B: Group difference analysis of NED         
  
Ned High  Ned Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure 0.159 0.076 -0.043 0.057 -2.186** 
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prem <--- size 0.057 0.552 -0.025 0.379 -0.825 
prem <--- roa -3.011 0.000 -0.923 0.004 2.433** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.232 0.014 -0.011 0.633 -2.498** 
prem <--- bown 0.958 0.413 -0.293 0.196 -1.050 
prem <--- level -1.100 0.002 -0.160 0.304 2.465** 
prem <--- pea 0.004 0.029 -0.001 0.002 -2.429** 
prem <--- fcf 0.218 0.859 -0.020 0.941 -0.189 
                
  
Ned High  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure 0.159 0.076 0.036 0.602 -1.084 
prem <--- size 0.057 0.552 -0.111 0.039 -1.529 
prem <--- roa -3.011 0.000 0.196 0.703 3.386*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.232 0.014 0.245 0.000 0.114 
prem <--- bown 0.958 0.413 0.325 0.316 -0.521 
prem <--- level -1.100 0.002 -0.589 0.100 1.024 
prem <--- pea 0.004 0.029 -0.003 0.165 -2.537** 
prem <--- fcf 0.218 0.859 -0.106 0.897 -0.219 
                
  
Ned Medium  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure -0.043 0.057 0.036 0.602 1.086 
prem <--- size -0.025 0.379 -0.111 0.039 -1.398 
prem <--- roa -0.923 0.004 0.196 0.703 1.845* 
prem <--- lnnas -0.011 0.633 0.245 0.000 3.857*** 
prem <--- bown -0.293 0.196 0.325 0.316 1.563 
prem <--- level -0.160 0.304 -0.589 0.100 -1.098 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.165 -1.116 
prem <--- fcf -0.020 0.941 -0.106 0.897 -0.100 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of 
board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta 
ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are 
defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 
67th to maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta btenure is defined as the minimum to 50th 
percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. 
Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings 
ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.83 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, large proportion of financial experts on board 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - measurement 
invariance test 
Groups Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI △Chi-square Invariance 
Board 
size 
groups 
Unconstrained 77.593 60 1.293 0.063 0.876 0.854 
Δχ2(2)= 7.566, p=0.023 No 
Fully constrained 85.159 62 1.374 0.072 0.837 0.842 
          
NED 
groups 
Unconstrained 95.843 63 1.521 0.085 0.794 0.817 
Δχ2(2)= 10.794, p=0.005 No 
Fully constrained 106.637 65 1.641 0.094 0.739 0.804 
Board size group: The standardised board size is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th 
percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. Ned group: The standardised proportion of non-executives on board 
is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to 
maximum for high levels. 
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Table 4.84 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, large proportion of financial experts on board 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
Panel A: Group difference analysis of board size    
  
Bsize High  Bsize Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.125 0.173 0.170 0.000 0.437 
prem <--- size -0.088 0.159 -0.346 0.000 -3.683*** 
prem <--- roa 1.012 0.201 2.801 0.000 1.714* 
prem <--- lnnas 0.092 0.187 0.316 0.000 2.792*** 
prem <--- bown -0.011 0.987 -2.533 0.000 -3.171*** 
prem <--- level -0.048 0.839 0.156 0.227 0.763 
prem <--- pea 0.002 0.600 0.000 0.305 -0.581 
prem <--- fcf -1.015 0.306 -1.892 0.000 -0.784 
                
  
Bsize High  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.125 0.173 -0.141 0.068 -2.216** 
prem <--- size -0.088 0.159 0.085 0.376 1.511 
prem <--- roa 1.012 0.201 -1.791 0.002 -2.872*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.092 0.187 0.054 0.516 -0.354 
prem <--- bown -0.011 0.987 0.514 0.370 0.579 
prem <--- level -0.048 0.839 -0.963 0.073 -1.562 
prem <--- pea 0.002 0.600 0.000 0.962 -0.432 
prem <--- fcf -1.015 0.306 0.858 0.467 1.217 
                
  
Bsize Medium  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.170 0.000 -0.141 0.068 -3.509*** 
prem <--- size -0.346 0.000 0.085 0.376 4.27*** 
prem <--- roa 2.801 0.000 -1.791 0.002 -5.16*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.316 0.000 0.054 0.516 -2.86*** 
prem <--- bown -2.533 0.000 0.514 0.370 4.47*** 
prem <--- level 0.156 0.227 -0.963 0.073 -2.025** 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.305 0.000 0.962 0.147 
prem <--- fcf -1.892 0.000 0.858 0.467 2.137** 
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Panel B: Group difference analysis of NED       
  
Ned High  Ned Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe -0.391 0.000 0.094 0.000 4.089*** 
prem <--- size -0.003 0.972 0.036 0.127 0.438 
prem <--- roa -2.077 0.007 -0.818 0.016 1.506 
prem <--- lnnas 0.349 0.002 -0.024 0.254 -3.323*** 
prem <--- bown 2.812 0.004 -0.038 0.817 -2.848*** 
prem <--- level -0.751 0.016 -0.266 0.105 1.372 
prem <--- pea 0.003 0.107 -0.001 0.000 -1.915* 
prem <--- fcf 1.785 0.076 -0.488 0.076 -2.177** 
                
  
Ned High  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe -0.391 0.000 0.107 0.041 3.922*** 
prem <--- size -0.003 0.972 -0.114 0.013 -1.132 
prem <--- roa -2.077 0.007 0.587 0.244 2.911*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.349 0.002 0.227 0.000 -0.981 
prem <--- bown 2.812 0.004 0.105 0.724 -2.626*** 
prem <--- level -0.751 0.016 -0.305 0.349 0.986 
prem <--- pea 0.003 0.107 -0.002 0.266 -1.936* 
prem <--- fcf 1.785 0.076 -0.016 0.983 -1.442 
                
  
Ned Medium  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.094 0.000 0.107 0.041 0.211 
prem <--- size 0.036 0.127 -0.114 0.013 -2.921*** 
prem <--- roa -0.818 0.016 0.587 0.244 2.312** 
prem <--- lnnas -0.024 0.254 0.227 0.000 4.085*** 
prem <--- bown -0.038 0.817 0.105 0.724 0.422 
prem <--- level -0.266 0.105 -0.305 0.349 -0.108 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.266 -0.779 
prem <--- fcf -0.488 0.076 -0.016 0.983 0.600 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial 
experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are defined as 
the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to 
maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta fe is defined as the minimum to 50 th percentiles 
for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets 
in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.85 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) - measurement invariance test 
Panel A: 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-square/df RMSE
A 
CFI GFI 
ΔChi-
square 
Invariance 
Board 
tenure 
groups 
Unconstrained 120.289 74 1.626 0.095 0.653 0.777 Δχ2(3)= 
2.024, 
p=0.567 
Yes Fully 
constrained 
120.913 77 1.570 0.091 0.671 0.776 
 
Panel B: 
Board effectiveness: Board tenure 
Path 
High Board tenure Low Board tenure 
Unconstrained Fully constrained Difference 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
sta size →prem -0.096 0.516 0.028  0.821 χ2(74)= 120.289 χ2(75)= 120.490 Δχ2(1)=0.201, p>0.1 
sta ned →prem -0.103 0.396 -0.161 0.183 χ2(74)= 120.289 χ2(75)= 120.590 Δχ2(1)=0.301, p>0.1 
Dual →prem 0.078 0.500 0.017 0.886 χ2(74)= 120.289 χ2(75)= 120.297 Δχ2(1)=0.008, p>0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 (one year 
before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives 
on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta bsize: 
the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low and high levels for sta btenure is defined as the 
minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels. 
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Table 4.86 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high 
level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
  
Btenure High  Btenure Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta bsize -0.040 0.516 0.020 0.821 0.563 
prem <--- sta ned -0.045 0.396 -0.106 0.183 -0.631 
prem <--- dual 0.081 0.500 0.045 0.886 -0.106 
prem <--- size -0.075 0.096 0.006 0.918 1.118 
prem <--- roa 0.975 0.037 -2.306 0.000 -4.729*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.171 0.000 0.083 0.200 -1.095 
prem <--- bown -1.018 0.004 0.902 0.061 3.223*** 
prem <--- level -0.582 0.002 -0.396 0.209 0.503 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.935 0.005 0.132 1.503 
prem <--- fcf -0.596 0.390 0.960 0.176 1.568 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of 
board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta 
ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are 
defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 
67th to maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta btenure is defined as the minimum to 50th 
percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. 
Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings 
ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.87 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on 
board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - measurement 
invariance test 
Panel A: 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-square/df RMSE
A 
CFI GFI 
ΔChi-
square 
Invariance 
Financial 
experts 
groups 
Unconstrained 107.515 68 1.581 0.089 0.740 0.805 Δχ2(3)= 
15.372, 
p=0.002 
No Fully 
constrained 
122.887 71 1.731 0.099 0.658 0.793 
 
Panel B: 
Board effectiveness: the proportion of financial experts on board (FE) 
Path 
High FE Low FE 
Unconstrained Fully constrained Difference 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
sta size →prem -0.054 0.714 -0.074 0.551 χ2(68)= 107.515 χ2(69)= 107.545 Δχ2(1)=0.030, p>0.1 
sta ned →prem -0.507 0.000 0.413 0.000 χ2(68)= 107.515 χ2(69)= 122.121 Δχ2(1)=14.606, p<0.001 
Dual →prem 0.084 0.551 -0.224 0.035 χ2(68)= 107.515 χ2(69)= 110.261 Δχ2(1)=2.746, p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one 
year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives 
on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta bsize: 
the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low and high levels for sta fe is defined as the minimum 
to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels. 
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Table 4.88 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
 
  
Fe High  Fe Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta bsize -0.028 0.714 -0.049 0.551 -0.191 
prem <--- sta ned -0.217 0.000 0.290 0.000 5.277*** 
prem <--- dual 0.126 0.551 -0.395 0.035 -1.849* 
prem <--- size -0.010 0.834 -0.081 0.155 -0.970 
prem <--- roa 0.207 0.713 -0.988 0.041 -1.611 
prem <--- lnnas 0.098 0.020 0.227 0.000 1.699* 
prem <--- bown -0.086 0.802 1.268 0.071 1.73* 
prem <--- level -0.084 0.790 -0.395 0.069 -0.812 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.997 0.008 0.049 1.946* 
prem <--- fcf 0.618 0.394 1.517 0.032 0.888 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial 
experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are defined as 
the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to 
maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta fe is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles 
for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets 
in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.89 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) - measurement invariance test 
Groups Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI △Chi-square Invariance 
Board 
size 
groups 
Unconstrained 90.150 63 1.431 0.070 0.769 0.837 
Δχ2(2)= 3.936, p=0.140 Yes 
Fully constrained 94.086 65 1.447 0.068 0.752 0.832 
          
NED 
groups 
Unconstrained 91.100 66 1.380 0.066 0.792 0.826 
Δχ2(2)= 5.532, p=0.063 No 
Fully constrained 96.632 68 1.421 0.070 0.762 0.818 
           
Duality 
groups 
Unconstrained 61.939 40 1.548 0.079 0.755 0.883 
Δχ2(1)= 1.529, p=0.216 Yes 
Fully constrained 63.468 41 1.548 0.079 0.749 0.880 
Board size group: The standardised board size is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 
66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. Ned group: The standardised proportion of non-executives on 
board is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th 
to maximum for high levels. Duality group: The CEO duality is divided into two groups: equals to 1 denotes the duality group, otherwise 
denotes the not duality group. 
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Table 4.90 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) - group differences 
Panel A: Group difference analysis of board size       
  
Bsize High  Bsize Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure -0.073 0.155 -0.043 0.260 0.476 
prem <--- size -0.073 0.210 -0.014 0.760 0.798 
prem <--- roa -0.222 0.557 0.297 0.527 0.861 
prem <--- lnnas 0.011 0.850 0.102 0.000 1.422 
prem <--- bown -0.174 0.556 0.340 0.066 1.476 
prem <--- level 0.400 0.284 -0.032 0.848 -1.058 
prem <--- pea -0.002 0.639 -0.001 0.315 0.066 
prem <--- fcf -0.503 0.267 0.094 0.863 0.842 
                
  
Bsize High  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure -0.073 0.155 0.108 0.089 2.215** 
prem <--- size -0.073 0.210 0.123 0.047 2.307** 
prem <--- roa -0.222 0.557 -0.562 0.382 -0.456 
prem <--- lnnas 0.011 0.850 -0.019 0.727 -0.375 
prem <--- bown -0.174 0.556 -0.320 0.217 -0.373 
prem <--- level 0.400 0.284 0.608 0.035 0.440 
prem <--- pea -0.002 0.639 0.001 0.735 0.574 
prem <--- fcf -0.503 0.267 0.838 0.263 1.533 
                
  
Bsize Medium  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure -0.043 0.260 0.108 0.089 2.038** 
prem <--- size -0.014 0.760 0.123 0.047 1.78* 
prem <--- roa 0.297 0.527 -0.562 0.382 -1.079 
prem <--- lnnas 0.102 0.000 -0.019 0.727 -2.023** 
prem <--- bown 0.340 0.066 -0.320 0.217 -2.073** 
prem <--- level -0.032 0.848 0.608 0.035 1.924* 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.315 0.001 0.735 0.709 
prem <--- fcf 0.094 0.863 0.838 0.263 0.804 
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Panel B: Group difference analysis of NED       
  
Ned High  Ned Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure 0.117 0.287 0.034 0.441 -0.701 
prem <--- size 0.083 0.341 -0.060 0.132 -1.490 
prem <--- roa -1.157 0.040 1.183 0.016 3.131*** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.044 0.425 0.056 0.079 0.191 
prem <--- bown 0.165 0.576 -0.192 0.481 -0.889 
prem <--- level 0.783 0.038 -0.473 0.056 -2.78*** 
prem <--- pea -0.006 0.187 0.003 0.399 1.556 
prem <--- fcf 0.243 0.629 -1.272 0.035 -1.931* 
                
  
Ned High  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure 0.117 0.287 -0.112 0.016 -1.916* 
prem <--- size 0.083 0.341 0.057 0.167 -0.272 
prem <--- roa -1.157 0.040 -0.404 0.445 0.977 
prem <--- lnnas 0.044 0.425 -0.010 0.782 -0.819 
prem <--- bown 0.165 0.576 -0.054 0.732 -0.654 
prem <--- level 0.783 0.038 0.243 0.252 -1.245 
prem <--- pea -0.006 0.187 -0.003 0.089 0.704 
prem <--- fcf 0.243 0.629 -0.301 0.556 -0.759 
                
  
Ned Medium  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta btenure 0.034 0.441 -0.112 0.016 -2.28** 
prem <--- size -0.060 0.132 0.057 0.167 2.039** 
prem <--- roa 1.183 0.016 -0.404 0.445 -2.198** 
prem <--- lnnas 0.056 0.079 -0.010 0.782 -1.373 
prem <--- bown -0.192 0.481 -0.054 0.732 0.440 
prem <--- level -0.473 0.056 0.243 0.252 2.199** 
prem <--- pea 0.003 0.399 -0.003 0.089 -1.432 
prem <--- fcf -1.272 0.035 -0.301 0.556 1.228 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of 
board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta 
ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are 
defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 
67th to maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta btenure is defined as the minimum to 50th 
percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. 
Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings 
ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.91 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, high proportion of financial experts on board tends to 
indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - measurement invariance test 
Groups Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI △Chi-square Invariance 
Board 
size 
groups 
Unconstrained 64.139 60 1.069 0.026 0.972 0.892 
Δχ2(2)= 5.053, p=0.080 No 
Fully constrained 69.192 62 1.116 0.034 0.950 0.885 
          
NED 
groups 
Unconstrained 78.827 66 1.194 0.043 0.901 0.867 
Δχ2(2)= 1.089, p=0.580 Yes 
Fully constrained 79.916 68 1.175 0.041 0.908 0.865 
           
Duality 
groups 
Unconstrained 49.627 40 1.241 0.048 0.927 0.902 
Δχ2(1)= 0.034, p=0.854 Yes 
Fully constrained 49.661 41 1.211 0.045 0.934 0.902 
Board size group: The standardised board size is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 
66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to maximum for high levels. Ned group: The standardised proportion of non-executives on 
board is divided into three groups: the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th 
to maximum for high levels. Duality group: The CEO duality is divided into two groups: equals to 1 denotes the duality group, otherwise 
denotes the not duality group. 
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Table 4.92 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
structures on the relationship between board effectiveness and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to 
indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
Panel A: Group difference analysis of board size       
  
Bsize High  Bsize Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.027 0.647 -0.090 0.000 -1.818* 
prem <--- size -0.093 0.103 -0.047 0.217 0.672 
prem <--- roa -0.160 0.647 -0.125 0.781 0.061 
prem <--- lnnas 0.012 0.822 0.114 0.000 1.716* 
prem <--- bown -0.209 0.446 0.595 0.000 2.545** 
prem <--- level 0.251 0.345 0.063 0.688 -0.612 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.765 -0.004 0.005 -0.733 
prem <--- fcf -0.580 0.185 0.402 0.435 1.455 
                
  
Bsize High  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.027 0.647 0.009 0.838 -0.238 
prem <--- size -0.093 0.103 0.047 0.351 1.843* 
prem <--- roa -0.160 0.647 0.036 0.954 0.275 
prem <--- lnnas 0.012 0.822 0.011 0.823 -0.017 
prem <--- bown -0.209 0.446 -0.174 0.477 0.095 
prem <--- level 0.251 0.345 0.433 0.115 0.475 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.765 -0.001 0.671 -0.064 
prem <--- fcf -0.580 0.185 -0.584 0.224 -0.006 
                
  
Bsize Medium  Bsize Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe -0.090 0.000 0.009 0.838 1.902* 
prem <--- size -0.047 0.217 0.047 0.351 1.491 
prem <--- roa -0.125 0.781 0.036 0.954 0.210 
prem <--- lnnas 0.114 0.000 0.011 0.823 -1.89* 
prem <--- bown 0.595 0.000 -0.174 0.477 -2.641*** 
prem <--- level 0.063 0.688 0.433 0.115 1.173 
prem <--- pea -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.671 0.709 
prem <--- fcf 0.402 0.435 -0.584 0.224 -1.402 
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Panel B: Group difference analysis of NED       
  
Ned High  Ned Medium 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.006 0.919 -0.046 0.299 -0.700 
prem <--- size 0.043 0.488 -0.094 0.033 -1.795* 
prem <--- roa -0.985 0.021 0.214 0.640 1.918* 
prem <--- lnnas 0.030 0.516 0.076 0.031 0.807 
prem <--- bown 0.101 0.696 -0.093 0.754 -0.493 
prem <--- level 0.621 0.086 0.115 0.615 -1.182 
prem <--- pea -0.006 0.197 0.005 0.201 1.814* 
prem <--- fcf -0.104 0.712 -0.825 0.232 -0.968 
                
  
Ned High  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe 0.006 0.919 0.014 0.672 0.119 
prem <--- size 0.043 0.488 0.045 0.258 0.020 
prem <--- roa -0.985 0.021 -0.744 0.154 0.357 
prem <--- lnnas 0.030 0.516 0.016 0.657 -0.232 
prem <--- bown 0.101 0.696 -0.082 0.596 -0.608 
prem <--- level 0.621 0.086 0.440 0.022 -0.442 
prem <--- pea -0.006 0.197 -0.003 0.116 0.653 
prem <--- fcf -0.104 0.712 0.084 0.864 0.331 
                
  
Ned Medium  Ned Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta fe -0.046 0.299 0.014 0.672 1.083 
prem <--- size -0.094 0.033 0.045 0.258 2.34** 
prem <--- roa 0.214 0.640 -0.744 0.154 -1.382 
prem <--- lnnas 0.076 0.031 0.016 0.657 -1.186 
prem <--- bown -0.093 0.754 -0.082 0.596 0.033 
prem <--- level 0.115 0.615 0.440 0.022 1.086 
prem <--- pea 0.005 0.201 -0.003 0.116 -1.776* 
prem <--- fcf -0.825 0.232 0.084 0.864 1.071 
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Panel C: Group difference analysis of CEO duality       
  
Dual  Not dual   
Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
prem <--- sta fe -0.016 0.740 -0.005 0.893 -0.189 
prem <--- size 0.037 0.440 -0.039 0.300 1.250 
prem <--- roa -0.052 0.921 -0.388 0.205 0.553 
prem <--- lnnas -0.008 0.864 0.073 0.015 -1.428 
prem <--- bown -0.235 0.278 0.209 0.266 -1.548 
prem <--- level 0.286 0.251 0.330 0.101 -0.138 
prem <--- pea -0.003 0.169 0.000 0.847 -0.991 
prem <--- fcf -0.597 0.127 -0.221 0.562 -0.689 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial 
experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are defined as 
the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to 
maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta fe is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles 
for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets 
in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
523 
Table 4.93 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) - measurement invariance test 
Panel A: 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-square/df RMSE
A 
CFI GFI △Chi-square Invariance 
Board 
tenure 
groups 
Unconstrained 139.427 76 1.835 0.097 0.549 0.784 
Δχ2(3)= 6.636, 
p=0.084 
No Fully 
constrained 
146.063 79 1.849 0.098 0.523 0.777 
 
Panel B: 
Board effectiveness: Board tenure 
Path 
High Board 
tenure Low Board tenure 
Unconstrained 
Fully 
constrained 
Difference 
Coefficient
s 
p-
value 
Coefficient
s 
p-value 
sta bsize 
→prem 
-0.280 0.103 0.181 0.145 
χ2(76)= 
139.427 
χ2(77)= 
143.019   
Δχ2(1)=3.592, 
p<0.1     
sta ned →prem 
-0.097 0.582 0.035 0.796 
χ2(76)= 
139.427 
χ2(77)= 
139.692 
Δχ2(1)=0.265, p>0.1  
Dual →prem 
-0.146 0.367 0.308 0.013 
χ2(76)= 
139.427 
χ2(77)= 
143.831 
Δχ2(1)=4.404, p<0.0
5 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-
1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion 
of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, 
otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low and 
high levels for sta btenure is defined as the minimum to 50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels. 
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Table 4.94 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (Btenure) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of 
board effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and 
takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to indicate a high level of board 
effectiveness) - group differences 
  
Btenure High  Btenure Low 
z-score 
Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta bsize -0.075 0.103 0.068 0.145 2.183** 
prem <--- sta ned -0.028 0.582 0.014 0.796 0.565 
prem <--- dual -0.086 0.367 0.264 0.013 2.451** 
prem <--- size 0.053 0.218 -0.091 0.039 -2.337** 
prem <--- roa -0.792 0.089 -0.120 0.714 1.183 
prem <--- lnnas 0.022 0.514 0.100 0.009 1.519 
prem <--- bown 0.095 0.644 0.087 0.710 -0.026 
prem <--- level 0.201 0.294 0.631 0.038 1.194 
prem <--- pea -0.002 0.301 0.002 0.506 1.128 
prem <--- fcf 0.225 0.742 -0.003 0.993 -0.295 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of 
board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta 
ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are 
defined as the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 
67th to maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta btenure is defined as the minimum to 50th 
percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. 
Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings 
ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.95 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to 
indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - measurement invariance test 
 
Panel A: 
Groups Models 
Chi-
square 
df 
Chi-square/df RMSE
A 
CFI GFI 
△ Chi-
square 
Invariance 
Financial 
experts 
groups 
Unconstrained 150.858 76 1.985 0.097 0.645 0.804 Δχ2(3)= 
6.636, 
p=0.084 
Yes Fully 
constrained 
154.587 79 1.957 0.096 0.641 0.801 
 
 
Panel B: 
Board effectiveness: the proportion of financial experts on board (FE) 
Path 
High FE Low FE 
Unconstrained Fully constrained Difference 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
sta bsize →prem 0.293 0.020 -0.099 0.413 χ2(76)= 150.858 χ2(77)= 154.329 Δχ2(1)=3.471, p<0.1 
sta ned →prem 0.037 0.789 -0.140 0.227 χ2(76)= 150.858 χ2(77)= 151.401 Δχ2(1)=0.543, p>0.1 
Dual →prem 0.101 0.422 -0.010 0.938 χ2(76)= 150.858 χ2(77)= 151.292 Δχ2(1)=0.434, p>0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year 
before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on 
boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the 
standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. The low and high levels for sta fe is defined as the minimum to 
50th percentiles for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels. 
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Table 4.96 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - the multi-group test for moderating effects of board 
effectiveness on the relationship between board structures and takeover 
premiums in MBO deals  
(In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial experts on board tends to 
indicate a high level of board effectiveness) - group differences 
  
Fe High  Fe Low 
z-score Estimate P Estimate P 
prem <--- sta bsize 0.114 0.020 -0.027 0.413 -2.395** 
prem <--- sta ned 0.014 0.789 -0.038 0.227 -0.854 
prem <--- dual 0.094 0.422 -0.006 0.938 -0.715 
prem <--- size -0.101 0.021 0.028 0.407 2.337** 
prem <--- roa -0.620 0.118 -0.184 0.594 0.829 
prem <--- lnnas 0.099 0.010 0.017 0.543 -1.7* 
prem <--- bown 0.214 0.348 -0.105 0.510 -1.147 
prem <--- level 0.527 0.043 0.151 0.424 -1.168 
prem <--- pea 0.004 0.191 -0.003 0.146 -1.905* 
prem <--- fcf -0.315 0.453 -0.527 0.124 -0.391 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. fe: the proportion of financial 
experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta fe: the standardised fe in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. The low, medium and high levels for sta bsize and sta ned are defined as 
the minimum to 33rd percentiles for low levels, the 34th to 66th percentiles for median levels and 67th to 
maximum for high levels. The low and high levels for sta fe is defined as the minimum to 50 th percentiles 
for low levels, the 51th to maximum for high levels.  Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets 
in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.97 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (the board tenure) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: 
the mediation effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between 
board structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 102.355 74 1.383 0.074 0.851 0.767 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for mediation 
analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE  
sta btenure <--- sta bsize -0.110 0.127 -0.868 0.385 
sta btenure <--- sta ned -0.027 0.127 -0.214 0.830 
sta btenure <--- dual 0.710 0.360 1.972 0.049 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta btenure 0.047 0.051 0.911 0.362 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize -0.002 0.055 -0.043 0.965 
prem <--- sta ned -0.025 0.055 -0.459 0.646 
prem <--- dual -0.060 0.160 -0.373 0.709 
Control 
variables 
sta btenure <--- sg -0.199 0.165 -1.203 0.229 
sta btenure <--- ceoch -0.336 0.445 -0.755 0.450 
sta btenure <--- big4 -0.027 0.359 -0.076 0.940 
sta btenure <--- roa 0.857 0.802 1.068 0.285 
sta btenure <--- size 0.002 0.080 0.023 0.982 
sta btenure <--- bown 0.234 0.938 0.249 0.803 
prem <--- size -0.038 0.042 -0.902 0.367 
prem <--- roa -1.208 0.427 -2.830 0.005 
prem <--- level -0.468 0.209 -2.236 0.025 
prem <--- lnnas 0.115 0.048 2.385 0.017 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.001 0.229 0.819 
prem <--- fcf 0.389 0.563 0.692 0.489 
prem <--- bown 0.034 0.411 0.082 0.934 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Bsize →sta btenure →prem -0.012 0.907 -0.004 0.965 
No 
mediation 
Sta Ned →sta btenure →prem -0.052 0.621 -0.048 0.646 
No 
mediation 
Dual →sta btenure →prem -0.017 0.868 -0.040 0.709 
No 
mediation 
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Panel D: Bootstrapping tests     
Standardised Indirect 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned  
Sta btenure 0.000 0.000 0.000  
prem -0.010 (0.484) 0.022 (0.336) -0.002 (0.601)  
     
Standardised Direct 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta btenure 
Sta btenure -0.096 (0.467) 0.220 (0.074) -0.024 (0.794) 0.000 
prem -0.004 (0.899) -0.040 (0.665) -0.048 (0.698) 
0.100 
(0.512) 
     
Standardised Total Effects Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta btenure 
Sta btenure -0.096 (0.467) 0.220 (0.074) -0.024 (0.794) 0.000 
prem -0.014 (0.870) -0.018 (0.788) -0.050 (0.650) 
0.100 
(0.512) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board 
of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board 
of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable 
equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the 
standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised 
ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in 
year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free 
cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to 
big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year 
Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.98 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation 
effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board 
structures and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of 
financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 101.082 74 1.366 0.070 0.785 0.863 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE  
sta fe <--- sta bsize -0.351 0.117 -2.994 0.003 
sta fe <--- sta ned 0.150 0.121 1.238 0.216 
sta fe <--- dual -0.016 0.348 -0.045 0.964 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta fe -0.076 0.051 -1.504 0.133 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize -0.053 0.055 -0.966 0.334 
prem <--- sta ned -0.038 0.054 -0.706 0.480 
prem <--- dual -0.028 0.154 -0.182 0.856 
Control 
variables 
sta fe <--- sg 0.156 0.143 1.094 0.274 
sta fe <--- ceoch -0.295 0.431 -0.683 0.495 
sta fe <--- big4 -0.133 0.315 -0.422 0.673 
sta fe <--- roa -0.297 0.757 -0.392 0.695 
sta fe <--- size 0.153 0.076 2.024 0.043 
sta fe <--- bown 1.463 0.890 1.644 0.100 
prem <--- size -0.032 0.041 -0.780 0.435 
prem <--- roa -1.152 0.420 -2.745 0.006 
prem <--- level -0.369 0.197 -1.868 0.062 
prem <--- lnnas 0.133 0.046 2.897 0.004 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.001 0.337 0.736 
prem <--- fcf 0.752 0.537 1.399 0.162 
prem <--- bown 0.249 0.405 0.614 0.540 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without 
Mediator Direct with Mediator Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Bsize →sta fe →prem -0.052 0.609 -0.102 0.334 
No 
mediation 
Sta Ned →sta fe →prem -0.096 0.353 -0.072 0.480 
No 
mediation 
Dual →sta fe →prem -0.015 0.880 -0.018 0.856 
No 
mediation 
 
 
 
Appendix 
530 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests     
Standardised Indirect 
Effect 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned  
Sta fe 0.000 0.000 0.000  
prem 0.051 (0.123) 0.001 (0.829) -0.022 (0.217)  
     
Standardised Direct 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta fe 
Sta fe -0.313 (0.044) -0.005 (0.970) 0.132 (0.316) 0.000 
prem -0.102 (0.367) -0.018 (0.685) -0.072 (0.679) -0.164 (0.301) 
     
Standardised Total Effects Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta fe 
Sta fe -0.313 (0.044) -0.005 (0.970) 0.132 (0.416) 0.000 
prem -0.051 (0.640) -0.017 (0.709) -0.094 (0.525) -0.164 (0.301) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. . fe: the proportion of financial experts on the 
board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors 
in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' 
CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. Sta bsize: the 
standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: 
return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts 
divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy 
variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change 
equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.99 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (the board tenure) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: 
the mediation effects of board structures on the relationship between 
board effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the third-party LBO context, longer board tenure 
tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 70.507 62 1.137 0.044 0.930 0.888 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS  
sta bsize <--- sta btenure -0.060 0.085 -0.711 0.477 
sta ned <--- sta btenure -0.038 0.101 -0.375 0.708 
dual <--- sta btenure 0.068 0.036 1.901 0.057 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize -0.002 0.065 -0.037 0.971 
prem <--- sta ned -0.025 0.056 -0.449 0.653 
prem <--- dual -0.060 0.160 -0.374 0.709 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta btenure 0.047 0.051 0.920 0.358 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 0.002 0.116 0.021 0.984 
dual <--- sg -0.018 0.053 -0.342 0.732 
dual <--- size 0.000 0.026 -0.015 0.988 
dual <--- roa -0.163 0.261 -0.626 0.531 
dual <--- bown -0.033 0.300 -0.111 0.912 
dual <--- ceoch 0.106 0.144 0.739 0.460 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.317 0.407 0.779 0.436 
sta ned <--- big4 0.126 0.328 0.383 0.701 
sta ned <--- sg 0.099 0.151 0.654 0.513 
sta ned <--- size 0.006 0.074 0.086 0.931 
sta ned <--- roa -0.958 0.739 -1.296 0.195 
sta ned <--- bown -0.940 0.849 -1.108 0.268 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.499 0.341 1.461 0.144 
sta bsize <--- big4 -0.529 0.275 -1.925 0.054 
sta bsize <--- sg -0.079 0.126 -0.626 0.531 
sta bsize <--- size 0.351 0.062 5.667 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa 0.049 0.619 0.079 0.937 
sta bsize <--- bown 1.349 0.711 1.897 0.058 
prem <--- size -0.038 0.048 -0.789 0.430 
prem <--- roa -1.208 0.432 -2.800 0.005 
prem <--- level -0.468 0.211 -2.219 0.027 
prem <--- lnnas 0.115 0.048 2.391 0.017 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.001 0.229 0.819 
prem <--- fcf 0.389 0.561 0.693 0.488 
Appendix 
532 
prem <--- bown 0.034 0.418 0.081 0.935 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Btenure →sta bsize →prem 0.093 0.380 0.093 0.382 
No 
mediation 
Sta Btenure →sta ned →prem 0.093 0.380 0.091 0.390 
No 
mediation 
Sta Btenure →dual →prem 0.093 0.380 0.102 0.347 
No 
mediation 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests 
  
Sta Btenure →sta bsize 
→prem 
Sta Btenure →sta ned 
→prem 
Sta Btenure →dual 
→prem 
Standardised 
Indirect 
Effects 
  Sta btenure   Sta btenure   Sta btenure 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.000 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize 0.000 
Sta 
bsize 
0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.000 (0.776) prem 0.002 (0.542) prem -0.008 (0.343) 
              
Standardised 
Direct Effects 
  Sta btenure   Sta btenure   Sta btenure 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.220 (0.078) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned -0.043 (0.633) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.067 (0.393) 
Sta 
bsize 
0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.093 (0.589) prem 0.091 (0.578) prem 0.102 (0.473) 
              
Standardised 
Total Effects 
  Sta btenure   Sta btenure   Sta btenure 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.220 (0.083) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned -0.043 (0.633) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.067 (0.393) 
Sta 
bsize 
0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.093 (0.543) prem 0.093 (0.555) prem 0.093 (0.545) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board 
of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the 
board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy 
variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: 
the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board 
ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year 
Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' 
audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO change equals to 
1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.100 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation 
effects of board structures on the relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in third-party LBO deals  
(BE→ BS→ premiums). (In the third-party LBO context, the high proportion of 
financial experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 71.740 62 1.157 0.046 0.896 0.923 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS  
sta bsize <--- sta fe -0.232 0.086 -2.706 0.007 
sta ned <--- sta fe 0.136 0.098 1.397 0.162 
dual <--- sta fe -0.003 0.035 -0.097 0.923 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize -0.053 0.062 -0.862 0.389 
prem <--- sta ned -0.038 0.056 -0.688 0.492 
prem <--- dual -0.028 0.155 -0.181 0.856 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta fe -0.076 0.051 -1.506 0.132 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 0.002 0.104 0.021 0.983 
dual <--- sg -0.029 0.047 -0.614 0.539 
dual <--- size -0.001 0.025 -0.037 0.970 
dual <--- roa -0.087 0.251 -0.348 0.727 
dual <--- bown 0.012 0.290 0.043 0.966 
dual <--- ceoch 0.079 0.143 0.551 0.582 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.371 0.394 0.940 0.347 
sta ned <--- big4 0.138 0.287 0.480 0.631 
sta ned <--- sg 0.039 0.130 0.301 0.763 
sta ned <--- size 0.009 0.069 0.129 0.897 
sta ned <--- roa -1.087 0.693 -1.569 0.117 
sta ned <--- bown -1.160 0.801 -1.449 0.147 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.352 0.347 1.017 0.309 
sta bsize <--- big4 -0.557 0.252 -2.206 0.027 
sta bsize <--- sg 0.037 0.114 0.321 0.748 
sta bsize <--- size 0.341 0.061 5.597 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa -0.451 0.609 -0.741 0.459 
sta bsize <--- bown 1.506 0.704 2.140 0.032 
prem <--- size -0.032 0.046 -0.698 0.485 
prem <--- roa -1.152 0.428 -2.690 0.007 
prem <--- level -0.369 0.198 -1.866 0.062 
prem <--- lnnas 0.133 0.046 2.906 0.004 
prem <--- pea 0.000 0.001 0.337 0.736 
prem <--- fcf 0.752 0.539 1.395 0.163 
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prem <--- bown 0.249 0.409 0.608 0.543 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without 
Mediator 
Direct with 
Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficient
s 
p-value 
Coefficient
s 
p-
value 
Sta Fe →sta bsize 
→prem -0.147 0.143 -0.170 0.107 
No 
mediatio
n 
Sta Fe →sta ned →prem -0.147 0.143 -0.138 0.179 
No 
mediatio
n 
Sta Fe →dual →prem -0.147 0.143 -0.148 0.142 
No 
mediatio
n 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests 
  Sta Fe →sta bsize →prem Sta Fe →sta ned →prem Sta Fe →dual →prem 
Standardised 
Indirect 
Effects 
  Sta fe   Sta fe   Sta fe 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.000 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.025 (0.275) prem -0.010 (0.504) prem 
0.000 
(0.963) 
              
Standardised 
Direct Effects 
  Sta fe   Sta fe   Sta fe 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 
-0.011 
(0.968) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.153 (0.251) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.247 (0.030) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem -0.170 (0.244) prem -0.138 (0.310) prem 
-
0.148(0.271) 
              
Standardised 
Total Effects 
  Sta fe   Sta fe   Sta fe 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 
-0.011 
(0.968) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.153 (0.251) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.247 (0.030) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem -0.145 (0.282) prem -0.148 (0.276) prem 
-
0.148(0.277) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. . fe: the proportion of financial experts on 
the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of 
directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 
1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. 
Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets 
in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year 
Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio 
in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: 
dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.101 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (the board tenure) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: 
the mediation effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between 
board structures and takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to 
indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 131.004 74 1.770 0.094 0.658 0.836 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE  
sta btenure <--- sta bsize -0.106 0.093 -1.135 0.256 
sta btenure <--- sta ned -0.236 0.098 -2.410 0.016 
sta btenure <--- dual 0.171 0.227 0.753 0.452 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta btenure -0.033 0.038 -0.869 0.385 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize 0.000 0.034 0.009 0.992 
prem <--- sta ned -0.002 0.037 -0.049 0.961 
prem <--- dual 0.086 0.079 1.093 0.275 
Control 
variables 
sta btenure <--- sg -0.066 0.038 -1.713 0.087 
sta btenure <--- ceoch 0.353 0.316 1.118 0.263 
sta btenure <--- big4 0.059 0.190 0.309 0.757 
sta btenure <--- roa 1.246 0.768 1.622 0.105 
sta btenure <--- size 0.100 0.082 1.225 0.221 
sta btenure <--- bown 0.605 0.442 1.368 0.171 
prem <--- size -0.014 0.034 -0.406 0.685 
prem <--- roa -0.310 0.305 -1.016 0.310 
prem <--- level 0.260 0.182 1.425 0.154 
prem <--- lnnas 0.058 0.028 2.112 0.035 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.002 -0.724 0.469 
prem <--- fcf -0.018 0.339 -0.053 0.958 
prem <--- bown 0.101 0.169 0.600 0.549 
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Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Bsize →sta btenure →prem 0.016 0.881 0.001 0.992 
No 
mediation 
Sta Ned →sta btenure →prem 0.018 0.870 -0.006 0.961 
No 
mediation 
Dual →sta btenure →prem 0.120 0.293 0.125 0.275 
No 
Mediation 
 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests 
Standardised Indirect 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned  
Sta btenure 0.000 0.000 0.000  
prem 0.011 (0.381) -0.008 (0.316) 0.024 (0.291)  
     
Standardised Direct 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta btenure 
Sta btenure -0.116 (0.401) 0.086 (0.432) -0.252 (0.031) 0.000 
prem 0.001 (0.951) 0.125 (0.351) -0.006 (0.998) -0.096 (0.418) 
     
Standardised Total 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta btenure 
Sta btenure -0.116 (0.401) 0.086 (0.432) -0.252 (0.031) 0.000 
prem 0.012 (0.893) 0.117 (0.406) 0.019 (0.868) -0.096 (0.418) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of 
board of directors in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta 
ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. 
Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total 
assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy 
variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, 
CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.102 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation 
effects of board effectiveness on the relationship between board 
structures and takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial 
experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 132.757 74 1.794 0.087 0.717 0.861 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BS →BE →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BS →BE  
sta fe <--- sta bsize -0.022 0.102 -0.219 0.827 
sta fe <--- sta ned 0.009 0.101 0.088 0.930 
sta fe <--- dual -0.303 0.244 -1.241 0.215 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta fe -0.012 0.028 -0.415 0.678 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize 0.009 0.029 0.296 0.767 
prem <--- sta ned -0.009 0.029 -0.297 0.767 
prem <--- dual 0.064 0.069 0.928 0.353 
Control 
variables 
sta fe <--- sg 0.038 0.046 0.833 0.405 
sta fe <--- ceoch -0.208 0.361 -0.575 0.565 
sta fe <--- big4 -0.226 0.211 -1.068 0.285 
sta fe <--- roa 0.952 0.746 1.276 0.202 
sta fe <--- size 0.001 0.089 0.013 0.990 
sta fe <--- bown 0.113 0.509 0.222 0.824 
prem <--- size -0.027 0.03 -0.908 0.364 
prem <--- roa -0.333 0.269 -1.237 0.216 
prem <--- level 0.291 0.157 1.851 0.064 
prem <--- lnnas 0.053 0.026 2.066 0.039 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.002 -0.590 0.555 
prem <--- fcf -0.268 0.252 -1.064 0.287 
prem <--- bown 0.055 0.154 0.357 0.721 
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Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without 
Mediator Direct with Mediator Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Bsize →sta fe →prem 0.029 0.763 0.029 0.767 
No 
mediation 
Sta Ned →sta fe →prem -0.028 0.773 -0.029 0.767 
No 
mediation 
Dual →sta fe →prem 0.097 0.325 0.093 0.353 
No 
mediation 
 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests     
Standardised Indirect 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned  
Sta fe 0.000 0.000 0.000  
prem 0.001 (0.597) 0.005 (0.345) 0.000 (0.904)  
     
Standardised Direct 
Effects 
Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta fe 
Sta fe -0.022 (0.854) -0.136 (0.207) 0.009 (0.993) 0.000 
prem 0.029 (0.900) 0.093 (0.460) -0.029 (0.825) -0.038 (0.633) 
     
Standardised Total Effect Sta bsize dual Sta ned Sta fe 
Sta fe -0.022 (0.854) -0.136 (0.207) 0.009 (0.993) 0.000 
prem 0.030 (0.882) 0.098 (0.424) -0.029 (0.834) -0.038 (0.633) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. . fe: the proportion of financial 
experts on the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number 
of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: 
dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. 
Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: 
board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets 
in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, 
does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy variable, CEO 
change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.103 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (the board tenure) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: 
the mediation effects of board structures on the relationship between 
board effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(BS→ BE→ premiums). (In the MBO context, longer board tenure tends to 
indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 100.680 62 1.624 0.084 0.768 0.873 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS  
sta bsize <--- sta btenure -0.093 0.108 -0.863 0.388 
sta ned <--- sta btenure -0.243 0.100 -2.422 0.015 
dual <--- sta btenure 0.090 0.050 1.793 0.073 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize 0.000 0.035 0.009 0.993 
prem <--- sta ned -0.002 0.036 -0.049 0.961 
prem <--- dual 0.086 0.074 1.161 0.246 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta btenure -0.033 0.037 -0.882 0.378 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 0.099 0.097 1.017 0.309 
dual <--- sg 0.050 0.019 2.682 0.007 
dual <--- size -0.106 0.043 -2.485 0.013 
dual <--- roa -0.107 0.404 -0.264 0.792 
dual <--- bown -0.117 0.221 -0.529 0.597 
dual <--- ceoch -0.310 0.160 -1.933 0.053 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.884 0.321 2.756 0.006 
sta ned <--- big4 0.152 0.194 0.780 0.435 
sta ned <--- sg -0.027 0.037 -0.716 0.474 
sta ned <--- size 0.248 0.085 2.912 0.004 
sta ned <--- roa 0.108 0.809 0.133 0.894 
sta ned <--- bown -0.429 0.443 -0.968 0.333 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.151 0.345 0.438 0.661 
sta bsize <--- big4 -0.178 0.209 -0.851 0.395 
sta bsize <--- sg 0.062 0.040 1.563 0.118 
sta bsize <--- size 0.346 0.092 3.782 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa 0.673 0.870 0.774 0.439 
sta bsize <--- bown 0.128 0.476 0.269 0.788 
prem <--- size -0.014 0.038 -0.367 0.714 
prem <--- roa -0.310 0.309 -1.002 0.316 
prem <--- level 0.260 0.183 1.421 0.155 
prem <--- lnnas 0.058 0.028 2.114 0.035 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.002 -0.724 0.469 
prem <--- fcf -0.018 0.336 -0.053 0.958 
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prem <--- bown 0.101 0.165 0.614 0.539 
 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Btenure →sta bsize →prem -0.075 0.467 -0.078 0.452 
No 
mediation 
Sta Btenure →sta ned →prem -0.075 0.467 -0.084 0.428 
No 
mediation 
Sta Btenure →dual →prem -0.075 0.467 -0.094 0.369 
No 
mediation 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests 
  Sta Btenure →sta bsize →prem Sta Btenure →sta ned →prem Sta Btenure →dual →prem 
Standardised 
Indirect 
Effects 
  sta btenure   sta btenure   sta btenure 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.000 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem 0.002 (0.718) prem 0.010 (0.638) prem 0.022 (0.171) 
              
Standardised 
Direct Effects 
  sta btenure   sta btenure   sta btenure 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.175 (0.102) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned -0.228 (0.014) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.083 (0.410) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem -0.078 (0.521) prem -0.084 (0.462) prem -0.094 (0.374) 
              
Standardised 
Total Effects 
  sta btenure   sta btenure   sta btenure 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.175 (0.102) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned -0.228 (0.014) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.083 (0.410) Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
prem -0.076 (0.462) prem -0.075 (0.477) prem -0.071 (0.485) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. btenure: the average tenure of board of directors in year Y-1 
(one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of 
non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 
0 in year Y-1. Sta btenure: the standardised btenure in year Y-1. Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the 
standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. 
Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-
earnings ratio in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: dummy 
variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Table 4.104 Sensitivity analysis: use alternative measure for board 
effectiveness (FE) - SEM approach for mediation analysis: the mediation 
effects of board structures on the relationship between board 
effectiveness and takeover premiums in MBO deals  
(BE→ BS→ premiums). (In the MBO context, the high proportion of financial 
experts on board tends to indicate a high level of board effectiveness) 
 
Panel A: The model fit for the unconstrained model    
Models Chi-square df 
Chi-
square/df 
RMSEA CFI GFI 
Unconstrained 98.191 62 1.584 0.075 0.826 0.895 
 
Panel B: The unconstrained model for 
mediation analysis (BE →BS →Prem) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
BE →BS  
sta bsize <--- sta fe 0.019 0.090 0.217 0.828 
sta ned <--- sta fe 0.035 0.092 0.377 0.706 
dual <--- sta fe -0.055 0.041 -1.342 0.180 
BS →Prem  
prem <--- sta bsize 0.009 0.032 0.277 0.782 
prem <--- sta ned -0.009 0.029 -0.296 0.767 
prem <--- dual 0.064 0.067 0.955 0.340 
BE →Prem  prem <--- sta fe -0.012 0.028 -0.415 0.678 
Control 
variables 
dual <--- big4 0.073 0.090 0.812 0.417 
dual <--- sg 0.044 0.019 2.345 0.019 
dual <--- size -0.071 0.039 -1.841 0.066 
dual <--- roa 0.016 0.323 0.049 0.961 
dual <--- bown 0.069 0.213 0.327 0.744 
dual <--- ceoch -0.294 0.154 -1.910 0.056 
sta ned <--- ceoch 0.668 0.342 1.951 0.051 
sta ned <--- big4 0.042 0.201 0.209 0.835 
sta ned <--- sg -0.018 0.042 -0.434 0.664 
sta ned <--- size 0.162 0.086 1.877 0.060 
sta ned <--- roa -0.825 0.719 -1.148 0.251 
sta ned <--- bown -0.893 0.473 -1.887 0.059 
sta bsize <--- ceoch 0.115 0.334 0.344 0.731 
sta bsize <--- big4 -0.034 0.197 -0.173 0.862 
sta bsize <--- sg 0.050 0.041 1.217 0.223 
sta bsize <--- size 0.370 0.084 4.398 0.000 
sta bsize <--- roa -0.272 0.702 -0.387 0.698 
sta bsize <--- bown 0.368 0.462 0.796 0.426 
prem <--- size -0.027 0.033 -0.836 0.403 
prem <--- roa -0.333 0.272 -1.227 0.220 
prem <--- level 0.291 0.157 1.849 0.064 
prem <--- lnnas 0.053 0.026 2.070 0.038 
prem <--- pea -0.001 0.002 -0.590 0.555 
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prem <--- fcf -0.268 0.252 -1.065 0.287 
prem <--- bown 0.055 0.153 0.360 0.719 
Panel C:  
Relationship 
Direct without Mediator Direct with Mediator 
Indirect 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sta Fe →sta bsize →prem -0.049 0.593 -0.049 0.592 
No 
mediation 
Sta Fe →sta ned →prem -0.049 0.593 -0.048 0.598 
No 
mediation 
Sta Fe →dual →prem -0.049 0.593 -0.038 0.681 
No 
mediation 
 
Panel D: Bootstrapping tests 
  Sta Fe →sta bsize →prem Sta Fe →sta ned →prem Sta Fe →dual →prem 
Standardised 
Indirect 
Effects 
  Sta fe   Sta fe   Sta fe 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 0.000 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize 0.000 Sta bsize 0.000 
Sta 
bsize 
0.000 
prem 0.000 (0.857) prem -0.002 (0.592) prem 
-0.011 
(0.238) 
              
Standardised 
Direct Effects 
  Sta fe   Sta fe   Sta fe 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 
-0.124 
(0.167) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.035 (0.761) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.019 (0.796) Sta bsize 0.000 
Sta 
bsize 
0.000 
prem -0.049 (0.553) prem -0.048 (0.550) prem 
-
0.038(0.623) 
              
Standardised 
Total Effects 
  Sta fe   Sta fe   Sta fe 
dual 0.000 dual 0.000 dual 
-0.124 
(0.167) 
Sta ned 0.000 Sta ned 0.035 (0.761) Sta ned 0.000 
Sta bsize -0.019 (0.796) Sta bsize 0.000 
Sta 
bsize 
0.000 
prem -0.049 (0.553) prem -0.050 (0.529) prem 
-0.049 
(0.521) 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Prem: takeover premiums 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. . fe: the proportion of financial experts on 
the board in year Y-1 (one year before the announcement of takeovers). Bsize: the total number of the board of 
directors in year Y-1. Ned: the proportion of non-executives on boards in year Y-1. Dual: dummy variable equal to 
1 when firm' CEO and chairman is the same person, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sta fe: the standardise fe at yeat Y-1. 
Sta bsize: the standardised board size in year Y-1. Sta ned: the standardised ned in year Y-1. Size: ln total assets 
in year Y-1. Roa: return on assets in year Y-1. Bown: board ownership in year Y-1. Lnnas: ln non-audit fees in year 
Y-1. Level: total debts divided by total assets in year Y-1. Fcf: free cash flow in year Y-1. Pea: price-earnings ratio 
in year Y-1. big4: dummy variable, does firms' audit belongs to big six, five or four audit firms in year Y-1. ceoch: 
dummy variable, CEO change equals to 1, otherwise 0 in year Y-1. Sg: sales growth in year Y-1. 
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Appendix 4.105: Moderation & Mediation Analysis 
A moderator is a variable (Mo) that affects the strength and/or the direction of 
the relationship between independent (X) and outcome (Y) variables (Figure 
4.19) (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The moderator demonstrates the changes in 
the relation between independent (X) and outcome (Y), illustrating the 
conditions under which the association is enhanced, reduced, or directionally 
changed (Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010). Moderation analysis could be used in 
research to explain whether or when the circumstances that strengthen or 
weaken the association between the independent (X) and outcome (Y) 
variables, especially when this association is unexpectedly weak or 
inconsistent (Ro, 2012; Fairchild and MacKinnon, 2009). 
 
Figure 4.19 Moderating relationship among variables 
 
 
From an econometric perspective, a moderating effect is typically expressed as 
the interaction between independent (X) and moderator (Mo) variables (Ro, 
2012; Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010). The term ‘interaction’ represents a joint 
effect that accounts for additional variance in the outcome variable beyond that 
which is explained by the independent (X) and moderator (Mo) variables (Figure 
4.20) (Ro, 2012). The basic moderation model is estimated via the following 
multiple regression equation: 
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𝑌 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑜 + 𝛼3𝑋 ∗ 𝑀𝑜 + 𝜀                             (4.25) 
 
To test for the presence of moderation, a constrained model where the 
independent (X) and moderator (Mo) variables are entered into the model as 
predictors of the outcome variable (Y), is compared with an unconstrained 
model where an interaction term, the product of the independent and moderator 
variables (X*Mo), is added (Ro, 2012). If the unconstrained model is a better fit 
to the data, then there is evidence for the moderating effect. 
 
Figure 4.20 Statistical model of a moderating effect 
 
 
By contrast, a mediating analysis explains the causal link between independent 
variables (X), mediators (Me) and outcome variables (Y) (Figure 4.21) (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986). In the model, Me is typically called a mediator variable or, 
stated differently, an intermediary variable, through which an independent 
variable (X) is able to influence an outcome variable (Y) (Rose et al., 2004; 
Fairchild and MacKinnon, 2009; Hayes, 2013). Since a mediational analysis 
produces a story about a sequence of effects, the process of mediation implies 
a causal chain where the mediator variable (Me) is assumed to be caused by 
the independent variable (X) and to cause the outcome variable (Y) (Ro, 2012; 
Kenny, 2008). It follows, then, that mediators are usually investigated when 
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there is a significant relationship between the independent variable (X) and the 
outcome variable (Y) (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
 
Figure 4.21 Mediating relationship among variables 
 
 
A mediating effect in its simplest form represents an intermediate variable in the 
relation between independent (X) and outcome (Y) variables, whereby the 
independent (X) causes the mediator (Me), and the mediator (Me) causes the 
outcome (Y), so X→ Me→ Y (MacKinnon et al., 2007). To model mediating 
effect, the overall effect between X and Y can be decomposed into component 
parts called the direct effect of X on Y and the indirect (i.e. mediated) effect of 
X on Y through Me (Figure 4.22) (Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010; Fairchild and 
MacKinnon, 2009). The basic mediation model is defined by three equations as 
follows (Baron and Kenny, 1986): 
 
𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋 + 𝜀                                                (4.26) 
𝑀𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 + 𝜀                                               (4.27) 
𝑌 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑋 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑒 + 𝜀                                          (4.28) 
 
The first regression model (Eq. 4.26) is to test the overall effect of the 
independent variable (X) on the outcome variable (Y). Consequently, the 
mediation model uses regression Equations 4.27 and 4.28 to decompose the 
overall effect into direct and indirect components. Specifically, the second 
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regression model (Eq. 4.27) tests the relationship between the independent 
variable (X) and the mediator variable (Me) to establish Path a (indirect effects) 
in the mediation chain. The third regression model (Eq. 4.28) tests the direct 
effects (Path c’) and contains both the independent and mediator variables 
entered simultaneously, with the outcome (X, Me→ Y) (Fairchild and McQuillin, 
2010; Ro, 2012; Holbert and Stephenson, 2003; Fairchild and MacKinnon, 
2009).  
 
Figure 4.22 Statistical model of a mediating effect 
 
 
To test the significance of the mediating effect, early studies (e.g. Baron and 
Kenny, 1986; Judd and Kenny, 1981a; Judd and Kenny, 1981b) illustrate the 
causal step approaches to test for mediation, which detail four criteria for 
complete mediation. First, mediating effects should only be tested when the 
relationship between the independent and the outcome variables is statistically 
significant; otherwise, there is no relationship to mediate. However, Kenny et al. 
(1998) and Zhao et al. (2010) suggest that this first step is not required, because 
when direct and indirect effects have opposite signs, it could be the case that 
Step 1 would not be met, but mediation still exists. Shrout and Bolger (2002) 
argue in favour of skipping the first step in cases in which the independent is 
distal to the outcome, because such studies often lack power to detect the direct 
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relation between independent and outcome. Second, the independent variable 
(X) should have a significant influence on the mediator variable (Me). Third, the 
mediator (Me) must be significantly related to the outcome variable (Y). Fourth, 
the effect of the independent variable (X) on the outcome variable (Y) should 
become zero once the role of the mediator (Me) is taken into account (full 
mediation) (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Holbert and Stephenson, 2003).  
 
However, more recent research has supported tests for statistical mediation 
based on coefficients from the regression Equations 4.3 and 4.4. Sobel’s (1982) 
z-test is one of the most well-known methods. The product of coefficients 𝛽1 
and 𝛾2 computed from Eqs. 4.3 and 4.4 is divided by its standard effort term, 
to yield a z-score (𝑍 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝛾2/𝑆𝛽1𝛾2). Specifically, 𝑆𝛽1𝛾2 = √𝛽1
2 ∗ 𝑆𝛾2
2 + 𝛾2
2 ∗ 𝑆𝛽1
2  
is the variance of the 𝛽1 ∗ 𝛾2 coefficient; 𝛽1 is the coefficient for Path a, which 
predicts the mediator (Me) from independent variable (X); 𝑆𝛽1 is the variance 
of the 𝛽1  coefficient; 𝛾2  is the coefficient for Path b, which predicts the 
outcome variable (Y) from mediator (Me) when controlling for the independent 
variable (X); and 𝑆𝛾2  is the variance of the 𝛾2  coefficient (Fairchild and 
MacKinnon, 2009; Fairchild and McQuillin, 2010).  
 
Recently, an alternative procedure, the bootstrapping procedure, has been 
suggested to assess the magnitude of the indirect effects (Cheung and Lau, 
2008; Hayes, 2009; Ro, 2012). The bootstrapping approach is a non-parametric 
method based on repeated resampling during the analysis (Hayes, 2009). Once 
a resample is constructed, 𝛽1 and 𝛾2 are estimated from this resampled data 
set and the product of the path coefficient is recorded. This procedure will yield 
a bias-corrected confidence interval. If zero is not included in the confidence 
interval, then the indirect effect is different from zero (MacKinnon et al., 2007; 
Hayes, 2009). 
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